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Epigraph 
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Resumen de la Tesis Doctoral 
Introducción General 
La racionalidad que suele legitimar y justificar la imposición de sanciones es la esperanza 
para resolver un conflicto sin sufrimiento masivo u otras consecuencias negativas asociadas a la 
guerra. El presente estudio situa esta hipótesis en contexto y evalúa si el uso de sanciones es un modo 
plausible de alcanzar paz y seguridad internacionales o es en realidad un problema a la hora de 
resolver los motivos que llevan a las sanciones. Esta tesis propone analizar el impacto de las sanciones 
sobre los regímenes de Irán y Zimbabue en los derechos y bienestar de la población civil. La elección 
de esta área específica de estudio corresponde tanto a mi interés personal como académico. Mi 
relación personal con iraníes y zimbabuenses, quienes son mis amigos, compañeros de escuela y a los 
que considero mis hermanos y hermanas ha influenciado mi interés en estudiar cómo las sanciones de 
EEUU y UE  supuestamente sobre a dirigentes individuales en Zimbabue y las sanciones de NU que 
apuntan al programa nuclear de Irán han afectado a la población entera.  
Visión general del caso de Zimbabue 
Su historia colonial y postcolonial, su economía divergente, sus perspectivas políticas y otros 
factores casuales han influenciado la perspectiva del gobierno de Zimbabue y los gobiernos 
occidentales de afirmar un entendimiento plausible de los hecho(s) reales que llevan a la imposición 
de sanciones en Zimbabue por Occidente. Siguiendo una serie de condenas y críticas de varios temas 
cruciales, EEUU y la UE han mantenido sanciones en contra de Zimbabue por más de una 
década.  Zimbabue tiene una larga historia de sanciones, ambas amplias y unilaterales. El país es un 
caso significativo como ejemplo de sanciones. Las Naciones Unidas impusieron sus primeras 
sanciones en Rodesia, hoy Zimbabue, en 1966. Desde ese periodo hasta la actualidad, Zimbabue ha 
estado bajo sanciones de Naciones Unidas, EEUU, la Unión Europea o ambas.  Zimbabue ha sido 
sancionado en 6 episodios de sanciones: 1966, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2008 y 2009, lo que lo convierten en 
uno los países más sancionados en el mundo. En un simple análisis, Zimbabue se ha convertido en un 
candidato regular de la “industria de las sanciones”. Por lo tanto, este estudio estima relevante analizar 
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el impacto de las sanciones en este país con respecto a los derechos humanos y bienestar de la 
población civil. El presente episodio de sanciones comenzó en diciembre del 2001, cuando los 
Estados Unidos aprobó la Ley de Recuperación Económica de la Democracia Zimbabuense  
(DEZIAR). Esta se oponía a la extensión de préstamos o cancelaciones de deudas de Instituciones de 
Financiación Bilateral (FMI, Banco Mundial y BDA) a Zimbabue. Luego de esto, el Reino Unido y 
los Estados Unidos unieron fuerzas en 2002 y persuadieron a sus aliados para imponer sanciones a 
Zimbabue.  El 18 de febrero de 2002, siguiendo la expulsión del jefe de la misión de monitoreo de 
elecciones de la UE, Pierre Schori, quien fue acusado por el gobierno de Zimbabue de interferir en su 
elección, la UE introdujo sanciones referidas como “medidas restrictivas” en contra del presidente 
Robert Mugabe y otros oficiales mayores. Estas medidas punitivas también prohibieron viajar a estos 
funcionarios principales del Estado dentro y alrededor de Europa y congelaron  sus bienes y cuentas 
bancarias personales. Adicionalmente, en septiembre de 2002, el gobierno de Howard en Australia 
impuso sanciones dirigidas a miembros del gobierno de Zimbabue en protesta por el deterioro de la 
situación política en Zimbabue. Esto incluía restricciones de viajes, embargos de armas y sanciones 
financieras dirigidas.  
En principio, el presente régimen de sanciones contra Zimbabue dice estar restringido a 
ciertos ámbitos.  De acuerdo a los EEUU y la UE las sanciones fueron impuestas para establecer 
democracia, promover lo derechos humanos y el estado de derecho en Zimbabue. Entonces, las 
sanciones tendrían como fin desarrollar un cambio en el comportamiento del régimen. 
Contrariamente, el gobierno de Zimbabue ha argumentado continuamente que las sanciones son  
económicas. El gobierno de Zimbabue apoya esta denuncia al resaltar el hecho que desde la 
promulgación de DEZIAR, el Banco Monetario Internacional (BMI), el Banco Mundial y el Banco de 
Desarrollo Africano (BDA) han denegado al estado la extensión de préstamos, créditos o garantías, 
facilidades de mercado externo y ayuda financiera, por tanto se indicaría que las sanciones fueron una 
estrategia premeditada utilizada para colapsar la economía.  Como respuesta a estas denuncias por el 
régimen de Zimbabue en el 2008 la UE dio un decreto en el cual se argumentó que las sanciones no 
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fueron dirigidas contra el gobierno de Zimbabue como país, sino a individuos específicos y por lo 
tanto no podría verse como perjudicial a la economía zimbabuense.  
Visión general del caso de Irán  
La República Islámica de Irán es un actor clave en el Medio Oriente dado su vasto territorio y 
tamaño geográfico, influencia en las políticas de Medio Oriente y sus enormes reservas de petróleo, 
entre otros. Como el único estado teocrático de la región y se rige por la Sharia, las intenciones de 
Irán son difíciles de evaluar debido a la falta de transparencia y comportamiento contrario a las 
normas internacionales en relación a su programa nuclear, apoyo a organizaciones designadas como 
terroristas por Estados Unidos y otros países de Occidente y su dedicación a expandir la revolución 
Islámica. Históricamente, la desconfianza árabe de los persas y la desconfianza suni de la sharía 
aumenta la discordia regional. Temiéndole a los problemas internos que la Sharía puede causar a su 
propia población, las naciones del Golfo Árabe como Arabia Saudita y Bahréin mantienen vigilancia 
constante a Irán y a sus políticas externas/domésticas, aborreciendo la posibilidad del crecimiento 
militar iraní. Para los Estados Unidos y otros países occidentales, Irán es de particular interés tanto 
regional como internacional por el soporte iraní a organizaciones regionales terroristas, falta de 
transparencia sobre su programa nuclear y el que Irán esté involucrado en Estados vecinos, 
especialmente Irak y Afganistán, donde los conflictos continúan.  De hecho, el interés de EEUU en 
Irán es multifacético, éste mantiene sanciones en contra de Irán desde la revolución islámica de 1979 
y ha asumido el rol de jefe de seguridad en monitorear las relaciones de Irán, lo que ha incrementado 
las tensiones y la desconfianza entre EEUU e Irán y, por extensión, a otros países de Occidente.  
Las razones para imponer sanciones a Irán pueden resumirse en las siguientes: hacer que Irán 
abandone o renuncie a su programa nuclear y se olvide de toda la riqueza del uranio; para fortalecer la 
democracia y derechos humanos y el estado de derecho (Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, 2012). En una situación 
como esta, una pregunta importante sería: ¿Cuáles son las posibilidades de éxito de usar sanciones 
económicas para prevenir o transformar conflictos? En mi opinión, mientras las sanciones tienen la 
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habilidad de inducir el reajuste de Teherán en un análisis de costos/beneficios sobre su programa 
nuclear, las sanciones por sí solas no podrían proveer una solución al impasse nuclear.  
El régimen en Teherán ha bajo presiones considerables, de igual forma el pueblo fue el que 
sufrió la peor parte de la presión que llevó a una economía inestable como resultado de las sanciones. 
De todas formas, el dilema central es que correcta u incorrectamente, el líder supremo y gran parte de 
la elite del gobierno dio su legitimidad en el program nuclear.  En relación con esta visión, la tesis 
busca presentar el caso de que las sanciones y el desafío no son sustitutos para la seriedad 
diplomática, lo que eventualmente significa que ambos partidos deben mostrarse preparados para 
cambiar sus posiciones abiertas y pedir su lealtad y compromiso al Plan de Acción Comprensivo 
Conjunto (PACC), también conocido como el acuerdo nuclear Irán -P5+1. 
Mi argumento principal es que al contrario de la creencia común de que las sanciones pueden 
lograr las metas deseadas de resistencia al gobierno de un Estado particular para promover 
democracia y derechos humanos o que lo fuerza al abandono de políticas tales como el programa 
nuclear, muchas veces se olvida el principal foco. Por el contrario, perjudican a los pobres, a grupos 
de la sociedad civil sin fuerza e irónicamente amenazan el proceso democrático. De acuerdo al Dr. 
Alex, T. Magaisa (The independent, 2015), un abogado de derechos humanos de Zimbabue: 
The problem is that, it is the weak members of the society that are hard hit by the 
effects of the sanctions. Democracy cannot flourish in poverty. It needs stable 
economic foundations (The Independent, 2015). 
La privación económica inducida por sanciones económicas tanto en Zimbabue como Irán es trágica 
puesto que sus economías se destrozaron. En consecuencia, la situación amenazó la seguridad humana 
mientras que se negaba a la población civil sus principales derechos humanos en contra a como se 
prescribió en la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos y otros tratados de derechos humanos 
internacionales. En mi opinión, sería injusto declarar a los derechos humanos universales, inalienables 
e indivisibles, mientras que al mismo tiempo la comunidad internacional (la ONU) y países como 
EEUU emplean medidas que obviamente impiden o/y restringen la capacidad de la persona individual 
de disfrutar de sus derechos. El sistema mundial está interrelacionado y los Estados se encuentran 
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imbuidos en el sistema. Por lo tanto, es inapropiado argumentar que las sanciones no tienen efectos en 
la población del Estado sancionado o que las excepciones humanitarias son capaces de mitigar las 
consecuencias arrepentidas humanitarias de sanciones económicas en la sociedad civil.   
Problema a Investigar  
 Las sanciones económicas antes los 90s han sido aplaudidas tanto por partidarios de la guerra 
como por pacifistas como alternativas a la guerra. El aclamado éxito de las sanciones contra Rodesia y 
Sudáfrica lo hicieron aceptable para muchas personas, quienes percibieron las sanciones como una 
alternativa adecuada al uso de la fuerza militar. Sin contar el pobre récord posterior de Sudáfrica, 
políticos y hacedores de política aún discuten que las sanciones son efectivas y llenan un vacío en las 
relaciones internacionales. De acuerdo a Richard Holbrooke, embajador de EEUU bajo el mandato de 
Bill Clinton, “the concept of sanctions is not just still valid, it’s necessary. What else fills the gap 
between pounding your breast and indulging in empty rhetoric and going to war besides economic 
sanctions?” (The New York Times, 2003). El debate sobre las sanciones económicas se ha convertido 
en un dilema humanitario. Sin contar el hecho que muchos analistas, escolares y observadores 
políticos han denunciado  su apoyo a las sanciones económicas, su aplicación ha sido en el incremento 
desde 1990. La falta de suficiente entendimiento en el grave sufrimiento humano que viene de 
sanciones económicas y los cambios políticos que vienen al juego de determinar a quién sancionar así 
como los tipos de sanciones adecuadas hacen este estudio muy oportuno e importante, puesto que 
intenta llenar este vacío informativo. Esta tesis cree que el público general no está provisto de 
suficiente información para entender el impacto de las sanciones en las víctimas. Por lo tanto, las 
sanciones económicas no están valoradas por el público respecto a su desastroso y predecible 
resultado humanitario.  
Objetivos del estudio  
 El principal objetivo de este estudio es examinar cómo las sanciones económicas afectan los 
derechos y el bienestar de la población civil del Estado sancionado. Adicionalmente, revisa la 
bibliografía disponible en sanciones y su impacto humanitario, mientras se enfoca en el caso 
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específico de Zimbabue e Irán. Del objetivo principal se talla la realización de otros objetivos claves 
de este estudio, que son los siguientes:  
 Examinar la plausibilidad de usar sanciones para mantener la paz y la seguridad 
internacionales.  
 Dar voz a los civiles que han experimentado sanciones económicas.  
 Realizar una aportación a la literatura sobre sanciones económicas, desde la perspectiva de  
sus víctimas civiles.  
Pregunta de Investigación 
Habiendo explicado el objetivo del estudio, este trata las siguientes preguntas:  
 ¿Son las sanciones capaces de resolver conflictos internacionales y restaurar la paz y la 
seguridad?  
 ¿Cuáles son los impactos del régimen de sanciones en la población civil?  
 En una situación donde las sanciones económicas son empleadas para resolver un conflicto, 
¿son estas capaces de evitar sufrimiento masivo y otras consecuencias negativas asociadas a 
la guerra?  
 ¿Son las sanciones económicas compatibles con la Declaración Universal de Derechos 
Humanos?  
Metodología 
El estudio utiliza dos casos de estudio que se enfocan en la posibilidad de usar sanciones para 
promocionar la paz y seguridad internacionales y cómo estas sanciones afectan los derechos y el 
bienestar de la población civil en Irán y Zimbabue. Ya que esta es una investigación empírica que 
investiga el fenómeno contemporáneo dentro del contexto de la vida real, es importante ser holístico 
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en la aproximación así como también estar capacitado para resolver los objetivos de investigación 
satisfactoriamente. El estudio utiliza metodologías de investigación cualitativas tanto como 
cuantitativas. La metodología  clave empleada, la cualitativa, me brinda la oportunidad de llevar a 
cabo un estudio profundo, a través del trabajo de campo, para aprender sobre las experiencias de la 
población iraní y zimbabuense y cómo las sanciones afectan su bienestar. Se realizaron además 
entrevistas para recabar información de los participantes. El estudio emplea una entrevista abierta, 
donde propongo una serie de preguntas que luego permiten al entrevistado explicar y discutir las 
respuestas. Adicionalmente, los cuestionarios fueron dados a los entrevistados de antemano. El 
cuestionario contiene el perfil demográfico de los entrevistados que participaron en el estudio. 
Asimismo, el estudio utiliza fuentes secundarias como revistas académicas, libros y artículos nuevos 
que tratan sobre sanciones y el impacto en los derechos y bienestar de la población civil de los 
Estados a los que fueron dirigidas.  
Estructura  
 La tesis está dividida entre 4 capítulos principales y una conclusión final. Cada capítulo 
comienza con su propia introducción y termina con una conclusión del tema a que se dedica. El 
capítulo 1 “Una Introducción a las Sanciones” provee una visión de conjunto de las sanciones, 
remontándose a sus orígenes e historia. También analiza diferentes tipos de sanciones y las razones 
dadas por partidos sancionadores para imponer sanciones económicas contra un Estado o territorio. 
También explora otras razones por las cuáles el uso de sanciones ha aumentado desde 1990. 
Adicionalmente, el capítulo examina debates sobre sanciones económicas antes de los 90´s así como 
también el debate actual, que se ha establecido desde 1990 hasta hoy. El capítulo evalúa la elección y 
uso del lenguaje en episodios de sanciones económicas. Da luz sobre porqué fraseologías como 
Estado dirigido, nación ofendida, excepción humanitaria y efecto colateral son usados durante las 
sanciones.    
El capítulo dos “La Posición de la Ley Internacional de Derechos Humanos y el Rol de las 
Teorías” provee una perspectiva legal de las sanciones. Revisa la compatibilidad y/o permisibilidad de 
 8 
 
sanciones bajo las leyes humanitarias internacionales y las convenciones como la Declaración 
Universal de Derechos Humanos (DUDH). Asimismo, el capítulo examina el rol de los Estados y la 
comunidad internacional de proteger y salvaguardar los derechos humanos. Adicionalmente, revisa las 
teorías principales de relaciones internacionales para dar un entendimiento más claro de los patrones 
de interacción y relación entre Estados. Para entender las relaciones de Estado y porqué los Estados 
actúan y reaccionan de la forma en que lo hacen, este estudio considera necesario analizar teorías 
particulares del Estado y las relaciones internacionales. De todas formas, es difícil y casi imposible 
visionar una teoría de sanciones simple y general.  En contra de este fondo, el capítulo examina 
diferentes teorías de relaciones internacionales, particularmente las que estudian a la motivación para 
el continuo uso de sanciones económicas en contra de su pobre récord y otros que racionalizan y 
justifican el continuo uso de sanciones como una herramienta necesaria de la diplomática 
internacional. Revisa extensivamente teorías como el Realismo, Liberalismo, Institucionalismo, 
Teoría de la Estabilidad Hegemónica, Teoría del Poder del Balance, Teoría Cosmopolita, Teoría del 
Imperialismo, Teoría de la Dependencia y Teoría de la Paz Democrática.   
El capítulo tres “Sanciones de Rodesia a Zimbabue” provee una visión general de la historia 
de Zimbabue desde la pre y post independencia. Más importante aún, el capítulo toma en cuenta la 
ambigüedad en el entendimiento de la naturaleza de las sanciones en contra de Zimbabue desde la 
década pasada. Por ejemplo, la UE ha argumentado continuamente que las sanciones contra Zimbabue 
no son económicas sino “medidas restrictivas”. Asimismo, los Estados Unidos argumentan que las 
sanciones a Zimbabue son sanciones dirigidas/inteligentes, apuntando al Presidente Robert Mugabe y 
ciertos miembros de su régimen. Sin embargo, el gobierno de Zimbabue insiste en que las sanciones 
contra el país son económicas e ilegales. Debido a estas ambigüedades, este capítulo da luz sobre las 
estrategias y la implementación de las sanciones de EEUU y UE contra Zimbabue en un esfuerzo por 
establecer si son económicas, dirigidas/inteligentes o medidas restrictivas. El capítulo también explora 
los impactos de las sanciones en la economía de Zimbabue y la población civil. El análisis en el 
impacto de sanciones cubre dos áreas principales: el impacto de las sanciones en los derechos 
humanos y el bienestar de los zimbabuenses y su impacto en el ambiente económico y social. Sobre 
 9 
 
los derechos humanos y bienestar, el estudio toma en cuenta los efectos de las sanciones en el ámbito 
de los derechos humanos, como el derecho a la salud, a la educación y a una calidad de vida estándar. 
Así, examina el impacto de las sanciones en factores económicos claves como inflación, acceso a las 
finanzas foráneas y cambios. Finalmente, revisa la “Política de Mirada al Este” de Zimbabue.   
El capítulo cuatro “Los Retos de Décadas de Sanciones Económicas contra Irán y una 
revisión de Casos Selectos de Disuasión Nuclear a través de Sanciones”, provee una revisión histórica 
sobre Irán, rastreando la historia política y religiosa del país.  También, resalta episodios de sanciones 
contra Irán, comenzando con la crisis de los rehenes en 1979 hasta las presentes sanciones contra el 
programa nuclear. Provee una cronología y perfil de sanciones tanto de Occidente como de la ONU 
contra Irán. Además, el capítulo examina el acuerdo del Tratado de la No-Proliferación Nuclear, 
revisando las implicaciones de cierta “cláusula” contenida en el ensayo del acuerdo. Adicionalmente, 
revisa los casos donde las sanciones han sido previamente empleadas como disuasión a la 
proliferación nuclear. La razón para analizar estos casos previos es dar pista  a sanciones capaces de 
alcanzar disuasión nuclear en el pasado y también explorar y/o anticipar la posibilidad de alcanzar la 
misma (disuasión) en el presente caso de Irán y en el futuro. El capítulo provee una visión general del 
impacto de sanciones en la economía y derechos humanos de la población iraní. En la economía, 
revisa cómo las sanciones afectan al PBI - ingresosa Teherán, particularmente por petróleo y otros 
productos relacionados. En el impacto sobre la población civil, el capítulo examina cómo las 
sanciones afectan los principales derechos humanos de los iraníes, como el derecho a la salud, 
educación, empleo, buenas condiciones laborales y a la calidad de vida. También revisa cómo 
variables económicas como la inflación, influenciada por las sanciones, afecta la calidad de vida de la 
población, en especial la de los grupos vulnerables. Finalmente, el capítulo provee información de la 
negociación reciente entre Irán y el P5+1 (China, Francia, Rusia, Reino Unido, y los Estados Unidos, 
+ Alemania). 
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Marco de Análisis 
Para poder engranar el discurso sobre las sanciones, me referiré al trabajo de John Paul 
Lederach (2005), The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace. De acuerdo con 
Lederach, para que los seres humanos alcancemos la paz dentro de nosotros y en las sociedades en las 
que vivimos, debemos cambiar la forma en que respondemos y reaccionamos a los retos y conflictos. 
Entonces, la sociedad puede convertirse en una mejor y más pacífica si podemos emplear una 
imaginación moral de paz en resolver conflictos en vez de usar medidas violentas: 
If we are to survive as a global community, we must understand the imperative nature 
of giving birth and space to the moral imagination in human affairs. We must face the 
fact that much of our current system for responding to deadly local and international 
conflict is incapable of overcoming cycles of violent patterns precisely because our 
imagination has been corralled and shackled by the very parameters and sources that 
create and perpetuate violence (Lederach, 2005: 46). 
De acuerdo con Lederach, estamos estancados en el presente sistema (Sistemas globales), el 
cual es caracterizado por el uso de violencia para resolver un conflicto. Él apunta a la imaginación 
humana y habilidad para crear morales como la respuesta a romper este ciclo. De acuerdo a él, “la 
moralidad es la motivación, innovación y el mecanismo” y debemos emplearlo para permitirnos salir 
del círculo de violencia en el sistema del mundo. El enfatiza la necesidad de moverse desde “violencia 
destructiva hacia un compromiso social constructivo.” Para Lederach, la paz puede ser alcanzada a 
través de nuestra imaginación moral, por lo tanto afirmando lo siguiente:  
The moral imagination requires the capacity to imagine ourselves in a web of 
relationships that includes our enemies; the ability to sustain a paradoxical curiosity 
that embraces complexity without reliance on dualistic polarity; the fundamental 
belief in and pursuit of the creative act; and the acceptance of the inherent risk of 
stepping into the mystery of the unknown that lies beyond the far too familiar 
landscape of violence (Lederach, 2005: 5). 
la “imaginación moral” es la capacidad de reconocer puntos de cambio y posibilidades para 
poder emprender caminos desconocidos y crear lo que aún no existe.  Significa imaginar y generar 
procesos constructivos que están atrincherados en desafío de la violencia del día a día y que ahora 
supera los patrones negativos. La imaginación moral explora la naturaleza de estos puntos cambiantes 
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y la complejidad, diferentes formas de conocer (intuición particular), entender la esencia, la 
importancia de la humildad, cómo las situaciones más serias y peligrosas pueden ser transformadas, la 
dinámica de la naturaleza de las conexiones, la importancia de la creatividad espontánea, y la quietud 
(Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 7).  
En la visión de Lederach (2005), una comunidad más pacífica (mundial) es alcanzable al 
conectar  pasado, presente y futuro. Él concluye que la paz necesita ser imaginada, mientras aún 
permanece enraizada en las realidades del conflicto. Entonces, “La Imaginación Moral” desafía el 
modelo del estatus quo de resolución de conflictos promulgado hoy, el cual emplea medidas 
coercitivas (sanciones económicas en nuestro caso), pues en vez de defender la inclusividad moral, 
defiende el direccionamiento de conflictos y desacuerdos. Lo que el sistema mundial necesita es 
buscar la  creación de un importante red de relaciones que yace escondida detrás del conflicto. Estas 
redes contienen espacios que pueden ser la base para la reconciliación. Esto puede ser alcanzado al 
explorar los 4 elementos principales de la imaginación moral: “relaciones”, alcanzando a aquellos a 
los que temes; “curiosidad paradójica”, tocando el corazón de la complejidad; “creatividad”, 
imaginando más allá de lo visible; y el “riesgo”, arriesgando la propia vulnerabilidad.  
Lederach and Maiese (2009: 7-8) indica que la transformación de conflictos desafía al 
grupo específico de técnicas; por el contrario es una forma de ver y observar que requiere lentes 
(multi-lentes) a través de los cuales hace sentido el conflicto social. En este caso, cada lente concentra 
un aspecto en particular del conflicto y ayuda a enfocar con más claridad el significado general del 
conflicto. Esto implica que emplear unos simples lentes cuando se trata un conflicto produciría una 
visión opaca del conflicto entero. Son necesarias muchas lentes para visionar múltiples aspectos de las 
realidades complejas de los conflictos multidimensionalidades. Entendiendo el multidimensionalismo 
de un conflicto complejo a través de diferentes lentes podemos desarrollar un marco único que nos 
ayudará a ver el conflicto como un todo. La lente inicial revela la situación inmediata y/o el problema 
mientras el lente subsecuente mira más allá de los problemas inmediatos y captura los patrones de la 
relación escondida o subyacente que crean el contexto del conflicto. Precisamente, la transformación 
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de conflictos no significa una solución de base rápida al problema, pero principalmente conlleva un 
entendimiento de las relaciones humanas a un nivel más  profundo. Las terceras lentes ayudan a 
visualizar un marco que va a incorporar firmemente los ya mencionados puntos de vista y 
comprenden el contenido, el contexto y la estructura de la relación  (Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 7-
9). Es desde esta plataforma que los partidos en un conflicto pueden comenzar a encontrar respuestas 
creativas y soluciones. Juzgando desde nuestro caso de estudio, es obvio que los mecanismos de 
transformación de conflictos que están siendo usados en nuestro mundo contemporáneo (sanciones 
económicas) necesitan ser sustituidos con lo que Lederach se refiere a “Procesos de Cambio 
Constructivo”. De acuerdo a Lederach (2005), “La transformación de conflictos empieza con una 
meta central, la cual es construir cambios constructivos fuera de la energía creada por el conflicto. Al 
enfocar esta energía en las relaciones subyacentes y estructuras sociales, los cambios constructivos 
pueden salir a flote. La clave aquí es llevar los conflictos desde los procesos destructivos hacia los 
constructivos. La tarea principal de la transformación de conflictos no es encontrar soluciones rápidas 
para problemas inmediatos, sino generar mecanismos creativos que puedan direccionar 
simultáneamente temas de la superficie y cambiar las estructuras subyacentes sociales y patrones de 
relaciones” (Mischnick, 2007: 60). En la línea del punto de vista de Lederach, Mischnick añade, 
“rather than viewing conflict as a threat, the transformative view sees conflict as a valuable 
opportunity to grow and increase our understanding of ourselves and others. Conflict can be 
understood as a motor of change that keeps relationships and social structures dynamically responsive 
to human needs” (Mischnick, 2007: 60).  
Tomando en consideración la acertada evaluación de Lederach sobre el sistema internacional 
con respecto a los mecanismos de transformación de conflictos, busco ampliar y profundizar su 
análisis al examinar de cerca el poder y los discursos dominantes y las narraciones de sanciones. Para 
concretar, este estudio busca explorar cómo las sanciones afectan y/o violan los derechos y bienestar 
de los civiles en Irán y Zimbabue. Dentro de esta conceptualización analítica, es esencial examinar la 
posición del derecho internacional y el derecho internacional humanitario en el uso de sanciones 
económicas coercitivas con respecto al previsible impacto en los derechos civiles y el bienestar. 
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Tomando en consideración que las sanciones se han convertido en una norma en las relaciones 
internacionales, uno podría preguntarse qué tipo(s) de visión o/y solución podría ofrecer un análisis 
profundo del impacto de las medidas ofrecidas en términos de la teoría, estrategia y práctica de 
transformación de conflicto. Para direccionar esta pregunta, tomo una famosa cita del Papa Juan 
XXIII, que dice: “disagreements must be settled, not by force, not by deceit or trickery, but rather in 
the only manner which is worthy of the dignity of man” (Merryfield and Remy 1995: 186). Por tanto, 
las sanciones son particularmente adecuadas para estudiar los estándares del sistema internacional 
para la resolución de conflictos y las normas que se dirigen hacia las estrategias de transformación de 
los mismos.  
La comunidad internacional (CSNU) y los países occidentales han sostenido políticas de 
sanciones con despreocupación a pesar haber confrontado casos muy polémicos. Si estamos de 
acuerdo en el hecho que las sanciones económicas sí manifiestan consecuencias humanitarias atroces 
en la población civil y que violan derechos humanos e impactan negativamente en el bienestar de las 
personas, entonces uno se pregunta por qué aún se mantienen como una herramienta de diplomacia 
internacional dentro de la ONU y son hasta comúnmente usadas por Estados Unidos y la Unión 
Europea. Adicionalmente, preocupa que el derecho internacional humanitario veta el uso de de 
medidas coercitivas que puedan dañar civiles, pero aún así se mantienen. ¿Qué quiero decir con esto? 
La DUDH, por ejemplo, prevé que cuando el derecho de una persona es violado o abusado a través de 
sanciones, estas no pueden ser sujeto de remedio y/o compensación. La implicación de tal 
ambigüedad es que, mientras sancionamos violaciones de derechos, se proveen significados políticos 
y justificaciones por el continuo uso de medidas coercitivas en la población civil, mientras falta la 
disposición legal para contener estos principios y darle fuerza a reglas perentorias establecidas por 
consenso internacional. 
Dentro de esta evaluación crítica, compromiso de sanciones vis-a-vis y su impacto hay mucho 
por mejorar, hasta en las herramientas analíticas con las que abordo el tema. Empleo el derecho 
internacional con respeto a los derechos humanos fundamentales que son universales, inalienables e 
indivisibles, mientras se reconocen sus ambigüedades inherentes. Busco dentro de la “autoridad 
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constitucional” de las Naciones Unidas, mientras soy crítico con las contradicciones entre los 
principios de Naciones Unidas y violaciones a derechos humanos perpetrados por  sanciones de 
CSNU. Suscribo la soberanía del Estado, pero soy consciente de la necesidad de la intervención 
humanitaria cuando los crímenes chocan con la conciencia.  Estas son solo algunas de las paradojas 
que uno puede encontrar a través de este estudio. Son indicadores de las tensiones creadas por la 
coalición de lucha para la justicia social, política y económica; llevando al  status quo (sanciones) 
establecidas y aceptadas como norma en las relaciones internacionales y como pancea para la 
seguridad internacional y construcción de paz. 
Conclusiones y Reflexiones 
    En la introducción de este estudio, propuse explorar cómo el régimen de sanciones afecta los 
derechos humanos y el bienestar de toda la población civil de un Estado. Haciendo eso, avancé las 
siguientes preguntas de investigación: ¿Son las sanciones capaces de resolver conflictos 
internacionales y restaurar la paz y la seguridad? ¿Cuáles son los impactos de las sanciones en la 
población civil? En una situación donde las sanciones económicas son empleadas para resolver un 
conflicto, ¿son capaces de evitar sufrimiento masivo y otras consecuencias negativas asociadas a la 
guerra? ¿El uso de las sanciones económicas viola la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos? 
El estudio revela que las sanciones económicas están muy lejos de ser una forma suave de 
diplomacia. En realidad sirven como una nueva forma de salario de guerra. Las sanciones contra Irán 
y Zimbabue son en realidad problemáticas. Han violado los derechos básicos de las personas en 
contra de las recomendaciones y provisiones del derecho internacional humanitario y otros tratados de 
derechos humanos.  Obviamente, las sanciones son efectivas para proteger los intereses de los 
sancionadores, pero perjudican gravemente los intereses humanitarios. En 1993, la Conferencia 
Mundial de Derechos Humanos llevada a cabo en Viena estableció que los derechos humanos civiles, 
políticos, sociales, económicos y culturales son universales, indivisibles e inalienables. Bajo ese 
pronunciamiento, todos los seres humanos sin distinción de raza, religión y sexo son acreedores de 
derechos que deben ser protegidos todo el tiempo. Entonces, cuando me refiero al impacto de las 
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sanciones económicas en los derechos y bienestar de iraníes y zimbabuenses, las siguientes preguntas 
vienen a mi mente: ¿Es esencial modificar nuestra moral, estándares éticos y nuestros valores de 
derechos humanos para avanzar hacia la democracia y mantener la seguridad internacional? Más 
específicamente, ¿es aceptable dejar de lado los derechos humanos de la mayoría (población civil) 
para beneficiar a una minoría? ¿Considera la ONU que su posición como líder moral en el mundo es 
mutable bajo su propia ética como defensor de los derechos humanos? ¿Cómo se sienten la ONU y 
otras organizaciones, EEUU y otros Estados en torno a la violación del derecho internacional y la 
Convención de Ginebra al imponer sanciones económicas? 
El mecanismo de las sanciones económicas impone una culpa colectiva y un castigo a la 
población entera de un Estado. Esa culpa es orquestada en contra de toda la población de una forma   
que desemboca en la violación de sus derechos básicos y fundamentales, como el derecho a la salud, a 
la educación, al trabajo y buenas condiciones laborales y a la calidad del estándar de vida. La 
Convención Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (CIDESC) de 1966 
incorpora el seguro de salud como parte de los derechos humanos.  A parte del CIDESC, la 
Convención de los Derechos de los Niños (CDN) reconoce el derecho a la salud para todos los niños y 
provee guías para su realización. De forma similar, CETFDCM estableció la obligación de adoptar 
medidas que garanticen el acceso de la mujer a la salud y al cuidado médico, sin distinción de raza, 
religión, condición económica o social y creencia política. De acuerdo a la OACDH, toda persona 
individual debe tener derecho a un sistema de protección de salud que provea equidad de 
oportunidades para las personas para poder gozar de la “mayor calidad de salud posible”. Por lo tanto, 
el derecho a la salud implica que todo ser humano tiene el derecho de atender al mayor estándar 
posible de salud mental y física, el cual incluye la prevención, tratamiento y control de enfermedades, 
acceso a servicios médicos, sanidad, comida adecuada, casa decente, condiciones de vida saludables y 
un ambiente limpio.  En todo caso, el derecho individual a la salud connota que hospitales y clínicas, 
medicinas, medicaciones y servicios médicos deben ser disponibles, accesibles y de buena calidad 
para todos, en una base equitativa dónde y cuándo se requieran. De todas formas, las sanciones 
impuestas contra Irán y Zimbabue han afectado severamente el sector de la salud en estos países. 
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Como consecuencia, la calidad de los servicios dados al público y especialmente a pacientes se ha 
depreciado grandemente. Por ejemplo, las sanciones han causado un perjuicio en la medicina 
disponible para el tratamiento del VIH, hipertonía y genéricos similares, así como perjuicios en los 
trabajadores del sector, resultando en sufrimiento, dolores y finalmente en muerte de pacientes. Por 
tanto, las sanciones impuestas contra ambos países han violado los derechos de la población a la 
calidad y a la disponibilidad de servicios médicos. 
De forma similar, la educación es reconocida entre lo más importante de los derechos 
humanos. En la Sección (1) de la DUDH, bajo el artículo 26 se dice: “todos tenemos el derecho a la 
educación. La educación debe ser gratuita, al menos en los niveles elementales y fundamentales. La 
educación elemental debe ser obligatoria. La educación técnica y profesional debe estar al alcance 
general y la educación superior debe ser igualmente accesible a todos en base a méritos”. Fuera de 
ello, la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Educación, Ciencia y Cultura (UNESCO) 
proclamó la educación como derecho humano fundamental que es “esencial para el ejercicio de los 
otros derechos humanos” porque “promueve la libertad individual y empoderamiento y conlleva a 
importantes beneficios de desarrollo”. Así, la educación ocupa un rol central cuando se trata de 
derechos humanos; por lo tanto, la violación del derecho a la educación va afectar significativamente 
el disfrute de otros derechos, como el derecho al trabajo y buenas condiciones laborales. De todas 
formas, este estudio revela que las sanciones contra Irán y Zimbabue han violado este “todo 
importante” sobre derechos humanos, y, por tanto, amenaza la capacidad de la población a disfrutar 
sus otros derechos y también pone la movilidad social en peligro. 
También, el artículo 25 de DUDH reconoce el derecho a un “estándar de vida adecuado para 
la salud y bienestar de la persona humana, incluyendo comida, ropa, casa, cuidado médico y servicios 
sociales necesarios, así como el derecho a la seguridad si hay un eventual desempleo, enfermedad, 
discapacidad, viudez, edad avanzada o falta de estándares de vida en circunstancias fuera de su 
control”. En la cuenta de ese derecho, bajo ninguna circunstancia la persona humana debe ser sujeto 
intencional de una situación que afecte negativamente su estándar de vida. De todas formas, como se 
describió antes, las sanciones económicas son impuestas con el fin de perjudicar las condiciones de 
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vida de la población del Estado a que van dirigidas. Por ello, la medidas afectan intencional, 
indiscriminada y negativamente los estándares de vida de la población civil de Irán y Zimbabue y 
entonces, violan el derecho a la equidad en la calidad de vida.  En Irán y Zimbabue, las sanciones 
propician la inflación, niveles altos de desempleo y el capital, lo que causa pobreza y baja calidad de 
vida de la población. En mi opinión, imponer sanciones económicas contra la población fuera de sus 
ya vistas consecuencias negativas en civiles es una clara infracción en sus derechos humanos 
fundamentales y una aberración del derecho internacional humanitario. Desafortunadamente, las 
sanciones no han resuelto los temas que llevaron a su implementación, como restaurar la “democracia 
real” en Zimbabue, o evitar que Irán enriqueciese uranio. Por el contrario, han sumado problemas y 
retos a la población civil. Por tanto, el talón de Aquiles de las sanciones económicas no es solo 
evidente en su inhabilidad de cumplir con las normas internacionales en sus pasos y acciones, sino que 
perjudica la protección de derechos inalienables de la población de un Estado o región sancionados. 
    En el caso de Zimbabue, la tesis concluye que las sanciones se han movido de dirigirse 
individuos de las elites que gobiernan en Zimbabue a afectar a toda la población. También han fallado 
tanto en alcanzar sus metas para las que se han aplicado por más de una década. A parte de ello, es 
difícil para cualquiera reclamar plausiblemente que van a ser exitosos en alcanzar sus objetivos retos 
en Zimbabue, incluyendo la caída de Robert Mugabe y su gobierno FP-UNAZ. Desafortunadamente, 
las sanciones llamadas dirigidas están afectando con más fuerza a la población civil que 
supuestamente debían proteger que en lo individuos seleccionados que dicen dirigirse. Por ejemplo, el 
Presidente Robert Mugabe ha estado en Singapur para chequeos médicos más de 15 veces entre el 
2010 y 2015, mientras que los zimbabuenses corrientes no pueden acceder a buenos servicios de salud 
en casa por falta de dinero, falta de médicos en el hospital o por ambos casos. Adicionalmente, las 
violaciones a los derechos de los zimbabuenses van más allá del colapso de la salud, sistemas 
educativos y alto nivel de desempleo e inflación cubiertos en esta tesis. Las sanciones tienen un efecto 
nocivo en todos los sectores de la economía zimbabuense y por lo tanto contribuyen a los altos niveles 
de corrupción en el país. También han impulsado las oportunidades del mercado negro inherentes a 
toda economía de sanciones sujeta a corrupción y crimen organizado, mientras al mismo tiempo, 
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agrandan las brechas económicas entre la población. El impacto de la corrupción es muy evidente en 
el bajo servicio dado a la población, mientras las élites mantienen un cómodo estilo de vida.  
    Deseo aclarar que no sugiero que las sanciones dirigidas sean inútiles. Por el contrario, si son 
implementadas efectivamente, son razonables y tienen sentido. Para ello, las consecuencias de esas 
medidas deben enfocarse solo en los individuos o entidades a quienes van dirigidos y pueden emplear 
presión para cambiar sus comportamientos. Como tales, pueden ser un componente válido en una 
estrategia más grande para promover reformas políticas y económicas en un Estado. De todas formas, 
las sanciones contra Zimbabue no son selectivas, como dicen los EEUU y la UE. Por el contrario, son 
un paquete de sanciones económicas. Como se indicó anteriormente, un hecho importante es que 
EEUU y la UE deben considerar si las sanciones han provisto algún medio para derrocar el Presidente 
Robert Mugabe y su cohorte del poder después de una década. Definitivamente, Mugabe debe irse 
considerando todas sus atrocidades; de todas formas, esto se quedará sólo como un deseo mientras los 
EEUU y la UE continúen con su filosofía de apoyar la destrucción de la economía del país así como la 
violación a los derechos humanos de las personas.       
Hablando francamente, es crucial armonizar las relaciones entre Zimbabue y Occidente al 
menos por el beneficio de las generaciones presentes y futuras. Los EEUU, la UE y otros países de 
Occidente deben encontrar una vía  para comprometer al gobierno de Zimbabue a través del diálogo. 
Adicionalmente, el acceso a las finanzas externas deberían ser accesibles y  deberían abrirse líneas de 
crédito para Zimbabue para poder mejorar la situación económica de la población civil. En mi 
opinión, las personas económicamente estables son las más propensas para derrocar un gobierno 
brutal. Por tanto, al revisar la economía de Zimbabue nos proveemos de la oportunidad de una 
revuelta política por el pueblo a través de las urnas de votación. También, el hecho de la recolocación 
de tierras es un tema central para el impasse diplomático entre Occidente y Zimbabue, aunque éste no 
sea citado entre las razones oficiales para las sanciones. El ejercicio de la recolocación de tierras de 
Mugabe debe ser revisado y resuelto por todos los actores en cuestión de una forma transparente, más 
allá de líneas políticas y tomando en consideración las minorías atadas a éste. Los partidos políticos 
deben ser reformados y su calidad democrática debe ser la prioridad del gobierno. 
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    También es pertinente notar que a pesar de que las sanciones juegan un gran rol en el colapso 
de la economía de Zimbabue, otros factores contribuyen al ahogo de la economía del país. Primero, 
está  la introducción del Programa de Ajustes Estructural (PAE) del FMI y el Banco Mundial. 
Segundo, está la intromisión en el conflicto de la república Democrática del Congo y tercero, están las 
políticas viejas de gobierno, junto con la corrupción y una pobre gestión. En conclusión, quisiera decir 
que a pesar de que las sanciones contra Zimbabue no han alcanzado su meta luego de una década, son 
válidas para los EEUU y la UE como medios de propaganda  contra el régimen del Presidente 
Mugabe. Finalmente, el gobierno de Zimbabue tiene una obligación moral y constitucional de respetar 
los derechos humanos y los principios democráticos para el beneficio de los ciudadanos. El gobierno 
debe ser transparente con el electorado sin coerción ni influencias externas.  
En el caso de Irán, casi dos décadas de sanciones económicas no podrían detener el programa 
nuclear del país. Por el contrario, las sanciones han afectado la economía causando altos niveles de 
pobreza y una gran cantidad de inequidad económica entre la población.  La inhabilidad del gobierno 
iraní  para el acceso a finanzas externas, sumado a las dificultades de las empresas iraníes para entrar 
al mercado externo afectan tanto el ingreso per cápita de los iraníes como el nivel general de vida. 
Entonces, las sanciones han resultado causando sufrimiento masivo en la población civil, en contraste 
con la previsión de la DUDH. El resultado de las sanciones afecta y/o viola los derechos inalienables 
de los civiles, como el acceso a la salud, educación, trabajo y calidad de vida puesto que el grues ode 
la población no puede escapar a las sanciones.  
De todas formas, las sanciones contra Irán tienen mucho sentido cuando uno las mira desde 
un punto convencional o desde una perspectiva “periférica”, la cual no da consideración a las actuales 
víctimas de sus resultados. Indiscutiblemente, todo intento de que el mundo esté libre de un peligro 
potencial nuclear debe ser bienvenido al menos bajo el interés de la humanidad. Sin embargo, la 
pregunta es: ¿quién está sufriendo realmente por las sanciones? Obviamente, el entonces presidente de 
Irán, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, el presidente actual Hassan Rouhani, el Líder supremo Ali Khamenei y 
otros altos gobernantes oficiales no sienten las consecuencias de las sanciones como sí lo hacen los 
civiles corrientess, quienes desafortunadamente no pueden opinar ni sobre las sanciones ni sobre las 
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políticas nucleares adoptadas por los líderes. Por tanto, es irracional así como injusto inducir una 
privación fuerte de civiles ordinarios de un crimen que no han cometido. Empáticamente hablando, 
Irán no debería desarrollar armas nucleares ya que se ha adherido al TNP.  Sería una violación del 
TNP si Irán en cualquier momento (sea ahora o en el futuro) produce ADM. También sería una clara 
forma de insubordinación de Teherán. Sin embargo, las sanciones no son un arma de transformación 
de conflicto plausible y en este caso particular de Irán, las sanciones solo han servido para dañar a la 
población civil y a miembros vulnerables de la sociedad iraní. Incluso si las sanciones fueran exitosas 
en frenar las ambiciones nucleares de Irán, el mundo y particularmente los estudiosos y facilitadores 
de paz y trabajadores por los derechos humanos deberían matizar este éxito. Mi razón es que ese éxito 
no debe edificarse sobre el dolor, sufrimiento y muertes de civiles. Las sanciones exacerban los 
problemas económicos de Irán y causan ineficiencias económicas amplias. Desafortunadamente, los 
más perjudicados están entre los más pobres entre la población civil.  
Sin embargo, el trato nuclear alcanzado por Irán y el P5+1 el 14 de julio de 2015, aunque con 
reservas, ofrece un poco de esperanza y posibilidad de compromiso para una paz sostenible y 
duradera. Dentro de otros hechos contenidos en el trato nuclearm, destaca que los partidos van a 
encontrarse cada dos años para revisar y asesorar el progreso del acuerdo y para adoptar decisiones 
apropiadas. Aparte de suscrir una revisión periódica y/o asesoramiento del acuerdo, sugeriría que la 
revisión pueda incluir un análisis factible del impacto humanitario de las sanciones. Mi motivo es que 
un entendimiento claro del atroz impacto de las sanciones en la población iraní por el régimen en 
Teherán y un reconocimiento de los países occidentales y de la ONU sobre el impacto de su acción en 
los ordinarios e inocentes civiles, jugaría un gran rol en determinar la mejor forma de sobrellevar 
estos y futuros conflictos. A pesar de que se ha llegado a un acuerdo, hacen falta hechos válidos y/o 
evidencia empírica sobre las víctimas reales y la magnitud de las consecuencias humanitarias de las 
sanciones. 
    Este estudio ha demostrado suficientemente que las sanciones económicas contra Irán, 
Zimbabue y otros países son una forma de hacer la guerra sobre un Estado soberano, el cual pone la 
economía bajo el punto de mira, con efectos colaterales negativos en la población civil. En general, el 
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uso incesante de sanciones como antídoto de “talla única” para todas las formas de conflicto está 
enraizado en la mentalidad occidental de escribir las reglas de juego, mientras se espera una estricta 
adherencia y/o conformidad del resto del mundo. La situación actual prueba que este enfoque ya no es 
sostenible. En vez de doblegar a los afectados, las sanciones están creando provocaciones y sumando 
tensión en los asuntos mundiales. Los que proponen sanciones económicas arguyen que las medidas 
llenan un vacío en un situación donde no llegala diplomacia. Siguiendo esta hipótesis, las sanciones 
económicas son de algunas formas percibidas y justificadas como conducentes a un final positivo, en 
contra de la evidencia empírica que ofrecen las violaciones de derechos humanos y otras 
consecuencias negativas. Como propuso el gran sociólogo Emile Durkheim, la definición de una 
situación real está en sus consecuencias. Lo que esto significa es simplemente que uno no debe nunca 
permitir que una falsedad se convertirse en realidad y, por extensión, los individuos actuen como si la 
situación estuviera justificada y la aplican en ellos mismos dentro de esta estrecha perspectiva. 
Mi conclusión es que los que proponen sanciones y particularmente los políticos están poco 
dispuestos a reconciliar especulaciones políticas y realidad. Los políticos especulan que el brutal 
impacto de las sanciones en la población civil va a impulsar la revolución contra el régimen, cuando 
la realidad (violaciones de derechos humanos a gran escala) permanece por la ya mencionada falacia 
de la hipótesis política. Esta hipótesis, en mi opinión defectuosa equivocada y errónea, define la 
imposición de sanciones como panacea para la paz mundial la seguridad. La solución a los 
desacuerdos y conflictos es la diplomacia a través del diálogo continuo y la negociación. El mayor 
reto de la diplomacia en nuestro mundo contemporáneo tiene que ver  con el interés establecido de 
negociación de los partidos. Entonces, la diplomacia en nuestro caso debe significar un diálogo 
inclusivo, comprometido y continuo, carente de falsedad. Los negociadores deben entender la 
necesidad de ser justos y transparentes, mientras debe darse un plazo razonable para que la 
negociación sea exitosa.  
    Esta tesis ha probado más allá de dudas razonables que las sanciones contra Zimbabue e Irán 
violan los derechos básicos de la población. Por tanto, puede ser útil para despertar a los ciudadanos 
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globales para que defiendan a las víctimas civiles de sanciones económicas, cuyos derechos básicos 
como la educación, salud, trabajo y buena calidad de vida son violados o puestos en peligro. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The rationale often cited for imposing sanctions is the hope to resolve a conflict 
without mass suffering and other negative consequences associated with war. This study puts 
this assumption into context and evaluates whether the use of sanctions is a plausible way to 
achieve international peace and security or is actually problematic to resolving the issues that 
lead to sanctions. Therefore, this thesis proposes to analyse the impact of regime related 
economic sanctions on the rights and well-being of the civilian population of Iran and 
Zimbabwe. The choice of this specific area of study corresponds to both my personal and 
academic interest. My personal relationship with Iranians and Zimbabweans who are my 
friends, schools mates and those that I consider my brothers and sisters have influenced my 
interest in studying how US and EU sanctions purportedly imposed on select individuals in 
Zimbabwe and UN economic sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear program have affected the 
entire population.  
Overview of the case of Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe’s colonial and postcolonial history, divergent economic and political 
perspectives and other casual factors have influenced the perspectives of the government of 
Zimbabwe and Western governments respectively in establishing a plausible understanding 
of the real issue(s) that led to the imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe by the West. 
Following a barrage of condemnations and critical deprecation on a number of salient issues, 
the US and the EU has maintained sanctions against Zimbabwe for more than a decade. 
Zimbabwe has a long history when it comes to sanctions, both comprehensive and unilateral. 
The country is a significant case in sanctions episodes starting from 1966, when the United 
Nations imposed its first comprehensive sanctions against Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. From 
that period until the present, Zimbabwe at one time or another has been under sanctions either 
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by the United Nations, the United States, the European Union or all the aforementioned. In 
total, Zimbabwe has been sanctioned in six sanctions episodes: 1966, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2008 
and 2009, making it one of the most sanctioned countries in the world. In a simple analysis, 
Zimbabwe has become a regular candidate of the “sanctions industry.” Hence, this study 
deems it relevant to analyse the impact of sanctions on this country with respect to their 
impact on human rights and well-being of the civilian population. The present sanctions 
episode against Zimbabwe started in December 2001, when the United States passed the 
Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA). The Act opposed extension 
of loans or debt cancellations from Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFI’s) such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the African development Bank (AfDB) 
to Zimbabwe. Subsequently, the United Kingdom and the United States joined forces in 2002 
and persuaded their allies to impose similar sanctions against Zimbabwe. Then on February 
18, 2002, following the expulsion of the EU head of election monitoring mission Pierre 
Schori, who was accused by the Zimbabwe government of interfering with its elections, the 
EU introduced sanctions it referred to as “restrictive measures” against President Robert 
Mugabe and some senior government officials. These punitive measures also barred the 
targeted State functionaries from travelling in and around Europe just as their personal assets 
and bank accounts were frozen. In addition, on September 2002, the Howard government in 
Australia imposed another sect of targeted sanctions on members of the Zimbabwe 
government in protests against what it termed deteriorating political situation in Zimbabwe. 
The sanctions included travel restrictions, arms embargos and targeted financial sanctions.  
In principle, the present sanctions against Zimbabwe is said to be a targeted sanctions. 
According to the US and the EU, the sanctions were imposed in order to improve democracy, 
promote human rights and enhance the rule of law in Zimbabwe. Thus, the sanctions aim to 
compel a change in the behaviour of the regime. Contrarily, the government of Zimbabwe 
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argue that the so called targeted sanctions are in fact economic sanctions. Robert Mugabe’s 
regime supports this claim by highlighting the fact that since the enactment of ZIDERA by 
the US Congress, the IMF, the World Bank and the AfDB have denied Zimbabwe loan 
extensions, credits or guarantees, external market facilities and financial aid, thus indicating 
that the sanctions were a premeditated strategy utilized to collapse the economy. As a 
response to the claims by the Zimbabwe regime, in 2008 the EU issued a statement in which 
it argued that the sanctions were not targeted against Zimbabwe as a country, but rather 
specific individuals and therefore could not be seen as detrimental to the Zimbabwean 
economy.  In view of the discrepancies in understanding the actual nature of the sanctions, 
this thesis will explore the strategies used by the US and the EU to implement their targeted 
sanctions against Zimbabwean officials. 
Overview of the case of Iran 
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a key actor in the Middle East due to its vast territorial 
and demographic size, influence in the Middle East politics and its huge petroleum reserves 
among others. As the only Shi’a-ruled and only theocratic State in the region, Iran’s 
intentions are difficult to assess due to lack of transparency and behaviour deemed contrary to 
international norms in regard to its nuclear program, support for organizations designated as 
terrorist in nature by the United States and other Western countries, and its dedication to 
spreading Islamic revolution. Historically, Arab mistrust of Persian and Sunni mistrust of the 
Shi’a add to regional discord as Iran’s Shi’a population majority puts it at odds with the rest 
of the Muslim world, including its nearest neighbours. Fearing internal discord from their 
own Shi’ite populations, Arabian Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain keep constant 
surveillance on Iran and its foreign/domestic politics, abhorring growing Iranian military 
might. For the United States and other Western countries, Iran is of particular interest both 
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regionally and internationally given Iran’s support for regional terrorist organisations, lack of 
transparency about its nuclear program, and Iran’s involvement in neighbouring States 
especially Iraq and Afghanistan during the continuing conflicts. In fact, the US interest in 
Iran is multi-faceted and in light of the multiple levels of interest, the US maintained 
economic sanctions against Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and has assumed the role 
of chief security officer in monitoring Iran’s affairs, which has in turn led to increased 
tensions and mistrust between the US and Iran and by extension other Western countries.  
The reasons for imposing sanctions on Iran can be summed up in the following: To 
cause Iran to abandon or forswear its nuclear programme and forgo all uranium enrichment: 
To strengthen democracy and improve human rights and the rule of law (Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, 
2012). In a situation as this one, an important question to ask is: what are the prospects of 
using economic sanctions to prevent or transform conflicts? In my opinion while sanctions 
have the ability to induce Tehran’s recalibration of its cost-benefit analysis in the pursuit of 
its nuclear programme, sanctions by themselves could not provide a solution to the nuclear 
impasse.  
The regime in Tehran is undeniably under considerable pressure, likewise the general 
populace suffering the brunt of pressure brought about by Iran’s flagging economy resulting 
from sanctions. However, the key dilemma is that rightly or wrongly, the Supreme Leader 
and much of the governing elite staked their legitimacy on the nuclear programme. In view of 
the above, this study sought to make the case that sanctions and defiance are no replacement 
for serious diplomacy, which eventually means that both parties must express their readiness 
to shift from their opening positions and pledge their loyalty and commitment to the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran - P5+1 nuclear agreement.  
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My principal argument is that contrary to the common belief that sanctions can bring 
about the desired goals of compelling a government of a particular State to promote 
democracy and human rights or force it to abandon its policies such as nuclear program; they 
often miss the intended targets. Instead, they target the poor, disempower civil society groups 
and ironically threaten the democratic process. According to Dr. Alex T. Magaisa, a 
Zimbabwean human rights lawyer: 
The problem is that, it is the weak members of the society that are hard hit by 
the effects of the sanctions. Democracy cannot flourish in poverty. It needs 
stable economic foundations (The Independent, 2005). 
The hardship induced by economic sanctions in both Zimbabwe and Iran is tragic as their 
economies are shattered. Consequently, the situation threatens human security whilst they 
substantially contribute to denying the civilian population of their core human rights as 
prescribed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human 
rights treaties. In my opinion, it will be unfair to declare human rights to be universal, 
indivisible and inalienable (Dennis and Stewart, 2004: 462), while at the same time the 
international community (the UN) and States such as the US knowingly employ economic 
measures that obviously impede and/or restrain the capability of the individual person to 
enjoy rights. The world system is interrelated and States are embedded in the system. 
Therefore, it is inappropriate to argue that economic sanctions have no effects on the 
population of a sanctioned State or that humanitarian exemptions are capable of mitigating 
the regretful humanitarian consequences on the civilian population.  
Research Problem  
 Economic sanctions before the 1990’s have been applauded by both war protagonists 
and pacifists as durable alternatives to war. The acclaimed success of economic sanctions 
against Rhodesia and South Africa made it acceptable to many people, who perceived 
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sanctions as a suitable alternative to the use of military force. Despite its poor record after 
South Africa, politicians and policy makers still argue that sanctions are effective and fill a 
gap in international relations. According to Richard Holbrooke, a UN ambassador under 
President Bill Clinton, “the concept of sanctions is not just still valid, it’s necessary. What 
else fills the gap between pounding your breast and indulging in empty rhetoric and going to 
war besides economic sanctions?” (The New York Times, 2003). The debate about economic 
sanctions has become a humanitarian dilemma. Despite the fact that many analysts, scholars 
and political observers have denounced their support for economic sanctions, its application 
has been on the increase since 1990. The lack of sufficient understanding of the grave human 
suffering that arises from economic sanctions and the political twists that comes into play in 
determining who to sanction as well as the types of suitable sanctions makes this study very 
timely and important, as it intends to fill this information gap. This thesis believes that the 
general public is not provided with enough information that will help them understand the 
regretful impact of economic sanctions on victims. Hence, it offers to provide an in-depth 
analysis of the impact of economic sanctions on the human rights and well-being of the 
civilian population in Zimbabwe and Iran.  
Objectives of the study 
 The principal objective of this study is to provide an in-depth analysis of how 
economic sanctions affect the rights and well-being of the civilian population of a sanctioned 
State. Furthermore, it reviews the available literature on sanctions and their humanitarian 
impact, while focussing on Zimbabwe and Iran. Since the study is covering only Zimbabwe 
and Iran, it will base its analysis and conclusions on these specific cases. From the main 
objective stems the realization of other key objectives of this study, which are as follows: 
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 To examine the plausibility of using economic sanctions to maintain international 
peace and security. 
 Give voice to civilians that have experienced economic sanctions.  
 Add to the growing literature on economic sanctions, from the perspective of civilian 
victims of them. 
Research Questions 
In view of the objectives of the study explained above, this study addresses the following 
questions: 
- Are sanctions capable of resolving international conflicts and restore peace and 
security?  
- What are the impacts of regime related sanctions on the civilian population?  
- In a situation where economic sanctions are employed to resolve a conflict, are they 
capable of avoiding mass suffering and other negative consequences associated with 
war? 
- Does the use of economic sanctions conform to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights? 
Methodology 
The study utilises two case studies that focus solely on the possibility of using 
sanctions and particularly economic sanctions in promoting international peace and security 
and how sanctions measures affect the rights and well-being of the civilian population in Iran 
and Zimbabwe. Since it is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, it is important to be holistic in approach so as to be able to address 
the research objectives satisfactorily. The study utilizes both qualitative and quantitative 
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research methods. Qualitative research, the key methodology employed, provides me with the 
opportunity to carry an in-depth study, through fieldwork, to gain insight and vision into the 
experiences of the Iranian and Zimbabwean population and how sanctions affects their well-
being. Interviews were conducted to elicit information from participants. The study employs 
an open ended interview, where I will pose series of questions to the respondents, who then 
explain and discuss their answers. Additionally, questionnaires were given out to 
respondents. The questionnaire provides only the demographic profile of the respondents who 
participated in the study. Furthermore, the study utilizes secondary sources of data such as 
academic journals, books and news articles that deal on sanctions and their impact on the 
rights and well-being of the civilian population of targeted States. 
Structure  
 The thesis is divided into four principal chapters and a final conclusion. Each chapter 
starts with its own introduction and ends with a conclusion of the theme to which it is 
dedicated. Chapter one “An Introduction to Sanctions,” provides a comprehensive overview 
of sanctions, tracing back their origins and history. It also analyses different types of 
sanctions and the reasons given by sanctioning parties for imposing economic sanctions 
against a State or territory. It further explores other reasons why the use of sanctions has 
increased since 1990. In addition, the chapter examines debates on economic sanctions before 
the 1990’s as well as the current debate, which has taken place from the 1990’s until the 
present. Very importantly, the chapter evaluates the choice and use of language in economic 
sanctions episodes. It shed light on why phraseologies such as target State, offending nation, 
humanitarian exemption and collateral effect are used during sanctions episodes.  
Chapter two “The Position of International Human Rights Law and the Role of 
Theories,” provides legal perspective of sanctions. It reviews the compatibility and/or 
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permissibility of sanctions under international humanitarian laws and conventions such the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Also the chapter examines the role of 
States and the international community in protecting and safeguarding human rights. In 
addition it reviews mainstream theories of international relations in order to give a clearer 
understanding of the interaction patterns and relationship between States. To understand State 
relations and why States act and react the way they do, this study deems it necessary to 
analyse selected theories of State and international relations. However, it is difficult and 
almost impossible to envision a single, overarching theory of sanctions. Against this 
backdrop, the chapter examines different theories of international relations, particularly those 
that give insight to the motivation for the continuous use of economic sanctions against its 
poor record and others that rationalizes and justifies the continuous use of sanctions as a 
necessary tool of international diplomacy. Thus, it extensively reviews theories such as, 
Realism, Liberalism, Institutionalism, Hegemony Stability Theory, Balance of Power Theory, 
Cosmopolitanism Theory, Imperialism Theory, Dependency Theory and Democratic Peace 
Theory.  
 Chapter three “Sanctions from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe,” provides a brief overview of 
the history of Zimbabwe from pre to post independence. Most importantly, the chapter 
addresses the ambiguities in understanding the nature of the US and the EU sanctions against 
Zimbabwe since the last decade. For instance, the EU has continually argued that its 
sanctions against Zimbabwe are not economic sanctions, but rather they are “restrictive 
measures.” Also, the United States argues that its sanctions against Zimbabwe are 
targeted/smart sanctions, targeting President Robert Mugabe and select members of his 
regime. However, the government of Zimbabwe insists that sanctions against the country are 
economic and illegal. Owing to these ambiguities, this chapter sheds light on the strategies 
and implementation of US and EU sanctions against Zimbabwe in an effort to establish 
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whether they are economic, targeted/smart or restrictive measures. Furthermore, the chapter 
explores the impacts of sanctions on Zimbabwe’s economy and the civilian population. The 
analysis on the impact of sanctions covers two main areas: sanctions impact on human rights 
and well-being of Zimbabweans and its impact on the economy and social environment. 
Regarding human rights and well-being, the study addresses the effects of sanctions on core 
human rights, such as right to healthcare, right to education and right to quality standard of 
living. Then it examines sanctions impact on key economic factors such as inflation, access to 
foreign finance and exchanges. Finally, it reviews the “Look East Policy” of Zimbabwe. 
Chapter four “The Challenges of Decades of Economic Sanctions against Iran and a 
Review of Selected Cases of Nuclear Deterrence through Sanctions,” provides a historical 
overview of Iran, tracing the country’s political and religious history. Also, it outlines 
sanctions episodes against Iran, starting with the 1979 US embassy hostage crisis until the 
present sanctions against its nuclear program. It provides a chronology and profile of both 
Western and UN sanctions against Iran. Furthermore, the chapter examines the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty agreement, reviewing the implications of certain “clause” contained in 
the draft agreement. In addition, it reviews previous cases in which sanctions were employed 
to deter nuclear proliferation. The reason for analysing these previous cases is to track 
sanctions capability of achieving nuclear deterrence in the past and also to explore and/or 
anticipate the possibility of achieving same (deterrence) in the present case of Iran and in the 
future. The chapter provides a general overview of the impact of economic sanctions on the 
economy and human rights of the Iranian populace. On the economy, it reviews how 
sanctions affect the GDP - income and revenue accruable to Tehran, particularly revenue 
from oil and other oil related products. On the impact on the civilian population, the chapter 
examines how sanctions affect core human rights of Iranians, such as right to healthcare, 
education, employment and good working condition and right to quality standard of living. 
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Also it reviews how economic variable such as inflation, triggered by economic sanctions 
affect the well-being of the population especially the vulnerable groups. Finally, the chapter 
provides information about Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, plus Germany) negotiations and agreement. 
Framework of analysis 
In order to engage economic sanctions discourse, I will refer to the work of John Paul 
Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace. According to 
Lederach, for human beings to achieve peace within ourselves and in the societies in which 
we live, we must change the way in which we respond and react to challenges and conflicts. 
Thus, the society can become better and more peaceful if we can employ our moral 
imagination of peace in resolving conflicts instead of using violent measures: 
If we are to survive as a global community, we must understand the imperative 
nature of giving birth and space to the moral imagination in human affairs. We 
must face the fact that much of our current system for responding to deadly 
local and international conflict is incapable of overcoming cycles of violent 
patterns precisely because our imagination has been corralled and shackled by 
the very parameters and sources that create and perpetuate violence (Lederach, 
2005: 46). 
According to Lederach, we are stuck in our current system (global systems), which 
are characterized by the use of violence to resolve conflict. He points to the human 
imagination and ability to create morals as the answer to breaking out of this cycle. 
According to him, “morality is the motivation, innovation and the mechanism” we should 
employ in order to enable us to step out of the current circle of violence in the world system. 
He emphasizes the need to move from “destructive” violence to a “constructive” social 
engagement. To Lederach, peace could be achieved through our moral imagination, thus 
asserting the following: 
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The moral imagination requires the capacity to imagine ourselves in a web of 
relationships that includes our enemies; the ability to sustain a paradoxical 
curiosity that embraces complexity without reliance on dualistic polarity; the 
fundamental belief in and pursuit of the creative act; and the acceptance of the 
inherent risk of stepping into the mystery of the unknown that lies beyond the 
far too familiar landscape of violence (Lederach, 2005: 5). 
The moral imagination is the capacity to recognize turning points and possibilities in 
order to venture down unknown paths and create what does not yet exist. It means to imagine 
and generate constructive processes that are entrenched in the day-to-day challenges of 
violence and yet surpass these negative patterns. The moral imagination explores the nature 
of turning points and complexity, different ways of knowing (particularly intuition), 
understanding the essence, the importance of humility, how even the most serious and 
dangerous situations can be transformed, the dynamic nature of connections, the importance 
of spontaneous creativity, and stillness (Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 7) 
In the Lederach (2005) view, a more peaceful community (world) is achievable by 
connecting the past, present and the future. He concludes that peace needs to be imagined, 
while still remaining grounded in the realities of the conflict. Thus, the moral imagination 
challenges the status quo model of conflict resolution promulgated today, which employs 
coercive measure (economic sanctions in our case), and advocates instead for a moral 
inclusiveness in addressing conflicts and disagreements. What the world system needs is to 
look for the important web of relationships that lies hidden behind the violence of a conflict. 
Such webs contain spaces that may become foundation for reconciliation. This could be 
achieved by exploring the four key elements of the moral imagination: “relationships,” 
reaching out to those you fear; “paradoxical curiosity,” touching the heart of complexity; 
“creativity,” imagining beyond what is seen; and “risk,” risking vulnerability one step at a 
time. 
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Also Lederach and Maiese (2009: 7) contends that conflict transformation defies a 
specific set of techniques; instead it is a way of looking and seeing that requires a set of 
lenses (multi-lenses) through which to make sense of social conflict. In this case, each lens 
concentrates on a particular aspect of the conflict and helps focus more clearly on the overall 
meaning of the conflict at hand. This implies that employing a single lens when addressing a 
conflict will produce an opaque view of the entire conflict. As such, multiple lenses are 
needed to envision multiple aspects of complex conflict realities and multidimensionalities. 
Understanding the multidimensionality of a complex conflict through different lenses helps 
us to develop a unique framework that will allow us to approach the conflict as a whole. The 
initial lens reveals the immediate situation and/or problem while the subsequent lens look 
beyond the immediate problems and capture the underlying and/or hidden relationship 
patterns that create the context of conflict. Precisely, conflict transformation does not mean a 
quick surface solution to the problem, but rather it entails an understanding of human 
relationships at a deeper level. The third lens helps visualise a framework that will firmly 
incorporate the aforementioned viewpoints and address the content, the context and the 
structure of the relationship (Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 7-9). It is from this platform that 
the parties in a conflict can begin to find creative responses and solutions. Judging from our 
case study, it is obvious that the conflict transformation mechanisms being used in our 
contemporary world (economic sanctions) need to be substituted with what Lederach referred 
to as “Constructive Change Processes.” According to Lederach:  
Conflict transformation begins with a central goal, which is to build 
constructive change out of the energy created by conflict. By focusing this 
energy on the underlying relationships and social structures, constructive 
changes can be brought about. The key here is to move conflict away from 
destructive processes and toward constructive ones. The primary task of 
conflict transformation is not to find quick solutions to immediate problems, 
but rather to generate creative mechanism that can simultaneously address 
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surface issues and change underlying social structures and relationship 
patterns (Mischnick, 2007: 60).  
In line with Lederach’s view, Mischnick added that, “rather than viewing conflict as a threat, 
the transformative view sees conflict as a valuable opportunity to grow and increase our 
understanding of ourselves and others. Conflict can be understood as a motor of change that 
keeps relationships and social structures dynamically responsive to human needs” 
(Mischnick, 2007: 60). 
Taking into full consideration of Lederach’s accurate assessment of the international 
system with respect to conflict transformation mechanisms, I seek to broaden and deepen his 
analysis by closely examining the power and the dominant discourses and narratives of 
sanctions. Within this analytical conceptualization, it is essential to examine the position of 
the international law and the international humanitarian law on the use of coercive economic 
sanctions with respect to their foreseeable impact on civilians’ rights and well-being. Taking 
into consideration that sanctions have become a norm in international relations, one may ask 
what kind(s) of insight and/or solution can an in-depth analysis of the impact of the measure 
offer in terms of conflict transformation theory, strategy and practice. To address this 
question, I borrow a famous quote credited to Pope John XXIII which says: “disagreements 
must be settled, not by force, not by deceit or trickery, but rather in the only manner which is 
worthy of the dignity of man” (Merryfield and Remy 1995: 186). Thus, sanctions are 
particularly suited for studying the practicality of the standards of the international system for 
conflict resolution and the norms that steer conflict transformation strategies.  
The international community (UNSC) and mostly Western States have maintained 
sanctions policy with insouciance, despite daunting records. If we agree on the fact that 
economic sanctions do manifest heinous humanitarian consequences on the civilian 
population of targeted societies and also that it contributes to rights violation and impact 
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negatively on civilians well-being, one will only but query why they are still maintained as 
tool of international diplomacy within the UN and most often used by the United States and 
the European Union. In addition, it is worrisome that international humanitarian law 
challenges the use of coercive measures that may harm civilians, yet it maintains them. What 
do I mean by this? The UDHR for example provided for remedy when a person’s right is 
violated or abused, however, rights violation perpetuated through “legal” sanctions are not 
subject to remedy and/or redress. The implication of such ambiguity is that, while 
International laws challenges human rights violation, it at the same time provide the political 
means and justifications for the continued use of economic coercive measures on the civilian 
population, while lacking the very legal disposition to uphold its principles and enforce 
peremptory rules established by international consensus. 
Within the critical evaluation and engagement of sanctions vis-a-vis its impact on 
civilian victims, I do not shy away from paradoxes. There are plenty to be found, even in the 
analytical tools with which I approach the subject. I employ international law with respect to 
the fundamental human rights which are universal, inalienable and indivisible, while 
recognizing its inherent ambiguities. I look to the constitutional authority of the United 
Nations, while being critical of the contradictions between United Nations principles and 
human rights violation perpetuated by Security Council economic sanctions. These are but a 
few of the many paradoxes that one will encounter throughout this study. They are indicative 
of the tensions created by the collision of struggle for social, political and economic justice; 
leading to the status quo (sanctions) established and accepted as a norm in international 
relations and a panacea for international security and peace building. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  AN INTRODUCTION TO SANCTIONS 
1.1. Introduction  
 Sanctions have been referred to by the United Nations as a “tool for all seasons.” 
They are often seen as alternative to military action (De-Goede, 2012: 177), aimed to control 
the excesses of an offender, which is usually a State government, an individual or group. 
There are different forms of sanctions, including economic, social and political forms. A 
broad and continuously growing range of situations have been determined by the United 
Nations Security Council as threatening or breaching international peace and security, 
thereby favouring the use of sanctions. The Security Council, while occasionally authorizing 
the use of military force has changed its strategy to employ non-military measures in order to 
enforce compliance with its decisions. This development facilitated the imposition of 
sanctions as deterrence. Sanctions have been imposed on different countries for different 
reasons. Examples include the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the purported discovery of the 
latter’s arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Also, the United Nations, the EU and the 
United States imposed sanctions on the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because of its 
role in escalating the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990’s (Hejsek, 2012: 1-2). 
Furthermore, sanctions have been imposed on countries for their support of international 
terrorism. Examples are UN sanctions imposed on Libya in 1992 for supporting terrorism and 
terrorist groups such as the Irish Republican Army; the Basque separatist group ETA; Sierra 
Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (U.S. Department of State, 2007); similar sanctions were 
also imposed on Sudan by the United States in 1997 and the UN in 2005 for supporting 
Janjaweed; and Afghanistan in 1999 for supporting the Taliban. In other cases, sanctions 
have been imposed due to violence and civil wars in countries such as Somalia, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone (U.S. Department of State, 2007). Furthermore, the breakdown of democratic 
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governance in Haiti, coupled with massive human rights violations has led to the imposition 
of sanctions on the country. 
Article 39 of the UN Charter states: “The Security Council shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security” (UN General Assembly 
Resolution 3314, 1976). A more complicated and controversial issue is the increased 
willingness of the Security Council to determine the very internal situations that meet the 
requirements of Article 39, particularly those that do not materially threaten international 
peace in the sense of potentially provoking an international armed conflict or breach of 
international peace. Massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law as well as 
massive displacement and suffering of civilian populations deriving from or increased by 
internal armed conflicts with or without external support have prompted the Security Council 
to take action under Chapter VII. Chapter VII of the UN Charter titled “action with respect to 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression” gives the Security 
Council the power to determine an action deemed to be a threat to international peace and 
security. Under Articles 39 through 43, it further empowers the Security Council to take 
either military or non-military action, in order to restore international peace and security 
(Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1985). The 
above provision of the Charter implies that the Security Council may employ non-military 
measures such as sanctions. This raises the question of whether sanctions have the capacity to 
improve the well-being of the citizens of sanctioned regimes. Sanctions adopted under Article 
41 have the following reach:  
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call 
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upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may 
include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, 
air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations (Charter of the United Nations and Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, 1985).  
In essence, sanctions are formulated as general prohibitions to carry out certain transactions 
or activities with target States particularly those that will provide them with economic 
benefit. The institutional role of the United Nations in the implementation and enforcement of 
sanctions is mainly discharged by the sanctions committee. The committees are composed of 
all the members of the Security Council at any given time, which thus may perpetuate the 
advantages deriving from permanent membership. Sanctions committee are 
political/administrative bodies whose practice and procedures can be quite complex, prone to 
politicization and at times bewildering to the public. For example, the committee meetings 
are convened in private sessions, which make it impossible for the public to scrutinise their 
activities. In my view, this lack of transparency explains to a certain extent why the activities 
of the sanctions committee are viewed as highly politicised.  
The rationale often cited for imposing sanctions is the hope to resolve a conflict 
without mass suffering and other negative consequences associated with war. However, 
reality shows that sanctions particularly economic sanctions are not alternative to war judging 
by their humanitarian impact. Instead their impacts on civilians are similar to those produced 
by warfare. As such, it is ill to misinform the public by presenting economic sanctions as a 
soft approach that can be used to compel or pressure an offender, specifically the government 
of a State, to behave in line with the doctrine of the international community or the body 
imposing sanctions. This tool of international relations, despite its increased use, has 
produced limited success. According to Peter Wallensteen (2000: 5-6), studies show that 
sanctions in general have recorded very low success in terms of achieving desired goal. 
While Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott in their book Economic Sanctions Reconsidered conclude 
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that 34 percent of the sanctions undertaken between 1914 and 1990 were effective. They 
further conclude that the success rate is declining. While 44 percent of the sanctions efforts 
undertaken before 1973 were classified as successes, only 24 percent of post-1973 sanctions 
efforts were successful (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, 1990). The contrast in the recorded 
success of sanctions and its continuous use as a moderate tool of international diplomacy 
shows that there are other reasons for the increased use of sanctions measures other than to 
restore international peace and security as permitted by the UN Charter. Thus, I will examine 
the history and use of sanctions, review some of the challenges associated with sanctions and 
most importantly how sanctions have affected the well-being of the people of Zimbabwe and 
Iran. Obviously, the case of Zimbabwe has become a dilemma to the international community 
owing to the fact that economic situation in the country has worsened since 2001, when the 
US imposed sanctions against the country. However, for humanitarian reasons and because of 
security considerations, I believe that to remain passive and/or complicit is not an option. 
Although reality is in fact more complex, nevertheless, the discussion in academic and 
policy-making circles should focus the debate on whether continued sanctions is the proper 
way to coerce leaders of Zimbabwe and Iran to behave in the desired way, rather than 
assisting the suffering masses.  
This thesis therefore, provides an understanding of international relations by going 
beyond the description of the subject matter (sanctions) and explains how the system and the 
units of the system might be transformed. The thesis believes that our present world system 
requires an overhaul, one that will foster durable peace by substituting violence with selfless 
diplomacy and moral imagination of peace. Foucault (1980) shows how discipline and 
punishment in the world changed over time as the people informed the governments of what 
types of punishment and discipline were acceptable. The role of the people was determined 
by the society in which they lived. The people in turn redefined acceptable practices in the 
 43 
 
society. The same can be applied to States in the international system with respect to coercive 
economic sanctions. The system provides meaning to being a State. The States then redefine 
acceptable practices in the system. In this manner the system and the States may be 
transformed. Thus the responsibility of transforming the international system; substituting 
violent conflict transformation mechanisms such as the use of military force and economic 
sanctions lies on the people (you and I) to push for a change in the global system. One way of 
achieving this however, is by reviewing the methods and mechanisms presently in use, 
analysing these methods and/or mechanisms against cause and effect. 
I do not intend to hide my values nor pretend to be value free, rather the priority of 
this thesis is underpinned in a desire for positive and durable peace. This I believe could be 
achieved through protection of the fundamental human rights, which are “inalienable” so to 
say. At the heart of my argument is that substituting violent measures and/or mechanisms 
with real diplomacy will not only guarantee durable peace, it will also avoid grave 
humanitarian consequences associated with our present conflict transformation tools. 
Therefore, this thesis is not in a anyway disparaging or proscribing sanctions rather it reviews 
them in such a manner that glaringly show that even when the political goals of imposing 
such coercive measures are achieved their impact on human development remain a concern 
whilst their continued usage is condemnable. For this reason, this thesis analyses sanctions in 
general but particularly economic sanctions from the perspective of human rights and well-
being of civilian victims of sanctions measures. By doing this, I review international 
humanitarian law and certain sections of the United Nations Charter and their predisposition 
on the use of sanctions for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security and/or 
protection of human rights.  
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1.1.1. History of sanctions 
Sanctions have been a tool of economic statecraft for many centuries dating back to 
the 5th century. In the 5th century B.C., when the Megra Empire supported Sparta, a City-
State that was considered an enemy of the Athenian Empire, Pericles, a statesman in Athens, 
ordered a trade ban between the Athenian Empire and the Megra. Short of going to war, the 
message transmitted was that Athens would punish anyone who challenged its authority 
(Thucydides, 1972: 118). The use of sanctions as a tool of international policy started after 
World War I with a proclamation by the then US president Woodrow Wilson. He suggested 
to the League of Nations that the adoption of sanctions would help keep the world free of 
war. He described sanctions as a “peaceful, silent, deadly remedy” (Gordon, 1999:124).  
For the most part sanctions were rarely used in the 20th century. During the Cold 
War, the quest by both the USSR and the United States to gain a competitive edge over each 
other led them to support and co-operate with corrupt and brutal leaders (Shane, 2004). This 
policy made sanctions unpopular and ineffective during the period. Before the fall of the 
Berlin wall in 1989, the United Nations sanctioned only two countries, Rhodesia and South 
Africa. The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era and a new set of countries were 
sanctioned. As reported by Hughes (2007) they include Iraq (1990), the former Yugoslavia 
(1991, 1992, and 1998), Libya (1992), Liberia (1992), Somalia (1992), parts of Cambodia 
(1992), Haiti (1993), parts of Angola (1993, 1997, and 1998), Rwanda (1994), Sudan (1996), 
Sierra Leone (1997), and Afghanistan (1999) and others. They were sanctioned for reasons 
ranging from external and internal aggression, suppression of democracy and support of 
terrorism (Chan and Drury, 2000: 3). Within this period, the United States rose to world 
superpower status, giving greater authority to its unilateral sanctions. Scholars such as Haass 
(1998) and Delevic (1998) argue that the economic interests of the United States, combined 
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with reluctance to deploy its military force to address economic, moral, and political issues 
gave rise to increased use of unilateral sanctions by the United States. In 1998, one 
commentator estimated that “two-thirds of the world’s population was subject to some sort of 
US sanctions” (Dunne, 1998: 2). However, the United States is not the only country imposing 
economic sanctions; the European Union has also been sponsoring its own brand of 
sanctions. 
Many scholars and organizations have argued against the use of economic sanctions 
because of its horrific humanitarian consequences. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990) did a 
comprehensive and extensive study on sanctions, having researched 116 case studies since 
World War I. The most important conclusion from their findings is that sanctions have a 
historical poor track record, with respects to performance, cause and effect (Hufbauer, Schott, 
and Elliott, 1990). The first and second UN sanctions imposed against South Africa and 
Rhodesia were perceived to be successful. The euphoria of using sanctions partially or wholly 
in achieving compliance in the behaviours of these regimes earned sanctions a monumental 
position in international relations. If I may say, it was overwhelming to use “ordinary” 
sanctions to remove the apartheid regime from power. However, the success accredited to 
sanctions against the apartheid regime, has been challenged by scholars on notable grounds. 
One of them, Philip Levy, argues that the situation in South Africa was unique and certainly 
not possible to replicate (Levy, 1999: 10-12). The fact is that the apartheid regime in South 
Africa was unique to other situations in which sanctions are imposed and expected to produce 
the same outcome as in South Africa. Apart from Levy, legal positivists also argue that 
sanctions do not conform to international humanitarian laws or the United Nations 
declaration of rights. They conclude that both are inconsistent and incoherent. Also, Joy 
Gordon argues in support of this motion when she describes economic sanctions as siege and 
refers to them as a form of warfare (Gordon, 1999: 149). Furthermore, the conservative 
 46 
 
Heritage Foundation, an American “Think Tank” organization, does not support sanctions. 
Instead, it cautions against the excessive utilization of sanctions as a foreign policy tool and 
points to the adverse effects they can have on all involved parties. The United Nations in her 
report tagged, “Bossuyt Report,” gave an in-depth analysis of sanctions, adjudging it from the 
perspective of human rights and incorporating legal aspects of international law. The report 
criticizes the fact that there is “hardly any mention of human rights and humanitarian law 
norms” in the usual debate about sanctions within the United Nations assembly and the 
Security Council (Bossuyt, 2000: 4).  
1.1.2. Definitions of sanctions 
According to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2007), sanctions are valuable 
instruments in international efforts to safeguard peace and security and to promote democracy 
and human rights. They represent coercive measures that supplement supportive measures in 
the areas of diplomacy and development assistance with the same objectives. Sanctions mean 
‘restrictions,’ limiting the freedom of a State, a group or its leaders to act. They are imposed 
through a collective decision by other States. This is done because the international 
community wants to use peaceful means to influence the behaviour of the State, group or 
individual through various economic and political measures. They may be employed to 
change the policies of a State that threatens international peace and security; to defuse a 
conflict in a country; to induce a State to cease systematic violations of human rights; or to 
compel a State to adopt certain democratic principles. Sanctions differ from other foreign 
policy instruments in that they are regulated through legal provisions. They are precisely 
formulated and violating them may result in penalties. Sanctions are intended to be of a 
temporary nature and regularly reviewed in light of developments. When their objectives 
have been achieved, they are to be removed (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2007). 
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I chose the above definition by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs because it 
offers broad and detailed information about sanctions; providing limit and duration for 
applying them. Nonetheless, I personally do not agree completely with the above definition; 
however, I find it important to represent the two sides of the coin. I take issue with part of the 
definition due to its claim that sanctions are used to promote peace and security. Contrary to 
this view, this thesis explains that sanctions distort peace and have proved to be incapable of 
achieving international peace and security. Also, the understanding that sanctions are a legal 
instrument is “tricky.” I agree that they are instruments permitted by the UN Charter; 
however, the use of economic sanctions contradicts the UN declaration of human rights, 
which emphasizes the “right to live in dignity.” I argue that economic sanctions deny 
civilians of a target State the opportunity to live in dignity due to the negative consequences 
and aspects often associated with such measures. In chapter three and four, I provide more 
facts to buttress the argument raised here in my analysis of the impact of sanctions on the 
rights and well-being of the civilian population of Iran and Zimbabwe. 
According to Margaret P. Doxey, sanctions are penalties threatened or imposed as a 
declared consequence of the target’s failure to observe international standards or international 
obligations (Doxey, 1996: 9). By this definition, it means that all those who happen to reside 
in sanctions target area are culpable of the crime or offence for which sanctions are imposed. 
The use of such generalizations criminalizes civilians and at the same time provides 
justification for those who employ such coercive measures on civilians. 
Also, sanctions have been defined as a broad range of reactions adopted unilaterally 
or collectively by States against the perpetrator of an internationally unlawful act in order to 
ensure respect for and performance of a right or obligation (Decaux, 2008: 249). 
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Laura Forlati Picchio asserts: “sanctions would be any conduct that is contrary to the 
interests of the State at fault, that serves the purpose of reparation, punishment or perhaps 
prevention, and that is set out in or simply not prohibited by international law’’ (Cited in 
Decaux, 2008: 249). 
 Furthermore, sanctions are defined as a calculated attempt by one party to control, 
compel and induce change in the behaviour of another party without the use of weapon and 
military offensives. Sanctions often have uncertain and irreversible consequences and can 
cause great human suffering. However, they have also been successful in changing the 
behaviour of the opponents. Sanctions and threats of sanctions have been credited to have the 
capabilities of curbing human rights violations, ousting belligerent leaders and limiting the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Shane, 2004). 
 In analysing the definitions provided above and the good intentions of sanctions as 
given by the bodies that impose them, I argue that it is problematic to employ any measure or 
action that has grave humanitarian consequences on the civilian population. Previous 
experiences have shown that in many cases economic sanctions failed to achieve their goals 
(Wallensteen, 2000: 5-6). Instead, they create suffering and hardship on civilians to whom 
they are rhetorically intended to help.   
1.1.3. Types of sanctions 
 From the viewpoint of President Woodrow Wilson and the United Nations, sanctions 
are instruments of a diplomatic or economic nature that seek to bring about change in 
activities or policies, such as violations of international law or human rights or policies that 
do not respect the rule of law or democratic principles. They come in different forms, such as 
comprehensive and targeted sanctions, unilateral and multilateral sanctions. Also, there are 
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other types of sanctions that are comprised of arms embargoes, restrictions on admission 
(visa or travel bans) or other measures as appropriate (European Commission, 2008). 
In 1999, the Strategic Planning Unit in the Executive Office of the UN Secretary 
General notes:  
There is a widespread consensus that, when confronting major transgressions 
of international law, the international community needs some instrument of 
persuasion that lies between diplomatic censure, on the one hand, and war, on 
the other. For this purpose, there is no real alternative to sanctions (Mack and 
Khan, 1999: 104). 
In any case, the international community considers sanctions as a middle ground between 
traditional diplomacy and the use of military force. Therefore, if diplomacy fails, in the 
absence of going to war sanctions fulfils a gap. 
1.1.3.1. Comprehensive sanctions  
 Comprehensive economic sanctions are measures that seek to deny a target State 
access to all international financial, trade and service interactions (Doxey, 1996: 139). The 
mechanism of comprehensive economic sanctions is to deny a target State access to 
international markets and other sources of finance and funding, with the exception of those 
exempted on humanitarian grounds (Doxey, 1996: 139-40). Since the establishment of the 
UN, it has imposed four prominent comprehensive economic sanctions against Rhodesia, 
South Africa, Yugoslavia and Iraq (House of Lords, 2006-07: 14). Apart from the UN, the 
United States and the European Union have also been imposing comprehensive sanctions and 
using international institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, as allies to enforce such 
sanctions. The case of Zimbabwe is one example of comprehensive economic sanctions by 
the US and the EU, which is being enforced in alliance with international financial agencies 
(IMF, World Bank and AfDB), thereby making the effect severe on the target State and 
mostly on its citizens.  
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In two of the four cases, Rhodesia and South Africa, comprehensive economic 
sanctions contributed only in a secondary way to achieving the objective of the sanctions 
(Watson Institute for International Studies, 2004). In the case of Iraq, most of the concessions 
were achieved not singularly by the use of sanctions, but combined by the use of force. 
Overall, comprehensive economic sanctions have not achieved major goals without being 
combined with or preceded by the threat or use of force (Watson institute for international 
studies, 2004). In the latter half of the 1990’s, comprehensive sanctions became the object of 
criticism and debate from various quarters, including politicians and scholars such as 
Baldwin (1985), Tostenson and Bull (2002) and Andreas (2005). The primary focus of critics 
was the negative humanitarian impact they had upon civilian populations. In this regard, 
Carne Ross, First Secretary at the UK Permanent Mission to the UN from 1999 to 2003 
states, “I do not think that comprehensive economic sanctions should ever be imposed, on any 
country, ever again, because of what they did to the Iraqi people” (House of Lords, 2006-07: 
16).  
Contrary to the views of Carne Ross, Hans Von Sponeck, the UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator for Iraq between 1998 and 2000, argues that humanitarian exemptions were 
sufficient to “limit the severity of the human costs of comprehensive economic sanctions 
sufficiently to make its use legitimate” (House of Lords, 2006-07: 16). The statement by Von 
Sponeck suggests that economic sanctions are inherently brutal and that the application of 
humanitarian exemptions will make them appear humane and considerate. Also, Dr. Kim 
Howells, a British parliamentarian, argues in support of economic sanctions when stated thus:  
I do not think we can abandon the weapon of comprehensive sanctions 
because there will be situations in the future, as I suspect there may even be at 
the moment, where comprehensive sanctions probably could do more good 
than damage (House of Lords, 2006-07: 16). 
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 A study by Watson Institute on humanitarian costs of comprehensive economic 
sanctions concluded that civilian suffering caused by such measures often overshadows their 
potential political gains. Moreover, comprehensive economic sanctions complicate the work 
of humanitarian agencies, cause long-term damage to the productive capacity of target 
nations and unfairly penalize their neighbours, who are often their major trading partners 
(Weiss; Cortright; Lopez and Minear, 1997: 17). In response to these criticisms against 
comprehensive sanctions as well as an increase in calls to reform sanctions instruments, the 
international community shifted grounds and adopted targeted sanctions directed against 
policymakers responsible for reprehensible policies and the elites who benefit from and 
support them. 
1.1.3.2 Targeted sanctions 
 Targeted sanctions are designed to target specific persons, groups and entities 
responsible for the objectionable policies or behaviour. Mostly, such sanctions comprise both 
an obligation to freeze all funds and economic resources of the targeted persons and entities 
and a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to or 
for the benefit of these persons and entities (Watson Institute for International Studies, 2004: 
3). Additionally, it can be a sort of travel ban on a specific entity, person or group of persons. 
Targeted sanctions make intuitive sense and seem to respond directly to the criticisms against 
comprehensive sanctions. Why not direct sanctions against the architects of the policies 
opposed by the international community, rather than against civilians? In this way, targeted 
sanctions theoretically address the adverse humanitarian effects of comprehensive sanctions. 
If designed and implemented effectively, only dictators, demagogues, rebel leaders and their 
supporters would need to fear the effects of targeted sanctions (Watson Institute for 
International Studies, 2004: 3).  
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 This type of sanctions has been in existence for long though they are new in the 
“toolbox” of the United Nations. Evidence could be seen from the Nürnberg and Tokyo 
tribunal. At the tribunal which was set up following World War II, individuals found culpable 
of international crimes were sanctioned (Greppi, 1990: 4-7). Despite its long time in history, 
the focus on multilateral sanctions in the sense of Article 41 on targeted individuals has only 
remained an academic exercise. The end of Cold War however, ushered in a new era in the 
functioning of the Security Council (Hanhimäki, 2008: 11). The Council experienced 
improvement in its decision making process, paving way for more sanctions episodes. 
However, the success accredited to sanctions faced serious setback; their impacts on the 
civilian population were lethal. The impact of these sanctions became apparent with the case 
of Iraq; thus the utility of economic sanctions were put to question. UN agencies, such as 
UNICEF and the World Health Organization, as well as nongovernmental organizations like 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, documented the continuing nature of the crisis, 
including starvation and malnutrition, the deterioration of the national health care system, 
widespread of epidemics, shortages of electricity, and many other humanitarian issues 
(Watson Institute for International Studies, 2004). 
 In the wake of these concerns, the call for more targeted sanctions grew loudly. As a 
result of massive outcry from different quarters, the Security Council deemed it pertinent to 
review its sanctions instrument in a way that it would not have broad humanitarian impact. 
This gave way for the adoption of targeted sanctions by the council. Sanctions against 
individuals and other non-State actors that were identified as a more direct threat to 
international peace and security than entire populations of a State were the logical 
consequence (Gordon, 1999: 315-320). By imposing targeted sanctions, it sends a clear 
message to those who have been subject to it that their behaviour specifically, rather than the 
broader issue, of for example, hostilities within a State, is considered worthy of being 
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subjected to economic sanctions. It is also a strongly symbolic gesture, which may serve to 
discourage other States from supporting the rogue regime. 
 This brand of sanctions were first imposed on the government of Libya in 1992 and 
later used against the regime of Raoul Cedras in Haiti in 1994 (Watson Institute for 
International Studies, 2004: 13). However, targeted sanctions have been characterized with 
inconsistent implementation, and there are issues of ambiguity in identifying the specific 
targeted individuals. Again, a key example is the case of Haiti in 1994. 
1.1.3.3. Major challenges of UN targeted economic sanctions  
Scholarly works on the UN economic sanctions against Iraq revealed that the 
sanctions caused terrible humanitarian suffering on the civilian population (Irwin and 
Gungwu, 2003: 93-94). This raised question about who the actual or intended target of the 
sanctions are. Firstly, unlike earlier economic sanctions episodes, as sanctions against Iraq 
progressed it became clear that the ordinary citizens of Iraq were suffering significant 
humanitarian problems as a consequence of the sanctions. Secondly, those ordinary Iraqi 
citizens, despite their suffering, had no control over the actions of the State that had prompted 
the imposition of sanctions on the country (Irwin and Gungwu, 2003: 90-96). The question 
that comes to mind in a situation such as Iraq is: why are economic sanctions imposed on a 
country since they are missing their intended target? As Sponeck (1984: 483) notes, “the 
assumption that economic pressure on the population would lead to political change at 
government level [...] turned out to be a fallacy with significant human costs. As such, 
subjecting them to sanctions could not be justified because they would not prompt regime 
change.” The use of targeted economic sanctions would, in light of these difficulties, have 
been a more proportionate measure as they would have been applied only on the individuals 
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who could force change in Iraq and would therefore have reduced, if not eliminated, the 
humanitarian suffering experienced by the general population.  
 While targeted sanctions are less injurious to civilians than comprehensive economic 
sanctions, they are not without negative effects. First, it may not be possible to limit the 
economic effects of targeted sanctions to the intended targets alone. Most targets, be they 
individuals, groups, or economic sectors are embedded in a larger network of suppliers, 
service sector providers, and/or consumers, such that the effects of a targeted sanctions 
cannot be entirely isolated to the targets. There will be an inevitable effect on untargeted, 
unintended, and otherwise innocent actors. 
Second, sanctions of any type, including targeted sanctions, create strong incentives 
for evasion. A political economy of sanctions evasion (illegal financial transfers, arms 
smuggling, commodity smuggling) can leave a legacy of corruption that may prove difficult 
to root out after sanctions have been lifted (Watson Institute for International Studies, 2004: 
14). The tradition and practices established, the lessons learned, and the lucrative benefits that 
derive from a regime of sanctions evasion may linger on in the form of unabated smuggling, 
tax evasion, and general corruption. 
Third, targeting a person because of his or her membership of a certain group may be 
problematic. This is because there tend to be a hierarchy in every organization or group 
where top leaders make decisions that is carried out by each member of the group. 
Considering this fact, targeted sanctions should focus on the leader of a group, who makes 
decisions with regard to the functioning of the group and takes full benefit of the financial 
position of the group, instead of ordinary members of a group, who has no power over the 
movement of the group and who may have joined out of undue pressure and/or coercion. For 
example, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and Joseph Kony’s Lord’s 
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Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda forcefully recruited children, drugging them and teaching 
them how to kill (Meredith, 2006: 563). Therefore, it is beyond logic to allege that such a 
child solider is culpable and targeted sanctions will have any impact on his or her behaviour, 
which is controlled by the top hierarchy of the group. This creates a similar difficulty to 
sanctions taken against States, in that the sanctions may impact on persons who have little to 
do with the behaviour that prompted the use of sanctions. Thus targeted sanctions should be 
directed specifically at the leadership of the group or State in question.  
Fourth, there are the unintended effects on neighbouring States in the way of “spill 
over.” Implementing targeted sanctions relies heavily on certain States, particularly 
neighbouring States who act as a watchdog over the targeted State (Watson Institute for 
International Studies, 2004: 14). These neighbouring States bear partly the impact of targeted 
sanctions and should be provided with technical assistance and means of special financial 
support by the international community, as specified in Article 50 of the UN Charter. 
Another problematic about targeted sanctions that requires consideration is the fact 
that, targeted or smart sanctions assume that the leaders can be separated from their 
populations in a simple way. However, this is not always the case. In some cases, the rulers 
built on a legitimacy which separated them from the rest of the population. In other cases, 
however, regime leaders even though they are brutal and authoritarian may be appreciated by 
their people and they are perceived as representatives of the entire population or groups. Ian 
Smith of Rhodesia and Milosevic of Serbia are examples. As Barbara Geddes, puts it:  
Different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they 
differ from democracy. Their leaders emerge from different groups and via 
different selection processes. They rely on different segments of society for 
support. They have different procedures for making decisions, and different 
interest groups influence policies. Intra-elite factionalism and competition take 
different forms in different kinds of dictatorship, and consequently succession 
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occurs in different ways. They deal with ordinary citizens, opposition and 
members of the elite group in different ways (Geddes, 2004: 5). 
Based on this fact, targeted sanctions should not be used as an instrument just to 
punish and/or remove a particular leader; rather its focus should be on changing the thinking 
of an entire political elite group (Wallensteen, 2000: 12). The reason for suggesting the above 
is because, if a particular leader or regime is undermined by smart or targeted sanctions, the 
implication might be that the leader will be replaced by others, even more brutal, 
representatives of the same elite group in question. This implies that for targeted or smart 
sanctions to be effective, a proper analysis needs to be carried out on the target regime with 
respect to the strength of the representatives and associates of the incumbent regime.  
Furthermore Wallensteen (2000) added that the “smart or targeted sanctions can only 
produce desired result if the leaders of a target State are dependent on international relations. 
On the contrary, smart sanctions can only serve a symbolic purpose. Evidence from history 
shows that financial operators are those that are most immediately hit by international 
sanctions, that to say that if traders, investors, and other commercial interests control the 
powers of a society, they are likely to be vulnerable to targeted sanctions.  
Finally, a new twist to the challenges faced by smart or targeted sanctions is that it 
becomes a way of singling out individuals for punishment of their actions. Thus, settlements 
of sanctions situations might include a factor of personal fear that has not been the case 
before. Whether such fears help to bring out a readiness to agree or rather results in increased 
defiance needs to be considered. Whatever the case maybe, smart or targeted sanctions do 
open up new possibilities and would be interesting to explore further. 
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1.1.3.4. Arms embargoes  
According to the European Union, an arms embargo is a type of sanctions imposed to 
stop the flow of arms and military equipment to conflict areas or to regimes that are likely to 
use them for internal repression or aggression against a foreign State (Austin, 2005: 4; 
European Commission, 2008:4). The use of arms embargoes has been on the rise since the 
1990’s, and many institutions such as the European Union, the United Nations, the Arab 
League and others have implemented them at one point or another. Also individual countries 
such as the United States have used arms embargoes in a form of unilateral embargoes 
against States, organizations or groups of people. 
In the case of the United Nation, arms embargoes are imposed by resolutions adopted 
under the authority of Chapter VII, Article 41, by at least nine of the fifteen members of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), including all five permanent members. The 
Security Council has two types of arms embargo: voluntary and mandatory (Fruchart; Holtom 
and Wezeman, 2007: 1). Voluntary arms embargoes are invoked through the Security 
Council resolutions and call for member States to end the supply of arms, ammunition, 
military material and related services to a target. The symbolic part of this type of arms 
embargo is the “request to cease supply” to target States or groups (Baldwin, 1997: 81). 
Mandatory arms embargoes are also invoked through the Security Council resolutions; it is 
an order that prohibits the sale or supply of arms, ammunitions, military equipment and 
related services by member States to a target. Mandatory UN arms embargoes legally oblige 
UN members to enforce them, having pledged in Chapter I, Article 2(5), of the UN Charter to 
refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the UN is taking preventive or 
enforcement action (Fruchart; Holtom and Wezeman, 2007: 1-3).  
 58 
 
In order to engage in the argument of arms embargoes, it is important to point out that 
arms embargoes in the Middle East or the arms embargoes against South Africa were violated 
in many ways, and studies on the Tripartite Agreement concluded that the arms embargoes 
had not been properly implemented (Harkavy, 1975, Wulf, 1986, Brzoska, 1991). Also, 
recent studies on the United Nations arms embargoes by scholars such as Cortright and Lopez 
(2000); Bondi, (2001); Fruchart et al. (2007), show that arms embargoes have a reputation for 
being ineffective, poorly designed and implemented. In all, the United Nations has imposed 
27 mandatory arms embargoes administered by the UN sanctions committee (Hufbauer, 
Schott, and Elliott, 1990; Fruchart et al., 2007: 51). The essence of these embargoes is to 
compel targets to seek peaceful resolution to conflict, restore or strengthen legitimate 
governments, cease support for international terrorist organizations and also to abandon 
nuclear proliferation and programmes to acquire weapons of mass destruction (Ki-moon, 
2007). According to Bondi (2001: 125), these objectives often cited for imposing arms 
embargos are rarely achievable. 
Two major reasons have been identified for the frequent use of UN arms embargoes 
in the post-Cold War era. The first reason given involves efforts by the UN to play a global 
role in maintaining world peace and security, thereby using arms embargoes as a tool (Tierny, 
2005: 643). Another reason is the perception that arms embargoes are “smarter” than 
comprehensive economic and trade sanctions, by targeting elites of States and thereby 
limiting humanitarian impacts (Brzoska, 2002: 3-4). 
 Against all the claims of good intentions rooted in arms embargos, there have been 
criticisms regarding its application and implementation. Assessment of UN arms embargoes 
imposed in the 1990’s have shown clearly the failures and inability of arms embargoes to 
stop the flow of arms and/or to influence significant changes in the behaviour of target 
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regions and entities (Cortright and Lopez, 2000; Fruchart et al., 2007: 51). Furthermore, 
Bondi (2001) and Baldwin (1997) argue that arms embargoes fail because they are primarily 
of symbolic rather than practical value. They are imposed very late, with unclear definition of 
coverage scope, lack of unity and commitment of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council to enforce the embargoes and, most importantly, there is a clear lack of political will 
to punish those who violate the embargoes, particularly within the Security Council 
permanent member States (Fruchart et al., 2007: 1-3; Brzoska, 2008; Ohlson, 1988). Thus, 
arms embargoes can only achieve their goals if the supplier governments support the goals of 
the embargo; however, supplier governments generally are not willing to enforce the 
implementation to a significant degree (Bondi, 2001: 142). 
1.1.3.5. Restrictions on admission (Visa or Travel Ban) 
Restrictions on admission are a type of targeted sanctions, where an individual or 
group of individuals are banned from entry into, or transit through, the territories of the State 
or group of States that is/are imposing the ban (European Commission, 2008: 5). This type of 
sanction has been used unilaterally by the United States mostly to fight terrorism. 
Additionally, the European Union has adopted this measure against people whose behaviours 
contradict international norms or are deemed to be a threat to public peace and security 
(European Commission, 2008: 5-6). For example, in February of 2011, the EU imposed a 
travel ban on former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and 25 members of his family and 
inner circle (The Telegraph, 2011). The ban was a restriction to territories that belong to the 
European Union. Also on 12 March 2014, the EU imposed travel ban on 21 Russian and 
Ukrainian officials for their role in what the EU consider an inversion of the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of independent Ukraine (BBC News, 2014). In the wording of the 
EU document outlining the measures: “Member States shall take the necessary measures to 
prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of the natural persons responsible 
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for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
independence of Ukraine” (BBC News, 2014; Santa and Baker, 2014). Although the 
sanctions are imposed by the EU, their implementation is in alliance with the United States, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Japan and Canada; an effort to ensure the sanctions net is as tight and 
effective as possible. However, the enforcement of travel ban may be difficult in certain 
situations.  
I use the EU as an example of how challenging the enforcement of a travel ban may 
be. The EU is made up of 27 member States. When a travel ban is imposed on an individual 
or entity by the EU, it is expected that the 27 member States will enforce the ban. However, 
within the EU is the Vatican City, which is an observer State to the United Nations but not a 
member State of the EU. The implication of this is that a person(s) banned from entry or 
transit from the EU can visit the Vatican City. An example to buttress this assertion is the 
case of Robert Mugabe who is sanctioned by the EU and prohibited from visiting or 
transiting from EU territory. Despite EU travel ban being in place, Mugabe attended Pope 
John Paul’s funeral in 2005 and for his beatification in 2011. Also, he attended the 
inauguration ceremony of Pope Francis held in St. Peter’s Square in the Vatican on March 
19, 2013 (Reilly; Malm and Roberts, 2013).  This kind of situation makes the enforcement of 
a travel ban within the EU challenging. Finally as a general rule, the legal instrument 
imposing such restrictions allows for exemptions from the visa or travel ban on humanitarian 
and other grounds or in order to comply with obligations of a Member State under 
international law (European Commission, 2008: 5). 
1.1.3.6. Unilateral sanctions 
 Unilateral sanctions usually are trade and other economic embargoes which are 
imposed independently by one country on another. Research shows that the major purpose of 
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unilateral sanctions is the advancement of sender’s foreign policy on the target (Dowling and 
Popiel, 2002: 8). While international or comprehensive sanctions are imposed by 
international bodies like the United Nations Security Council (in political cases) or the World 
Trade Organization (in economic ones), unilateral sanctions are imposed by a single State 
mostly on reasons that has to do with national interest (Dowling and Popiel, 2002: 8). 
Increasingly, it is observed in our contemporary world that certain States impose unilateral 
sanctions against third party through application of national legislation. Thus, an increased 
use of unilateral sanctions by States particularly the United States raises concern that requires 
consideration. Although the use of sanctions arguably is permitted under the UN Charter, the 
use of unilateral sanctions are however questionable under the law. Therefore, a rational 
question to ask is whether unilateral sanctions are permissible under the international law or 
the UN Charter. An answer to this question will be provided in chapter two where I will 
review unilateral sanctions in the light of international humanitarian law. Since one of our 
cases study, Zimbabwe is under the US unilateral sanctions; this part of the thesis examines 
US unilateral sanctions episodes. It also examines some of the reasons for imposing such 
measure on other countries and evaluates the efficacy of unilateral sanctions with respect to 
goal attainment. 
 More than any country in the world, the United States is increasingly employing 
unilateral economic sanctions against other countries (Haass, 1997: 74). Most of the countries 
targeted by US unilateral sanctions are developing countries and the reason being mainly due 
to contrasting political issues. It is widely believed that an increase witnessed in the use of 
unilateral sanctions by the US is underpinned by its quest to influence political behaviour in 
the target States (Nyun, 2008: 468). For example, the US sanctions against Cuba, which 
started on October 19, 1960 is believed to aim at influencing change in Cuba’s political 
system (from communism to democracy). Unfortunately, such measures often has drastic 
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outcome as they hamper economic development in the target State and also the political well-
being of their citizens.  
 The 1990’s, witnessed increased desire by the US to push its foreign policies abroad. 
This development paved the way for enactment of new laws and executive actions. As Jim 
Lobe reports, from 1993 to 1996, the US enacted 61 laws and executive actions authorizing 
the use of unilateral economic sanctions for foreign-policy purposes (Lobe, 1997). 
Consequently, a total of sixty-one countries were specifically targeted by US unilateral 
sanctions within this period (See figure 1). 
Figure 1: Number of sanctions imposed by the US between 1993 and 1996. 
 
Source: http://archives.usaengage.org/archives/studies/nam2.html | National Association of 
Manufacturers, March 1997. 
 Analysts argue that the use of unilateral sanctions by the US is ineffective (Askari; 
Forrer; Teegen and Yang, 2003; Shane, 2004; National Foreign Trade Council, 2007; US 
Chamber of Commerce, 2014), pointed that none of the sanctions were able to significantly 
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change the policy of targets to meet US demands rather they create a “backlog” on US 
foreign relations (the US sanctions episodes in Cuba and the Soviet Union are cited as 
examples). Also the National Association of Manufacturers, in March 1997 reported that 
unilateral sanctions often reduce US export, resulting in lower revenues and lost jobs. In 
addition, the Commerce Department estimate that the oil embargo against the Soviet Union in 
the 1980’s caused a total loss of about $2 billion to US direct export sales and argues that the 
indirect impact may even be higher. Furthermore, (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2000: 13) 
allege that unilateral sanctions place US companies at a disadvantage relative to their foreign 
competitors. While Hufbauer and Kimberly (1997), reports that from 1995 sanctions may 
have cost the US a loss of almost $19 billion per year in export and about 200,000 to 260,000 
jobs in export related business. In addition Enerst Preeg of the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) writes that the actual figure is far beyond what commentators 
have to provide (Collins and Bowdoin, 1999). Against all the negative perception of 
unilateral sanctions, Washington has continued to believe in the efficacy of this measure in 
the pursuit of its foreign policy and agenda. In the words of a former Secretary of State 
George Schultz, unilateral sanctions are a form of “light-switch diplomacy” (The New York 
Times, 1982). Schultz perceives foreign trade (trade between one country and another) as a 
tool of foreign policy which can be turned on and off like a light. Despite arguments for and 
against unilateral sanctions, some reasons have been identified for adopting the measure (See 
figure 2): 
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Figure 2: Reasons for imposing unilateral sanctions 
 
Source: http://archives.usaengage.org/archives/studies/nam2.html | National Association of 
Manufacturers, March 1997. 
1.1.3.7. Economic sanctions 
Economic sanctions are “coordinated restrictions on trade and financial transactions 
intended to impair economic life within a given territory” (Davidsson, 2002: 4). It consists of 
export and/or import bans, trade sanctions which may apply to specific products such as oil, 
timber or diamonds, also bans on the provision of specific services brokering, financial 
services, technical assistance, flight bans, prohibitions on investment, payments and capital 
movements or the withdrawal of tariff preferences.  
An attempt by scholars to provide comprehensive analysis of economic sanctions has 
produced a broad range of different classifications. For example, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot 
(1990) put economic sanctions into three categories (1) limiting export to target (2) restriction 
of targets export (3) impeding finance available to target through suspension and/or 
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withdrawal of aid. Daoudi and Dajani (1983) basing their analysis on international affairs 
perspective, classified them into five (1) impediment to technology (2) restriction on supply 
of arm and other war munitions (3) restriction of raw materials available to target (4) 
restriction on targets import (5) international boycott. Perhaps the reason for classifying 
economic sanctions by scholars is to elaborate on areas and/or sectors where their impact are 
felt most or where they intend to affect, however this classifications seen not too relevant as a 
widely held opinion is that the measures are “anti-civilian well-being.” Further research 
reveals that not only do economic sanctions have adverse economic impact on their target; 
they also affect the economy of the sender State(s). Askari et al. (2003: 90) writes that 
economic sanctions affect the following economic variables in the sanctioning/sender State(s) 
and also target State: (a) Profits and revenues of State owned enterprises; (b) Profits and 
revenues of private owned enterprises; (c) Sales and export; (d) Employment; (e) Economic 
growth; (f) Development; (g) Revenues and taxes to government; (h) Standard of living; (i) 
Wages. However, the impact is felt differently as that of the target is often massive compared 
to the sender. 
Since the main goal of economic sanctions is to limit resources available to a regime 
on which sanctions are imposed, the expected result is to force the regime to accept the 
policies for which sanctions are imposed. In order to achieve this goal, the party that imposes 
sanctions intentionally harm the civilian population of a sanctioned State or region by 
reducing their access to basic needs. The assumption of those who advocate for economic 
sanctions is that the locus of political power resides within the people of such countries, and 
that pressure on the people will induce them to vote out or overthrow their corrupt leaders. 
Contrary to this assumption, the locus of political power in most impoverished nations, such 
as Iran and Zimbabwe, lies within the entrenched tribal, religious and political class, who are 
willing to use whatever force necessary to protect their interests. Therefore, it is inapposite 
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for proponents of economic sanctions to impoverish civilians with the hope that economic 
hardship will instigate civil resistance against regimes or leaders of a target State. 
1.2. The basis for economic sanctions in the UN Charter 
The UN was founded against the background of World War II and following the 
failure of the League of Nations. Whilst the objective of the UN is to maintain international 
peace and security, there was a need to have a means in place to address conflict when it did 
arise. The means of dealing with such conflict was provided for in Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) with powers to decide measures to be taken should there be a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or an act of aggression’ in order to prevent that threat or breach from 
escalating (Article 39, UN Charter). Aside from the option of calling upon a transgressor to 
comply with provisional measures, the UN can take military actions under Article 42 or non-
military action under Article 41 (ibid). In my opinion, the provisions of Article 41 embodies 
David Kennedy’s assertion that reads “rather than operating as a stasis against violence, 
institutional energy must be harnessed to do the work of war without violence, or to deploy 
violence on behalf of peace” (Kennedy, 1987: 867). 
When we conceptualize the wording of Article 41, it becomes obvious that from the 
decision to give the UNSC such power with respect to the invocation of economic sanctions, 
their position within the UN framework would be reactionary. The predecessor to the UN, the 
League of Nations, also had provisions for economic sanctions in its Covenant (The 
Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919). Under Article 16 of the Covenant, members of the 
League of Nations were obligated to automatically cease economic relations with any State 
that was deemed to have committed an act of war against any other member. This created 
uncertainty as to how economic sanctions would actually be triggered (Farrall, 2007: 53). A 
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Committee of Jurists constituted by the League of Nations determined that the States 
themselves would be required to decide when an act of war had occurred that necessitated 
economic sanctions (Abi-Saab, 2001: 40). By making the above pronouncement, the 
Committee of Jurists provided Member States with leeway in determining when an act of war 
has occurred, resulting in the United States, France and Germany refusing to take part in the 
economic sanctions against Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia on grounds that it did not 
constitute an act of war (Scott 1973: 340).  
In contrast to the League of Nations, the UN Charter places the decision to invoke 
economic sanctions in the hands of the Security Council, with States only responsible at the 
point of implementing the measures that the UNSC decides upon. This provides a trigger 
mechanism as to when economic sanctions will be invoked. However, it leaves the power to 
invoke economic sanctions in the hands of a small minority of States and, as such, economic 
sanctions and other measures may be taken in circumstances that do not reflect the will of the 
majority of UN Member States. Under the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions adopted 
on non-procedural matters require the affirmative vote of all five permanent members of the 
Council plus at least four non permanent members (Article 27(3), UN Charter). This gives the 
five permanent member of the Security Council an absolute veto on the invocation of 
economic sanctions. Although not envisaged in the UN Charter, it has become accepted 
practice that the voluntary abstention from or non-participation in a UNSC vote does not 
prevent a non-procedural resolution from passing (Kaul, 2002: 34). This allows resolutions to 
pass in situations where States, although not rejecting the measures, are not offering their full 
support to them. Consequently, there is inherent concern on how decisions to impose 
sanctions on a particular country against another are being determined by the Security 
Council while at the same time; it undermines the credibility and justification for imposing 
some of the UN sanctions. 
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1.2.1. The purposes of economic sanctions  
The debate over the effectiveness of economic sanctions has been on-going over the 
years (Miyagawa, 1992). This thesis, therefore, does not deal with whether or not economic 
sanctions are per se effective. Nevertheless, for me to assess different sanctions episodes, the 
reasons why UN economic sanctions and other sanctions imposed by individual States like 
the US or regional organization such as the EU have developed in certain ways and the best 
way for them to progress in future, it is necessary to consider whether sanctions, as 
implemented, have been effective. It is also clear that, irrespective of how effective or 
ineffective they actually are, the use of economic sanctions measures has been favoured by 
the UNSC. Therefore, in order to consider their effectiveness, the possible purposes of 
adopting such measures by the UNSC need to be understood. In view of this, I analyse the 
principle purposes of economic sanctions from four different perspectives: coercion, 
punishment, symbolism and signaling. 
1.2.1.1. Coercion  
Coercive economic sanctions are taken in the belief that economic sanctions may 
persuade a State, person or entity to amend their behaviour. The intended coercive effect of 
economic sanctions taken within the UN framework is of the believe that they are capable of 
driving change in the behaviours of States and/or forcing States to abstain from actions 
threatening or breaching international peace and security (Murphy, 2011: 10). According to 
James Barber, in each case in which sanctions have been applied there appear at first sight to 
be clear objectives relating to changes in the behaviour of the government against whom they 
are directed and this position reflects UN continuous use of economic sanctions (Barber, 
1979: 368).  
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Over the years Security Council resolutions will always cite coercive reasons for 
invoking economic sanctions and this has raised comments that the generally accepted 
purpose and emphasis of such sanctions lies in modifying behaviour (Reinisch, 2001: 851). 
For example, during the economic sanctions taken against Libya, States were required to 
uphold the sanctions until such time as the UNSC determined that the Libyan Government 
had committed to ceasing all forms of terrorist action and assistance and responded to 
requests by various States in relation to the legal procedures related to the attacks carried out 
against Pan Am flight 103 and Union de transports aeriens flight 772 (UN Doc S/RES/748).  
Equally, economic sanctions were put in place against Haiti following the overthrow 
of the legitimate Government led by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Resolution 841 set out 
the measures, which it said would be put in place if attempts, being undertaken at that time by 
the UN Special Envoy for Haiti and the Organization of American States (OAS), to establish 
a political dialogue with the Haitian parties, failed (UN Doc S/RES/841). These examples 
show that UN economic sanctions are adopted for coercive purposes. However, further 
analysis shows that in practice the UN’s use of economic sanctions as coercive measures is 
somewhat uneven. For example, economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, which will 
be discussed in considerable detail in a later chapter, were clearly intended to have a coercive 
effect. They were put in place for the purpose of bringing an end to illegal white rule in 
Southern Rhodesia and remained in place until there was regime change at which point they 
were lifted (UN Doe S/RES/217). In contrast, economic sanctions against Iraq, were on their 
face arbitrarily coercive in that they were imposed for the purpose of forcing Iraq to withdraw 
from Kuwait, which it had invaded (UN Doc S/RES/661). However, even following its 
withdrawal from Kuwait, economic sanctions against Iraq remained in place. As such, it is 
clear that they were intended to have a purpose beyond coercion. 
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1.2.1.2. Punishment  
According to Foran (2008: 123), economic sanctions are intrinsically punitive. The 
adoption of the word “sanctions” in itself is minatory and connotes a form of punishment 
even in cases where the purpose of adopting them is not simply punishment (Charnovitz, 
2001: 95). The belief that economic sanctions are punitive in nature can be deduced from the 
US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s, speech in 2009, when she said: “Iran would, if 
diplomacy failed to bring about a favourable outcome, be subjected to crippling sanctions” 
(Reid, 2009). The above statement by Clinton clearly shows that sanctions are somewhat 
imposed as a form of deliberate punishment on the target. Another example of the punitive 
nature of economic sanctions is the case of reparations made by Germany contained in the 
Treaty of Versailles following World War I (Treaty of Versailles, 1919). In Part VIII of the 
Treaty, Germany accepted responsibility for causing all the loss and damage to the allied 
countries, to the associated governments and to their nationals and agreed to make 
compensation for damage to the civilian population of the allies and associated States and to 
their property. Compensation was available not only for damage caused by Germany itself 
but also damage caused by its allies (Murphy, 2011: 11).  
It may be important to state at this point that there is a divided opinion among 
scholars and commentators on whether the UN economic sanctions are punitive in their 
nature or not. Those who support the punitive nature of UN economic sanctions argue that for 
a State, person or entity to be punished it must have been involved in an action deemed 
wrong and for which it is punished. According to Abi-Saab (2001: 39), the UN economic 
sanctions are based on a “finding” of wrongdoing by the Security Council, which would be 
consistent with sanctions having a punitive function. Furthermore, Al-Anbari (2001: 371-
372) describes the invocation of UN economic sanctions under Articles 39 and 41 of the UN 
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Charter as tantamount to a judgment and final conclusion that a wrong has been committed. 
However, Crawford (2001: 57) holds a different view when he states that no international 
wrong need be committed in order for economic sanctions to be taken in accordance with the 
UN Charter. The suggestion of Crawford is that the Security Council may invoke sanctions 
measures not necessarily on “evidence” of a wrongful act but also by a mere “speculation” of 
an imminent one. 
Having provided views of different scholars on the punitive nature of economic 
sanctions, my personal opinion is that they possess punitive elements. To further prove my 
point, I present the UN economic sanctions against Iran as an example. The UN resolution to 
impose economic sanctions against Iran was a measure to deter Iran from developing nuclear 
technology that may eventually be used to produce nuclear weapons (UN Doc S/RES/1737). 
In the view of Western Countries such as the US, Britain, and France, Iran was at the verge of 
developing a nuclear weapon which may eventually be used against Israel. Thus, prompting 
the Security Council to invoke a resolution imposing economic sanctions aimed at forcing 
Iran to conform to the terms of the non-proliferation treaty. Although the sanctions aims at 
behavior modification with respect to the non-proliferation treaty however, they must also be 
perceived as having a punitive element as, whilst they are taken as a result of the failure to 
adhere to the terms of the treaty.  
The irony of the Iran’s case may be seen from the standpoint of sanctions measures 
not been taken against States that are known to have nuclear weapons and, as such, there is 
inherent condemnation of Iran itself, and not simply of its nuclear policies, in the invocation 
of UN economic sanctions against it. This brings us back to the point raised earlier in this 
thesis. The premise behind economic sanctions taken against States is that, once the civilian 
population feels their effects it will seek to change its leadership to one that behaves in 
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accordance with required norms or the sanctioning party or the international community as 
the case maybe. The problem however, with punitive economic sanctions is that they may 
have the undesired side effect of prompting the citizens of a country to offer support to the 
regime being targeted. Thus, they may serve as a “social glue” when the population of a 
sanctioned State unite against the foreigners (sanctioning State) who damage their country or 
simply what Johan Galtung referred to as “rally round the flag effect” (Galtung, 1967: 393) 
when citizens perceive that economic sanctions were unfairly or unjustly imposed against 
their country. This occurred in the initially stage of the sanctions in Southern Rhodesia when 
the white elite supported their government on the basis that the sanctions imposed on them 
were unreasonable. This behaviour modification led to economic sanctions being less 
effective in that instance than they would otherwise have been (Murphy, 2011). The punitive 
intent of economic sanctions may also be diminished in circumstances where a black market 
economy develops, as those involved in such a market may actually benefit from the impact 
of economic sanctions thus defeating their punitive intent (Burgsdorff, 2008: 31). 
1.2.1.3. Symbolism 
Economic sanctions have a symbolic value and may be established for the purpose of 
conveying a particular message rather than achieving a tangible result, such as persuading 
change in the behaviour of target or as a punishment for wrongdoing (Gus, 2013: 453). In my 
analysis, the symbolism of economic sanctions is in two folds. Firstly, they may be used to 
convey to a target that its behaviour is being viewed unfavourably. Secondly, they may be 
used to convey to the wider public, which has raised concerns about the target’s behaviour 
that their concerns are being taken seriously by the Sender State or organization. The later 
could be used as a way of achieving political point domestically or among allies of the 
sanctions imposing party. Hence, the symbolic value of economic sanctions may therefore 
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explain why they are sometimes taken in instances where they seem extremely unlikely to 
succeed. Apart from my personal opinion, other scholars share a similar view that economic 
sanctions are used for symbolic purposes. One of such scholars is Ivan Eland who states that: 
“policymakers believe sanctions have utility as foreign policy tools, even if stated compliance 
goals are not likely to be met” (Cortright and Lopez, 1995: 30). According to Eland, the 
statement of President Jimmy Carter at the time the US imposed grain embargo against the 
Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan, “seem to suggest that President Carter wanted 
to use sanctions to demonstrate US resolve and to deter the Soviets from further aggression 
into more strategic areas’” (Cortright and Lopez, 1995: 30). Thus, the grain embargo was of 
symbolic importance. He concluded his argument with the assertion “in an anarchic and 
chaotic international environment, symbolic goals are important and may even be vital” 
(Cortright and Lopez, 1995: 31).  
In a related view, James Barber writes that there are two aspects to symbolic 
sanctions, pointing out that first, symbolic sanctions demonstrate a willingness and capacity 
to act and second, they deflate criticisms (Barber, 1979: 380). Furthermore, he added that 
governments consider it very important to be perceived or seen by their citizens to be busy 
and concerned about them (Barber, 1979: 380). Therefore, sanctions can serve as a tool of 
public distraction for the government that employs them. This reflects the case where one 
State has invoked economic actions while others have to consider their own reputations in 
relation to whether or not they should take similar action. The above expression is in line 
with the opinion of Johan Galtung when he asserts thus:  
When military action is impossible for one reason or another, and when doing 
nothing is seen as tantamount to complicity, then something has to be done to 
express morality, something that at least serves as a clear signal to everyone 
that what the receiving nation has done is disapproved of. If the sanctions do 
not serve instrumental purposes they can at least have expressive functions” 
(Galtung, 1967: 412). 
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It should be noted, however, that not all scholars shares the opinion that economic 
sanctions are often invoked for symbolic purposes. One of such scholars who disagree with 
this theory is Daniel Drezner, when he argues that, “to say that the empirical support for the 
invocation of symbolic sanctions is weak at best and insignificant at worst” (Drezner, 1999: 
67). However, Drezner’s position has been criticized on two grounds. Firstly, Drezner 
believes that there is a single, visible motivation for economic sanctions. For example, 
Kimberly Ann Elliot’s position contradicts that of Drezner’s when she states that the actual 
goal of economic sanctions may have little or no correlation with the stated aim of behaviour 
modification and proposing such alternative goals as deterring third States from engaging in 
undesirable behavior. Instead it is often used to enhance the sender’s credibility amongst its 
allies’ and as a response to domestic political pressure (Elliot, 1995: 51). 
Therefore, in practice it is clear that economic sanctions do not always have a single 
goal and symbolism should not be disregarded as a secondary motivation behind their 
adoption. Secondly, Drezner’s argument is based on economic sanctions taken by a single 
State (Drezner, 1999: 104), and this expressly excludes sanctions taken by international 
organizations such as the UN, neglecting the fact that action taken by the UN or other 
international organizations are measures collectively agreed by States and they have a 
stronger symbolic value than sanctions taken by a single State. Whilst it is submitted here that 
economic sanctions can and do have symbolic purposes it must be noted that the symbolic 
purpose of sanctions episodes will not be indicated on the face of the resolution adopting 
such a measure and may not be readily apparent from consideration of the particular 
sanctions episode. 
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1.2.1.4. Signaling 
Another purpose of economic sanctions by either the UN or other bodies is rooted in 
an effort to convey a “signal” to the target that their behaviour is unacceptable and if not 
modified, they will be visited with a more compelling and/or aggressive force or measure. 
Thus, economic sanctions are used by the sender (international community or individual 
States) as a signal of subsequent drastic measure against the target such as the use of military 
force. According to Hufbauer; Schott and Elliott (1990), economic sanctions often serve as a 
minor and/or subordinate weapon in the arsenal of diplomatic artillery aimed at the target 
State. They contend that out of the 115 sanctions cases studied, 34 of them were accompanied 
with policies of either quasi-military and/or real military action (Hufbauer; Schott and Elliott, 
1990: 43). In essence, the idea of preceding or accompanying economic sanctions with threat 
or real military hostility proves beyond doubt that sanctions may sometimes serve as 
forerunner of a more devastating action. Thus, economic sanctions may be used as a signal to 
convince a target to accept the sender’s preference before launching military offensive.  
For example, following the inversion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, the United States and 
the United Nations imposed stringent economic sanctions on the later as a way of signaling 
their disapproval of the latter’s action taken against the former. The sanctions were combined 
with vigorous diplomacy and gradual military build-ups, subsequently; a full military action 
was launched against the country in 1991. According to Melby (1998), in the ensuing conflict 
between Iraq and Kuwait, economic sanctions serves as the only veritable tool that can 
“signal” outrage and determination to resist Saddam’s inversion and occupation of Kuwait. 
Apart from using sanctions to signal a target of more drastic measure to follow if it 
fails to comply with the demand of the imposing party, senders also use them to signal their 
ally that taken similar action is required of them. As Lisa Martin puts it, costly sanctions by a 
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great power often signify determination and consequently it motivates and encourages other 
States to join in the sanctioning effort or take similar action (Martin, 1992: 36-38). 
1.2.2. Characteristics of UNSC economic sanctions  
As noted earlier, the use of economic sanctions as a tool to deter aggression and 
restore international peace and security has been favoured by the United Nation Security 
Council. There are different theories as to the reasons for frequent use of sanctions instrument 
by the UNSC. The first reason preferred by scholars such as Nyun (2008: 466), is that 
sanctions in general are hardly challenged by citizens of the imposing country or group. The 
second reason is that economic sanctions are cost effective from the perspective of the sender 
when compared to war. Despite their widespread use, the consensus amongst many scholars 
is that sanctions do not achieve their stated policy objectives and therefore they are 
remarkably unsuccessful in respect to goal attainment. According to Robert Gilpin, “with 
very few exceptions and under highly unusual sets of circumstances, economic sanctions 
have historically proven to be an ineffective means to achieve foreign-policy objectives” 
(Bienen and Gilpin, 1980: 89) Looking beyond failure, economic sanctions have certain 
characteristics which will be discussed below.  
1.2.2.1. Binding and supreme 
The most significant characteristics of the UN economic sanctions is that they are 
binding on Member States and supersedes any other obligation or whatever decision any 
Member State considers to take. Noteworthy is that the decisions of the Security Council are 
made by a few member of the UN comprising of the five permanent member of the Security 
Council and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General 
Assembly. 
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The binding nature of the UNSC decision comes from the UN Charter. Article 41, 
which is the bedrock of sanctions does not itself place a clear obligation on Member States to 
implement UN economic sanctions, rather it states: “the Security Council may decide what 
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its 
decisions, and it may call upon the members to apply such measures.” The wording of this 
article clandestinely indicates that perhaps the Security Council may adopt the use of 
economic sanctions and “may call upon” Member States to implement the measures. 
However, Article 25 of the UN Charter states that, “Member States agree to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the [UN] Charter.” When the 
two articles are put together, it becomes evidently clear that Member States were intended, in 
seeking membership of the UN and signing up to the Charter, concede to follow and/or abide 
by the decisions of the UNSC, which would therefore make those decisions binding on all 
Member States (Nafziger and Wise, 1998). According Burdeau and Stem (2004: 197), the 
binding characteristics of UNSC decisions taken under Chapter VII has been borne out by 
UN practice, statements of courts and State practice. 
Although Article 25 and 41 of the UN Charter imply that Member States must adhere 
to Council decisions, Rosalyn Higgins (1972: 281), argues different and contend that in 
practice not all Council resolutions are considered binding. According to Higgins, the 
language used in the particular resolution as well as its context are considered indicative as to 
whether a resolution places obligations on Member States to undertake certain action or 
merely requests that they do so. For example, when adopting a resolution under Chapter VII 
or using the phraseology of Article 39 which states that “when a measure is taken as a result 
of a State breaching or threatening the peace or committing an act of aggression” is not 
determinative of the binding nature of that resolution (Higgins, 1972: 281).  
 78 
 
Although Higgins presented a logical position, however her argument has not proven 
to be the case with respect to economic sanctions where the only non-binding sanctions 
resolutions were those taken against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, which were not 
stated to be taken under Chapter VII and which clearly indicated that States were requested 
(rather than obliged) to take the measures contained within them (UN Doc S/RES/181). 
Subsequent resolutions have clearly stated that they are being taken under Chapter VII and 
have, therefore, been binding on all Member States (UN Doc S/RES/232). 
Although the binding nature of some of the Security Council resolutions is acceptable, 
my main concern is whether the Security Council is constrained in any way by international 
law when adopting resolutions, and if so to what extent. Another important issue I would 
want to point out is the fact that there is no provision for Member States to refuse to 
implement binding Council resolutions, even where the Security Council has acted beyond its 
powers and rationality, nor is there any provision for a review of such measures to ensure that 
Council has acted within its powers. Therefore, it is appropriate to say whether Member 
States are or are not bound by UN economic sanctions is totally in the discretion of the 
Security Council itself. In addition, the UNSC is obligated to implement resolutions that may 
contain binding economic sanctions and by consenting to the UN Charter, Member States are 
obliged to abide by these resolutions.  
Apart from being binding on all Member States, economic sanctions as part of 
Council resolution also take precedence over other obligations of Member States. Article 103 
of the UN Charter states that “in the event of conflict between the obligations of the Members 
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail” (Article 
103, UN Charter). This therefore clearly shows that UN obligations supersede the obligations 
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of States under any other international agreements. This position has also been accepted and 
adopted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
The supremacy of the UN obligations over that of States in respect to their domestic 
affairs or their commitment to any other international organization has been put to question. 
An example is the comment made by Iain Cameron when he asserts that “it is not possible for 
States to avoid constitutional/ international human rights obligations by creating an 
international body and delegating to it the power to do something they are unable to do by 
themselves” (Cameron, 2003: 170-171). Cameron’s argument is that, whilst States can accept 
the supremacy of some international norms over their own domestic norms, however, in the 
event that international law conflicts with that of a State and which may entail the State to do 
something against its own fundamental constitutional principles, then a State’s acceptance of 
the reasonableness of the international norm and/or claim is put sorely to the test (Cameron, 
2003). He further asserts that “it is an open question, when push comes to shove, which will 
be preferred” (Cameron, 2003: 171). To buttress his augment, he pointed to the example 
where the Security Council may mandate a State to indefinitely detain a suspect for terrorism 
attack or put such a person to death. Although the example provided by Cameron is 
unimaginable and I would add that it is impossible to consider such example in the light of 
international law with respect to death penalty, it is clearly evident that Cameron wants States 
to consider their UN obligations as supreme so long as they are also compatible with their 
other obligations and conform with their national or domestic principles. By making the 
above comment, Cameron implies that States could simply refuse to implement Security 
Council resolutions imposing economic sanctions on the grounds that they will violate human 
rights. In as much as this argument appears sensible, the truth is that it controverts the UN 
Charter which Member States subscribed to. The purpose of article 103 is that Member States 
must adhere and/or comply with their UN obligations in a situation of conflict with other 
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obligations since they have already consented to the supremacy of the UN obligation by the 
time they affirmed to the Charter. Therefore, it is completely contrary to any logic to suggest 
that article 103 ceases to apply in circumstances where there is a real conflict between 
domestic and UN obligations.  
Michael J. Matheson in his article “ICJ Review of Security Council Decisions” argues 
that the Charter of the UN prohibits the organization from intervening in the domestic matters 
of a State (Matheson, 2004: 622). Although Matheson may be making a logical argument, the 
reality however, is that the Security Council interprets or determines the meaning of Charter 
wording. In addition they decide actions to be taken in resolving a conflict. In any case, there 
is no clear system of international judicial review or any other mechanism to authoritatively 
determine the legality of Council action. This leaves the Security Council as the final legal 
arbiter of its own actions.  
According to Liivoja (2008: 604), Security Council resolutions have not made a clear 
connection between customary international law and Article 103. Liivoja argues that in some 
cases, Council resolutions with specific respect to economic sanctions have breached 
customary international law and yet the Security Council implemented such resolutions. Such 
a resolution is implemented on the basis that States are obliged to implement Council 
resolution in line with article 103 despite its conflict with international law. An example is 
the economic sanctions imposed against Iraq which caused high mortality rate and the death 
of many civilian (Ali and Shah, 2000: 120), thus breaching the right to life. Another example 
is the UN sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which was said to be 
enforced in order to maintain the status quo, limiting the possibility of self-defense through 
arms embargo and thus causing more deaths (Horowitz, 2005: 197). By putting in place 
binding economic sanctions that breach customary international law, the UNSC conveys the 
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message that States are required to fulfill their obligations under the UN Charter not only in 
cases of conflict with international agreements but also in cases of conflict with customary 
international law (Murphy, 2011: 26). Although in cases relating to economic sanctions, 
humanitarian exemption has been authorized, however they have proved to be ineffective in 
terms of having the capacity to contend humanitarian consequences that are facilitated by 
economic sanctions. 
1.2.2.2. Politics and self-interest 
The UN Security Council resolutions with respect to economic sanctions are marred 
by politics and self-interest. This can be seen from the way in which these resolutions are 
passed by the Security Council and adopted by the general assembly. By having a small 
number of countries taken decisions that are binding on the general assembly which is made 
up of 192 members inherently make the decision taken by the UNSC political. To support the 
claim that Council’s resolutions are marred by politics, I will present speeches made by UN 
ambassadors during and after Council debate on resolution allowing economic sanctions 
against Syria. Meanwhile, to refresh our minds, I provide an overview of the situation in 
Syria. On March 15, 2011, the people of Syria started a peaceful demonstration against its 
government led by President Bashar al-Assad (Sterling, 2012). The major reasons cited by 
the people of Syria being that they want change in the political structure of their country and 
also improvement in their human rights and well-being. In attempt to quell the situation and 
crush the demonstrators who were branded as terrorist, the Bashar al-Assad led government 
reacted with force. The reaction of the government soon became counterproductive, and 
instead escalated the situation into full blown civil war between government forces and the 
rebels. In an effort to persuade the al-Assad’s government to end the violence and stop further 
destruction of lives and property, the Security Council on July 19, 2012 moved motion to 
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impose economic sanctions on Syria (Nichols, 2012). The motion to put in place economic 
sanctions against Syria was moved by France and supported by Britain, the United States and 
eight other member of the Security Council while Pakistan and South Africa abstained from 
the vote. However, the motion was vetoed by China and Russia citing that economic 
sanctions cannot resolve the conflict in Syria. Furthermore, they argue that the conflict in 
Syria is an internal affair which does not necessarily threaten international peace and security. 
In the words of Russian ambassador, Vitaly I. Churkin:  
We simply cannot accept a document under Chapter VII, one which would 
open the path for pressure of sanctions and further to external military 
involvement in Syrian domestic affairs.” He added that “It is unacceptable to 
us in the form in which it is now being prepared, and we, of course, will not 
let it through.” And finally, he concluded by telling reporters outside the 
Council chambers that, “What they (implying Western countries) really want, 
is Mr. Assad’s downfall because that would severely weaken the influence of 
Iran, Syria’s only ally in the region (Gladstone, 2012).  
Feeling disappointed and embittered by the actions of China and Russia, British 
ambassador, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, told Council after the vote that Britain was “appalled by 
the decision of Russia and China to veto this resolution aimed at ending the bloodshed in 
Syria” (Gladstone, 2012). While the American ambassador Susan E. Rice, announced to 
Council that “we have missed yet another critical opportunity to work together,” and called it 
a “dark day” (ibid). Also disheartened by the politics going on within the Security Council, 
resulting to inability to pass a resolution imposing economic sanctions on Syria, the then UN 
envoy to Syria Mr. Kofi Annan said that he was “disappointed that, at this critical stage, the 
UN Security Council could not unite and take the strong and concerted action he had urged 
and hoped for” (Gladstone, 2012). The scenario that plays out in the Security Council 
meeting of July 19, 2012 between China, Russia and the rest of Council members is a clear 
indication that Council resolutions are characterized by politics and self-interest. 
Unfortunately, there was no such objection on Council resolution to take military action 
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against Libya which experienced similar violent situation or even less when compared with 
Syria in terms of casualties. The point I am making here is that the five permanent members 
of the Security Council are armed with a dangerous weapon called “veto” which they chose 
to use whenever it serves their interest. As long as they continue to hold and invoke their veto 
rights and power, Council decisions will always be subjective. To support my argument, I 
reiterate the assertion of John Stoessinger which reads: 
When approaching security or human rights issues at the UN, inter alia, States 
do not jettison their usual concerns with their own particular prerogatives and 
aspirations for power, influence, independence, national security, and material 
gain. In short, they bring to the Council their national experiences and 
preoccupations. When the Council deals with peace and justice issues, narrow 
national interests are rarely absent. If we assume the United States was 
genuinely interested in utilizing the UNSC to stop atrocities in Syria in 2012, 
we should probably also assume Washington would be satisfied that the fall of 
the Bashar al-Assad regime would deprive Iran of a principal ally. In that same 
case, if we assume Russia was genuinely interested in a proper interpretation 
of the UN Charter, we should probably also assume Moscow would want to 
prevent the fall of the Assad government - its only open ally in the Arab world 
(Forsythe, 2012: 4). 
Another example of the political and self-serving nature of the Security Council 
resolutions can be seen in China’s veto of a peacekeeping mission to Guatemala in 1997. 
China vetoed the decision for a peacekeeping mission in Guatemala purely on political 
grounds and self-serving agenda. According to a statement credited to the Chinese 
government spokesman, Shen Guofang “China did not object in principle to the provision of 
UN peacekeepers to Guatemala, it was forced to use its veto powers because of Guatemala’s 
stance on Taiwan” (Tyler, 1997). It is important to note that Guatemala has long recognized 
Taiwan and Mr. Shen added that “it (referring to Guatemala) could not expect on the one 
hand to do something that harms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China while on 
the other hand requesting China to cooperate in peacekeeping” (Tyler, 1997). The most 
contentious issue with respect to the political and self-serving nature of UN economic 
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sanctions is the veto powers of the Security Council permanent members which I pointed out 
earlier. These veto powers arose because of the belief of the great powers that they were 
somehow superior to the other States and that as they would have the responsibility for 
enforcing the UN Charter, they should have the ultimate decision as to when intervention in a 
given situation should take place (Schlesinger, 2003: 55). 
Concerned by the failure of the League of Nations which was to a large extent caused 
by lack of support from major powers, the UN was formed with a prior notion that the 
organization will provide an environment that will appeal and allure the support of major 
powers. Unlike the League of Nations, there was awareness amongst States that in order for 
the UN to succeed the great powers would have to remain within its framework (Claude, 
1984:147). Since the main reason for establishing the UN is to avert any further World War, 
apparently States were ready to concede to any demand including veto power as long as it 
will guarantee the support of the major powers for the organization. However, the fact that 
the veto powers of the US and the Soviet Union paralyzed the Security Council during the 
Cold War called into question the practicality of the veto. And there remains concern to date 
that the veto is too frequently used or invoked by the Security Council for political rather than 
substantive reasons in situations where UN action is necessary and that its continuous use 
may make the UN appear incoherent or impressionable (Arias, 2003: 1012). 
Furthermore, in the current geo-political situation where the permanent members of 
the Security Council (P-5) is no longer wholly representative of the strongest global military 
and economic powers, there are significant difficulties with the veto remaining in place. 
Firstly, it obviously gives those States more power than other Member States as they are 
involved in, and have the possibility of unilaterally quashing, all Council resolutions that deal 
with materially important issues. This has been criticized recently in light of the perceived 
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links between Russia and China and regimes that have been accused of distorting democratic 
process, sponsoring terrorism and development of weapon of mass destruction. Secondly, the 
veto puts permanent member of the Security Council above the law as they completely 
protects the P-5 from being subjected to the same rules as other Member States because each 
P-5 member can veto any proposed sanctions or other measures against itself (Hughes, 2007; 
Murphy, 2011: 28). These issues raised have subjected the P-5 and the Security Council to 
criticism as it is believed by critics that they are imposing their will and ideological beliefs on 
other States. 
1.2.2.3. Media driven 
The advancement in technology has changed the way people receive and analyse 
information. As former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali rightly pointed out, 
“television has changed the way the world reacts to crises” (Jakobsen, 2000: 131). In the past 
decades, the major sources of information were through radio broadcast or newspapers, 
whereas today news is available 24 hours through the internet and mostly on social media. 
The internet has provided the platform for citizen journalism. And thusly, social Medias are 
flooded with news images of events going on in different parts of the world and as a result the 
media has impacted on the adoption and use of economic and political sanctions. I subscribe 
to the opinion that increased use of sanctions instrument by the UN and perhaps other 
international organizations has to do with increased media attention. This is evident when we 
consider the case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1992 when the situation in 
Yugoslavia escalated to a crises point, the UN was already committed to its economic 
sanctions on Iraq, however, news report, particularly images of rape, ethnic cleansing and 
other atrocities being committed in Yugoslavia necessitated the UN to take action and 
prevent the situation from further deterioration (Devin and Dashti-Gibson, 1997: 155). As a 
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result of media pressure, the UN imposed economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, as an 
expression of concern and a desire to resolve the crisis (Murphy, 2011). 
Another example to illustrate how the media has impacted on the use of sanctions 
(though not economic sanctions in this particular case) is the UN sanctions against Somalia. 
From the late 1980’s until after the new millennium, Somalia and its neighbouring country 
Sudan were going through a similar crises situation. The crisis in Somalia caused the death of 
about 550,000 people while in Sudan the death was estimated at over 2 million and more than 
4 million people were displaced (Deng, 2001: 13). However, in April 1992 the UN passed 
resolution 733 and put in place sanctions against Somalia whereas no such measure was taken 
against Sudan. As Paul Kennedy notes, sanctions against Somalia as opposed to Sudan is a 
result of varying level of information available with respect to the two cases (Kennedy, 2006: 
233). In my opinion, sanctions imposed on Somalia by the UN were as a response to media 
outcry and not necessarily to ameliorate the situation in the country. 
The examples provided above clearly demonstrate that the media has a substantial 
influence on the adoption of sanctions instruments by the Security Council. The looming 
danger however, is on media censorship. Whilst the general public rely on the media for 
information, it will be tragic should the media be censored to produce information that may 
justify the adoption and use of sanctions. As such, media censorship will misguide and 
influence public perception and reaction over sanctioned States. Another challenge is that the 
media has turned to huge business run for profit maximization and competition among media 
houses is very high. The quest for “breaking news” has seen media houses and journalist 
fabricating news stories, thereby misinforming the public.  In 2004, a journalist by name Jack 
Kelley, who works for the US Today news media, was found to have fabricated substantial 
parts of some of his stories about the US war in Iraq (Morrison, 2004).  
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The media has not only impacted on the use of sanctions, but sanctions has also have 
impact on the media. The case of Zimbabwe is a typical example. Although the sanctions that 
are in place in Zimbabwe are not imposed by the Security Council, they affect the activities 
of news media in the country. Sanctions played a role in the outrageous level of inflation in 
the country, thus making newsprint and other forms of media communication very expensive. 
This resulted in many media houses winding up as they could not afford the cost of remaining 
in business. Furthermore, sanctions have almost resulted in international neglect on the affairs 
of Zimbabwe and by implication it provided Robert Mugabe’s government an easy 
opportunity to silence the remaining news media that spoke out in opposition to the 
government.  
1.3. Ambiguity in UNSC economic sanctions 
The ambiguity in the resolutions of the Security Council with respect to economic 
sanctions has been a subject of academic debate over the years. The first UN economic 
sanctions put in place against Southern Rhodesia has been challenged by scholars and 
observers on the basis that the situation in Rhodesia did not merit Article 39. Under Article 
39 of the Charter, the Security Council must determine that there is a “threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression” before taking action under Article 41 and Article 
42. The action of the Security Council became contentious, since the situation at the time in 
Rhodesia did not rise to the level of being a threat to international peace and security. Whilst 
the Security Council interpretation of the wording of the Charter is vague, the question that 
comes to mind is: why is there no precise definition of the terms being used in the UN 
Charter? According to Malcolm Shaw, the interpretation of the terms used in the UN Charter 
depends on each particular case and the political situation in the Security Council at that 
particular time (Shaw, 2008: 1237).  He added that the phraseology “threat to the peace” is a 
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very difficult term that lacks precise definition. As it is, one can only but guess that these 
terms were purposely left undefined during the drafting of the UN Charter in order to provide 
the Security Council with flexibility in the use of Article 41 and Article 42. 
Ordinarily, the situation in Rhodesia did not in any way comply with Article 39 with 
respect to breach of international peace and security. However, the Security Council deemed 
it justified to take action under Article 41 and 42. The case of Rhodesia was purely a 
domestic matter involving seizure of properties that was believed to be owned by the British 
and maintaining of racist policies by the Ian Smith led government. Although the actions of 
the white elite in Rhodesia contravene international law, they did not in any way constitute 
threat to the peace and security outside Rhodesian borders. The point being made here is 
collaborated by a statement credited to US Senator Harry F Byrd Jr during the hearing on the 
Rhodesian Chrome Statute when he queries: Whom has Rhodesia threatened? What nation 
has reason to fear an assault by this small African nation? (The Rhodesian Chrome Statute, 
1972: 58). Of course the answer is explicitly clear: Rhodesia is not a threat to the 
international peace. Also, when the matter was raised in the Security Council, Sir Patrick 
Dean, representing United Kingdom had this to say “my Government does not consider that 
there is any genuine question of a situation existing in Southern Rhodesia which the Security 
Council should deal with in discharge of its responsibility to the maintenance of international 
peace and security” (UN Doc S/PV/4385). 
Though the actions of the Ian Smith regime violate international law, the Charter did 
not permit the use of economic sanctions for an internationally wrongful act which ordinarily 
did not breach the peace and security. However, a breach of international law might add 
support to the decision to impose sanctions. 
 
 89 
 
1.3.1. Counting successes and failures; argument of the sanctions advocates 
Literature on economic sanctions concludes that sanctions are a weak policy 
instrument. Records reveal that economic sanctions imposed before and during the Cold War 
failed more often than they succeeded (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, 1990). Against its track 
record of failure, proponents of sanctions uphold that they are and remain effective 
instrument of international diplomacy and their success and effectiveness depends on the 
barometer used to measure each particular sanctions episode. Furthermore, they argue that 
both the record and the available literature underestimate the likely effectiveness of economic 
sanctions particularly in post-Cold War. Available record shows that between 1914 to 1989 
about 115 sanctions episodes where impose or threatened to be imposed by the United States 
and other international institutions (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, 1990). Proponents of 
sanctions such as Elizabeth S. Rogers argue that the ineffectiveness or failure of sanctions 
were as a result of them being implemented as a partial measures that omitted important 
forms of punishment. For example, freezing assets, which she argues is a very strong 
sanctions mechanism, was rarely used. Apart from that, Rogers contend that many of the 
sanctions were imposed unilaterally by the United States making it easy for targets to escape 
their impact. In addition, these unilateral sanctions particularly the ones imposed by the 
United States were undertaken largely for symbolic reasons and given their unilateral and 
partial nature, there was little reason or expectation that they would succeed in causing the 
target State to change its behaviour (Rogers, 1996: 6).  
Furthermore Rogers, put forward that available sanctions literature suffers from three 
biases that cause it to underestimate sanctions effectiveness. First is that success of sanctions 
are narrowly measured, using barometers that substitute successful efforts as failure. The 
argument being made here is that sanctions fulfill three policy objectives. First, it compels 
 90 
 
change in behavior of target. Second, they are employed as a tool to weaken the target, 
thereby making it incapable of making trouble. Third, sanctions are used not necessarily as a 
punishment but as deterrence to a third party. Sanctions could be used as deterrence to a third 
party country in the sense that when they (third party country) see the consequences suffered 
by regimes placed under sanctions, they tend to avoid any action that will impel using such 
measure on them (Baldwin, 1985). A widely held opinion among proponents of sanctions is 
that sanctions literature adjudged it according to only the first of these objectives, behavior 
change. Thus, it qualifies as failures cases where sanctions successfully weakened or 
punished the target, and since many sanctions are undertaken largely for these purposes, it 
underestimates the effectiveness and success of sanctions. 
Second, the focal point of the literature is on the ability of imposed sanctions to 
influence or compel a desired change in the target behavior, while it understudy whether the 
threat of sanctions can deter the target from taking a certain action. Hence, sanctions are 
assessed from the standpoint of achieving compellence in behaviour change without recourse 
to its ability to achieve deterrence. According to French (1996), part of the reason for 
sanctioning Haiti in 1991 and Niger in 1996 after military coups in these States were to deter 
other countries from taking similar action. Hence the sanctions imposed on both countries 
should be judged on their merit as successful. 
Third, the literature base its conclusion mostly on cases in which sanctions were 
unilaterally or partially imposed. Therefore, it underestimates the possible effectiveness of 
comprehensive sanctions (Rogers, 1996: 6). Most of the US unilateral sanctions were 
imposed on countries that violated human rights, those working to acquire nuclear weapons 
and others that pledged support to groups and/or organizations branded as terrorist in nature 
(Nyun, 2008: 467). These three categories account for 74 percent of the forty-six US 
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economic sanctions imposed between 1973 and 1990 and largely account for the poor 17 
percent sanctions success rate that Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott reported for the US during 
this period. Therefore using the failure of these unilateral or partial sanctions as a predictor of 
sanctions success is problematic and arguably incorrect.  
Sanctions advocates also challenge the status quo argument, that economic sanctions 
do have deleterious effect on the innocent civilians in the target country, and thus violate a 
moral proscription on injuring political innocents (Damrosch, 1993: 274; Rogers, 1996: 15). 
They propose two main points to this criticism. First, they argue that whilst the humanitarian 
consequences on perhaps innocent civilians are a weakness to sanctions use, the cost 
however, should be analysed in relation to the benefits that sanctions provide. In the words of 
Pamela Constable, “the value of avoiding harm to innocents is not absolute, and should give 
way if the benefits of sanctions are greater” (Constable, 1992: 54). Second, they contend that 
no matter the extent which economic sanctions harm the civilian population of a target State, 
its impact cannot be compared to the use of alternative policy instrument such as military 
force (Rogers, 1996: 16). 
Furthermore, proponents of sanctions allege that critics hold on to two main 
arguments. First is the case of Iraq, which is often cited as example of where sanctions could 
not oust Saddam Hussein from office. Secondly, is the conclusion that sanctions failed to 
persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait during the 1990-1991 crisis. The first point according 
to Rogers (1996) puts sanctions above its potential standard of performance in the sense that 
entrenched leaders like Saddam cannot easily be removed from office by mere sanctions. 
Supporting her argument, Rogers pointed to the fact that while economic sanctions failed to 
remove Saddam, other measures such as military force did not succeed either. Summing up, 
she posits that the failure of sanctions to overthrow Saddam did not mean that they failed; 
 92 
 
rather, it implies they were only partially successful in Iraq. Nevertheless, this should not 
recondite other success made by sanctions (Aspin, 1990: 862-863).   
The second point is that sanctions failed to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Proponents of 
sanctions believe that this argument is weak and unfounded because the sanctions were not 
allowed ample time to serve its intended purpose. The forecast made by sanctions advocates 
during the pre-war Gulf crisis is that it will take a minimum of one year before sanctions can 
compel a change in the policy of Iraq (Aspin, 1990: 863) but US President George Bush 
opted to deploy military option within six months into the crisis. Advocates of sanctions 
therefore blamed the failure of sanctions in achieving its intended purpose of forcing Iraq out 
of Kuwait on lack of time needed for the measure to be effective.  
In conclusion, sanctions advocate believes that sanctions measures are still effective 
and can be used for the purpose of deterring actions deemed contrary to international norm 
and also prevent deadly conflict. The case of Haiti (1991 to 1994) and Yugoslavia (1992 to 
1995) are cited as examples that could replicate. They contend that the two cases Haiti and 
Yugoslavia represent comprehensive rather than unilateral and/or partial efforts to bring 
sanctions to success. The breadth of the tactics employed in implementing these sanctions 
expresses the senders’ commitment and seriousness of purpose with respect to achieving 
intended result. In each case, there was a broad international support for the sanctions effort 
and all available economic sanctions measures were deployed (trade cutoffs, aid cutoffs, and 
financial sanctions). In addition, the sanctions were complimented with other policy 
instruments (for example, force or threat of force). To proponents of sanctions, these two 
cases represent that economic sanctions are valid and can accomplish its goals if they are 
implemented with total support of the sender States. 
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1.3.2. Employing sanctions as a tool of regime change  
Records reveal that 46 percent of the sanctions imposed in the period between 1914 
and 2000 were aimed at promoting democracy, thus pushing autocratic or even despotic 
regimes out of power (Oechslin, 2013: 2). Although we have witnessed an increase in the use 
of economic sanctions as a policy instrument since the Cold War, yet our knowledge about 
how they might foster regime change and democratization is very limited. As Mack and Khan 
(2000: 281) writes, there is a widely held belief that “the pain inflicted by sanctions on 
citizens of target States will cause them to pressure their government into making the changes 
demanded by the sanctioning body.” Nonetheless, there has remained no comprehensive 
research work that explains the exact channels through which sanctions are supposed to 
promote democratization. The lack of empirical proofs on how sanctions will directly 
influence democracy and improve the welfare of civilians in target States presents a huge 
case against sanctions imposed for regime change. I would rather say that our understanding 
of the mechanisms determining the likelihoods of success and failure remain 
incomprehensive. 
When we closely analyse sanctions aimed at regime change, one particular thing that 
is obvious is the fact that targeted regimes make no effort at reducing the negative impact of 
the measure on its citizens. Rather they strengthen their resolve. In many cases, the regime 
responds by pursuing policies which severely compound the sanctions induced hardship on 
the general population (Mack and Khan, 2000: 281). As Peksen, 2009; Wood, 2008 writes, 
the often seen consequences of sanctions is that it triggers a targeted regime to commit more 
human rights violations and to increase repression. An example is UN sanctions imposed 
against Haiti from 1991 to 1994 and Iraq from 1990 to 2003 where the government disrupted 
the economic activity by aggressively cutting the supply of public services or by directly 
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inhibiting people from pursuing their businesses (Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010). In the 
case of Iraq, Mueller and Mueller (1999: 49) write “the country’s political leadership 
sometimes seems more interested in maximizing the nations suffering [...] than in relieving 
it.” Apart from Iraq, a similar strategy was adopted by the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe. 
After the enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) by 
the US congress in 2001, the Mugabe led regime instead responded with a “promise” to 
accelerate and expand the implementation of his catastrophic economic policies (The 
Economist, 2002).  
My opinion is that in an autocratic regime where the leaders have substantial leeway 
to implement any policy of their choice, it is inapposite to assume that sanctions can effect 
regime change. The point I am making here is that when sanctions measure are put in place in 
such a country, the government may choose to hamper the provision of public goods and 
services and also the productivity of private firms, thus affecting the citizens’ income. At the 
heart of my argument is that sanctioned regimes may use the supply of public goods as a 
defense mechanism. To put this into perspective, let us consider a regime such as Iraq that 
was placed under sanctions. Since the intention of the sender States was to use sanctions as a 
tool to facilitate a change to democracy, obviously the end result will be beneficial to the 
ordinary citizens. Thus, the political calculation is that sanctions will stimulate previously 
reluctant citizens into action of revolt against the government. The problem that I see here, 
which is often neglected by the literature is that the ruling elite will usually adopt strategies 
that will discourage any challenges from the citizenry by making challenges more costly. 
How is this possible? According to Oechslin (2013: 4), the straightforward way to do so is to 
decrease the supply of public goods. When the supply of public goods is hampered, the 
citizens’ incomes are lower; the result will be that a given cost associated with a revolt 
translates into a bigger loss in terms of instantaneous utility. This strategy was successfully 
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utilized by the Haitian and Iraqi governments. In particular, the Saddam Hussein led 
government strategy to impoverish the middle class was instrumental in preventing a serious 
uproar and/or challenges against the regime.  
My conclusion therefore is that dictators or autocratic leaders are self-interested actors 
who want to maximize their probability of remaining in power. The optimal response, then, 
to international sanctions will be repression on dissidents using all means available in the 
regime’s arsenal. Apart from that, using sanctions as a tool of regime change may face other 
challenges in the sense that they may in fact leverage the leader’s finances. Escribà-Folch 
(2009: 9) while referencing Kaempfer et al. (2004); Lektzian and Souva (2007), posits that 
the often neglected challenge of imposing economic sanctions on a dictator is that the 
scarcity, trade alteration and other imbalances resulting from sanctions generate rents for 
sanctioned dictators. If that is the case, sanctions would potentially improve the finances of 
the leaders and thus provide them with the capacity to maneuver and/or buy off political 
support. For example, the report by Independent Inquiry Committee (IIC) into the United 
Nations Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP) reveals that within 1990 to 2003, the 
administration of Saddam Hussein’s was able to earn over US$11 billion from the sale of oil 
in the black market (BBC News, 2004). That is to say those sanctions created an opportunity 
for the regime to strengthen its financial hold. I am not in any way engaging sanctions to the 
point that they have no effect on a dictator rather my point is that their impact with respect to 
ousting a dictator from power may be circumstantial. As Bates (2008) notes, sanctions affect 
some of the major sources of revenue to a dictator such as foreign aid and tax on international 
trade, which in most cases are sources of funding the leaders “patronage networks.” 
However, cancellation and/or suspension of aids to a dictator will have significant impact if 
only the economy is highly dependent on foreign aid. The strategies examined above have 
shown the weaknesses of sanctions as a tool of implementing regime change whilst it account 
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for the reason why sanctions may fail to remove an autocratic regime, as the ruling elite may 
employ starvation as a defense mechanism against the population thereby dampen any 
possibility of a revolt. 
1.3.3. Economic Sanctions as neo-colonialism 
At the end of the Gulf war, observers held high expectations for a reinvigorated 
Security Council and indeed the Council showed willingness to work with various partners in 
promoting human rights inside State boundaries. However, an undertow of concern 
manifested itself. Russia and China perceived Council actions, many of which were initiated 
by the United States and its close allies, as beneficial to Western national interests. Apart 
from Russia and China, developing countries were not comfortable with Western dominance 
of the Security Council functioning. As David Forsythe puts it:  
Developing countries recalling their experiences with Western colonialism or 
other negative experience with Western States were not always supportive of 
what they sometimes saw as Western moralistic crusading [...]. They perceive 
Council’s expansive and intrusive action as a form of neo-colonialism in 
which the same old Western powers sought to dictate the internal affairs of 
weaker States” (Forsythe, 2012: 4). 
The continuous use of economic sanctions as a policy tool mostly on countries of the 
South is viewed by some scholars and commentators from the standpoint of neo-colonialism. 
In the words of Kuthula Tawanda, call it whatever you like, a process and/or measure that 
predicates economic control via disproportionate foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
tantamount to re-colonisation (The Herald, 2013). The FDI serves as a “steroid” to any 
economy as it provides the much needed foreign investment from multinational companies, 
thus it strengthens the economy by providing finances, creating jobs and development of 
infrastructures. When a country is denied of this vital economic tool by another, then the 
answer is re-colonisation (The Herald, 2013). 
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If we consider the on-going US targeted sanctions and EU restrictive measures on 
Zimbabwe, one may probably have a good example to present. Sanctions against Zimbabwe 
started in 2001 with the enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act 
(ZIDERA) by the US congress. The major reasons cited by the US and the EU for their 
sanctions have been an issue of controversy between the regime in Zimbabwe and the 
Western Countries that imposed them. However, no-matter whose reason is right or wrong 
the sanctions are being perceived by some commentators as neo-colonialism mostly for the 
discrepancies in the reasons provided by the sanctions imposing party and the tactics used in 
implementing the sanctions. The most inordinate part of the sanctions is their enforcement in 
alliance with Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs). These MFIs are forbidden to provide 
any sort of financial assistance to Zimbabwe unless permitted by the President of the United 
States, even when the sanctions were supposed to be targeting only a few selected 
individuals. Ironically, Western countries uphold that mismanagement is solely responsible 
for Zimbabwe’s economic mess. Gregory Elich in his article: The Battle over Zimbabwe’s 
Future differs in opinion when he asserts that Western economic sanctions against Zimbabwe 
followed well-established patterns; soften the target nation with sanctions and cripple the 
economy. Blame the resulting economic disaster on government “economic mismanagement” 
(Elich, 2007). Ironically, the claims made by Western countries is that they want democracy 
in Zimbabwe, turned out to be a fallacy following democratic elections held in the country on  
July 31, 2013, instead the claim of the regime that it is being haunted for its land reform 
policy seems forthright (Elich, 2007).   
1.3.4. Major criticisms of UNSC Sanctions  
UN economic sanctions have been criticized by scholars, analyst and even the UN 
leadership for a number of reasons. The major criticism came in the aftermath of 
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overwhelming humanitarian consequences of sanctions on Iraq. The inability of the UN to 
substantially mitigate civilian suffering in Iraq raised many questions, yet no plausible 
answer has been provided. This section of the thesis reviews some of the major criticisms of 
economic sanctions. Before I proceed, a statement credited to the former UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan, on the situation in Iraq reads as follows: 
Let me conclude by saying that the humanitarian situation in Iraq poses a 
serious moral dilemma for this Organization. The United Nations has always 
been on the side of the vulnerable and the weak, and has always sought to 
relieve suffering, yet here we are accused of causing suffering to an entire 
population. We are in danger of losing the argument, or the propaganda war - 
if we haven’t already lost it - about who is responsible for this situation in Iraq 
- President Saddam Hussein or the United Nations (Gowlland-Debbas, 2001: 
16). 
1.3.4.1. Ethical dilemma 
Economic sanctions are widely perceived to hurt the civilian population of target State 
while sparing the political leaders (Kondoch, 2001: 270). The inability of economic sanctions 
to differentiate between the leaders, common civilians and ordinary bystanders is an issue 
that requires consideration. This has set the motion for debate on possible ways in which 
humanitarian cost of economic sanctions could be resolved. In the words of a former UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, sanctions are a “blunt instrument” (Wilson, 2014: 
102). Apart from Boutros-Ghali, NGOs such as the International Federation of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies, in their 1995 World Disaster Report expressed concern about the 
humanitarian impact of sanctions and queried the morality behind the continued use of such 
punitive measure by the UN (Kondoch, 2001: 242). Although when sanctions are imposed, 
certain measures allowing humanitarian exemptions for essential needs such as food and 
medicine are put in place, however they do not substantially mitigate sanctions impact. As 
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discussed in a later part of this chapter, humanitarian exemptions, which is a term used in war 
situation has, a track record of being ineffective in mitigating humanitarian sufferings. 
Therefore, the prospect of the same measure in mitigating the humanitarian outcome of 
economic sanctions is in my opinion is questionable. A UN study on the impact of armed 
conflict on children reveals that: 
Humanitarian exemptions tend to be ambiguous and are interpreted arbitrarily 
and inconsistently [...]. Delays, confusion and the denial of requests to import 
essential humanitarian goods cause resource shortages. While these effects 
might seem to be spread evenly across the target populations, they inevitably 
fall most heavily on the poor (UN Doc. A/51/306: 128).  
In light of the above revelation, it becomes illogical for anyone to believe that 
humanitarian exemptions will fully mitigate the impact of economic sanctions on the civilian 
population of a target State. The reason being that in time of war military facilities are the 
target of the enemy combatant while in economic sanctions the economy of a State is the 
prime target. Since it is apparent that the economy of every State is the life-wire of its 
citizens, therefore sanctions measures taken against any State are a direct coercion against its 
citizens. Thus we can say that an economic sanction against a State is a deliberate injury 
inflicted on its citizens. Apart from my personal opinion, other organizations including UN 
agencies have voiced out their opinion on the humanitarian dilemma resulting from economic 
sanctions. An example is the December 1997 report of the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights which noted that, “more attention needed to be paid to 
safeguarding the rights of the vulnerable in target countries and that sanctions might violate 
basic economic, social, and cultural rights” (Bothe and Kondoch, 2001: 271). The ethical 
dilemma of economic sanctions as outlined brings their utility to question, however, my hope 
is that they will play a role in the UN modification of its sanctions in a way that curtail their 
impact on the civilian population. 
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1.3.4.2. Double standards 
Another criticism of the Security Council sanctions is that they are based on biased 
standards. Proponents of this argument suggest that sanctions are targeting impoverished 
country of the South. For example, Kondoch (2001: 272) writes that all Security Council 
sanctions except on the former Yugoslavia are targeted at countries of the South. Kondoch’s 
argument seems true and there are evidences to support same. One example is the case of 
Iraq-Kuwait War and the subsequent economic sanctions against Iraq. On August 2, 1990 
Iraq invaded Kuwait on the allegation that the later was stealing its petroleum through slant 
drilling. Following the inversion, the Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iraq 
(Browne, 2003: 3). Whilst the action of the Security Council is recommendable, no such 
measures were taken in other cases where a country invaded another for purpose of 
occupying them. The case of Israel-Palestine, Turkey-Cyprus, China-Tibet serves as stack 
examples. 
1.3.4.3. Missing legal and constitutional concept 
Positivists have expressed their concern about the compatibility of economic 
sanctions with the international human rights law. This concern is raised by the lack of 
institutional arrangements within the UN to objectively address the humanitarian impact of its 
sanctions effectively (Kondoch, 2001: 272-273). As the concern grows, the Russian 
Federation presented a working paper to Council challenging the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions, stressing that each particular sanctions episode must clearly define its objectives 
and purposes. In addition they must have a time frame and being regularly reviewed against 
their intended goal (UN Doc. A/AC182/L100). Apart from Russia, report of other committees 
and organs of the UN have challenged the utility of economic sanctions. One of such report is 
the “Bossuyt Report” which was prepared at the request of the UN on how to modify and 
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improve its sanctions policy. The report recommended six steps the Security Council should 
adopt to effectively evaluate each sanctions episode. According to the report, the first step is 
to validate the reasons provided for adopting a particular sanctions episode. This implies 
evaluating the stated reasons for imposing sanctions against the established international legal 
framework, making sure that they stand in line with the international human rights law. The 
second step is that sanctions must be effectively directed to parties whose actions and 
behaviour violate or breach international norm and not on the ordinary civilians that has 
nothing to do with the very actions that impelled the use of sanctions. Third, the Security 
Council must make sure that humanitarian goods are not object of target by sanctions. The 
fourth and fifth steps are that sanctions should have limited time frame for it to be effective. 
The sixth and final step is that the UN must take into account the opinion of NGOs, scholars, 
intergovernmental bodies and the general public (Bossuyt Report, 2000).  
Despite suggestions by activists, scholars and UN organs on the impact of economic 
sanctions on civilians, particularly how they violate and/or impair the basic rights of the 
entire population of a targeted State, the Security Council has continually employed this 
violence policy tool to protect the same human rights they violate. 
1.3.4.4. Lack of effectiveness 
The effectiveness of sanctions has been an issue of heated debate within the academic 
circles in the last two decades (Hufbauer; Schott; Elliott and Oegg, 2007; Mack and Khan 
2000; Elliot 1995; Pape 1997; Portela 2008). Generally, the effectiveness of sanctions is 
measured by their impact on the target. However, the obstacle faced in determining the 
success and failure of sanctions is not just the methodological challenges in measuring 
sanctions effectiveness, but also some debates about definitions and the right criteria to 
measure effectiveness (Pape 1997; Elliot 1998; Grebe, 2010:10). Overall, more attention is 
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given to the primary objectives of sanctions, while the secondary or undeclared objectives are 
often neglected, resulting in difficultly to ascertain explicit assessment of sanctions episodes. 
1.4. Economic Sanctions: changing perceptions and euphemisms 
 Economic sanctions as a mode of coercion in international relations have been 
resuscitated in recent years, and this has prompted interest of scholars and analysts 
(Davidsson, 2002: 1). Why have such measures become so popular? One possible answer is 
that economic sanctions have become a means of exerting international influence by powerful 
States and organizations. Most importantly, economic sanctions face less resistance compared 
to war, from the citizens of the State or the organization imposing them (Nyun, 2008: 66). 
Unlike war, economic sanctions attacks the economy of a target State, while avoiding human 
casualties (such as death of soldiers) on the side of the State or group of States that employ 
such coercive measures. In other words, economic sanctions cost little to the side imposing 
the sanctions (Nyun, 2008: 67). Other reasons for the continuous use of economic sanctions 
are because it is a coercive tool for economically powerful States who themselves are 
immune to such measures. To back this assertion, I examine how economic sanctions have 
been perceived, justified or criticized. It is important that we understand how economic 
sanctions intend to achieve their end goals. This understanding will guide us toward a 
simplistic and misleading view that such measures are a humane alternative to military force. 
For this reason, I posit my argument on economic sanctions from the perspective of measures 
intended to impair economic life within a given territory, through restrictions on trade and 
finance. 
1.4.1. Brief history of the debate on economic sanctions  
Scholarly debate on economic sanctions before 1990, were centred on a few number 
of sanctions episodes in that period. The Arab oil boycott, the UN sanctions against Rhodesia 
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after the Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI), the sanctions imposed on the South 
African apartheid regime and trade restrictions imposed on the Socialist bloc (Conlon, 1995). 
In this period, economic sanctions were perceived as a soft approach in international 
diplomacy and received the support of pacifists. The question is why economic sanctions 
were acceptable in this period? Michael Reisman provides a possible answer to this question 
when he asserts thusly: 
Economic sanctions have enjoyed great popularity among people of a 
pacifistic bent, because they seem to offer wholly non-violent and non-
destructive ways of implementing international policy. Such assumptions are 
unfounded. The apparent reason for this persistent blind spot has been the 
incorrect assumption that only the military instrument is destructive. The 
assumption that non-military strategies are inherently non-destructive or 
nonlethal has also insulated their prospective and retrospective appraisal in 
terms of basic human rights instruments. The consequences of this blind spot 
can be very grave (Reisman, 1995: 354). 
The above statement by Michael Reisman brings us back to the assertion of John Paul 
Lederach (2005) in his book, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace. 
As explained by Lederach, we operate a system in which violence is used to confront 
challenges and conflict and, as a result, any approach perceived to be less violent is accepted 
as a soft alternative. The acceptance of economic sanctions before 1990 was premised on the 
fact that it helped prevent the sudden death of civilians caused by military bombardment; 
however, it neglects the untold hardship and eventual death caused by the very measure. In 
my opinion, the successes of economic sanctions do not in any way justify the hardship and 
suffering that they inflict on the civilian population. What we need is an overhaul of the 
present global system and the adoption of our moral imagination of peace as a tool that can 
foster durable and transformative peace. 
Authors such as Doxey, (1996); Hufbauer and Oegg, (1999) has written extensively 
on economic sanctions, providing analysis of their impact on ordinary citizens particularly 
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their impact on the vulnerable members of the society. Doxey emphasizes the theoretical 
aspects of the subject matter, while Hufbauer and his colleagues give incisive analysis of the 
116 sanctions episodes between 1914 and 1990. Furthermore, to bring the impact of 
economic sanctions to the public limelight, scholarly debate was organized by university 
scholars in the United States, moderated by Richard B. Lillich (Davidsson, 2002: 2). Scholars 
who participated in the debate include, Gordon Christenson, Jane Chalmers, David Caron and 
Pierre M, Dupuy among others. 
The essence of this debate was to provide insight into the impact and consequences of 
economic sanctions on civilians, within a university environment. It became imperative to 
convene such a debate due to the divisions in the opinions of university scholars in the United 
States on the use of economic sanctions. The goal of the debate was to analyse the 
instruments of economic sanctions and also to analyse their causes and effects. The outcome 
of the debate, reflected the ambivalent attitudes towards economic sanctions prompted by the 
Arab oil boycott, which was characterized by negative consequences (Lillich, 1976). 
Furthermore, it condemned economic sanctions imposed on developing countries by the 
United States. A unanimous decision from the debate is that economic sanctions impede 
economic development in target States, which are usually impoverished countries (Lillich, 
1976). However, some advocates of economic sanctions still emphasize the claim that they 
were successful on the apartheid regime in South Africa and insist that they can also be 
successful in other situations. Additionally, they claim that in the absence of war, economic 
sanctions fulfil a gap in international relations (Davidsson, 2002: 1). 
1.4.2. Economic sanctions debate in the 1930’s 
 In the 1930’s the debate on economic sanctions focuses on aggression. The resonating 
question at that point in time was: what can the international community do in the face of 
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major powers attacking other countries with the clear intent of occupying them? The First 
World War saw the application of sanctions against the allied countries of the continent. 
Following the War sanctions gained prominence, subsequently, sanctions policy and 
instrument became a major issue of discussion in the 1930’s (Wallensteen, 2000: 1). The 
conclusion after the First World War was that economic sanctions put in place against 
Germany was successful. It was believed that German imperial armies were not militarily 
defeated; rather it was the citizens at home that succumbed, due to the economic pressure put 
on the Wilhelminian regime. Consequently, economic sanctions became acceptable as an 
important tool of international diplomacy in the Convent of the League of Nations 
(Taubenfeld, 1958; Walters, 1965). In the 1960’s however, a new intensive debate emerged, 
resulting from the acclaimed success of sanctions in Rhodesia and South Africa. Sanctions 
debate in this period focus on decolonisation (Walters, 1965). The 1990’s witnessed a 
repeated interest in sanctions debate and this time it was referred as the “new wars.” This era 
of debate was triggered by the disastrous economic sanctions against Iraq. These three stages 
of sanctions debate are interesting in themselves, whilst they represent the on-going evolution 
of peace thinking. In addition, they create new political practices. 
1.4.3. Economic sanctions debate in the 1960’s to 80’s 
 The UN economic sanctions in the 1960’s to 1980’s were for decolonisation purpose 
(Wallensteen, 2000: 3). The debate in that particular time focussed on two cases. First, it was 
on the UN economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in 1965, following the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Ian Smith regime. Second, was on the UN 
economic sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa during the 1980’s. These 
two cases where remarkable in the sense that they were adjudged to be successful by the 
international community and even those of the pacifist bent. Also in this period, other 
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countries were placed under sanctions by major powers outside the framework of the UN. For 
example, sanctions were put in place against Cuba and the Dominican Republic by the United 
States, while Albania and China were under USSR sanctions (Wallensteen, 1968: 247; 
Wallensteen, 2000: 2). In all the cases mentioned, none was related to territorial aggression, 
instead, they have to do with foreign policies pursued by these countries, how the regime 
treated its citizens or the threats they may have posed to neighbouring countries.  
 The acclaimed success of sanctions in both Rhodesia and South Africa provided a 
boost to economic sanctions, paving way for their acceptance as a vital tool of international 
diplomacy and measuring it as a humane alternative to the use of military force. Although 
economic sanctions were gaining wide support, the Cold War dampened the UN from 
imposing more sanctions. The reason being that the two world powers United States and 
Russia were busy luring countries to their side while at the same time offering protection to 
brutal regimes as long as they were ready to tow their part. The end of Cold War however, 
ushered in a new era that favours sanctions as an important foreign policy tool. 
1.4.4. Economic sanctions debate after 1990 
The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the subsequent rise of the United States as the 
world super power, led to a series of changes in the international agenda. This change was 
reflected in the working of the United Nations Security Council and the adoption of unilateral 
hegemonic policies towards other States (Davidsson, 2002: 2). On August 6, 1990, the 
Security Council imposed stringent economic sanctions on Iraq and began what David 
Cortright and George A. Lopez called “The Sanctions Decade” (Cortright and Lopez, 2000). 
The UN Security Council, between 1990 and 2000 imposed economic sanctions on a number 
of countries, including Iraq, Haiti, Libya, former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Angola, 
Cambodia and Afghanistan. Other types of non-economic sanctions, particularly arms 
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embargoes and diplomatic sanctions, were imposed on some other countries, including Iraq in 
1990; Somalia in 1992/2002; Democratic Republic of Congo in 1993/2003; Sudan in 
1994/2004; Ivory Coast in 2004; North Korea in 2006; Iran in 2006; Eritrea in 2010; and 
Libya in 2011. Also regional organisations, such as the Organization of American States 
(OAS), the European Union and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) joined the sanctions industry and have imposed their own brand of economic 
sanctions, independently, or in conjunction and alliance with the United Nations (Pavoni, 
1999; Cortright, 2000: 171). The increase in the use of sanctions in that decade drew the 
attention of analysts, and it was termed a “growth industry” (Reynolds, 1997: 333). Because 
of wide interest in the proliferation of economic sanctions, numerous symposia and 
conferences were organized by university scholars and positivists in the United States to 
discuss economic sanctions in general in order to analyse their effectiveness, implementation, 
impact and legal aspects. The point of reference in most of the conferences was on the 
consequences of sanctions on Iraq and particularly the effects on the civilian population.  
The devastating consequences of the United Nations economic sanctions against Iraq 
and Haiti, and also the United States economic sanctions against Panama and Cuba, 
undermine the much argued human nature of economic sanctions. Many peace activists who 
previously supported the use of economic sanctions as a humane alternative to military action 
realized the truth in the expression of US President Woodrow Wilson, who described 
sanctions as “peaceful, silent and deadly pressure that no modern nation could resist” 
(Carter, 1999: 1169). For the purpose of this thesis and in line with the analysis provided by 
Davidsson (2002: 4 -5), the debate on economic sanctions after 1990 is classified into four 
categories: 
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(a) Studies that view economic sanctions from the perspective of economic relations 
(Doxey, 1996); 
(b) Studies that emphasize the effectiveness of economic sanctions in general or using 
specific cases. Effort is aimed at proving the efficacy of economic sanctions as a 
policy tool or recommend ways and strategies to increase and improve their coercive 
effects (Cortright and Lopez, 2000; Joyner, 1992; Conlon, 1996; Eizenstat, 1999); 
(c) Studies that document the negative humanitarian impact of sanctions and in an 
attempt to mitigate the humanitarian impact. In this case, efforts are made to improve 
the effectiveness of existing humanitarian programmes and also recommendations of 
alternative forms of international coercive measures, such as targeted sanctions 
(Garfield, 1999; Gibbons, 1999; Winkler, 1999). 
(d) Studies assessing the ethics and legality of economic sanctions under international 
law and reviewing their compatibility with human rights norms and international 
humanitarian law (Gordon, 1999; Rene, 1992; Koechler, 1995).  
In the first edition of Margaret Doxey’s (1987) book, International Sanctions in 
Contemporary Perspective, she reflects the change in scholarly perception on economic 
sanctions. Most of the work she listed deals with sanctions as a policy instrument or as a tool 
of statecraft, addressing their utility, effectiveness, implementation and enforcement in 
relation to the international legal order and to international relations in general. However, in 
Doxey’s second edition of the same book, which was published after the imposition of 
economic sanctions against Iraq, she specifically addresses the humanitarian consequences of 
economic sanctions. Henceforth, there has been a shift in scholarly argument concerning 
economic sanctions. The emphasis has since shifted to the humanitarian consequences of 
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such measures on civilian populations, rather than concentrating on the reasons for which 
they are imposed. 
1.4.5. How economic sanctions goals are achieved 
Although the reasons for imposing sanctions may be legitimate, I am concerned with 
the mechanism used to secure compliance with these demands and also some of the linguistic 
devices that mask these mechanisms. The implied theory of economic sanctions is that by 
crippling or grinding to a halt the economy of a target State or territory, the government of 
that territory is prevented from providing basic needs, such as supply of essential 
commodities, services and employment (Davidsson, 2002: 6). In such situations, massive 
shortages that arise will create a crack between the government and the people that will 
translate into discontent and pressure on the government by the people to adhere to the 
demands of the sanctioning parties or resort to campaigns for regime change. In summary, 
this theory is predicated on using civilian pain to achieve political gain. Truly, this strategy of 
showing economic apathy may have worked in South Africa and gave credibility to the use of 
economic sanctions before 1990. However, the reality is that the situation in South Africa is 
unique and cannot be compared to present situations in which economic sanctions are 
expected to produce such positive results as it did in South Africa.  
As noted earlier, Cortright and Lopez disagree with the economic sanctions theory of 
using civilian pain to achieve sanctions goals’, arguing that there is no direct relationship by 
which social suffering is translated into political change (Cortright and Lopez, 1998). Despite 
all arguments in favour of economic sanctions, there are no plausible explanations of a 
distinct mechanism by which it will enforce compliance without adverse consequences on 
ordinary citizens. Therefore, it is disheartening that politician’s loath to acknowledge that a 
political goal is not to be achieved by inflicting severe suffering on a civilian population.  
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1.4.6. The mechanisms of economic sanctions  
For us to understand and effectively analyse economic sanctions, considering its 
complex and highly politicized nature, it is important to analyse the choice of words and 
terminologies often used to express and explain the subject matter. Among the tools of 
sanctions is the creative use of euphemisms and obfuscatory expressions (Davidsson, 2002: 
5). Stanley Cohen in an attempt to analyse euphemisms used for economic sanctions asserts: 
The most familiar form of reinterpretation is the use of euphemistic labels and 
jargon. These are everyday devices for masking, sanitizing, and conferring 
respectability by using palliative terms that deny or misrepresent cruelty or 
harm, giving them neutral or respectable status. How words insulate their 
users and listeners from experiencing fully the meaning of what they are doing 
remains the classic source on the subject (Cohen, 1996: 527). 
The euphemism of economic sanctions is anchored on the fulfilment of three salient issues. 
Firstly, it attempts to hide the measures in which it tends to achieve its end goal. Secondly, it 
implies that sanctions target is wrongdoers and the “bad guys.” Thirdly, it portrays that such 
measures are compatible with humanitarian principles (Davidsson, 2002: 6). I argue that the 
choice of language used for economic sanctions are deliberate. The euphemisms seem to be 
carefully chosen and used to disrupt the truth and realities of sanctions and misguide the 
public, while at the same time present sanctions as an inevitable tool in international 
relations. 
The euphemisms of economic sanctions sometimes proscribe guilt on the entire 
population, whilst the sanctioning party capitalises on the guilt posed by these euphemisms 
on the entire population to exonerate themselves of wrongdoing. In my opinion, this is an 
abuse of the interaction between States as an entity and its citizens. The priority of those who 
study economic sanctions should properly address the use of sanctions terminology. Hence, 
this thesis reviews some of the most common linguistic devices that have been used to mask 
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the reality of economic sanctions. By doing so, one can then explore how language and 
meaning are used by the powerful to marginalize, dominate and ultimately oppress others (the 
civilian population). 
1.4.7. Understanding the real targets of economic sanctions 
As the mechanism of economic sanctions intends to create popular discontent within 
the targeted territory, measures inevitably are directed to impair the lives of the civilian 
population (Davidsson, 2002: 6). It is self-evident that the real targets of economic sanctions 
are those who happen to live in the sanctioned territory, without distinction. This fact must be 
borne in mind when examining the language used to address the various aspects of economic 
sanctions. 
Individuals and families are affected by economic sanctions in different degrees, 
depending on their social status. Those who suffer most from economic sanctions are the 
vulnerable and powerless population groups, whereas the powerful and the wealthy elites can 
often avoid the most adverse consequences and may, sometimes, even enrich themselves 
from the inevitable emergence of black markets. It is thus accurate to say that economic 
sanctions target a civilian population of a given territory as a whole, particularly the most 
vulnerable segments of society. In making this statement, I presume that those who adopt 
sanctions policies intend their foreseeable consequences. Several research projects on 
economic sanctions indicate that the measure has not achieved its goal of changing the 
policies of a target regime (Masaka, 2012: 57). The only way to explain the success of 
economic sanctions is by accessing the degree of humanitarian consequences that comes from 
them. Zimbabwe may be an example. The country has become the first to experience 
hyperinflation in the 21st century, which is significantly caused by economic sanctions 
imposed on it by the US and the EU. A hyperinflation occurs when inflation rates stand at or 
 112 
 
exceed 50 percent on a monthly basis (Siklos, 2000). Obviously, the reason for imposing 
economic sanctions is to impair the life conditions of civilians in a target region. As noted by 
Hans-Peter Gasser of the International Committee of the Red Cross, “To speak of mere 
‘regrettable side-effects’ of sanctions is inadequate in view of the severe and lasting negative 
impact on civil society. Such negative effects on the civilian population are of course 
intended by those who impose economic sanctions” (Gasser, 1996: 874). 
1.4.8. A review of the euphemisms of sanctions 
This part of the thesis examines some of the euphemisms of economic sanctions. The 
purpose is to create a common understanding of how these euphemisms influence public 
opinion and their perceptions of sanctions. As I noted earlier, these euphemisms are carefully 
chosen and use by politicians to misguide the public on the indiscriminate impact of 
economic sanctions.  
First of all, discourse analysis examines how people relate versions of their 
experiences, actions and perceptions, through the languages they use to express their opinion 
on a certain issue of concern (Fairclough, 2001: 21). The assumption is that people draw on 
cultural and linguistic resources in order to construct their talk in certain ways to have certain 
effects. I analyse how languages are constructed to create culpability of all who happen to 
reside in a sanctioned territory and at the same time justify the actions of the party that 
imposes sanctions. In doing this, I refer to one of the social theories that expresses how 
identities are created between one group and another, “social identity theory” (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979). The theory suggests that people organize and perceive themselves differently 
by categorising people into groups and then identifying with one group as opposed to 
another. Furthermore, it expresses that a sense of self-esteem is derived by creating a 
category of “we and they.” In this situation, people exaggerate the similarities between 
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members of their group and also exaggerate the differences between members of their group 
and members of other groups (Baumeister and Vohs, 2007: 494). This approach is 
problematic because it condemns people in other group not necessarily for their wrongdoing, 
but because they are not like “us” (Wetherell, 1996: 48). In this case “us” is seen to be good, 
innocent and always doing the right things, while “them” is seen as evil, bad and wrongdoers. 
A related theory is that of Baumeister (1996), myth of “pure evil,” the common way in which 
people construct themselves. We are good and innocent but provoked, reacting to a sadistic, 
evil behaviour. A common theme of these theories is the notion of “us and them” that is used 
many times to describe and justify an action such as economic sanctions. 
1.4.8.1. Target State 
In sanctions episodes, the sanctioning party is referred to as the “sender,” while the 
sanctioned party is addressed as the “target” (Joyner, 1992). The term “sender” refers to the 
individual State, the regional organisation or the international organisation imposing the 
sanctions. The term “target” usually refers to the State against which the sanctions are 
imposed. While the term “sender” serves a suitable linguistic choice for the entity or entities 
that impose economic sanctions, the term “target” masks the identity of the real and actual 
addressees. While sanctions are typically coercive, they cannot, obviously, coerce an object, 
let alone an abstract construct, such as a “State” or “country.” While military facilities and 
other material objects can be targeted for destruction in warfare, only human beings can be 
the targets of coercive measures, like economic sanctions (Tavernier, 1993:21). 
The targets of economic sanctions are simply all those who reside within the territory 
of a target State or region. Another variant of the expression “target State” is “offending 
nation” (Sidel, 1999: 1497; Davidsson, 2002: 8). Invoking the expression target State or 
nation imputes collective culpability and provides indirect justification for imposing 
 114 
 
collective injury. The rationale, justifying the concept “target State,” rests on the view of the 
global system as a set of interacting black boxes whose content is irrelevant (Davidsson, 
2002: 8). By considering States as entities with an autonomous will and existence, rather than 
the mere symbolic representation of the individual human being who lives within the given 
area, makes it easy for politicians to continue imposing economic sanctions, with imminent 
humanitarian consequences that amount to crimes against humanity.  
1.4.8.2. Coalescing a population with its leader 
Another obfuscation used to project economic sanctions is to imply that sanctions 
target a particular reprehensible individual rather than an entire population (Davidsson, 2002: 
9). An example is the proceeding debate in the US Congress prior to the Gulf war. During the 
Congress debate, Senator B. Bradley conflated Iraq with its President, Saddam Hussein when 
he pronounced: “We would isolate Iraq from the international economic system, with 
sanctions to deny him markets for his export, oil, to freeze his foreign financial assets, and to 
deny him access to spare parts and supplies on which his military machine depends” (U.S. 
Congress Report, 1991). 
In the above statement, Senator, B. Bradley identified the entire people of Iraq with 
Saddam Hussein, ignoring the fact that Iraq is much more than its leader. The use of similar 
obfuscatory statement is evidently common in virtually all sanctions episodes.  
1.4.8.3. The concept of “Collateral” effects 
The expression collateral effect of economic sanctions is borrowed from the language 
of warfare. The expression “collateral damage” expresses the idea that civilian victims of 
military attacks are a regrettable but unavoidable by-product of legitimate warfare, as long as 
the attacks are justified by the principles of necessity and proportionality and do not 
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specifically target civilians (Davidsson, 2002: 9). Unlike military warfare, the weapon of 
economic sanctions is incapable of discriminating between combatants and civilians. It is 
levelled on the economy of the target State or region composed mainly by the civilian 
population (Tomasevski, 1997: 218). Therefore, it is inapposite to relate the term “collateral” 
to economic sanctions. In making this statement, I presume that the party imposing sanctions 
is not ignorant of the negative consequences imposed on the civilian population; rather, they 
gamble on the negatives of economic sanctions on the population to achieve the very goal of 
sanctions. Article 50 of the U.N. Charter foresees such “collateral” consequences of economic 
sanctions: 
If preventive or enforcement measures against any State are taken by the 
Security Council, any other State, whether a Member of the United Nations or 
not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising 
from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the 
Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems (UN Charter, 
1945: 152). 
The rationale behind this provision is that preventive or enforcement measures against a State, 
taken by the Security Council, including economic sanctions, are not intended to harm other 
States; however, unintended harm may ensue. The distinction made in the aforementioned 
provision between the target State and “other” States with regard to the right to consult the 
Security Council in the case of special economic problems supports the assertion that adverse 
consequences in “other” States are unintended, whereas adverse consequences in the target 
State are intended. In most situations where economic sanctions are imposed against a State, 
there is always an accompanying claim that insinuates that while harm to the economy is 
intended, no harm is intended to the vulnerable segments of that population such as children, 
the disabled, pregnant women, the elderly and the sick. 
For clarity purposes, I challenge this impression and query that, when parents lose 
their job as a result of economic sanctions, their children will definitely suffer. It is impossible 
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to detach the intended consequences on the State from the unavoidable direct and indirect 
brutal impact on the population living within that geographic territory. Therefore, how do we 
mediate this very real tension between the vulnerable and the non-vulnerable population? In 
the case of Zimbabwe or any other country with strong family ties and extended family 
system, invariably the effects will multiply. That economic sanctions aim to cripple the 
economy of a target State signifies that they lack the measure and capability to differentiate 
between “vulnerable” and “non-vulnerable” segments of the population. Even if mitigation 
measures are applied, they can only marginally compensate for the indiscriminate 
consequences of the sanctions. As Davidsson (2002: 10) note; to the extent that mitigation 
measures fully compensate the adverse consequences of economic sanctions, they defeat the 
very purpose of the sanctions. 
Furthermore, the use of the expression “vulnerable populations” is inappropriate in the 
particular context of economic sanctions. While this expression is relevant for emergency 
situations, such as natural disasters, its use within the framework of economic sanctions is 
questionable. By using the term “vulnerable populations,” does it imply that some people are 
not protected by the principles of international humanitarian law? Another important issue is 
how can measures that knowingly infringe upon the human rights of civilian adults, such as 
the right to healthcare, to work and to live in dignity, be justified on the account that the 
individual in question is not a member of a “vulnerable” group? Can children be spared 
hardship and suffering when destitution is imposed on their parents? The risk of invoking 
expressions such as “vulnerable populations” in the context of economic sanctions is that they 
legitimize measures that inflict harm on civilians deemed “non-vulnerable” by the sanctioning 
party, while giving an appearance of humanitarian concern. 
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1.4.8.4. Humanitarian exemptions 
The expression “humanitarian exemption” to economic sanctions is a discretionary 
measure employed by the sanctioning parties to the citizens of the sanctioned State, based on 
humanitarian considerations. The use of this term is an acceptance that economic sanctions, if 
not withered by such humanitarian exemptions, would inflict unimaginable harm on the 
civilian population. There is, however, something disingenuous with this expression. While 
the immediate purpose of armed warfare is to destroy military facilities and armed forces, the 
immediate purpose of economic sanctions is to cripple the economy, thereby inflicting 
suffering and hardship on the civilian population. Obviously there is a clear difference 
between these two forms of injury. According to Davidsson (2002: 11), the expression “to 
destroy a military facility” refers to actions that only seek to prevent an enemy from using 
violence. The immediate purpose of economic sanctions is, however, to cripple the economy 
or, more precisely, to severely impair the living conditions of the civilian population. 
Therefore, should humanitarian exemptions reduce this suffering; automatically they 
undermine the crippling effects of economic sanctions (Doxey, 1996: 112). In addition, to the 
extent that humanitarian exemptions permit civilians to live their normal lives, such 
exemptions automatically undermine the sanctions. In most economic sanctions episodes, the 
United Nations humanitarian programme was grafted not to eliminate sufferings or normalize 
the living conditions of the population, but merely to prevent a further deterioration of the 
humanitarian situation (Davidsson, 2002: 11). The case of Iraq could be used as a classic 
example. In other words, the intention of sanctioning parties applying humanitarian 
exemption is to maintain the sanctioned population in destitution and not to get them out of 
starvation. I query why the market and economic structure of a State is destroyed through 
economic sanctions only for them to be later given food aid and other forms of humanitarian 
assistance and exemptions. Zimbabwe could be used as an example in this particular issue. 
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Prior to the year 2000, Zimbabwe was known as the breadbasket of Africa due to its high 
quantity of food production (World Food Programme, 2012); however, with a series of 
economic and political sanctions, the country has deteriorated into a state of severe economic 
poverty and is unable to feed its citizens. In 2011, the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment 
Committee (ZimVAC) estimated that more than one million Zimbabweans were unable to 
meet their food requirements, despite being provided with food aid to mitigate food insecurity 
in the country (World Food Programme, 2012). This supports my argument that humanitarian 
exemptions are not intended to and cannot end the suffering of victims of economic 
sanctions. 
1.4.9. Economic sanctions: theoretical considerations 
 Despite reasons given to justify economic sanctions, this study believes that economic 
sanctions are motivated by reasons other than the general perception of inducing change in 
the behaviour of a target. In order to explore some other motives for incessant use of 
sanctions against its poor performance and track record, this research will review all possible 
reasons and motivations for the continued use of coercive sanctions instruments. An 
important question to begin with is: Why economic sanctions? 
Sanctions as explained earlier are actions initiated by one party (sender) against 
another (sanctioned) in order to compel the target to act according to the wish of the sender. 
Debate on sanctions revolves around main issues. Firstly, what is the possibility of sanctions 
to achieve the expected or intended goal? Secondly, since the sender sees sanctions as an 
alternative to war, what then is the possibility of sanctions achieving their objective without 
colossal collateral damage that is associated with war? Against the general reasons given to 
justify economic sanctions by sanctioning parties, this part of the research examines some 
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other reasons that might actually be propelling the continued adoption of sanctions 
instruments, against their overall poor performance.  
One of the strong arguments against economic sanctions is that in many cases they are 
motivated by interests. For example, countries such as China and Saudi Arabia with 
questionable human rights records are not sanctioned due to their economic and/or political 
importance. However, major powers, particularly the US and the EU, often impose economic 
sanctions even when there is little probability of forcing a change in the target country’s 
policies. I argue and support the notion that sanctions are formal acknowledgement of a 
problem, which goes nowhere in achieving its primary objectives. Instead politicians have 
used sanctions to appease their constituencies and remain viable in politics. This is the reason 
why sanctions are often employed by the US and the EU, despite daunting record that they 
often fail to achieve their intended objectives.  
As noted earlier, there are certain objectives States seek to accomplish by imposing 
sanctions. They seek to achieve coercive and expressive objectives; both represent a 
fundamental motive and provide useful dichotomy for thinking about sanctions (Miyagawa, 
1992: 89; Doxey, 1996: 54-58). The most widely viewed or conventional understanding of 
economic sanctions is that they are an instrument of coercive diplomacy used by one State in 
an attempt to influence another State to change its policy or behaviour. Going by this 
definition, sanctions occupy the area between diplomacy (persuasion) and force (coercion), 
and this middle ground is a central aspect of their appeal as a tool of liberal statecraft 
(Baldwin, 1985: 43). Sanctions that lean too far in the direction of force are those that are 
aimed to strategically weaken the target State, and thus should not be called sanctions in the 
classic liberal sense, but rather as a tool of economic warfare (Pape, 1997: 93; Baldwin, 1985: 
36-38). Coercive sanctions inflict economic distress, hardship, frustration and uncertainties 
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on the State and citizens of a target State. The irony of sanctions is that even if the desired 
economic goals are achieved, it is still uncertain that the target State will change its policy or 
behaviour in the desired manner. In this regard, I argue that sanctions are imposed even 
though there is strong support that they will not successfully influence the apparent target. As 
noted earlier, evidence shows that most sanctions episode do not achieve their goals, yet the 
measures are often employed. Kimberly Elliott collaborated this when she asserts that 
sanctions are mostly employed to enhance the credibility of the sender among its allies or as a 
response to political pressures (Elliott, 1995: 51). I posit that it is very important that against 
foreign policy objectives, States should consider the short and long term consequences of 
economic sanctions on the population of a target State or territory. 
1.4.10. Comments and opinions on the determination and use of sanctions 
The UN Charter specifies that the imposition of sanctions shall be instituted after the 
determination of an “aggressive act” as defined in Article 39. However, the concept of 
determination of an aggressive act has resulted in many arguments and disagreements. 
Griffiths; O’Callaghan and Roach (2008: 289) note that the phrase “determination of an 
aggressive act” is ambiguous. The debate on determination of an aggressive act, as argued by 
analysts, has made it evident that sanctions are often imposed unfairly, using biased measures 
and standards. The whims and prerogatives of the mighty rather than clear rules of 
international laws are often used to determine the targets and the harshness of each particular 
sanctions episode.  
As argued by Ambassador Joseph Legwaila of Botswana in the 1995 Council debate, 
“sanctions are meant to bring about change of behaviour; they are not supposed to be 
punishment or retribution” (Griffiths et al., 2008: 289) Another delegate from Malaysia in a 
1997 General Assembly debate expresses that, “we regret that sanctions have of late been 
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used, or have been perceived to be used, as a tool in the furtherance of narrow national 
interests of some of the Council’s members, to serve specific political objectives or agendas” 
(Griffiths et al., 2008: 316). Having explained the views and expressions of analysts and 
critics, I would assert that economic sanctions have failed to hit the mark for which they have 
been established. As such, they should be substituted with real diplomacy, where interest is 
not a priority in decision making. 
Another problem with sanctions, particularly UN sanctions, is the level of secrecy 
which the sanctions committee function. Usually sanctions begin with one justification and 
continue with others, which might not be available knowledge to the general public. Former 
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1995 report asserts: “the objectives have 
not always been clearly defined. Indeed, they may sometimes seem to change over time. This 
combination of imprecision and mutability makes it difficult for the Security Council to agree 
on when sanctions can be lifted” (Bilgrami 2004: 235).  
The above statement confirms that sanctions are motivated by political interest and 
guided by prerogative of the mighty. The United Nations, the European Union and other 
organizations imposing sanctions should provide a comprehensive account of the progress or 
success they achieved through sanctions on different targets at different periods of time. Also, 
the barometer used to determine the degree of the sanctions imposed on different cases and 
the strategies used to monitor these sanctions by the sanctions committee should be made 
public. This will give an insight into how sanctions are coordinated and also provide clear 
evidence to support different debates and perspectives about the functionality of sanctions. 
Until this is done, sanctions remain a game of superiority and a show of power by powerful 
States against less powerful ones. 
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Conclusions 
In this chapter, I provide a general overview of sanctions, including the types of 
sanctions and the approaches used for each type of sanctions. Also, I examine how the 
Charter of the United Nations provides a framework that supports the use of economic 
sanctions. I explain the real targets of economic sanctions and most importantly, I review the 
euphemisms of sanctions and the role they play in masking the grave consequences of 
sanctions measures on the civilian population. Therefore, this thesis provides an in-depth 
analysis of the causes and effects of sanctions, especially on the civilians who happen to bear 
the most severe consequences of sanctions. This thesis admits that sanctions are a belligerent 
act where the sanctioning parties emasculate the sanctioned party to adhere to its dictates or 
be visited with actions that may lead to humanitarian suffering. I argue that the sanctioning 
party believes they can influence behaviour of the sanctioned party, usually a State or 
government, by deliberately punishing the inhabitants of the target State or territory that are 
mostly civilians.  
 While some people believe that economic sanctions are a necessary tool of 
international diplomacy that can be used to induce despots to change their behaviour for the 
better, there is a serious danger that sanctions produce exactly the opposite. The economic 
pressure of sanctions in most cases may lead a target regime to stiffen its resolve against the 
sanctioning party and also repress internal oppositions that rise against the regime. This 
outcome is particularly distressing if the sanctions were imposed in response to human rights 
violations, democracy and circumvention of international treaties, such as the case of Iran and 
Zimbabwe. In the wisdom of Woodrow Wilson, economic sanctions would eliminate the 
need for war. As he noted, “a nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. 
Apply this economic, peaceful, silent deadly remedy and there will be no need for force” 
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(Hufbauer; Schott and Kimberly 1990: 9) Contrary to the belief of Woodrow Wilson, 
sanctions have lost their promises as they have failed to bring about world peace. It is 
alarming and disheartening that economic sanctions still retain their place in the toolbox of 
international relations and are still believed by politicians to be somewhat less cruel than war. 
However, the arguments of this thesis reveal that sanctions are instruments of warfare against 
civilians. Therefore, it suggests that such measures should not be used anymore. 
 Finally, policy makers contemplating the use of economic sanctions as a response to 
conflict or unacceptable behaviour from a regime should seriously consider its effects on the 
entire civilian population. Evidence shows that not only will life become difficult for civilians 
inside targeted regimes, but also that sanctions reduce the probability that a regime will 
change its behaviour. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
AND THE ROLE OF THEORIES 
Mother Theresa in her letter to the Supreme the US Supreme Court on Roe vs. 
Wade, note that: human rights are not a privilege conferred by government. 
They are every human being’s entitlement by virtue of his humanity (Harees, 
2012: 51) 
Human rights are inscribed in the hearts of the people; they were there long 
before lawmakers drafted their first proclamation - Mary Robinson, Former 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Ball and Gready, 2006: 
92). 
2.1. Introduction 
The adoption of economic sanctions by the United Nations Security Council as a 
policy instrument for the maintenance of peace and security has remained a contentious issue. 
Legal positivist contend that the use of economic sanctions contradict international human 
rights law as the measures infringes on the human rights of civilians in target States. In 
addition, the impact of the UN Security Council binding resolutions with respect to economic 
sanctions on the civilian population clearly circumvents the primary objectives of the UN as 
contained in the organization’s Charter. As Marco A. Velásquez Ruiz pointed out; the 
implementation of such measures (referring to economic sanctions) has an impact on the 
enjoyment of human rights, but in particular on the civilian’s economic, social and cultural 
rights (Velásquez Ruiz, 2012). In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, under Values and 
Principle, Number 4, 9 and 12, the United Nations reaffirmed to uphold the principles of 
human rights. Number 9, specifically emphasized the interconnectedness of human rights, 
development and peace and security (General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/1, 2005). In 
view of the above General Assembly resolution, it seems hypocritical for the UN to maintain 
economic sanctions policy, considering its impact on rights enjoyment. Such collision of 
interest raises a delicate question to the international system such as the UN, which is 
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progressively moving towards the recognition of the individual rights as the main concern of 
the organization and its protection the ultimate objective. As Robin Geiss writes: 
At a time when the efficiency of the Security Council is no longer reduced to a 
minimum and the significance of human rights norms and humanitarian law 
principles are widely recognized at the international level, it would be 
anachronistic to grant unlimited power to any international organ (Geiss, 
2005: 173). 
With the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has imposed series of sanctions 
both economic and political in its effort to maintain peace and security. The dominance of the 
United States in world affairs combined with its controversial crusade for democracy added 
to the frequent use of economic sanctions as a measure to influence democratic changes in 
target States. The quest for global democracy is rooted on Western believe that democracy as 
a system of governance guarantees economic and political freedom to citizens while at the 
same time provide protection to their fundamental human rights (Udogu, 2014: 174). 
Therefore, regimes seen not to be “democratic enough” are targets of economic sanctions 
with the aim of forcing them to adopt democratic principles that will eventually benefit their 
citizens. There is a contrast in using economic sanctions to address right violations. This is 
because sanctions at best contribute to violation of the individual’s rights, such as right to live 
a dignified life. Thus, using a measure that directly violate or substantially contribute to 
violation of human rights for the purpose of protecting the same human rights that it violates 
is questionable whilst it is considered a paradox. According to August Reinisch: 
Some scholars have even spoken of an human rights paradox, i.e., that since 
the end of the cold war the cause for human rights has increasingly become 
the reason for the imposition of the UN sanctions, while the United Nations in 
adopting such sanctions, more and more disregards these same human rights 
principles. The paradox continues in the sense that under sanctions, the middle 
class is eliminated, the poor get poorer, and the rich get richer as they take 
control of smuggling and the black market (Reinisch, 2001: 852). 
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This chapter of the thesis describes several legal issues related to the imposition of 
economic sanctions by the Security Council, in order to show that even if it appears that the 
Security Council has a wide margin of appreciation when maintaining international peace and 
security, there are some legal limits to its action. In addition, the chapter examines theories of 
international relations in order to understand how they shape relationship and interactions 
among States and most importantly, how they influence our approaches in handling conflicts. 
I do not claim that the theories reviewed are better or more appropriate than others, but rather 
more generally examine the defining history, characteristics and criticisms of each of the 
theories provided.  I analyse them in a manner that provides an insight into the reasons why 
actions such as sanctions are used to enforce cooperation and discipline or to restore 
international peace and security as claimed by the United Nations and other organizations, 
instead of applying a moral imagination to peace (Lederach, 2005). 
2.1.1. Overview of human rights 
No single phrase in recent human history has been more privileged to bear the 
mission and burden of human destiny than the phrase “human rights” […] the 
greatest gift of classical and contemporary human thought is the notion of 
human rights. Indeed, more than any other moral language available to us at 
this time in history, the language of human rights is able to expose the 
immorality and barbarism of the modern face of power (Mahler and Mihr, 
2004: 159).  
The issue of human rights has been present throughout human history. Rights have 
been an issue of concern in many different societies and in every civilization era. However, 
the modern concept of human rights gained prominence in the twentieth century following 
the end of World War II, particularly the heinous crimes against humanity committed during 
the Holocaust (Scheffer, 1998). As an effort to address the atrocities committed during the 
war and offer protection to civilians in the future, Member States of the United Nations 
gathered in 1948 and drafted the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (UDHR). The 
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UDHR however, has become the most famous, most translated, and probably most important, 
human rights document (OHCHR, 2010). The fundamental rights contained in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights are legally binding on every State that affirmed to the human 
rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Going by the list posted on the UN 
website, each of the Covenants have been ratified by over 150 States. Collectively, these 
documents are known as the International Bill of Human Rights. Human Rights therefore, 
can be defined as the basic rights permitted by law which every human is entitled regardless 
of their sex, race or colour (The British Institute of Human Rights, 2006). They penetrate 
almost every part of human existence and include the rights to food, shelter, freedoms of 
thought religion and expression, to rights to education and good health.  
A broad and more explicit definition and/or analysis of human rights was provided by 
the United Nations Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights and read as follows: 
Human rights are inherent in all human beings, whatever their nationality, 
place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or 
any other status. Every individual is entitled to enjoy human rights without 
discrimination. These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. 
Human rights are often expressed and guaranteed by law, in the forms of 
treaties, customary international law, general principles and other sources of 
international law. International human rights law lays down obligations on 
States to act in certain ways or to refrain from certain acts, in order to promote 
and protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals or 
groups (UNHR, 2012: 9). 
Apart from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations, regional 
organizations have adopted their own regional human rights treaties such as the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights. In all, these rights are underpinned by core values or 
principles, including fairness, respect, equality, dignity, autonomy, universality and 
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participation. Furthermore, human rights are said to be: indivisible; interrelated and 
inalienable (Koch, 2009; Dennis and Stewart, 2004: 462), which imply that the restriction of 
one right will have adverse impact on the other rights. To put this into perspective, if a 
person’s right to health is restricted, invariably his/her right to life will be affected whereas 
enhancing the right to education through the provision of effective and quality education 
system may improve his/her other rights such as right to work.  
2.1.1.1. Economic and social rights 
Economic and social rights are concerned with “basic human needs for food, shelter, 
water and for the means to provide those things for oneself” (Amnesty International, 2012). 
They are “rights to which the individual citizen is entitled, which he can exercise only in his 
relationship with other human beings as a member of a group and which can be made 
effective only if the State acts to safeguard the individual’s environment” (Ransom, 2007: 
18). For the purpose of this thesis, I consider economic and social rights as an entitlement to 
the avoidance of severe deprivation of basic needs such as food and nutrition on a person. 
Therefore, they serve as “base-net” against poverty while protecting the individual person 
from harm. Although they do not guarantee life of affluence and luxury, nevertheless, they 
protect an individual against induced starvation, one which economic sanctions may cause. 
Obviously, what amounts to a basic need is not self-evident; however, according to Virginia 
Mantouvalou, they include the following entitlements: (a) right to housing; (b) right to basic 
nutrition, including a right to water; (c) right to basic healthcare, because ill-health can lead 
to severe human suffering; (d) right to education; (e) right to social security and social 
assistance; (f) right to work and decent working conditions (Mantouvalou, 2010: 2).  
The debate on social rights has been phenomenal in the sense that some scholars’ do 
not believe that such rights are admissible. One of such scholar is Maurice Cranston who 
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perceives social rights simply as an appropriation of modern communists’ principles into the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Cranston, 1964). Despite these rights being 
incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights they face major challenges. 
Among these challenges is the argument that some States do not have the resources required 
to guarantee such rights. However, this thesis is of the opinion that outside State borders, the 
principles of economic and social rights are haunted by UN economic sanctions in the sense 
that in many cases sanctions hamper an individual’s capability to enjoy these rights. For 
example a person’s right to food and freedom of choice of food may be hampered by food 
shortages resulting from sanctions (Zimbabwe could serve as example in this regard).  
2.1.1.2. Civil and political rights 
Political rights entail the liberty to participate directly or indirectly in the process of 
governing the affairs of a State and/or society in which one lives (O’Flaherty, 2012: 627). 
The principles of political rights presume that a State and/or society should be structured in a 
way that provides opportunity for eligible citizens to participate in the political process of 
establishing a government. In light of modern political rights, every citizen must be accorded 
the right and opportunity to participate in government and policy making processes directly 
or through democratic representatives (O’Flaherty, 2012: 627). The term “civil rights” 
therefore, refers to the rights enshrined in Articles 1 to18 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which are also regarded as binding treaty norms in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. Civil rights serve “protective” purpose, in the sense that they 
were enacted to refrain governments and organizations from taken actions that will infringe 
and/or violate individuals freedoms whilst they ensure one’s ability to participate in actions 
affecting the individual and his or her autonomy.  
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According to Edward N. Zalta, they include: right to life, right to vote and other 
political participation, protection of an individual from any form of discrimination on the 
basis of race, gender, nationality, age, physical or mental disability and what he called the 
primary rights (Zalta, 2012: 860). In addition, they include right to effective remedy, 
individuals’ freedom such as freedom of speech and/or expression, freedom from torture, 
movement, and freedom of choice of religion and most recently though controversial is the 
right to sexual orientation. In order to elaborate the perspective of this thesis and engage 
sanctions vis-a-vis human rights, I provide a rundown of some of the individual’s civil rights 
that may be affected when economic sanctions are imposed on a State or regime. 
2.1.1.3. Right to life 
The first and foremost among civil rights is the right to life. Because human life is 
seen to be sacred, thus, the right to life is prima facie among all other rights entitled to an 
individual person. This means that States and organisations are obliged to protect the right to 
“life” while they are prohibited from action that endangers the life of an individual. 
Contrarily, evidence abound that the right to life in many cases have been violated by the 
same organ (States) that are meant to protect and preserve it (Stein, 2004: 195). According to 
the international human rights mechanisms, the right to life may be violated in different ways 
including direct and indirect killing of a person through the use of absolute force or by taken 
actions that put the life of a person in danger such as deportation of a person back to a 
country or place undergoing violent conflict. Also the deportation of a person back to a 
country where he/her life is at risk because of political persecution or other reasons different 
than a violent conflict (Rosenblatt, 2000: 73). Furthermore, it includes the use of torture as a 
mechanism to extract confession or statement from an individual which may cause or 
contribute to the person’s death. In addition “negligence,” may also be considered as 
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violation of the right to life, if a State refuses or feel reluctant to investigate alleged violations 
of the right to life; while the international human rights law also place limits on the use of the 
death penalty (Clapham; Gaeta and Sassoli, 2015: 464-466). Finally, I argue that the use of 
starvation as a weapon of war or indirectly through economic coercion may cause or 
contribute to death of civilians and thus violate their right to life as enshrined in the UDHR.  
2.1.1.4. Right to freedom from torture 
The Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment on December 10, 1984 defined torture as:  
an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of 
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in 
an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions (Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984, art. 1, 
para.1). 
This definition contains three cumulative elements: the intentional infliction of severe mental 
or physical suffering by a direct act or with acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. Thus the State and its apparatus are forbidden to act in any 
capacity that may inflict either physical or psychological pain or suffering on a person. 
Furthermore, the convention prohibits States from taken actions such as expelling a person to 
a country where he/she may be tortured or may face other forms of inhuman treatment. Most 
importantly, States are prohibited under the international law and human rights treaties from 
resorting to actions that subject a person to poverty even though there is no intention to inflict 
suffering. Apart from the 1984 convention against torture, article 7(2e) of the 1998 Rome 
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Statute of the International Criminal Court defined torture as “the intentional infliction of 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under 
the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only 
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions” (Bassiouni, 2011: 200).  
The definitions provided by these two organs of the UN (the Convention against 
Torture and the Rome Statute of the ICC) simply imply that international human rights are 
not applicable in all situations and thus it places the “inalienability” of human rights that is 
often touted by the UN at a “cross-road.” In any case, the Convention against Torture and the 
Rome Statute of the ICC insinuate that any form of suffering or death resulting from 
sanctions such as the one witnessed in Iraq is justified on the grounds that Security Council 
resolutions to impose sanctions are legal. This brings us to the legality and limits of UNSC 
economic sanctions which will be discussed in the later part of this chapter. 
2.1.1.5. Right to an effective remedy 
This is a human right that sort to provide individuals with effective remedies when 
their human rights are violated (Kuijer, 2014: 1). The principle of the rule of law advocates 
and/or ensures a judicial review in cases of right violation and thus constitutes an essential 
aspect of democratic accountability. Under the rule of law, providing effective remedy to 
persons whose rights have been violated is of utmost importance, without which justice may 
become meaningless. According to the international human rights mechanisms- treaties and 
other international documents relevant to international human rights law and the protection of 
human rights, the right to effective remedy may be violated in a variety of ways such as; a 
State failing to make available adequate legal procedures and/or means of complain and 
receiving compensation for human rights violations: not investigating allegations of rights 
violation and/or not showing commitment to the investigation with respect to bringing 
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culprits to book (Kuijer, 2014: 2). The continuous violation of human rights through 
economic sanctions however, raises the following questions: Where does the right to an 
effective remedy come from? When can a person consider the right to an effective remedy? 
In the absence of an explicit legal procedure at the international level to address rights 
violation resulting from economic coercive measures, this thesis is compelled to review some 
sections of the international law that may be considered as deterrence to the use of coercive 
measures such as economic sanctions. 
2.1.2. The right to development  
The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which 
every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, 
and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” “The human 
right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to 
self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both 
International Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable 
right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources (Article 1.1 
and Article 1.2, Declaration on the Right to Development).  
The right to development has been controversial over the last 30 years (Alston, 1988: 
3) with some States arguing that such right cannot be part of the international human rights. 
Paradoxically the United States is among the vocal voices challenging the right to 
development, alleging that the definition of the term “development” is ambiguous (Marks, 
2004: 148). From the 1970’s through the 80’s, the right to development was perceived as part 
of a “third generation” of human rights (Marks, 1981: 435). The first generation of human 
rights are those that deal with civil and political rights; the freedom from State abuse and 
infringement on the rights of a person. While the second generation comprises of economic, 
social, and cultural rights, and thus, they provide freedom to the individual from oppression 
and exploitation. The first and second generations of human rights were necessitated by the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century revolutionary struggles of Europe and North America in 
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advancing social justice and the twentieth-century struggles against economic oppression and 
exploitation (Marks, 2004: 138). Therefore, these rights aimed at providing clear obligation 
and duties for the individual citizens and their principal (State or employers). The third 
generation of rights, however, is more directly linked to a people (Marks, 2004: 138); they 
include development, environment, common heritage and peace. Some scholars such as 
Stephen Marks argue that the direct connection of the third generation of human rights to a 
people underscores their importance, whilst it rationalizes their universal acceptance under 
international law. In any case, the basis of classifying human rights into different generations 
is underpinned by the normative propositions that victims of repression and oppression have 
aspired to fair and equitable treatment for centuries. For example, liberation from slavery and 
colonialism were terms later reflected in the declaration of human rights; while religious, 
political and other forms of freedom were reflected in the civil and political rights and in the 
economic, social, and cultural rights.  
The bedrock of the right to development was laid in the UN Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. However, its formal articulation in a form of text as human 
rights was in the late twentieth century, starting from the 1970’s (Marks 2004: 138). 
Consequently, it was proclaimed a human right by the United Nations General Assembly in 
1986 through the adoption of resolution U.N. Doc. A/41/925 (Manchak, 2010: 426) and were 
strengthened by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic and Social Rights. Apart from the United Nations and its organs, the 
right to development has been recognised and adopted by regional organisations and treaties 
such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the Arab Charter on Human 
Rights. In addition, it is recognised by the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, the Millennium Declaration of the United Nations and the 2007 Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. According to Article 3 of the Declaration on the Right to 
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Development, “States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and 
international conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development.” Thus the 
right to development is an inalienable human right since it is connected to peoples’ 
sovereignty and recognized by international law (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217A). Since it has been recognised and protected under international law, the 
right to development becomes part of the International Bill of Human Rights entrenched as an 
international legal norm by the later (Manchak, 2010: 424).  
Despite being adopted  by the UN Commission on Human Rights on April 22, 1998 
as part of human rights (U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/177), the right to development remain 
insupportable by some States. If we use the time of writing this thesis as our benchmark, it 
means that forty-three years after it was first proposed as a human right, twenty-nine years 
after it was officially recognised by the United Nations General Assembly as a human right 
and twenty-two years after the majority of States affirmed their support to it, the right to 
development has received a considerable amount of acceptance mainly among legal and 
human rights advocates. However, there also have been sceptical views and opinion about the 
right. Western countries, particularly the United States, expresses frustration on the right and 
view it as an effort by member States of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) towards 
manoeuvring the right to development in a manner that will serve their interest, contrary to 
those of donor States (Marks, 2004: 135). NAM was founded in 1961 during the 
independence and decolonization struggles of the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
other regions of the world and as of May 2012 it comprises of 120 member States. Members 
of the organization did not seek to formally align themselves with either the United States or 
the Soviet Union, but sought to remain independent or neutral during the Cold War (Marks, 
2004: 138).   
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On the other hand, the NAM member States argue that the reason why they want the 
right to development to be adopted as part of human rights is because, it will compel 
developed States to show substantial commitment towards development cooperation with 
impoverished States, who happen to be their former colonies. In view of the above opinion by 
NAM member states, if the right to development is adopted and incorporated as part of 
human rights, it will play a significant role in eradicating poverty and achieving other 
development goals of impoverished States.  
Against this argument, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights decided to implement and/or incorporate the right to development as part of 
international legal standards that will be binding on all States through a vote count in 2001. It 
also presented a guideline for the right to be implemented. While other countries voted in 
favour of the right to development, the US, Australia and Japan voted against it while the 
United Kingdom, Canada and the Republic of Korea abstained from the vote (U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/167). Thus the US policy has consistently shown apathy and/or sabotage for the 
right to development. Nonetheless, the hostile attitude and/or position of the United States 
toward the right to development do not in any way excuse its legal obligations to the right 
(Marks, 2004: 140). Customary international law underscores that even in a situation in 
which a State refuses to ratify a treaty, being signatory to it alone, mandates the State to 
refrain from any act that may impact otherwise to the very purpose of the instrument (U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/1999/SR.59). In addition, the assumption that a treaty is not binding simply 
because a State choose to sabotage it by declaring non-execution or because it choose not to 
ratify it is not the case particularly when the issue in question is related to customary 
international law (Marks, 2004). A State therefore is obligated to abide by and to fulfil its 
responsibility towards any treaty it signed and neither the United States nor any other State is 
an exemption. 
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In our case, economic sanctions are considered an impediment to the right to 
development. Thus, if the right to development is considered as part of human rights, 
economic sanctions should then be adjudged by its detrimental impact on the achievement of 
this right. However, the on-going debate on whether the rights to development merited being 
part of human rights is marred with controversies whilst a parallel divide between US 
officials and those of the political South characterize opinions. According to Manchak 
(2010), an allegation made by impoverished countries of the political South that the idea of a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) that is being projected by the United Nations is in 
fact favouring industrialised countries of the West, generated a reaction of hostility and/or 
lack of support for the right to development by some Western countries and particularly by 
the United States. For example, during the period of the Open-ended Working Group 
(OEWG) constituted by the UN Human Rights Commission during the Basel Convention to 
review the implementation of the right to development, a group emerged among the NAM 
member States calling it-self “Like-Minded Group” (Marks, 2004: 141). The group 
comprises of Algeria, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, China, 
Vietnam, Cuba, Indonesia, the Philippines, Iran, Malaysia, India, Sudan, and Egypt (Human 
Rights Voices, 2014). They accused Western countries of creating inequalities in 
international trade, sustaining differential access to technology and most importantly 
increasing the developing countries debt burden, which in all cases are detrimental to their 
right to development. In essence, there is a discourse on the right to development. However, 
just like economic sanctions, the discourse on the right to development is often characterized 
by predictable posturing of political positions rather than practical dialogue with respect to 
rational utility. 
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2.1.2.1. The US objection to the right to development 
As noted earlier, the United States and some Western countries have maintained an 
opposing stance on the right to development. In order to explore this assertion, opinions, 
comments and speeches credited to some US officials and representatives will be reviewed. 
To start with, Michel Novak, a former US representative to the UN Human Rights 
Commission and author of the book: The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism had this to say 
during the 37th session of the Commission: 
In 1881 […] no one spoke of a “right to development.” But our nation had an 
opportunity to develop, perhaps even a responsibility to develop. Our people 
knew that a responsibility to develop was imposed on them by their own 
capabilities and blessings and by their new ideas about political economy 
(Marks, 2004: 144). 
The above statement implies that development occurs as a result of economic liberties and/or 
capitalist social structure rather than a “given” right to development. In the wisdom of Novak, 
capitalism is the bedrock, panacea and engine of development and not a “given” right. Apart 
from Novak, other US officials and scholars have aired their view on the right to 
development. Among them is Philip Alston of the New York University School of Law. 
Aston claimed that the Ronald Reagan administration did not view the right to development 
in a positive light rather they perceived it thusly: 
[…] as the antithesis of a large part of its foreign policy. In this view, the right 
to development is little more than a rhetorical exercise designed to enable the 
Eastern European countries to score points on disarmament and collective 
rights and to permit the third World to “distort” the issue of human rights by 
affirming the equal importance of economic, social and cultural rights with 
civil and political rights and by linking human rights in general to its “utopian” 
aspirations for a new international economic order (Marks, 2004: 146). 
Also a statement credited to the US delegation, on the 59th session of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights held on February 10, 2003 reads: 
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In our estimation the right to development is not a “fundamental,” “basic,” or 
“essential” human right. The realization of economic, social and cultural rights 
is progressive and aspirational. We do not view them as entitlements that 
require correlated legal duties and obligations. States therefore have no 
obligation to provide guarantees for implementation of any purported “right to 
development (Marks, 2004: 147). 
This thesis therefore considers the US preponderance of plundering capitalism and/or 
free market liberties over the human rights to development as paradoxical owing to the fact 
that resounding echoes of collaborative development policies and strategies, particularly in 
the UN millennium agenda, are dominating the twenty-first century. Instead of pledging 
support to the right to development, the US occasionally has accused developing countries 
that their intent for the right is underpinned in a pretext to violate other human rights (Marks, 
2004: 147-148). The assumption made by the US is that if the right to development is not 
acceptable by Western industrialised countries, perhaps, impoverished States will then use 
that as an excuse to violate civil and political rights. Whether the US or developing countries 
is right or ill on their divergent stance on the right to development, the point is that US 
foreign policy in general seems incompatible with development in the political South. If we 
consider the US presumption that development occurs as a result of economic liberties then 
the question will be: why the US is imposing economic sanctions on almost every country of 
the political South, considering that the main purpose of economic sanctions is to disrupt 
and/or impair economic activities within a target State or region. In 1999, Someshwar Singh 
reported that 75 countries (developing countries) were subjected to US unilateral coercive 
economic sanctions (Singh, 1999). While studies on economic sanctions reveal that they 
impede development in target countries (Farfer, 1996; Köchler, 1997; Malloy, 2000; 
Hondora, 2009; Manchak, 2010) yet the US sees nothing ill in imposing such coercive 
measure on other countries. Thus, the continuous use of unilateral economic sanctions by the 
US against developing countries merely because of divergent political views is disheartening, 
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as they may be perceived as an attempt by the US to distort political and economic 
development in the target States.  
2.2. Economic sanctions and human rights protection 
Throughout history, sovereign States have utilized economic sanctions at different 
times to achieve various purposes of interest to the States that impose them. It is believed by 
sender States that economic sanctions are a durable alternative capable of achieving what 
traditional diplomacy alone could not accomplish. The use of this coercive measure was 
never questioned until in the latter part of the 20th century (Schefer, 2007: 11). That is to say, 
from the first time sanctions were imposed by the Ancient Greeks (more than three thousand 
years ago) until after World War II, no one challenged the utility of economic sanctions with 
respect to their coercive and inhumane nature. After World War II, came the formation of the 
United Nations and thus ushering in a new political era that favours the use of economic 
sanctions. In this time however, economic sanctions were imposed for the purpose of 
protecting human rights or at least protesting human rights abuses carried out by some 
regimes on their citizens. Permit me to repeat that the white racist regime in Rhodesia and the 
apartheid regime in South Africa spurred the interest of the United Nations to take action 
against human rights violation in these countries. 
These two cases mentioned set the stage running politically and morally for increased 
use of economic sanctions as a measure that “guarantees” protection of human rights. 
However, the 1990’s witnessed a change in focus, the question is no longer how sanctions 
can help protect rights, but how can sanctions cause violations of those rights. Consequently, 
debate on the legality, morality and utility of economic sanctions gained wide attention. It 
may be of importance to note that the first challenge to the utility of economic sanctions was 
in the 1960’s (Schefer, 2007: 13). This challenge stemmed from the argument of 
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economically weak and/or impoverished States alleging that senders of economic sanctions 
were wealthy industrial States, who themselves do not abide by the same human rights for 
which they impose sanctions on weak States. This constellation spurred the adoption of two 
UN General Assembly Resolutions (GA Res. 2131 of December 21, 1965 and GA Res. 2625 
of October 24, 1970). 
 The General Assembly Resolution 2131, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and 
Sovereignty States as follows: 
 No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, 
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats 
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and 
cultural elements are condemned. 
 No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type 
of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination 
of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from its advantages of any 
kind.  
 While the General Assembly Resolution 2131, the Declaration on Friendly Relations 
out rightly condemned the use of economic sanctions, arguing that their uses contradicts 
international law principle that prohibits States from interfering in the domestic affair of one 
another. Resolution 2625 states: 
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type 
of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination 
of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to seize from its advantages of any 
kind […]. 
Despite these resolutions and the position of many economically and/or politically 
weak States, alleging that imposition of economic sanctions are illegal or politically 
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unacceptable yet the measures have remained invaluable in the view of the United States and 
even the UN Security Council. Instead, the Security Council often claims that part of the 
reason for its sanctions is to protect the human rights of citizens of target States (such as Iraq) 
or to say to the regime “we do not support your actions.” Thus economic sanctions are 
imposed in some cases on grounds of “humanitarian intervention.” Consequent upon what UN 
officials called “genocidal” results in Iraq in the 1990’s, sanctions literature increasingly 
began to take opposing stance on the use of economic sanctions either to protect or protest 
human rights violation. Some commentators and scholars in the field of international relations 
such as Hersey (2013) began to argue that the sovereign right of States to use economic 
sanctions has limits corresponding to those faced by sovereigns using military force on 
another as enshrined in the international humanitarian law.  
In my view, whether economic sanctions are imposed for protecting human rights or 
not, the measure requires a stronger consideration of its collateral damage and/or effects. 
Furthermore, the international human rights law categorically states that there is no reason 
whatsoever to employ avoidable measures and/or actions that may cause harm to a person or 
the civilian population. This is because the principles of human rights protect every individual 
on the basis of humanity, and for that reason, no other goal can override the human rights of 
the individual. Yes, I agree that human rights may need to be balanced with, for instance, 
other important societal rights; however, there is no prior existing norm to trump core human 
rights. 
Also, using sanctions as a tool of promoting or enhancing human rights in a target 
country such as Zimbabwe raises some very important questions: first, can sanctions imposed 
with the aim of protesting or to end human rights abuses of a particular regime be permitted 
on grounds of “humanitarian intervention?” Secondly, can economic sanctions be permitted 
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under the international humanitarian law even when they can cause as much humanitarian 
damage to the civilian population as warfare? The first question responds to the issue of 
whether it is legitimate for the international community or individual States to take actions on 
a regime perceived to be oppressing its citizens and/or whether everything that a government 
does with regard to its own citizens is strictly domestic. The principles of international law 
with respect to intervention, prohibits States from interfering in the domestic/internal matters 
of a sovereign State. Based on the position of international law, proponents of intervention 
(militarily or economically) often make reference to grave violations of human rights, such 
that happened in countries like Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Kosovo. To proponents of 
intervention, economic sanctions are the only readily available measure to quell or checkmate 
serious violations of human rights that may occur inside State borders. In as much as I agree 
that economic sanctions may play a role in deterring brutal regimes from human rights 
violations, there remain no clear mechanism for which it will perform this duty without 
violating some fundamental rights of the same civilian it were meant to help and thus add to 
their burden. 
The second question raised was whether economic sanctions must be applied within 
the constraints of international humanitarian law. One may argue that even economic 
sanctions that are clearly aimed at protecting human rights or upholding international norms 
may be a functional equivalent of war when we consider their disastrous outcomes in Iraq and 
the on-going economic situation in Zimbabwe. For example, the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) study in Iraq reveals that sanctions were responsible for the deaths of 
567,000 Iraqi “children” (Hawksley, 2009: 82) while more than a million Zimbabweans are 
reported to be experiencing food shortages. Thus, like war, economic sanctions must adhere 
to the international humanitarian law. A deep consideration of these questions brings us back 
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to the point made in previous chapter that what we need is a complete overhaul of our present 
international system which deliberately violate one right in order to uphold another. 
Contrary to the opinion that economic sanctions may be imposed for the purpose of 
protecting and/or protesting human rights abuses, I submit that they in fact add to violation of 
the same rights they were meant to protect. The principle behind this argument is that 
economic transactions and/or trade between countries attract capital flow and thus it increases 
the production capacity of the economy (Callahan, 1999: 23). Consequently, more jobs are 
created which ultimately lead to political and social changes. Thus, an expansion of the 
middle class through increased job creation will obviously translate to improve social, 
political and economic rights of citizens (Baker, 2002: 46). Mark A. Warner supports this 
view, when he posits that the right way to expand the middle class is through constructive 
engagement (Warner, 1999: 100). In my view, rather than imposing sanctions, an increased 
economic and social wealth for citizens of sanctions target will result in faster improvements 
on human rights and related issues. As Mark B. Baker (2002) writes,  
A country and its political and social climate can benefit from the influence of 
wealth, security and foreign values and that a restrictive or repressive State, 
may “evolve” into a more open, protective State cognizant of, and responsive 
to, its citizens’ appeals for change. This evolution would be aided by private 
and public appeals to the government for change (Hindeya, 2013: 119).  
We may consider China as an example to expatiate this argument because the country has 
experienced some level of improvement as a result of increased trade and foreign investment. 
Although critics may say it is ill to propose business investment that will improve the 
economy of brutal States and/or regime, expecting that a successful economy will transform 
those regimes into a democracy. However, reality shows that we cannot be doing the same 
thing and expect a different result, coercion in many times have failed to change and/or 
contend brutal regimes. The truth is that if the international community and/or sanctioning 
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States are truly committed to helping the civilian population of target States, they would 
employ other measures that will stabilise the economic condition of the civilians population. 
This in my opinion will provide them with the courage and means to demand for change in 
the political landscape of their country. Anecdotal evidence also shows that higher income for 
citizens coupled with exposure to the international world (mainly of the middle class) will 
necessitate them to request for more political and social freedom and this will likely force a 
change in the regime behaviour rather than sanctions. 
2.2.1. Limits of economic sanctions under the UN Charter 
The imposition of limits and/or obligations to an entity such as the Security Council 
depends on its legal position under the system where it is performing its functions. First of 
all, the Security Council is a political organ of the UN, which was established by an 
international agreement with a constitutional instrument and/or document referred to as the 
“Charter” of the United Nations. Secondly, the Security Council is part of an organization 
(United Nations) that is subject of rights and obligations under international law thus; each 
one of these perspectives has different consequences. Going back to the first point, the 
International Court of Justice has firmly pointed out that “the political character of an organ 
cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter 
when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment” (ICJ Reports, 
1948, par. 64). In this case, the position of the Security Council with respect to maintaining 
international peace and security does not give it the power to act beyond the constitutional 
framework of the treaty that established the UN as an organization. In addition, there is no 
expression whatsoever from the text and/or language of the Charter stating that the Security 
Council is unbound by law or can act beyond the guidelines and permission of the UN 
Charter (ICTY Trial Chamber, 1995: 28).  
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On the issue, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has pronounced several times to 
support the United Nation’s subjectivity. In the Reparations Advisory Opinion, it was upheld 
that the Security Council “is subject to public international law because it partakes of 
personality under this legal system, thus the rights and duties of an entity such as the United 
Nations must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent 
documents and developed in practice” (ICJ Reports, 1949: 179). In addition, the ICJ has also 
pronounced that “International Organizations are subjects of International Law and, as such, 
are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law; 
under their constitutions or under international agreements they are parties” (Singh, 1989: 
162; Ahmed and Butler, 2006: 771). 
The above pronouncement made by the judicial organ of the UN is fundamental. The 
first is totally applicable as a limit to the Security Council actions, but it suffers deficiency in 
terms of specificity. Consequently, it could be interpreted and/or manoeuvred in many ways 
to pave way for adoption of varied measures by the Security Council, which may include 
imposing economic sanctions. The second pronouncement made by the same judicial organ 
of the UN, however, clarifies sources from which the organization (the UN) and by extension 
the Security Council is duty-bound under International Law. Therefore, it would be more 
suitable to use the provisions of the Charter as a constitutional authorization to engage more 
specific provisions of international law which contain relevant dispositions for the protection 
of the rights of civilians in the case of a humanitarian emergency, such as the one which 
might be prompted by economic sanctions. As Judge Alvarez rightly pointed out, “it is 
necessary when interpreting the Charter to look ahead” (Gowland-Debbas, 1994: 95). 
Since the UN Charter binds the activities and/or actions of the Security Council, I 
consider it permissible to deduce the limit of Council action by reviewing certain sections of 
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the Charter. Reviewing some sections of the Charter has become apparently important since 
the main intention to establish limits to the action of Council is the protection of civilians, 
thus I present three different provisions of the Charter that contain relevant dispositions 
which I consider as  restrictions when imposing economic sanctions: 
1. The Preamble of the Charter informs that the UN goal and/or aspiration is 
the “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth to human 
person” as well as the intention to “establish conditions under which justice 
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law can be maintained.” Apart from the legal value of the Charter 
Preamble, it also represents a political tendency and/or the way, which the UN 
as an organization is conceived. Furthermore, it provides insight on the 
disposition of the legal provisions of the Charter. 
2. Article 1(3), of the Charter on its part emphasises on a paramount aspiration 
of the UN in “solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or 
humanitarian character, and promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights.” 
3. Article 55, the Achilles heel of the Security Council economic sanctions, 
highlights the aspirations of the UN in pursing and/or promoting “higher 
standards of living,” as well as the “universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction.”  
Although the language used in these legal provisions are vague in the sense that they 
did not provide any explicitly mandate for the UN General assembly or the Security Council 
to observe human rights (Reinisch, 2001: 857) however, they provide a framework for 
actions to be taken by Council. In this situation, the question that follows is: whether such 
legal provisions are sufficient to limit Council’s action, and more important, to bring real 
protections for civilians and their fundamental rights. The challenge that I perceive in the 
formulation of the abovementioned rules is in their ambiguousness, which gives room for 
varied interpretations of their meaning and thus making it crucial to establish whether a more 
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concrete standards or obligations can be linked under international law. Nonetheless, since 
Article 1(3) and Article 55 of the Charter remain part of the UN objectives, it shows 
inconsistency when one of its principal organs (in this case the Security Council) resort to 
action(s) that breach one of its fundamental objectives (protection of human rights) in order 
to favour another i.e. the performance of political functions as the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
2.2.2. Limits of economic sanctions under international law 
Currently, there is no international law or international treaty that explicitly deals with 
the legal limit of economic sanctions. Article 41 of the UN Charter provided for the use of 
sanctions by the Security Council for the purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security; however the Article is silent on the issue of precise duration or limitations of 
sanctions measure. In the absence of a clear scope in the UN Charter, particularly in Article 
41 as to the “red-line” of economic sanctions with respect to their humanitarian impact, 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law provides limits of the 
permissibility of economic sanctions. According to Gasser (1993) International humanitarian 
law can be defined as:  
Those international rules, established by treaty or custom, which are 
specifically intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from 
international and non-international armed conflicts and which for 
humanitarian reasons, limit the right of the parties to a conflict to use methods 
and means of warfare of their choice or protect persons and property that are 
or may be affected by the conflict (Gasser, 1993: 16).  
Unfortunately, the international humanitarian law does not directly address the legality of 
economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council, but there is a general consensus among 
legal positivist that specific rules can be found in the four Geneva Conventions and relevant 
customary international law (Kondoch, 2001). 
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After World War II, it became apparently important to summon a convention that will 
produce legal instruments that addresses humanitarian issues arising from the war. 
Consequently, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 was convened to fill the gaps in international 
humanitarian law exposed by the conflict. The purpose of the instrument produced by the 
convention is to provide civilians with a minimum protection from the effects of armed 
conflict (Bothe and Kondoch, 2001: 284). The convention acknowledging that all human 
being are equal, however, defined certain population groups as vulnerable and specifically 
mentions sectors that are exempted from blockades with the intention of reducing the adverse 
humanitarian consequences of war. 
The lack of addressing economic sanctions in the Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocols can be explained by the fact that during the time of drafting the 
instrument, it was not anticipated that a non-military action and/or measure such as economic 
sanctions may cause thousands or even millions of civilian deaths. Nonetheless, since 
international law is highly adaptive and widely interpreted in a dynamic way, its enforcement 
may therefore be applicable to economic sanctions. The main point of my argument is that if 
international humanitarian law is not applicable to economic sanctions, it would otherwise be 
also impossible to apply them to new types of weapons (nuclear and chemical) since such 
weapons did not exist as of the time the instrument was drafted. As Hans-Peter Gasser 
argues, while the safeguards of international humanitarian law were intended primarily to 
protect the civilian population against the negativities of military operations during an armed 
conflict involving two belligerents, considerations of humanitarian policy explicitly suggest 
that “they also apply to enforcement measures based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter” 
(Gasser, 1996: 885). This holds true for economic sanctions adopted under Security Council 
resolutions. That is to say, economic sanctions should be subject of international 
humanitarian law considering the fact that it employs certain unacceptable mechanisms and 
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strategies of warfare. For example, starvation has been used as a method of warfare for 
centuries (Kondoch, 2001: 285). According to George, A. Mudge, starvation is “an effect, the 
condition or process of perishing from insufficient food intake, a state of extreme 
malnutrition, which may be caused by physical inability to eat or insufficient food supplies” 
(Mudge, 1969: 236) 
Article 23 of Geneva Convention IV, states that there is an obligation to let “essential 
foodstuff through battle lines if intended for children under fifteen and expectant mothers.” 
Although the provision of Article 23 limits starvation to a certain category of people it 
discourages starvation as a weapon of warfare. Apart from Article 23, broad and explicit 
limitation on the use of starvations as weapon of warfare was provided for in Article 55 of 
Geneva Convention IV, which states that the occupying force to the fullest extent of the 
means available has a duty toward the whole civilian population, not only those expecting or 
children, to provide foodstuffs if it is inadequately supplied. Indeed the provisions of Article 
55 makes practical sense as it would be immoral whilst unlawful to starve a population, 
which is already under occupied control. Also the wording of the article stresses on the duty 
of the occupying force to ensure adequate food supply by employing every means possible at 
their disposal. Furthermore, Article 54 of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions 
provides for an outright prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare or the use of any 
tactics that hampers the survival of civilians regardless of their motive, whether in order to 
starve out civilians or any other motive. Additional Protocol I has been praised by 
commentators for its merit in providing specifics for protecting civilians in times of war. In 
the words of George Aldrich, Additional Protocol I is a “major accomplishment […] that 
improves the situation of civilians dramatically” (Aldrich, 1985: 695).  
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Like in time of war, economic sanctions may be imposed in such a manner that may 
cause the civilian population to starve. The US/EU sanctions against Zimbabwe may be true 
of this fact. A report by World Food Programme (WFP) on October 2012 reveals that about 
1.7 million people in Zimbabwe are experiencing food shortages (WFP, 2012: 3). Although 
one may argue that the imminent starvation in Zimbabwe is as a result of bad policies of the 
government, which is partly true however the contribution of sanctions is beyond shield. 
Apart from Zimbabwe, the catastrophic impact of Security Council economic sanctions 
witnessed in Iraq adds to the list of examples. When we consider what happened in Iraq and 
the situation in Zimbabwe with respect to food insecurity, it becomes glaring that economic 
sanctions are culpable of starving a civilian population. Be it Zimbabwe or any other 
sanctioned country, if a significant segment of a civilian population falls below subsistence 
level as a result of the impact or contribution of economic sanctions, then sanctions violate 
the prohibition on starvation. Consequently, the international humanitarian law should be 
applicable to economic sanctions when necessary on humanity principle. 
2.2.3. Unilateral sanctions in international law  
As noted earlier, in recent years certain States have found themselves facing the 
specter of economic sanctions, generally because of contrasting political issues. 
Consequently, economic developments are hampered in target States, while the social and 
political well-being of its people is also affected. According to Mohamad (2013: 3), contrary 
to the use of sanctions, maintaining international peace, security and human dignity requires 
corporation among States. Thus, the proposition that sanctions are legitimate means of 
achieving international peace and security is controversial.  
Unilateral sanctions as a tool of statecraft are not permitted under any international 
law or recognized in the UN Charter. Arguably, article VII of the UN Charter may have 
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permitted the use of sanctions by the Security Council while maintaining the peace, however, 
the use of unilateral sanctions are not permitted under any international legal framework. 
Rather, unilateral sanctions are imposed by a State through the application of its domestic 
and/or national laws contrary to established principles of jurisdiction under international law 
(Mohamad, 2013: 4-5). According to the international law, all national and/or domestic laws 
are territorial in nature and as such cannot be applicable outside national territory. Hence the 
extraterritorial application of national legislation with respect to unilateral sanctions violates 
the basic principles of the UN Charter, such as the principle of State equality, respect for the 
dignity and of a sovereign State and the principles of non-intervention in domestic matters of 
a State. In addition they violate human rights of ordinary citizens by deliberately inflicting 
suffering on the population of a target and denying them the right to development and self-
determination. 
Although presently, international law lack an effective enforcement authority, 
however, that does not mean that a State can use its national policies and legislations against 
another State, particularly when such action may inflict harm or suffering on the civilian 
population. Considering the importance of the subject and its implications on target States, 
the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO) during the 2012 annual 
session, mandated its Secretariat to review the “Impermissibility of Unilateral Sanctions and 
Extraterritorial Application of National Legislation on Third Parties.” The study covers the 
impermissibility of unilateral sanctions under international law, including its impact on the 
effective functioning of economic activities, particularly the impact it has on financial 
institutions in the target country and its negative impact on trade and the human rights of 
civilians. The Secretariat report was submitted during the 2013 annual session of AALCO 
held in New Delhi, India. A major conclusion provided by the report was that unilateral 
sanctions violate the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and other 
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principles that are recognized through soft laws such as the 1970 right to development and 
Friendly Relations Declaration (Mohamad, 2013: 6). Consequently, the use of unilateral 
sanctions, which legally is the extraterritorial application of domestic and/or national 
legislation on another State, is illegal under international law. In addition the UN Charter 
does not permit such measure. 
2.2.4. Human rights and State(s) responsibility 
Human rights are the foundation of freedom, peace, development and justice- 
and the heart of the work of the United Nations around the world (Speech by 
Ban Ki Moon on December 10, 2010). 
According to the international law, States have the legal obligation to respect, protect 
and fulfil the human rights set out by international human rights conventions they ratify. Also 
they are obliged to abide by and to respect the human rights declarations and other such 
political commitments that they affirm (Goldoni,Marco and McCorkindale, 2012: 70). 
Therefore, States are required to refrain from any action(s) that breach or violate the rights of 
a person such as right to life, freedom, good health and other rights contained in human rights 
declarations. Also international organisations such as the United Nations, the European 
Union, the African Union and other regional organizations are duty bound under international 
human rights law to respect and protect human rights (Goldoni,Marco and McCorkindale, 
2012: 70). However, against human rights declarations, States have resort to measures that 
undermine the capability of a person to enjoy his/her rights. The justification often provided 
by States and/or the international community for employing measures that breach the rights 
of the individual person or his/her capability to enjoy rights are often hidden in an unproven 
quest to maintain international security. This type of logic raises the following questions: is 
security more important than human rights? Secondly, how can States or the international 
community refrain from taking actions and/or measures that violate human rights? As Sergio 
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Vieira de Mello, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights puts it: “too many international 
actors today are pursuing policies based on fear, thinking they will increase security. But 
true security cannot be built on such a basis. True security must be based on the proven 
principles of human rights” (Wolfgang, 2012: 35).  
The above assertion may be true of the continuous use of economic sanctions as a 
policy tool by States and the Security Council. Against their poor track record in terms of 
achieving set goals, the Security Council and the UN as a body has been “dishing out” 
economic sanctions as a panacea for international peace and security. In a related opinion, a 
former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan emphasises that security, development and human 
rights are inseparable when he posits thusly: “accordingly, we will not enjoy development 
without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either 
without respect for human rights […]” (OHCHR Report, 2005: 7; Heyns and Stefiszyn, 2006: 
156). The above expression shows how important it is for the international community (the 
UN) as a body to refrain from any action and/or measure whatsoever that may infringe on 
people’s rights, be it through imposed economic sanctions or any other measures.  
In addition, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in its 2012 
Interpretative Guide: The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights emphasises 
that:  
The obligation of States to respect human rights means that they must refrain 
from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. Their 
obligation to protect human rights requires them to protect individuals and 
groups against human rights abuses, including by business enterprises. Their 
obligation to fulfil human rights means that States must take positive action to 
facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights” (UNHR Report, 2012: 11). 
Also, the declaration adopted by the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 
1993 and the subsequent United Nations resolutions passed on the occasion of the 50th 
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anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1998 recognised human rights 
as universal. Judging that the mechanism through which economic sanctions function 
destroys economic activities in a target State, the end result obviously is that the citizens will 
suffer destitution and thus economic sanctions takes away their capability to enjoy rights. In 
my opinion, it is disheartening when we consider the startling contradiction in the number of 
States that have signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and then turn around to 
circumvent such agreement by adopting a repressive policy tool such as economic sanctions.  
Supposedly, human rights are the inherent dignity of all members of the human family 
as enshrined in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants of 
1966, which also recognised the ideal of free human being enjoying freedom from fear and 
want and accorded with equal and inalienable rights. Accordingly, human rights are universal 
and inalienable (Dennis and Stewart, 2004: 462), which means that they apply everywhere 
and in all situations and cannot be taken away from the human person even with his /her 
consent or agreement. In the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 the then 
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that “human rights are birth rights.” 
Therefore, it is mandatory on individual States and by extension the United Nations as an 
organization that is made up of States to implement, respect, protect and to fulfil human 
rights. The term “implement” implies that States and its authorities and/or apparatus must 
accept and respect human rights in totality. The State therefore, is duty bound to prevent 
violence and other human rights violations and the same duty is applicable to the 
international community or the United Nations. 
My point here is that it is only the protection of human rights that can guarantee 
security; if the former (human rights) are not protected then the later (security) may be 
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worthless and/or inexistent. As Lloyd Axworthy, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Canada rightly pointed out: “[Security] is, in essence, an effort to construct a global society 
where the safety of the individual is at the centre of the international priorities […], where 
international human rights standards and the rule of law are advanced and woven into a 
coherent web protecting the individual […]” (Wolfgang, 2012: 33). Thus, protection of 
human rights is the prime responsibility of States and the international community and as 
such, there will be no justification to violate human rights even on political grounds. 
2.3. Theories of international relations and States interaction 
Theory is an ordered set of assertions about a generic behaviour or structure 
assumed to hold throughout a significantly broad range of specific instances 
(Sutherland, 1975: 9).  
Also theory could be seen as a system of constructs and variables in which the 
constructs are related to each other by propositions and the variables are 
related to each other by hypotheses (Lundberg and Young, 2005: 168). 
Furthermore, theory is the critique, revision and summing up of past 
knowledge in the form of general propositions, the fusion of diverse views and 
partial knowledge’s in general frameworks of explanation (Pieterse, 2001: 2).  
 In order to create an in-depth understanding of the topic, this part of the thesis reviews 
theories of international relations, which allows me to explore their relationship to sanctions. 
Theory as defined above is an overall perspective from which we see and interpret the world. 
It includes the way we look at the social world, the lexicon and syntax through which we talk 
about it, the nature of our conceptual scheme, the categories into which we group things and 
the logical relations that exist between concepts (Abend, 2008: 179). A theory explains how 
and why specific relationships lead to specific events. Consequently, these explanations of 
relationships are critical for good theory formulation. Theory offers a way of looking or a 
way of talking about things. For example, society can be thought of as a system or the social 
world that is understood as containing objects with properties and variables with values. 
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However, these conceptual choices are predicated upon more general epistemological and 
ontological views, which theorists may or may not explicitly articulate (Abend, 2008: 180). 
Abend’s assertion implies that there is a direct relation between theory and practice and 
theory represents the basis or foundation of every logical and practical argument. On his part 
Stephen Van Evera asserts that theory is composed of “causal law or causal hypothesis 
connected with an explanation of the causal law or hypothesis” (Van Evera, 1997: 9). The 
definition provided by Van Evera implies that a theory should allow us to make predictions 
about future behaviour of the parties and/or actors involved based on an empirical 
explanation of how phenomena relate to each other. 
 With these factors in mind, I examine theories of international relations in order to 
understand how they shape the relationships of States and interaction, and most importantly, 
how they influence our approaches in handling conflict. I do not claim that the theories 
reviewed are better or more appropriate than others, but rather more generally examine the 
defining history, characteristics and criticisms of each of the theories provided. I analyse 
them in a manner that gives insight into the reasons why actions such as sanctions are used to 
enforce cooperation, discipline or to restore international peace and security as claimed by the 
United Nations and other organizations, instead of applying a moral imagination to peace 
(Lederach, 2005). 
2.3.1. Realism theory 
Realism is an international relations theory that emerged gradually through the work 
of different authors with a distinctive but still diverse style or tradition of analysis. Realism as 
a literary movement was first introduced in the mid-nineteenth century France and quickly 
spread to England, Russia, and the United States (Habib, 2013: 8). In France, the major realist 
writers include Honore de Balzac, Gustave Flaubert, Emile Zola and Guy de Maupassant, 
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among others. In Russia, the major realist writers were Ivan Turgenev, Fyodor Dostoevsky 
and Leo Tolstoy. In England, the foremost realist authors were Charles Dickens, George Eliot 
and Anthony Trollope. In the United States, William Dean Howells was the foremost realist 
writer (Habib, 2013: 8). However, Hans J. Morgenthau is recognized as the founder of post-
World War II realist theory in international relations (Kaufman, 2006: 24). First, the theory 
assumes that nation-States are unitary, geographically based actors in an anarchic 
international system with no authority from above, capable of regulating interactions among 
themselves due to the fact that no true authoritative world government exists. Secondly, it 
considers sovereign States are the primary actors in international affairs. Thus, States, as the 
highest order in international relations and affairs are in competition with one another and act 
as rational autonomous actors in pursuit of their own self-interests with a primary goal to 
maintain and ensure their own security (Ayanna, 2012: 17). Realism is not defined using 
explicit assumptions and propositions; rather as cited by different scholars, it is a general 
orientation. According to Gilpin (198I: 304), it is a philosophical disposition. Ferguson and 
Mansbach (1988: 79) see it as a set of normative emphasis that shapes theory. Garnett (1984: 
110) explains that it is an attitude of the mind with distinctive and recognizable flavour. Other 
authors such as Rosenthal (1991: 7) refer to it as a loose framework, while Elman (1996: 26) 
addresses it as a “big tent,” with room for a number of different theories. Though realist 
scholars differ in their opinions about the theory, all realists give primary emphasis to 
egoistic passions and the unavoidable presence of evil in all political relations (Morgenthau, 
1946: 203). According to Niebuhr (2002), because these passions are ineradicable, conflicts 
are inevitable. In a simple analysis, it means that differences in opinion, selfish interest and 
conflict are inherent in political relations and actions. Furthermore, Carr (1946: 231) asserts 
that it is illusionary to imagine a hypothetical world in which men no longer organize 
themselves in groups for the purposes of conflict. This statement rings true when we look into 
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the situations we have today with many international organizations such as NATO and the 
UN Security Council formed for the purpose of defence, either militarily or diplomatically. 
Despite all disparities in the opinions of realist scholars, they unanimously agree and propose 
that egoistic passions are an inevitable and inherent part of human nature. They argue that 
these passions define the central problem of politics. Furthermore, they emphasize that 
statesmanship and international relations are dominated by the need to control this side of 
human nature (Donnelly, 2000: 10). 
Realists also stress that international relations are characterized by anarchy and thus 
the law of the jungle must prevail in the absence of a world government (Schuman 1941: 9). 
According to some realists, the difference between civilization and barbarism is just a 
revelation of the inherent feature in human nature (egoism passion) that plays out under 
different conditions (Butterfied, 1949: 31; Schuman, 1941: 9; Spykman 1942: 141). They 
further argue that within the State, government and the law usually tame human nature, while 
in international relations, due to the absence of a world government, anarchy allows and 
encourages the worst aspects of human nature to prevail. As noted by Schwarzenberger 
(1951: 147), the interaction between egoism and anarchy makes power the overriding goal in 
international relations; this informs why power and security is primary in all international 
political relations and actions (Gilpin 1981: 305). Also, Jack Donnelly explains that nations 
are characterized by force and recurrent use of it; thus, “security” appears somewhat less 
dangerous and less violent than a safe and peaceful world (Donnelly, 2000: 10). Having 
pointed out that there are divergent opinions and perceptions within realist scholars, I will 
explain some of the classifications of realist and their perceptions as noted by Jack Donnelly 
(2000: 11-13). 
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Structural realists are a group that perceives international relations as being dominated 
by anarchy. One such realist is John Herz, who argues that international anarchy is the central 
reason for the struggle for power even in the absence of aggressiveness (Herz, 1976: 10). 
Structural realists believe that human nature has little or nothing to do with State(s) lust for 
power; rather it is the structure of the international system that necessitates States “scramble” 
for power. They contend that the world system exists without superior authority that can 
control the excesses of world powers thereby making it ever-more important for States to 
amass power and increase their self defense capabilities in the event of an attack or external 
aggression. In addition, this group of realists takes little or no cognisance of cultural 
diversities as well as differences in regime type, mainly because they believe that the 
international system offers the same basic incentives for all great powers. In any case, 
whether a regime is democratic, autocratic or even despotic is irrelevant, when it comes to 
how they act or react towards other States (Mearsheimer, 2006: 72). 
However, structural realists are divided into two categories with contrasting 
assumptions: defensive realists and offensive realists (Millier 1996; Frankel 1996; Brooks 
1997; Lobell, 2000; James, 2002; Walt 2002; Schweller, 2003 and Nexon 2009). Defensive 
realists such as Kenneth Waltz (1979) contend that it is unnecessary for a State to amass 
power because such attempt will result to punishment. The world system will punish any 
State for attempting to expand its power and domination over others. Thus, the hegemonic 
tendencies of States are deterred by a consequent punishment. While offensive realists like 
John Mearsheimer share opposing view when they asserts that it is in the interest of State(s) 
to acquire as much power as possible. The underlying argument being that a State is 
invulnerable by increasing its power and/or self defense capabilities. For structural realists, 
power is a means to an end and the ultimate end is survival (Mearsheimer, 2006: 72). That is 
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to say that the survival of a State depends on its material capabilities and the balance of 
power is a function of States expanding their military arsenals and capabilities. 
Another category of realist is the biological realists. This brand of realist lays 
emphasises on human nature. An example of such a realist is Hans Morgenthau, who argues 
that social forces are the end product of human nature in action. He states, “The social world 
is a projection of human nature on the collective plan, and political problems are projections 
of human nature into the society” (Donnelly, 2000: 11). Realists such as Morgenthau believe 
that even in the absence of conflict, pride, lust and quest for domination, eventually the nature 
of man will ignite conflict and war of all against all. They believe that war and conflict are 
rooted in human nature; the ultimate sources of social conflict and injustices are found in the 
ignorance and selfishness of men (Donnelly, 2000: 11). Also biological realists propose that 
the essential nature of man/woman may not be altered. They contend that in general, human 
behaviour can be improved with the establishment of authority and order, which reduces 
wrong behaviours and makes human nature better so to speak (Butterfield, 1960: 25).  
Strong realists are a category of realist that believes completely in realism as the 
positive theory of international politics or statesmanship. Because of their belief, they find it 
difficult or irrelevant to accommodate the opinions of others, particularly those opinions that 
contrast greatly to realist concerns (Donnelly, 2000: 12). They perceive realism theory as the 
end to the definition of international relations and politics.  
Hedged realists are comprised of a group of realist scholars who agree to the realist 
definition of international politics, characterized by anarchy and egoism. However, they have 
varying opinions about the issue of power politics. For example, E.H. Carr argues that we 
cannot ultimately find a resting place in pure realism (Donnelly, 2000: 18). Similarly, John 
Herz explains that the human cause will be lost if the liberal ideal is forgotten (ibid). This 
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implies that realism is not a panacea and/ or final arbiter in defining international relations. 
This group of realists believes that there is room and need to accommodate other views and 
theories about international relations. 
 Overall, realism theory has been challenged by scholars such as Kaufman (2006: 14), 
due to its emphasis on power and interest and scepticism over moral concerns in international 
relations. Also, the generalization by realists that “men/women are inherently bad” has been 
criticised. Critics argue that by perceiving man/women essentially as evil, individualistic, 
greedy and what Hans Morgenthau calls animus dominandi (Morgenthau 1965: 192); the 
human “lust” of power presents a huge challenge for human coexistence with one another. 
They contend that by insinuating that man/women are born with inherent quest for power and 
to enjoy the gains thereof, realism inevitably bring men and women into a perpetual conflict 
with each other. For example Professor Timothy Lim, of California State University argues 
that realism perception of international relations as “dog-eat-dog,” one in which the “biggest, 
baddest” dogs survive and prosper while others are subjugated is problematic and should be 
reconsidered. Another criticism or deficiency of realism is that the theory presents challenges 
in transforming conflicts by alluding that man is power craving in nature “animus 
dominandi,” a position that underscores a self-arm and/or defense ideology with a 
reactionary retaliation intent arising from irrational apprehension of being made subservient 
by others (Kaufman, 2006). In this case, realism is perceived as a theory based on paranoia 
and fear. The ever growing military industrial complex and the quest to develop nuclear 
weapons and weapons of mass destruction may be attributed to realist prepositions. Regimes 
arming themselves in an attempt to reassure that the worst will not come to them. 
Another issue with realism theory is that it assumes that all international relations are 
conflictual and war remains the only part to resolve international conflicts. It advocates and/ 
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or expresses nationalism whilst it displays tendencies that are interlinked with protectionism 
and expansionism. That is to say, States are selfish and always sort to protect their interest 
through dominance of other States: whereas dominance entails hostile take-overs (militarily 
or economically) and thus linking it with expansionism (Kaufman, 2006: 22-23). In my 
opinion, it is a bogus claim and also problematic to generalise that all human beings are 
inherently bad. The problem with such a claim is that it impedes hope for conflict 
transformation and also the possibility of a peaceful cooperation and coexistence. 
2.3.2. Liberalism theory 
Liberalism is a paradigm predicated on the hope that the application of reason 
and universal ethics to international relations can lead to a more orderly, just, 
and cooperative world, and that international anarchy (lack of a hierarchical 
authoritative world government) and war can be policed by institutional 
reforms that empower international organizations and laws (Kegley and 
Wittkopf, 2006: 28). 
 Liberalism is a set of normative or moral claims about the importance of individual 
rights and freedoms (Elias and Sutch, 2007: 65). Hoffman defines it as “the protection of 
individual freedom, the reduction of State power and the conviction that power is legitimate 
only if it is based on consent and respects basic freedoms” (Paris, 1997: 59). Also, Ray and 
Kaarbo define liberalism as “a theoretical perspective emphasizing interdependence between 
States and sub-State actors as the key characteristic of the international system” (Ray and 
Kaarbo, 2006: 7). 
 Liberalism is concerned with the proper limits to the exercise of political power and 
about the scope of just political actions. Issues such as individual freedom, political 
participation, private property and equality of opportunity are key tenets of the theory (Ray 
and Kaarbo, 2006: 8). Liberals believe in the principle and importance of the freedom of the 
individual, the right to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects and not as 
 165 
 
objects or means only (Badie, Schlosser and Morlino, 2011: 1434). It is characterized by a 
shared commitment to four essential institutions. First, citizens possess juridical equality and 
other fundamental civic rights such as freedom of religion and the press. Second, the 
sovereignty of the State is based on its representative legislatures, which derive their 
authority from the consent of the electorate and exercise their representative authority free 
from restrictions, other than the requirement that basic civil rights be preserved. Third, the 
economy rests on the recognition of the rights of private property, including the ownership of 
means of production. Justification of property ownership as implied here are through 
individual purchases, social agreement or social utility (Badie, Schlosser and Morlino, 2011: 
1436-1438). Thus, it excludes State socialism or State capitalism but accepts market 
socialism and a mixed economy. Fourth, market forces are the determinants of economic 
decisions, both domestically and internationally, and they must be free from bureaucratic 
control. 
 Furthermore, liberalism theory emphasizes the problem of war and peace with the 
goal of implementing sufficient reforms to end war and create a democratic world peace 
(Paris, 1997). It proposes that the continuous changing and evolving world necessitates that 
individuals, intellectuals and State actors globally adjust to the challenges brought by the 
metamorphosis in world events in order to make it a better place. Most recent argument, as 
controversial as it may sound, is the concept of democratic peace; liberals claim that real 
democracies do not go to war or fight one another (Paris, 1997: 30). Liberalism assumes that 
wars are a product of misery, poverty and inequality that result from inadequate institution or 
misunderstandings; it can be prevented by creating better institutions (collective security) and 
by eliminating the possibility of misunderstanding through education and discussion (Kegley, 
1995). Liberal approaches believe that man/woman is tied to fellow man/woman on the basis 
of common humanity principles. Therefore, the limits imposed by State boundaries are 
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artificial. These ideas lead to actions such as the pursuit and protection of human rights across 
State boundaries. Unlike the realist perception that States are the only important actor in the 
world system, liberalism emphasizes the embeddedness of States and the interconnectivity of 
State and non State actors. 
 As noted by Stephen Walt (1998), liberalism is built on three structural premises. One 
strand of liberal thought argues that economic interdependence would discourage States from 
using force against each other because warfare would threaten each side’s development and 
prosperity. A second strand, often associated with President Woodrow Wilson, believes that 
the spread of democracy is the key to world peace, based on the claim that democratic States 
are inherently more peaceful than authoritarian States. A third and more recent preposition of 
the theory is that international institutions such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could help overcome selfish State behaviour, mainly 
by encouraging States to forego immediate gains for the greater benefits of enduring 
cooperation (Walt, 1998: 29). 
However, liberalism theory has also been criticised. One of the criticisms is that it 
does not provide a necessary connection between the process of economic growth and 
political development (Nel and Mcgowan, 2002). According to Nel and Mcgowan, the liberal 
assumption that the acceptance of a democratic system of governance will guarantee peace 
and development is incorrect. Their conclusion is based on the argument that adopting 
democracy by a State does not certainly lead to development? Another criticism of the theory 
is that it ignores the differences in relative gains and the distribution of wealth generated by 
the market system (Nicolacopoulos, 2008: 39). In any case, critics argue that liberalism 
perceives market systems with a unipolar lens, which projects free markets as a means of 
creating wealth. Critics believe that this assumption is disingenuous because it neglects the 
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asymmetry in international trade, which remains a problem in the international system. Also, 
another issue is the notion of collective security. As Hagar Taha argues, collective security 
led to the inactions of the international community in situations that demand humanitarian 
intervention, such as in Rwanda and Somalia, where the intervention came too late as a result 
of delays in passing a UN resolution (Hagar, 2011).  
In response to this analysis, I agree with some of the proposals of liberalism, such as a 
free market system. However, I believe such a system will only produce wealth and distribute 
it more evenly if the system is reformed in a way to create a balance of trade. The concept of 
a balance of trade is the difference between the monetary value of exports and imports of a 
specific country’s economic output over a certain period of time (Hinkelman, 2005: 21). If a 
balance of trade is achieved in global market systems, it will relatively improve the 
economies of individual States by providing stability to their economy and value for their 
currency. Nevertheless, I disagree with the issue of collective security. Collective security, 
which the United Nations promotes, does not guarantee peace and security; rather, it gives 
advantages to the perpetrators of crimes as a result of delays and disagreements in the UN 
resolutions (examples are Rwanda, Bosnia and Syria).  
2.3.3. Institutionalism theory 
Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience 
and composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, 
together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and 
meaning to social life. Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, 
including symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts. 
Institutions operate at different levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to 
localized interpersonal relationships. Institutions by definition connote 
stability but are subject to change processes, both incremental and 
discontinuous (Scott, 2001: 49). 
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Andrew Hoffman expands this definition of an institution when he asserts that 
institutions are common rules, norms and beliefs that describe reality for the organization, 
explaining what is and is not, what can be acted upon and what cannot (Hoffman, 1999: 351). 
Jepperson (1991: 145) also defines the concept as performance scripts that provide stable 
designs for chronically repeated activity sequences. An important characteristic of 
organizations is that the environments in which they exist influence them. For this reason, 
institutions construct their actions in a way that fits their environment. Institutions do this, in 
order to establish a platform for acceptance and legitimacy (Scott, 1995:132). 
Furthermore, Scott (2004: 408) explains that institutionalism is a selection process in 
which an institution selects among alternatives the best practices and behaviours that will 
enable it to achieve its objectives and at the same time be acceptable within the environment 
or framework in which it operates. The theory examines systems ranging from micro 
interpersonal interactions to macro global frameworks. Also, it deals with resilient aspects of 
social structure and examines the processes by which structures, including schemes, rules, 
norms and routines become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour (Scott, 
2004: 450). Furthermore, it evaluates how these elements are created, diffused, adopted, and 
adapted over a period of time and how they fall into decline and disuse (ibid). It emphasizes 
that in order to survive, institutions must conform to the rules and belief systems prevailing in 
their environment. Additionally, it posits that through the adoption of institutional 
isomorphism, both structural and procedural, organisations earn legitimacy (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Dacin, 1997; Deephouse, 1996 and Suchman, 1995). 
If we relate this theory to organizations such as the UN and the EU, we can develop a 
direct relation between these organizations and the premise of this theory. For example, the 
institutionalisation of sanctions within the UN, the EU and other international organizations, 
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without recourse to cost and effect of such action, brings us to the negative realities of 
institutionalism. For example, sanctions were initiated at one point, have been adopted over 
time and thus have become a norm and regular instrument of international politics. 
I argue that institutionalism may be well intended, for example, to create synergy and 
oneness and to encourage unity and cooperation. However, as realists argue, the quest for 
control that results from egoistic characteristic of man/woman makes institutionalism a 
platform for exercising power and interests. One example is the “unpleasant” use of 
economic sanctions by institutions such as the UN, the EU and other regional organizations. 
Such displays of power demonstrate that institutionalism serves powerful States. To buttress 
this argument, I use the United Nations Security Council and the EU parliament as an 
example. The permanent members of the UN enjoy privileges that other members of the UN 
do not. Such privileges, like Veto power, have enabled the Security Council to take coercive 
actions, like economic sanctions against other States without minding the humanitarian 
consequences. Apart from the United Nations, the EU is also an institution in which the rich 
and powerful countries “call the shots.” The structure of the EU is such that a country with a 
huge population has more representatives in the EU parliament. This structure has made it 
possible for countries like Germany and France to exert powers over decisions and policies of 
the EU. Institutionalism provides a platform that enables powerful countries to take 
advantage of other States. In any case, decisions made by institutions are influenced to favour 
the will and wishes of powerful States within the institution. The increase in the use of 
economic sanctions when considering its poor record and humanitarian consequences shows 
that this coercive instrument is employed to serve the interest of powerful States within the 
institutions that happen to influence the decisions and policies of the institution through their 
position and privileges. 
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2.3.4. Hegemonic stability theory 
Hegemonic stability theory draws on realist, liberal and historical structuralism 
perspectives, which are concerned with the role of a hegemonic or superior power in global 
politics (Bozdaglioglu, 2009). The basic claim of this theory is that the global political and 
economic system is most stable when it is under the control of a single State, the hegemon. 
As Robert Gilpin asserts, hegemony involves one State achieving pre-eminence over other 
States in the system (Gilpin, 1981: 28). Thus, the hegemon uses its power to advance trade 
and/or economic freedom and a stable international monetary system that serves its own 
political and economic interests through the corporation of other States. In doing this, the 
hegemon may coerce reluctant States into obeying the rules of a liberal international 
economic order. According to Joshua Goldstein, hegemonic power is one which is powerful 
enough to effectively control all important international rules, agreements, and institutions, 
through a mixture of diplomacy, persuasion, military and economic coercion (Goldstein, 
2005: 83). Conversely, the absence of a hegemon is associated with disorder in the world 
system and undesirable outcomes for individual States. By implication, this theory believes 
that a State powerful enough to impose its will upon the rest of the world will establish a 
system of rules and norms that contributes to global stability. In his book, The World in 
Depression, Charles Kindleberger (1986) supports this theory. He argues that the economic 
difficulties of the 1920’s and 1930’s were a result of the collapse of world leadership.  In 
addition he posits that a hegemon advances liberal international economy for cosmopolitan 
economic reasons. Thus, Kindleberger suggestion is that the idea of hegemonic power is 
primarily rooted in economic interest of the hegemon and the world at large. In contract to 
Kindleberger’s assumption, another group of political scientist such as Robert Gilpin argues 
that the interest of a hegemon is not only economic but also political (Gilpin, 2002: 166). 
Despite these differences between Kindleberger’s liberal version of the theory and the 
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political scientist version, both versions state that the establishment of international and/or 
collective free trade and monetary stability requires a dominant power with certain 
characteristics. 
The main characteristics of the theory are that the hegemon must have the will to 
establish a hegemonic regime, possess the capability to lead and have the capacity to enforce 
the rules of the system. Also, the hegemon must have the ability to forge new international 
laws and organizations to support this regime and possess a powerful military (Gilpin, 2002: 
164). According to Richard Rosecrance, “States can only cooperate economically with one 
another when a hegemonic power holds the ring economically or militarily” (Rosecrance, 
1986: 55). Additionally, Charles Kindleberger states, “for the world to be stabilized there 
must be a stabilizer” (Kindleberger, 1973: 305). In this case, the function of a stabilizer has to 
be fulfilled by the hegemon, who is the dominant power in the world system. The theory 
claims that an assertive hegemon can act as a stabilizing force in the international system. 
However, there is an important question regarding the morality of hegemony itself. Can a 
hegemon exercise a moral imagination of peace instead of violence, considering that the 
theory advocates for a hegemon to amass military weapons? Some realists have attempted to 
relate hegemony stability theory to realism theory. One of the scholars, John J. Mearsheimer, 
in his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, outlines how the anarchic system to which 
neorealists subscribe, creates power hungry States who will all attempt to install themselves 
as regional and global hegemons (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
Regarding the topic of this thesis, I underscore the fact that the multitude of sanctions 
episodes imposed against other States by the United States is directly connected to the impact 
of hegemony discussed above. According to Bruce Moon (2005), the US acted as predicted 
by hegemonic stability theory by promoting the institutions that integrated national 
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economies after World War II. In any case, the United States is a hegemon (Hudson, 1996; 
Gilpin, 2002; Kaplan, 2008 and Hoffman, 2009) in our present world. However, contrary to 
the premise of the theory that having a hegemon will guarantee peace and stability, it is 
evident that US hegemony has not fostered durable peace or stability in the world. Instead, 
what we are experiencing is what Hubbard (2010) and Layne (2012) refer to respectively as 
imperial peace and Pax Americana. These types of peace are being enforced by the United 
States through the use of economic sanctions and military apparatus. Generally, people accept 
the present “peace situation” in the world not by their personal resolve but out of fear of 
repression. 
Obviously, economic sanctions fit the machinery of a hegemon. I do not pretend that 
only a hegemon employs the instruments of economic sanctions; however, I do contend that 
economic sanctions are one of the strategies a hegemon such as the United States employs to 
assert its power on other States. Research by Doxey (1996) reveals that sanctions are not 
achieving their goals and objectives, and yet the use of such coercive instrument is unabated. 
One explanation to the US sanctions on Zimbabwe through the enactment of the Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) in 2001 could be seen as a way the 
United States exerts its power and control over other States. This is in line with the premise 
of Hegemony Stability Theory. One of the proposals of the theory is that a hegemon should 
have power and control over the world economy. This would explain the reason why the 
United States has imposed more economic sanctions on other States than any other country in 
the world. The reason for employing such measure is to assert influence, power and control 
over the political and economic affairs of other States. Finally, I submit that economic 
sanctions are a coercive instrument that reinforces hegemonic power without considering the 
humanitarian impact. 
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2.3.5. Balance of power theory 
This is an international relations theory that has proved difficult to define in simple 
terms, thereby raising disagreements and debate among scholars. According to Inis, L. 
Claude (1989: 13), “the trouble with the balance of power is not that it has no meaning but 
that it has too many meanings.” Also, Christoph Rohde asserts, “the concept seems to be so 
elusive and contradictory that it cannot be proven or disproven” (Rohde, 2004: 1). First and 
foremost, I emphasize that power means different things to different people. For some people, 
power translates to the application of military force, but it can also refer to economic 
superiority or diplomatic persuasion to bring about an outcome desired by a specific nation or 
group of nations. For others, power is not a specific thing or activity, but the ability of a given 
political entity to impose its will on another despite the resistance of the later. Others tend to 
consider power as a more diffuse concept, whereby a given nation merely influences the 
behaviour of one or more other States through the implementation of its foreign policy. 
Finally, and perhaps the simplest way of conceiving power has been stated as follows: 
“anything that establishes and maintains control of man over man” (Sheehan, 1996: 6). 
Unfortunately, the semantic confusion regarding the evaluation of power is compounded by 
the fact that there exists little agreement on how to quantify it. 
Any way we look at it, a balance of power approach is closely associated with both 
diplomatic parlance and realist theory. Its logic derives from the self-help imperative of the 
international system’s anarchic structure in which States are obliged to give priority to 
survival and security. In pursuing this logic, States will usually form alliances to oppose any 
expansionist centre of power that threatens to dominate the system and consequently their 
sovereignty. Thus, balance of power behaviour is central to conceptions of the national 
interest and to alliance policy (Mearsheimer, 2001; Dunne, Kurki and Smith, 2010). 
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Generally, the theory proposes that a balance of power is the only tool sufficient to prevent a 
State from imposing its views and will or even interfere with the interest of another State 
(Sheehan, 2000: 8). It strongly believes that the most effective check on the power of a State 
is the power of other States. The theory maintains that when one State or group of States 
increases their power or applies more aggressive measures, the threatened States will in 
response naturally seek to increase their own power, often by forming counter coalitions 
(Kegley and Wittkopf, 2006: 503). The basic tenets of the theory contend that by shifting 
alliances and countervailing pressures, no one power or combinations of powers will be 
allowed to grow so strong as to threaten the security of the rest. Frederick Hartmann argues 
that a balance of power constitutes a system in the sense that one power bloc leads to the 
emergence of another, ultimately leading to a network of alliances (Hartmann, 1973). Realists 
agree that the premise of balance of power theory offers opportunities for peace and stability, 
particularly as aggression and coercion would appear unattractive if there was equilibrium of 
power between the rival coalitions (Kegley and Wittkopf, 2006: 503). 
However the theory has attracted criticism from scholars such as Christoph Rohde. 
Rohde argues that, “the theory of balance of power focuses on the quantifiable variables of 
State-to-State relationships […] because material power equations are difficult to measure; 
the evaluation of the strength of the decisive actors in the system is a matter of perception 
and guessing” (Rohde, 2004: 1).  
Additionally, there is a longstanding debate among realists on how the polarity of a 
system impacts the tactics States use. However, it is generally agreed that balancing is more 
efficient in bipolar systems, as each great power has no choice but to directly confront other 
States (Sheehan, 2000: 9). Realists argue that balancing is a predominant behaviour induced 
by the rationale that States wishing to maximise power would join a stronger side. This leads 
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to what has been denominated as the bandwagon effect, a polarisation of the concept of 
balance of power, thereby producing hegemony. Others argue that balance of power does not 
imply an exact or approximate equality of power, but a search for hegemony. Furthermore, 
they explain that the dynamics of balance of power politics leads States to constantly seek to 
increase their own capabilities. This process may lead to some sort of equilibrium, but a very 
unstable one at that (Little, 2007: 213- 248). 
2.3.6. Constructivism theory 
The focus of social constructivism is on human awareness or consciousness of 
its place in world affairs. Much international relations theory, and especially 
neorealism is materialist; it focuses on how the distribution of material power 
deﬁne balances of power between States and explains the behaviour of States. 
Constructivists reject such a one-sided material focus. They argue that the 
most important aspect of international relations is social, not material (Jackson 
and Sørensen, 2007: 163). 
This is an international relations theory that challenges the dominance of neoliberal 
and neorealist theories. The theory emerged from debates on the scientific method of 
international relations theories and the role of theories in the production of international 
power (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2006). The theory came to limelight at the end of the Cold 
War. It criticises the static assumptions of traditional international relations theory, such as 
realism and liberalism, and emphasizes that international relations are a social construction. It 
challenges the key tenets of realism, which focuses on security and power, and also liberalism 
theory, which focuses primarily on economic interdependence and domestic-level factors. 
According to Emanuel Adler, constructivism occupies a middle ground between rationalist 
and interpretative theories of international relations (Alder, 1997: 319). Furthermore, Michael 
Barnett explains that constructivism is concerned with how ideas define international 
structures; how these structures define the interests and identities of States; and how States 
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and non-State actors reproduce these structures (Barnett, 2005: 251). Constructivism believes 
that international politics are shaped by persuasive ideas, collective values, cultures and 
social identities; it argues that international reality is socially constructed by cognitive 
structures, which give meaning to the material world (Alder, 1997: 319; Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 2001: 391). The central tenet of the theory is that most or even all-important 
elements of international politics are the product of specific social circumstances and 
historical processes, rather than being inevitable consequences of the nature of humans or the 
nature of politics. The basic argument of constructivism is that human relations are guided 
more by ideas than by material things (Griffiths, 2007). Constructivists propose that people 
and the ideas they believe in are what give meaning to situations and political relations. They 
argue that power does not reside in the State or institutions, but rather in the ideas that people 
perceive and in which they believe. Constructivists believe that anarchy, economies, and 
alliances are what people decide to make of them; therefore, they can change if people choose 
to view them differently (Wendt, 1992: 391).  
Although there are overlapping ideas between constructivism, realism and liberalism, 
constructivists refer to the goals, threats, fears, identities, and other elements of perceived 
reality that influence States and non-State actors within the international system (Joo and 
Kwak, 2007: 193). Constructivists do not perceive anarchy as the invariable foundation of the 
international system. Instead, they claim that anarchy is what States make of it. As such, 
social norms shape and change foreign policy over time, rather than the notion of security as 
realists propose (Wendt, 1992: 417). Constructivists are not arguing that “reality” is an 
illusion. They propose that the reality that surrounds us is not merely a product of purely 
objective or material forces, but rather an essential product of our shared perceptions, values, 
ideas and understandings. Moreover, they argue that there is a mutually constitutive or 
interactive relationship between structures and actors (Hopf, 1998: 172-173). Thus, our 
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perception is based on how we define our relationships, interactions and things that happen 
within our environment. The theory however, has been criticised. One of the criticisms comes 
from Stephen Walt when he says that constructivist theory is “better at describing what is 
and what was than in predicting what might be or should be” (Walt, 1998; 38). To Walt, 
constructivism fails to forecast and/or predict the future. 
In my opinion, Constructivism as a systemic theory offers hope for a transformative 
change in our global system. This is because change can only occur when people realize that 
their collective identity or action is based on norms and principles that they can inculcate or 
reject or even remove from the structure of the system. Thus it has the potentials of providing 
a better explanation and understanding of international relations in the coming years than the 
more narrowly focused liberal and realist theories of international relations. 
2.3.7. Democratic peace theory 
The Cold War has ended, and we now have a chance to forge a democratic 
peace, an enduring peace built on shared values, democracy, political and 
economic freedom. The strength of these values in Russia and the other new 
independent States will be the surest foundation for peace and the strongest 
guarantee of our national security for decades to come (Brown; Lynn-Jones 
and Miller, 1996: 126). 
 The foundation of this theory is Immanuel Kant (1795) book titled, Perpetual Peace. 
The theory proposes that democracies do not fight each other due to the fact that citizens 
must give their consent before a democratic State can go to war, particularly regarding the 
costs of war. According to Bruce Russett, the absence of war among liberal democracies 
across a wide range of different historical, economic, and political factors suggests that there 
is a strong predisposition against the use of military violence between democratic States 
(Russett, 2009: 9). Joanne Gowa explains that the acceptance of a democratic system of 
governance is the way to achieve peace in our world. She continues her argument by 
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identifying four key elements that explain why democracies are peaceful and do not fight one 
another. According to her, the first reason is that democracies inherit norms of peaceful 
conflict resolution, and they also display these inherited norms in their external relations. 
Second, democratic institutions produce competitive elections and powerful legislatures that 
prohibit executives from going to war. Third, in most cases, democracies are trading partners; 
thus, war would only bring loss, which is not acceptable. The fourth reason is that 
democracies are mostly liberal societies, and this liberalism produces all of the above effects 
(Gowa, 1999). 
 Democratic Peace theory argues that democracies are satisfied States and less likely to 
fight about territory, particularly if they are well established democracies. Also, they have 
strong economic ties which foster liberal peace. According to Kant, and as emphasized by 
this theory, the conditions for peace are: 
 The civil constitution of every state shall be republican. 
 The right of nations shall be based on a federation of free or independent state. 
 Cosmopolitan rights shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. 
However, the theory has been queried and criticised. One of the major issues with this theory 
is the wide-reaching claim that the establishment of democracy will certainly translate to 
peace. Although the theory possesses merit in several aspects, it however makes 
generalisation that has many flaws and thus leaving the hypothesis in a dubious state. For 
example, the use of the term “democratic” State, which implies a State that practices 
democracy, has been queried particularly since there is no generally accepted definition of the 
term. In the words of Christopher Layne; “lack of precise definitions is the redeeming grace 
of democratic peace theorists” (Layne, 1994: 40). Thus, an absence of a generally agreed 
definition of democracy and liberalism weakens the theory and makes the apparent simplicity 
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of the term more problematic and even deceptive. I will add that the theory fails to 
acknowledge diverse human perception. The idea that democracies do not fight each other is 
underpinned by the assumption that citizens will obviously object any form of military action 
and/or war to another democratic State (Layne, 1994: 39-40). This notion however creates its 
own weaknesses. Firstly, it entails the recognition of one State as democratic by the other 
one, and vice versa. Secondly, the absence of a generally, or at least mutually agreed 
definition of the term democracy, makes it difficult to determine a benchmark for a 
democratic State. In view of the aforesaid, it is difficult to prove or falsify the hypothesis 
whilst the theory may lose merit in terms of credibility. Even though there is a generally 
agreed definition of democracy, it will entail States accepting other as democratic (Elman, 
1997: 96-97). The problem here is that States will not subjectively accept other as adhering to 
democracy standards. For example Zimbabwe is practicing democracy, yet the country is 
sanctioned for being undemocratic. This type of logic creates problems in terms of defining 
and quantifying democracy and a democratic State. As a result, the theory is weakened and 
prone to varied interpretation. 
 I would argue that the increased use of economic sanctions after the Cold War as a 
means of compelling regimes to adopt democratic values is influenced by the democratic 
peace theory. The theory proposes that the adoption of democracy by all States will lead to a 
peaceful world (Elman, 1997: 11-12). The quest to spread democracy around the world by 
Western countries headed by the United States and the resistance by some regimes around the 
world has resulted in the imposition of sanctions on those regimes that reject democracy or, 
more specifically, Western-imposed democracy. For example, the imposition of economic 
sanctions on Iraq from 1990 to 2003 and Zimbabwe since 2001 is basically to enforce 
democracy and to improve human rights. The irony is that democracy by definition tends to 
provide economic and political freedom to a people (Friedman, 2002: 9). My contention with 
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this assumption lies in the fact that some of the measures used to establish democracy 
globally violate the rights of the very people that democracy is supposed to redeem. The 
humanitarian situation that arises from the sanctions imposed on Iraq and the deteriorating 
economic situation of Zimbabweans since the inception of sanctions in 2001 reveals the 
paradox of democracy vis-a-vis the strategies employed by Western countries to establish it 
globally. In as much as the doctrines of democracy seem better than any other political 
system we have witnessed (Dalton; Shin, and Jou, 2007: 142), it is inappropriate to enforce it 
on a people through coercive measures like economic sanctions. Economic sanctions are 
immoral and violent, and therefore we should use the concept of the moral imagination to 
help us conceptualize other conflict transformation mechanisms for international conflict 
rather than employ coercive measures. 
2.3.7. 1. A critique of democratic peace theory 
 In this thesis, I argue that a strong relationship exists between democracy and the 
subject matter (sanctions). Therefore, I consider it pertinent to review how democracy can 
affect the ordinary civilians and the society at large. As noted earlier, most sanctions by the 
United Nations, the US and the EU are claimed to be targeting regimes with questionable 
democratic and human rights records. Thus sanctions are imposed against these regimes with 
the aim of influencing a change in their behaviour by compelling them to adopt democratic 
principles. In view of the above, this part of the thesis provides contrary argument and views 
against Western perception of democracy as an arbiter of a peaceful and free world. 
 Democratic peace theory argues that the establishment of democracy leads to peace 
and wealth creation through free market economy system. This assumption is based on the 
fact that the world is viewed from a bipolar perspective. Thus, we are in a hypothetical 
situation. The dominant view held and which is exported around the world is that democracy 
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is the ultimate solution to our problems. The major proponents of democratic theory propose 
that by being able to vote, which is arguably the only participation of civilians in democracy; 
the population becomes empowered and renews their esteem. Based on this assumption, there 
is a push for the acceptance of democracy world over and also the formulation of democratic 
peace theory (Archibugi, 2004). I support democracy as a system of governance. In the words 
of Winston Churchill, a former British Prime Minister “democracy is the worst form of 
government except for all of the others” (Langworth, 2008: 573). However, I disagree with 
the use of force or violence used to impose democracy or in the name of democracy, such as 
the case in Zimbabwe, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and many more. Furthermore, democracy as 
a system of governance should be relative in the sense that people should be able to develop 
their own model of democracy, which may not necessarily be in line with what is obtainable 
in Paris, London or Washington. The system of government adopted by a people should be in 
line with their needs, aspirations and expectations and not one that forces them to appear like 
others, while their needs are left unsolved.  
 As we see today, an important point with the model of democracy proposed by the 
Western powers is that though it strives to achieve egalitarianism it ultimately ends up 
creating elitism. Off course democracy tends to fight elitism, reality shows that the elites in 
the so called democratic societies are the ones that often assume political positions. One 
reason for this awkward reality being that the cost of elections campaign have been inflated 
to the extent that average citizens cannot muster the needed funds for election campaign. By 
this democracy creates a loophole, which only the elite in democratic societies can fill up. 
Thus, the idea of promoting democracy as a do or die system of governance, one that 
everybody must accept or be visited with coercive measures such as war and sanctions ends 
up being a nonsensical approach to conflict transformation. The world is too big to have a 
homogenous system of government. In some instances, democracy is not what the people 
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demand; rather, it is forced on them through imperialism, globalization and other economic 
and political strategies. Even though every person is accommodated in democracy, it is not 
possible that the model of Western democracy will be acceptable by every person, group and 
culture. Additionally, although democracy implies the wishes of the majority, at its worst, it 
is the tyranny of the majority over the minority. When the majority vote decides, it can easily 
rob dissenting groups of rights and privileges (Eagles; Holoman and Johnston 2004: 41). 
Contrary to the usual rhetoric that democracy stops corruption, it problematically has lead 
instead to corruption in many cases. By this, I mean that the emphasis becomes winning votes 
and not establishing the best policies. In many democratic States, political parties and other 
interest groups often vie to purchase votes; by lobbying, bribing, or even blackmailing 
opponents and voters (the 2016 US Presidential campaign is a good example). Democracy 
undoubtedly is better than any other system of governance that we have, however there 
should be caution in the use of violence in establishing it. The rights of the people should 
include an opportunity to develop a model of governance that suits their needs and one that 
will reinforce their human dignity. Apparently, the use of war as in the cases of Iraq and 
Libya, or economic sanctions in the case of Zimbabwe to promote or enforce democracy is 
antithetical to conflict transformation processes and the creative use of the moral imagination. 
2.3.8. Cosmopolitanism theory 
Cosmopolitans argue that the ever-increasing presence and participation of a 
global civil society, as manifested in the growing number of NGOs or 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), and locally based grass-root social 
movements, constitute the upcoming signs of a political cosmopolitan reality 
testifying to the moral and economic interdependence of humanity (Mooten, 
2007: 12). 
 Cosmopolitanism is the ideology that all human ethnic groups belong to a single 
community based on a shared morality (Yonas, 2015: 43). The theory believes that all human 
beings, regardless of their political affiliation, have something in common and therefore 
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belong to a single community. The theory argues that a commonly shared community should 
be cultivated. However, cultivation of a common community, as the theory advocates, is 
perceived in different ways. Some see it from the point of political institutions; others on 
moral norms or relationships; and still others from the point of view of shared markets or 
forms of cultural expression (Kleingeld and Brown, 2011). Cosmopolitanism presupposes a 
positive attitude towards “others,” a desire to construct broad allegiances and equal and 
peaceful global communities of citizens who should be able to communicate across cultural 
and social boundaries forming a Universalist solidarity (Lyman; Strachan, and Angeliki, 
2012: 90). Cosmopolitanism has, thus, been the interplay of ideas of world citizenship. 
Cosmopolitan democracy theorists argue that world citizens should govern global 
institutions, and they highlight the nation-State’s limitations as a hindrance to global 
democracy and global values. 
 Cosmopolitanism challenges the predominance of the nation-State on many fronts. 
For example the theory perceives State borders as an impediment to social mobility while 
State borders serve as a catalyst to world conflicts. Based on its sceptical position on States 
and their characteristic authority, the theory is considered as a response to our global and 
technological age (Gustavo, 2001: 2842). Cosmopolitanism argues that technology has 
defiled State borders and upholds that the world has become homogeneous. Secondly, it is a 
reaction to the incapacity of the nation-State to foster morality beyond its boundaries. For 
example, caring for foreigners and immigrants is not as relevant as caring for fellow-citizens. 
Furthermore, cosmopolitanism constitutes a reaction against material global interdependence, 
the impotence of the nation-state to satisfy our needs, and the rejection of discriminatory 
prejudices based on gender, race, class or nation (Mooten, 2007: 11). The underlying 
philosophy of Cosmopolitanism defines the reduction of State sovereignty in cases where 
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other institutions collide with the power of the nation-State to decide and shape events in 
global spheres (Archibugi, 1998: 216). 
 Thomas Pogge (2002) argues that cosmopolitanism is characterized by three key 
characteristics and summarises them follows: individualism; universality and generality. 
Individualism: perceives the individual person as the ultimate units of concern rather than 
family lines, tribes, ethnicity, cultural, or religious communities, nations or States. 
Universality: considers equal status an ultimate unit of concern that corresponds to every 
living human being and not on a mere subset, such as men, whites or Muslims. Generality: 
emphasises that people are the ultimate units of concern for everyone, not only for their 
compatriots, fellow religionists, kinsmen, relatives or other affiliations (Pogge, 2002: 169). 
However, there have been criticisms about cosmopolitanism. From the moment of its 
inception in the 18th century until the present, the most pertinent question has been, whether 
or not we live in a world that is interconnected enough to generate institutions that have a 
global regulatory reach and a global form of solidarity that can influence and enhance their 
functioning. The emphasis of cosmopolitanism is that the world should be a common place 
without State borders and State identity. The theory posits that human beings no matter where 
they come from should be treated the same and fairly. Furthermore, it believes that identity is 
the major cause of conflict and war or even sanctions, and it proposes that if the world is 
homogeneous without State identity, peace will be achievable.  
 The premise of cosmopolitanism seems rational. This is because its doctrine is based 
on human concerns such as fairness, equality and oneness. The problem with the theory is the 
fact that, like institutionalism, cosmopolitanism may create a platform that may enable strong 
and affluent civil society groups to take advantage of the cosmopolitan world. Another 
problem is that the theory assumes that civil society groups are rational entities. This is 
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because they derive their powers through the support of the people; however, there is no 
empirical evidence that shows that they cannot be manipulated or act irrationally. 
Additionally, my concern is that the voices of the local people in the most remote areas of the 
world may not be heard. This is because the world is constructed in such a way that the elites 
in every society manipulate the decision-making process and policies of their society. 
Although this is what cosmopolitanism tends to address, it is very unclear how the voices of 
the local and indigenous people will be represented without the elites exerting their influence 
and affluence on policies and decision-making. Furthermore, cosmopolitanism fails to 
explain how it will resolve conflicts that are inevitable in human relationships. The theory 
needs to explain how it will resolve conflicts without employing violent measures such as 
economic sanctions. 
2.3.9. New war theory 
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the 
given case. As a total phenomenon, its dominant tendencies always make war 
a paradoxical trinity composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, 
which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and 
probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element 
of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason 
alone (Herberg-Rothe, 2007: 101). 
 The New War Theory emphasises that multiple aspects of warfare had changed since 
World War II (Shaw, 2000: 171). The rules, players, targets, methods and effects were all 
different, thus essentially changing the nature of war. According to Mary Kaldor (2006), old 
wars are traditional warfare, where two uniformed armies combat each other, usually in an 
interstate collision. The State plays a significant role in funding and running the war. In old 
wars, the main targets are uniformed soldiers, while in new wars the targets are non-
uniformed civilians. 
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 In terms of the international structures, the new war thesis suggests that the current 
international system is divided into two distinct parts. Buzan and Little (1996) refer to these 
distinct parts as a “zone of peace” and a “zone of conflict”; Singer and Wildavsky (1996) 
categorised them as the “zone of peace” and “zone of turmoil”; and Renee Snow refers to 
them as “First Tier” and “Second Tier” (Snow, 1996: 11; Jung, 2003: 11). Even though 
scholars use different terminology, they imply the same meaning. The “zone of peace” refers 
to developed capitalist countries, and the “zone of conflict” comprises the rest of the world, 
which is more susceptible to external and internal violence. New war theory proponents argue 
that the demise of the Soviet Union and the totalitarian regimes, the retraction of superpower 
support, the power vacuum, the demeaning of socialist ideologies and the accessibility of 
surplus weaponry have triggered the development of an inherently new type of warfare 
(Kaldor, 2006: 4; Snow, 1996: 1).  
 New War Theory believes that conventional military weapons and battlefield tactics 
are no longer used between two or more States in open confrontation. It argues that 
globalisation has made three changes to war and that new wars are based on claiming identity 
not territory. Furthermore, guerrilla or terror tactics are used and international crime has 
transformed how wars are funded. According to Herfried Munkler, new wars have changed 
the usual landscape of warfare from symmetrical conflicts between States to asymmetrical 
global relationships of force; from national armies to increasingly private or commercial 
bands of warlords, child soldiers and mercenaries; from pitched battles to protracted conflicts 
in which there is often little fighting and most of the violence is directed against civilians 
(Munkler, 2004). Furthermore, Munkler argues that unlike old wars, new wars are not 
primarily about political power; rather they are caused by a combination of State and private 
interests of warlords, drug or arm dealers. Supporting Munkler’s opinion, Mary Kaldor, 
added that contemporary types of warfare are distinct from the classic modern forms of 
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warfare based on nation-States. New wars are part of a globalised war economy underpinned 
by transnational ethnicities, globalised arms markets and internationalised Western-global 
interventions. She asserts that the new type of warfare is a predatory social condition that 
damages the economies of neighbouring regions as well as the zone of conflict itself, 
spreading refugees, identity-based politics and illegal trade (Kaldor 2006: 17). It is also 
characterised by new forms of violence such as systematic murder of “others,” forced 
population expulsion and rendering areas uninhabitable, using militaries, paramilitary groups, 
self-defense units, mercenaries and international troops funded by remittances, diaspora fund-
raising, external government assistance and the diversion of international humanitarian aid. 
Kaldor argues that about 80 percent of victims of war in the last decades were soldiers. It is 
estimated that 80 percent of victims in contemporary wars are civilians. This new form of 
warfare is a political rather than a military challenge, and involves the breakdown of 
legitimacy, leading to unimaginable human suffering (Kaldor, 2006: 24). 
 The contemporary argument against new war theory is that most elements of new wars 
are also present in the earlier wars. For example, it is argued that States still play a central role 
in both new and old wars. However, Kaldor disagrees with this view and explains: “the new 
wars can be contrasted with earlier wars in terms of their goals, the methods of warfare and 
how they are financed” (Kaldor, 2006: 6). This implies that although States remain principal 
actors in both new and old wars, the mechanism of new wars has changed in terms of targets. 
A number of policy makers have acknowledged the shift in the mode of warfare, despite the 
fact that traditional threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation continue to challenge 
the international community. For example the UN Secretary General in a statement in 2010 
said that, “we now face a new constellation of modern threats” (Ban Ki-moon, 2010).  
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 Relating new war theory to the central topic of this thesis, I argue that the 
indiscriminate use of economic sanctions as a coercive measure or tool of economic warfare 
fits the argument of new war theorists. The invisible presence of soldiers, the civilian targets 
and humanitarian consequences points to the dimension of new war strategy. Economic 
sanctions are imposed in place of warfare, yet they produce almost the same magnitude of 
casualties. Denis Halliday, who served as UN Assistant Secretary General and the UN 
humanitarian coordinator of the Oil-for-Food program in Iraq, reveals that economic sanctions 
are as deadly as war. Halliday states that, “Between 1 million and 1.5 million Iraqis have died 
from malnutrition or inadequate health care resulting from economic sanctions” (Siegal, 
1999).  He further expressed his dissatisfaction when he asserts thusly: “for me what is tragic, 
in addition to the tragedy of Iraq itself, is the fact that the United Nations Security Council 
member States [...] are maintaining a program of economic sanctions deliberately, knowingly 
killing thousands of Iraqis each month and that definition fits genocide” (Siegal, 1999). The 
above statement from Denis Halliday, clearly shows that economic sanctions categorically fits 
new forms of war because they target civilians rather than old wars that target combatant 
soldiers. In view of the issues raised above, it has become ever more important for States and 
the international community to review their conflict transformation approach and particularly 
their sanctions policy.  
2.3.10. Imperialism theory 
 Imperialism theory explains the domination of impoverished States and territories by 
industrialized countries as the consequence of different economic and technological levels 
and unequal power potential resulting from differences in economic growth (Galtung, 1971: 
81). Galtung contends that the development of industrial capitalistic societies created pressure 
for expansion and led to military or political acquisition and maintained the economic 
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dependence of developing countries. Hans J. Morgenthau (1948: 5) defines imperialism as a 
national foreign policy aimed at acquiring more power than the state actually has, through a 
reversal of existing power relations or, in other words, a favourable change in power status. 
Thus, imperialism as a national foreign policy is in contrast to status quo foreign policy and a 
foreign policy of prestige. Galtung (1971) writes that the policy of imperialism assumes the 
classical realist theory perspective of analysis at the unit level in international relations. This 
leads to asymmetry relationship patterns between economically powerful and economically 
poor countries and as a consequence of resource drain, leaves the later impoverished. Also, 
imperialism is sometimes used to describe loose or indirect political or economic influence or 
control of weak States by more powerful ones (Johnston, 2000: 375).  
 The key element of the theory is that it emphasizes the creation and/or maintenance of 
asymmetric economic, cultural, and territorial relationships, usually between States and often 
in the form of an empire, based on domination and subordination (Galtung, 1971). Some 
scholars suck as Edward Said argue that imperialism is primarily a Western undertaking that 
employs expansionist, mercantilist policies. According to Said imperialism involves “the 
practice, the theory and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant 
territory” (Said, 1993: 8).  Robert Young supports this thinking as he puts forward that 
imperialism operates from the centre; it is a state policy developed for ideological as well as 
financial reasons (Crosby, 2004). 
 According to Johan Galtung imperialism is a process by which the Centre nation has 
power over the Periphery nation, so as to bring about a condition of disharmony of interest 
between them (Galtung, 1971: 82). In addition, he asserts that imperialism is a relation 
between a Centre and a Periphery nation so that: 
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 There is harmony of interest between the centre in the Centre nation and the centre in 
the Periphery nation. 
 There is more disharmony of interest within the Periphery nation than within the 
Centre nations. 
 There is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the Centre nation and the 
periphery in the Periphery nation (Galtung, 1971: 84). Diagrammatically, it could be 
illustrated thus: 
Figure 3: The structure of imperialism 
 
Source: http://bev.berkeley.edu/ipe/readings/Galtung.pdf | A Structural Theory of 
Imperialism, Journal of Peace Research (1971), Vol. 8, No. 2  
  In summary, imperialism creates poverty in the so-called developing countries 
because of the interaction pattern. Developed nations produce goods beyond the needs of 
their internal market, and in order to sell the excess, new markets are established in 
developing countries. This destroys the indigenous production and their market. In any case, 
the interaction pattern of imperialism creates unemployment and poverty in developing 
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countries due to their local production and market are hampered and they rely on production 
from developed countries. Johan Galtung refers to this dynamic as classical imperialism. 
  In view of our case topic economic sanctions, I argue that imperialism may be a 
reason and motivation for imposing economic sanctions against impoverished nations by rich 
industrialised nations. The quest to control other States politically and economically could be 
a motive for imposing sanctions. The implied theory of economic sanctions is to destroy the 
economy of the sanctioned State or territory (Davidsson, 2002: 6). In this case, an imperialist 
may employ economic sanctions as a mechanism to destroy or contend the economic base of 
opposing nations and by doing so strengthen its own power and domination. Furthermore, the 
increase in the use of unilateral economic sanctions by the United States despite its poor track 
record in achieving set objectives provides an insight that they may be employed for the 
purpose of maintaining imperial power and subjugation of other nations. 
2.3.11. Dependency theory 
Dependency is an explanation of the economic development of a state in terms 
of the external influences, political, economic, and cultural on national 
development policies. It is a historical condition which shapes certain 
structures of the world economy such that it favours some countries to the 
detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate 
economies; a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is 
conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which 
their own is subjected (Fann and Hodges, 1971: 226). 
  Dependency theory emphasizes how developing and developed nations interact 
(Jaffee, 1998: 154). It was formulated in the 1950’s, drawing on a Marxian analysis of the 
global economy and as a direct challenge to the free market economic policies of the Post-
War era. Dependency is an economic condition stemming from the flow of economic surplus 
from least-developed countries (LDCs) to the industrialized countries of the West (Ferraro, 
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2008: 58). It is a component of the regional polarization of the global economy, which results 
in development in the core (Centre) and underdevelopment in the periphery countries.  
 The free market ideology argues that open markets and free trade benefit developing 
nations, enabling them eventually to join the global economy as equal players. This premise 
asserts that although some of the methods of market liberalization and opening may create 
economic difficulties in the short run, in the long run they firmly help to establish the 
economy and make the nation competitive at the global level (Galtung, 1971: 82-83). In 
contrast, Dependency theorists uphold that so called third-world and/or underdeveloped 
countries were not always poor, but became impoverished through colonial domination and 
forced incorporation into the world economy by expansionist first-world powers. Thus, third-
world economies became geared more towards the needs of their first-world colonial masters 
rather than the domestic needs of their own societies. Galtung contends that relationships of 
dependency have continued even after formal colonization ended. Thus, the primary 
obstacles to autonomous development are seen as external rather than internal (Galtung, 
1971: 85). Therefore, so-called third-world countries face a global economy dominated by 
rich industrial countries that hinder domestic development. In a study titled, “Dependency 
Theory: An Introduction,” Ferraro (2008), argue that economic growth in advanced 
industrialized countries did not necessarily impact economic growth in the poorer countries; 
instead, the study suggests that economic activity in the richer countries often caused serious 
economic problems in the poorer countries. 
 Dependency theory also posits that the degree of dependency increases as time goes 
on. Wealthy countries are able to use their wealth to further influence developing nations into 
adopting policies that increase the wealth of the wealthy nations, even at their own expense. 
At the same time, they are able to protect themselves from being turned on by developing 
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nations, making their system more and more secure as time passes (Frank, 2005: 11). Huge 
amount of capital continues to flow from the developing nations to developed nations, 
causing the developing nations to experience lack of wealth. This situation forces these 
impoverished nations to take out larger loans from developed nations, further indebting them. 
Furthermore, Ferraro and Rosser (1994: 332) argue that developed nations actively keep 
developing nations in a subservient position, often through economic force by instituting 
sanctions. Again, they proscribe free trade policies attached to loans granted by MFI’s, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and as a result developed nations trump 
over developing nations who then become perpetually indebted to them.  
Figure 4: Dependency Theory 
        
Source: https://sites.google.com/site/theoriesofdevelopment/stages-and-theories/dependancy-
theories | Dependency theories in the neoliberal period: A Latin American perspective, 
Institute of social studies (2000), Vol. 16, No. 1. 
 In the diagram above, resources are transferred from Periphery States to Core States, 
while finished goods are moved from Core States to Periphery States. This transfer of raw 
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materials and receipt of finished goods accounts for underdevelopment of Periphery (third-
world) States. 
 Having explained different views of dependency theory, I submit that the theory is 
anchored upon radical views, such as isolation of the developed nation’s influence and ideas 
over the periphery States. While I agree that the dependency created by industrialised nations 
should be put to an end, I see the centre-periphery dichotomy as too simplistic. Periphery 
countries also need an integral approach that would bring change to these nations, but would 
consequently mean a less beneficial economic relationship with rich industrialised nations. 
Such actions include the establishment of strong institutions and independent anti-corruption 
agencies and also the development of traditional industries that will enhance domestic 
production, thereby relieving them of a dependency on goods from Core States. 
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Conclusions 
Economic sanctions, probably the most widely known form of foreign pressure, seek 
to generate a policy or institutional change in the targeted countries by imposing costs on 
them. Yet, research reveals that when economic sanctions are imposed on authoritarian 
regimes, they are more likely to trigger domestic policy changes aimed at maximizing the 
regimes likelihood of retaining political power. Sanctions have been favourably used by so 
called advanced democracies to enforce their will on targets while it avoids the political 
backlash associated with the use of military force. The United States in particular has adopted 
economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in advancing its economic and humanitarian 
policy goals abroad. Despite their humanitarian impact on civilians, the use of economic 
sanctions remains unfettered by international humanitarian laws. On the one hand, it may not 
be proper to challenge a State’s right and/or decision to provide or withdraw economic 
benefits to another State. On the other hand, one may argue that international humanitarian 
laws did not foresee the humanitarian impact that may arise from the use of economic 
sanctions. Hence it is mute about the measure, were as it provided rules for the use of military 
force in war situation. The purpose of international humanitarian laws is to protect civilians 
from harm resulting from arbitrary military objectives during warfare (Reisman and Stevick, 
1998: 94). In fact, they were designed to anticipate and contend any situation capable of 
inflicting harm on individuals during warfare. Therefore, all coercive measures should be 
adjudicated under international humanitarian law by their predictable and/or foreseeable 
effect and not merely by the mechanisms and/or method used for implementing them.  
Consequently, the predictable humanitarian consequences of economic sanctions 
which are akin to those experienced during warfare makes it pertinent that economic 
sanctions should be treated like weapons of warfare and should be regulated as such under 
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the provisions of international humanitarian law. Obviously, the narrow legal perspective of 
international humanitarian law, which underestimates the arbitrary nature of economic 
sanctions and their deleterious effects on the population of a target, may be seen as neglect to 
the common purpose of humanitarian response to coercive actions on the civilian population. 
Though the thesis have provided some sections of international humanitarian law that may 
serve as deterrence to the use of economic sanctions, the instruments failed in providing 
concrete and clear pronouncement on their uses and/or implementation. 
It is out of context that economic sanctions are adopted in lieu of military offensive; 
however, they can be as destructive as military offensive can be, and they can even cause 
more collateral damage than warfare. In view of this, I consider economic sanctions as an 
attack on civilians. Such human attacks should not elude legal consequences, particularly 
when they are considered as a humane policy tool of transforming international conflicts. 
Although sanctions have been applied for the most part against States and regimes whose 
actions and conduct violate international norms and/or shocks the conscience, we should not 
assume that morality is always on the side of the sanctioning State(s) and against the target 
State, individual or group (D’Amato, 1995: 150). The relation of morality to law is a 
contingent and not a necessary relation. Law can be utilized in the service of pseudo-morality 
or a false morality, as it was in Nazi Germany and in the apartheid regime of South Africa. 
Nevertheless, we have to be vigilant against slipping into a position where sanctions imposed 
against States and/or regimes that violate international norm turns into a popular conviction 
that sanctions are mechanisms for transforming international conflict and/or enforcing the 
moral standards of mankind. Instead, an understanding of their impact on the innocents will 
provide the much needed catalyst to review economic sanctions measure along the line of 
international humanitarian law and morality principles.  
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CHAPTER THREE: SANCTIONS FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE 
3.1. Introduction 
The belief or argument of those that impose sanctions is that a change in the 
behaviour of a targeted regime would benefit not only the citizens of the target State, but also 
other States and even the international community as a whole (Masaka, 2012: 54). That is to 
say, if a regime sanctioned for human rights violation changes its behaviour and improve on 
human rights policies and actions, then sanctions can be adjudged to be beneficial to the 
citizens of such State. In this regard, sanctions are perceived as a means to some good end, in 
that even though they may be ruthless, they are aimed at forcing the offending nation or 
individuals to comply with acceptable standards of behaviour that the sender of sanctions 
perceives to be useful (Masaka, 2012: 64). Thus, in the context of sanctions, the end justifies 
the means. This notion has been challenged by scholars such as Arne Tostensen and Beate 
Bull on the grounds that sanctions have proved incapable of bringing about the desired 
outcome on their own (Tostensen and Bull, 2002). One of the arguments raised by critics is 
that the leaders of a target State often look for ways to circumvent the negative impact of 
sanctions through, for example, smuggling and connivance with neighbouring or friendly 
nations to wither the effects of sanctions, particularly on their personal welfare and that of 
their families.  
However, there are divergent opinions among scholars on the ability of targeted 
regimes to circumvent the effect of sanctions. Marinov (2005) argues that contrary to the 
common perception that economic sanctions are ineffective, at least they are effective in 
destabilizing the leaders they target. Furthermore, he notes, “the leader of a government who 
comes under economic pressure […] is more likely to lose office than a leader who does not” 
(Marinov, 2005: 564). To some extent this argument may be accurate. After 8 years of US 
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and EU sanctions, Robert Mugabe almost lost the 2008 presidential election to the opposition 
party (Movement for Democratic Change) candidate Morgan Tsvangirai. This led to the 
formation of a Unity government between the ZANU-PF and the MDC in 2009 to avoid any 
possible conflict in the country. However, this view point is contestable. Some observers 
argue that sanctions has nothing to do with the near election loss faced by the ruling ZANU-
PF in 2008 election, rather the main reason was that most Zimbabweans were fed up with 
Mugabe’s long stay in office and needed a change in government. Whatever the case may be, 
it will not be wrong to suggest that the impact of US and EU sanctions on the citizens of 
Zimbabwe may have added to their disaffection with the Mugabe led government. 
The US and the EU respectively refer to their sanctions on Zimbabwe as targeted 
and/or restrictive measures. According to Andreas (2005: 339), the main objective of targeted 
sanctions is to effectively cripple the targets, while at the same time limiting humanitarian 
damage on the civilian population. Furthermore, targeted sanctions tend to be a form of 
reformative punishment; however, they often do not achieve this objective. As noted in 
chapter one, rather than softening the political stance of targeted individuals, sanctions in 
most cases make them to stick to the policies that led to sanctions (Masaka, 2012: 66). This 
could be true of the situation in Zimbabwe. Targeted sanctions may have harden rather than 
soften the stance of targeted individuals with respect to the fundamental issues that led to the 
imposition of sanctions, such as free and fair elections, democratic political transitions, the 
rule of law, press freedom and the land reform programme. Instead, it is the innocent citizens 
that are feeling the unpleasant consequences of the targeted sanctions, although they were 
supposed to be protected from them (Major and McGann, 2005: 337). 
The regime in Zimbabwe and other political elites targeted by the US sanctions and 
the EU restrictive measures have manipulated the sanctions into a broad national problem 
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that requires everyone’s attention. This complicates the effectiveness of targeted sanctions as 
a deterrent and reformative measure on those who are targeted by them. According to 
International Crisis Group (2012), Africa Briefing N° 86, instead of changing the behaviour 
of President Robert Mugabe and his associates, sanctions has provided them with a platform 
to present themselves as victims of external machinations, a propaganda narrative that 
reinforces the regime’s anti-imperialist rhetoric. 
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part, “Southern Rhodesia: An “ideal” 
target of UN economic sanctions?” provides a brief history of Zimbabwe starting from 
colonial era when it was known as Southern Rhodesia to independence. The information 
provided includes a general but mostly historical overview of the colonial period, during the 
white minority rule. However, I have simplified the analysis to include only the most 
important historical events. The section contextualizes the reasons for imposing sanctions on 
Rhodesia from the perspective of threatening international peace and security or a mere 
experimentation of UN comprehensive economic sanctions. Also, it discusses the oppression 
of indigenous African population by the white elite minority prior to independence. Finally, it 
provides information about stages and time-line of the UN economic sanctions against 
Rhodesia after the Unilateral Declaration Independence (UDI) from British rule.  
The second part, “Towards democracy and independence” provides information about 
Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence. It reviews the Matabeleland crisis that engulfed the 
country shortly after gaining independence and the political turmoil that followed. It analyses 
the Unity Accord of 1987 and recent developments since 2000. Information about foreign 
intervention and reactions to the political crisis between ZANU-PF and MDC since 2000 are 
also provided.  
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The third part, “Misconception and ambiguities: Overview of the US and the EU 
sanctions,” contextualizes the reasons advanced by the US and the EU for imposing sanctions 
on Zimbabwe. Furthermore, it seeks to explain the nature of US and EU sanctions on 
Zimbabwe. The focus here is to determine if the sanctions are targeted/smart, as posited by 
the US and the EU or if they are economic sanctions, as claimed by the government of 
Zimbabwe. To refresh our memory, targeted sanctions, often termed “smart sanctions,” are 
usually targeted at a small circle within the ruling elite of a given country. They were 
developed as an alternative to comprehensive sanctions that were characterized with negative 
humanitarian consequences. However, in some cases they may have a more devastating 
impact on the broader population than on those whose behaviours the sanctions intend to 
influence. Therefore, I consider it very important to examine the impact of the targeted 
sanctions and restrictive measures imposed on the regime of President Robert Mugabe and 
his affiliated businesses on the entire population. In my view, for anyone to engage the 
parties in this conflict (the US, the EU and the government of Zimbabwe) it is crucial to 
identify the nature of sanctions currently in place, and the means by which they are 
implemented. Hence, in this section, I analyse the strategies used to implement the US 
targeted sanctions and the EU restrictive measures in order to determine their nature.  
Additionally, the section seeks to explain why unilateral sanctions are on the increase 
despite a huge backlash on civilian victims. In this section, I explain that unilateral sanctions 
are a political tool used by economically powerful States of the West against impoverished 
and economically poor countries of the South. I further explain that contrary to the claims of 
the United States and other Western countries that unilateral sanctions are imposed in the 
interest of the citizens of the State where they are imposed, they in fact serve the interest of 
the party that imposes them. Additionally, I argue in this section that unilateral sanctions are 
selective, and countries such as the United States and the EU employ these measures on the 
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basis of their political and economic interests. This explains why sanctions are imposed on 
one State while another is spared even when they commit the same act.  
 The fourth part, “General impact of sanctions on Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans” 
provides a general overview of the impact of sanctions. It provides analysis of the impact of 
sanctions on core human rights of Zimbabwean. Among the rights discussed are the right to 
quality healthcare, right to education and right to quality standard of living. Also, it reveals 
how the US and the EU sanctions affected projects funded by international donor 
organizations in key sectors of the economy, such as agriculture and transportation. 
Furthermore, it analyses how sanctions affect Zimbabwe’s ability to get funds and finances 
from multilateral financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) and the impact of all of the above on the general well-being of 
Zimbabweans. Finally, the section reviews Zimbabwe’s “looks East policy,” and its role in 
the adaptation of the economy and Zimbabwe’s economic future. 
3.1.1. Southern Rhodesia: An “ideal” target of UN economic sanctions? 
As cited in chapter one, the first UN comprehensive economic sanctions in history 
were imposed against Southern Rhodesia in 1966. This attempt by the UN to resolve conflict 
through sanctions instead of military intervention has been challenged by scholars and 
observers on different grounds. The main argument of critics is that the situation in Rhodesia 
as at the time did not merit the requirements of article 39 of the UN Charter. That is to say, 
the situation and/or conflict in Rhodesia did not portray any threat to international peace and 
security. According to Douglas G. Anglin, Rhodesia was not sanctioned because it posed any 
threat to the international peace and security. Rather, the country possessed perfect 
characteristics suitable for UN sanctions (Anglin, 1987: 23). Thus, Rhodesia was an “ideal 
target” to experiment UN economic sanctions. In any case, the concept of an ideal target does 
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not relate to the legal threshold that need to be met before sanctions are imposed; rather it has 
to do with other factors such as economic, social and geographical factors. An “ideal target” 
therefore, means a State that will not be able to sustain itself, should the UN impose 
economic measures against it. In other words, the State will be paralysed to the extent that it 
would have no other choice than to comply with the demands of the UN in order to survive. 
Though it is difficult to imagine a State that possessed such characteristics that will merit it as 
an ideal target for UN sanctions, Anglin (1987) however, asserts that Southern Rhodesia 
possessed certain features that made it an “ideal target” for UN economic sanctions. He based 
his argument on the fact that Rhodesia was a small, landlocked country, which was 
particularly vulnerable to external pressure. As such, its geographical position would make it 
more susceptible to the impact of economic sanctions. Furthermore, he opined that the theory 
of economic sanctions postulates a dual linkage between external trade and economic 
deprivation, and between economic deprivation and political change (Anglin, 1987: 33). 
In the case of Southern Rhodesia, Anglin’s argument suggested that the economy was 
heavily reliant on a few trading partners, who themselves were not necessarily dependent on 
Rhodesia for survival. In addition, Rhodesia’s economy was hugely sustained by a few major 
exports. Going by this analysis, it is obvious that Rhodesia was susceptible to having its 
economy paralysed immediately by economic sanctions. Thus the question that comes to 
mind is: was Rhodesia an “ideal” and/or “perfect” target for UN sanctions? According to 
Johan Galtung, there are eight criteria that makes a State amenable to economic sanctions: (i) 
imports are necessary for key sectors of the economy of the sanctioned State; (ii) there is no 
internal substitute for those imports; (iii) a large percentage of the imports come from the 
sanctioning State(s); (iv) there is no external substitute for the imports which the sanctioned 
State can switch to; (v) the imports are either only a very small percentage of the sanctioning 
States exports or can be exported to another State; (vi) exports from the sanctioned State are 
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mainly sent to the sanctioning State(s); (vii) exports from the sanctioned State can be 
obtained elsewhere therefore causing little economic damage to the sanctioning State or in 
the alternative cannot be obtained elsewhere and this information is used by the sanctioning 
State to prove that it is willing to be deprived of the product rather than engage in economic 
interaction with the sanctioned State; and (viii) trade relations are visible and borders could 
potentially be controlled (Galtung, 1967: 384). 
With above points in mind, it could be said that whilst Southern Rhodesia might not 
be described as the “perfect” and/or “ideal” target to experiment UN comprehensive 
economic sanctions, it could certainly be regarded as a State that should have been very 
responsive to economic sanctions. However, reality shows that Rhodesia was able to contend 
the difficulties and pressures arising from sanctions for more than a decade, thus diffusing the 
concept of an idea and/or perfect target. Put simply, every sanctioned government will always 
find a way to circumvent the impact on the regime while the ordinary citizens bear the brunt 
of the sanctions. 
After more than a decade of maintaining its sanctions, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 460 on December 21, 1979 to end economic sanctions on Rhodesia. At this point, 
the sanctions were adjudged to have achieved its aim and the sanctioned regime had made a 
commitment to comply with the wishes of the UN by changing to majority rule (Kennedy, 
2006). Of course, economic sanctions themselves may not have been wholly responsible for 
the regime change in Southern Rhodesia and, in fact, given the period of time over which 
sanctions extended, it seems likely that there may have been many factors that ultimately 
contributed to the change (Baldwin, 1985; Minter and Schmidt, 1988). This does not, 
however, diminish the fact that economic sanctions prolonged the length of the crisis and 
may have contributed to resolving it. 
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3.1.2. A brief historical overview of Rhodesia 
The colony of Rhodesia was born on September 13, 1890 with the arrival of Cecil 
John Rhodes and his British South Africa Company (BSAC) (McCrea and Pinchuck, 2000: 
77). The arrival of BSAC represented years of European political manoeuvre and capital 
adventure in Africa, which was referred at the time as the “Scramble for Africa” 
(Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2011: 1). The arrival of Rhodes and his BSAC met 
resistance by the local and/or indigenous people, particularly the Monarch of Ama-Ndebele 
who was appalled with Mr. Rhodes and his associates. In order to secure a Royal Charter that 
would empower BSAC to occupy Mashonaland and extract minerals, Rhodes knew it was 
necessary for him to secure a treaty from the British government that will enable him to 
subdue the powerful local Ama-Ndebele Monarch.  
Consequently, BASC, through its chief protagonist Charles Dunell Rudd, applied to 
the British Government requesting for a Royal Charter to be granted to the company to 
operate in Mashonaland. The application was granted by the British government in October 
1889 and was referred to as the “Rudd Concession” (Zvobgo, 2009: 13). This document 
however, became the bedrock of the long and arduous colonial journey for Rhodesia 
spanning a century, from 1890 to 1980. The colonial era saw Rhodesia been developed by the 
British settlers into a colony with a racially segregated society with the white settlers 
occupying the upper affluent class while the indigenous inhabitants were forced into the 
underprivileged peasant class (Esterhuysen, 2004: 23). Following the abrogation of the 
Company’s Charter in 1923, Southern Rhodesia was given the option of being incorporated 
into the Union of South Africa or becoming a separate entity within the British Empire. The 
people rejected incorporation, and Southern Rhodesia was formally annexed by the United 
Kingdom. Southern Rhodesia was thus transformed into an internally self-governed colony 
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with its own legislature, civil service, armed forces and police. Upon attaining self-
governance, Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly was formed and in 1930, the assembly 
passed the Land Apportionment Act, which allocated 51 percent of the land to white settlers, 
30 percent was allocated to the indigenous black Africans and for private African purchase, 
while the remainder was unallocated (Esterhuysen, 2004: 23-24). This skewed distribution of 
land in favour of the white minority, coupled with rapid population growth rates, over time 
contributed to a high level of poverty amongst black Africans in the rural areas (Stocking, 
1978: 133). According to some commentators, the land allocation policy and other 
agricultural policies was orchestrated to favour white settlers whilst they marginalised the 
black population (Machigaidze, 1991; Selby, 2006: 50-51).  
The distinct class segregation of Rhodesian society was apparent from the collision of 
colonial imperialist political, legal, social, economic and religious structures and traditional 
norms, values and institutions. Till date, the most important aspect of history of colonialism 
in Zimbabwe has remained the issue of land ownership (Murphy, 2011). Ever since the 
colonizers lost hope to find mineral wealth in their new colony, land had become the primary 
interest of their politics. The legislative approach to land ownership was disguised by the 
white minority to enable them acquire and occupy vast agricultural land (Esterhuysen, 2004). 
Contrary to Western perception, the notion of legal property possession was alien to the local 
population and thus it makes little or no meaning to them. To black Rhodesians, possession 
of land by the white minority through legislative amendment was akin to land grab and/or 
occupation of their ancestral land. 
 In September 1953, the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
formed a multi-racial Central African Federation. This was an effort to pool resources and 
also to consolidate the market (Chinyamakobvu, 2011: 54). The federation recorded success 
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economically, but was opposed by the majority of the African population, mainly due to their 
scepticism that the structure of the federation would not guarantee them independence. The 
European electorate in Rhodesia, however, showed little willingness to accede to African 
demands for increased political participation.  
3.1.3. The use of suppressive racist policies 
After achieving federation status, the black population of Southern Rhodesia still 
faced a lot of challenges arising from brutal racist policies of their government. Although a 
30 member parliament was elected in October 1923 to replace Southern Rhodesia’s 
Legislative Council, the high property qualifications remained in place to ensure that the 
electorate would remain overwhelmingly white. As Esterhuysen (2004) notes, in 1951 the 
value of property required in order to participate in voting was increased to £500, while in the 
same period the annual wage rose to only £240, making it impossible for an average worker 
to be eligible to vote. 
Scholarly reports show that the white population was about 5 percent of the 
population of Southern Rhodesia while the rest of the population was black Africans (Austin, 
1975). Despite this huge disparity in population, by 1926, the black population had control of 
only 45,000 acres of land compared with 31,000.000 acres controlled by white European 
settlers (Wills, 1985; Murphy, 2011) while in the 1930 Land appropriation Act, 49,149.174 
acres of land were reserved for the white population and 33,011 acres for the native 
population. In addition to this, most senior and sensitive positions in government parastatals 
and public service such as education, healthcare and social services were exclusively reserved 
for the white minority. Also property and educational qualifications were manipulated to 
make sure that the white minority had 95 percent of the votes in national elections until 1979 
(Austin, 1975: 43).  
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Apart from land, other legislations enacted by parliament also had adverse effects on 
the native black population. For example, the Native Affairs Act of 1927 provided for the 
restriction of movement of the native population and required them to carry a pass whilst it 
provided authorities with arbitrary right to arrest and detain any African that is criticizing the 
government. Also the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 prohibited Africans from trespassing 
into areas exclusively designated for the white population while the Public Order Act banned 
the indigenous population from any form of nationalist movement and/or political activities. 
In addition, the Preventive Detention Act of 1959 empowered authorities to keep in custody 
any suspect for a period of ninety days without trial while the Law and Order (Maintenance) 
Act allowed the government through the office of the Minister for Internal Affairs to arrest 
and detain any person that violated any of the aforementioned act for a period of five years 
without possibility of appeal (Wilson, 1971; Murphy, 2011: 43). A combination of these and 
other factors in the mid-twentieth century resulted in huge disparity between the indigenous 
population of Southern Rhodesia and its white inhabitants. As time went on, it became 
increasingly unbearable for the native population to accept the injustices meted on them, 
particularly among some of the black population who has acquired Western education. This 
resulted in conflicts and violence across Rhodesia, creating tension and lawlessness within 
the Zimbabwean societies. 
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Table 1: Land classification according to the Land Apportionment Act, 1930  
Category Square 
Miles 
Acres Percent of 
Country 
European 
Areas 
(including all 
urban areas 
76,796 49,149.174 51% 
“Native 
Reserves” 
33,011 21,127,040 22% 
Unassigned 
Area 
(including 
game 
reserves/parks) 
27,802 17,793,300 18.5% 
“Native 
Purchase” 
Area 
11,663 7,464,566 7.8% 
Forest Area 923 590,500 0.6% 
Undetermined 
Area 
107 88,540 0.1% 
Source: http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/teachers/curriculum/m30/activity3.php | 
Exploring Africa Matrix.                                                                                                                                        
3.1.4. Unilateral declaration of independence (UDI); followed by sanctions 
 The administration of Southern Rhodesia witnessed a historic change in April 1964. 
The then Prime Minister, Winston Field, was replaced by his deputy Ian Smith as the Prime 
Minister (Mpofu, 2014). The ascension of Ian Smith to power as the Prime Minister bought 
new energy into the federation and resulted in a renewed call for independence from Britain. 
After unsuccessful negotiations with the British Government, on November 11, 1965, the 
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Prime Minister Ian Smith announced the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from 
British rule (Mlambo, 2014: 155). In his speech, Ian Smith had this to say: 
We Rhodesians have rejected the doctrinaire philosophy of appeasement and 
surrender. The decision which we have taken today is a refusal by Rhodesians 
to sell their birth right. And, even if we were to surrender, does anyone believe 
that Rhodesia would be the last target of the Communists in the Afro-Asian 
block? We have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization, and 
Christianity; and in the spirit of this belief we have this day assumed our 
sovereign independence. God bless you all (Bailey, 1979: 128). 
In response, the British government and the United Nations declared the UDI illegal. 
Consequently, the British government imposed a full range of economic sanctions against 
Rhodesia including the suspension of all British aid to and preferential treatment for 
Rhodesia, banning the importation of Rhodesian tobacco, asbestos, iron ore, chrome, meat, 
hides, skins and leather and recalling the British High Commissioner (Wood, 2012). The then 
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson went on to assure African States during the January 
1966 Commonwealth Summit held in Lagos (Nigeria), that recently imposed sanctions would 
bring down the minority Rhodesian regime in weeks, not months (Minter and Schmidt, 1988: 
207). Britain then made frantic effort to convince its allies within the Security Council to 
impose mandatory economic sanctions on Rhodesia. On December 16, 1966, the UN 
imposed its first comprehensive economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia (Lung-chu, 2015: 
364). However, hasty prediction by Mr Wilson that economic sanctions will bring down 
Rhodesia on her knees in weeks later became an implicit criterion to examine the success 
and/or failure of the sanctions.  
3.1.5. The UN economic sanctions 
 The Security Council economic sanctions against Rhodesia were in two-folds. The 
first resolution invoking sanctions against Rhodesia was passed following the UDI and was 
not binding on all members States (UN Doc S/RES/217, 1965). The resolution condemned 
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the UDI and requested further action from the United Kingdom in order to put an end to the 
situation in Southern Rhodesia. Furthermore, it requested States not to recognise the 
declaration and to refrain from providing economic support or military equipment and 
materials to the “illegal” regime (UN Doc S/RES/217, 1965). Also it called for embargo on 
oil and other petroleum products. A year after the UDI, the Security Council imposed 
comprehensive or binding economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia by adopting resolution 
232 (UN Doc S/RES/232, 1966). The resolution requested all member States to desist from 
importation of Rhodesian products such as asbestos, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, iron ore, hides, 
skins and leathers, tobacco and copper into their territories. In fact the resolution prohibited 
member States from engaging in activities that would encourage transfer of cash and/or 
capital including financial or other economic aid to Rhodesia (Murphy, 2011). Also they 
were to refrain from providing transportation for goods that originated in Rhodesia. In 
addition, member States were required to checkmate activities of their citizens within their 
territories that may breach the sanctions (UN Doc S/RES/232, 1966). 
Unfortunately, all member States did not adhere to resolution 232, and eighteen 
months later, the Security Council responded with further binding economic sanctions (UN 
Doc S/RES/253, 1968). The resolution adopting the sanctions reiterated most part of 
resolution 232, but this time member States were requested to avoid the importation of “all 
goods” originating from Southern Rhodesia. Also it prohibits member States from selling or 
supplying goods to Southern Rhodesia except on the basis of humanitarian exemptions. 
Member States were requested not to allow entry and/or transit into their territories any 
person(s) bearing Southern Rhodesia passport or any document issued under the UDI. It also 
urged member States to take every measure to discourage and/or prevent their citizens from 
travelling to Southern Rhodesia. Additionally, the resolution (UN Doc S/RES/253, 1968) 
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stressed on the need for member States to call back their diplomatic and/or consular 
representation to Southern Rhodesia. 
Despite UN sanctions in place, on October 2, 1970, Ian Smith declared Rhodesia a 
Republic (Austin, 1975). The Security Council responded by adopting resolution 277 calling 
for harsher sanctions against Rhodesia. In the resolution, council urged members not to 
recognise the illegitimate republic and avoid any official State dealings with it. Drawing from 
article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council further requested member States to 
terminate any diplomatic, consular, trade, military and other relations they had with Rhodesia 
(Murphy, 2011: 59). Also it called on member States to suspend officials of the regime from 
any position they were holding under UN specialized agencies. It further suggested that 
Rhodesia must not be recognised or accepted by the UN or by other regional organisations, 
whilst it urged the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other international agencies to 
accept and provide assistance to refugees from Southern Rhodesia (Murphy, 2011: 59-60). 
Council sanctions were extended ones more in 1976 through the adoption of 
Resolution 388. The resolution called on member States to ensure that commodities from or 
reasonably believed to have originated from Southern Rhodesia were not insured in their 
territories or by person residing therein. Also they must not provide insurance cover to any 
commodity from or property in Rhodesia. In addition, the resolution stressed that States 
should ensure that franchise are not granted to any commercial, industrial or public entity 
operating in Southern Rhodesia by organization originating from or person(s) operating 
within their territories (UN Doc S/RES/388, 1976). 
On May 27, 1977, the Security Country adopted yet another resolution, extending the 
sanctions (UN Doc S/RES/409, 1977). The resolution called on member States to prohibit 
any activity that will involve transfer of fund from its territory to the regime in Rhodesia. 
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Also member States must ensure that offices are not allocated, rented or leased to the regime 
or its agents in their territories except for pension purposes. 
3.1.6. Self-determination in context 
 Article 1 (2) of the UN Charter establishes that one of the main purposes of the 
United Nations is respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 
Antonio Cassese, defined it as a democratic principle calling for the consent of the governed 
in any sovereign State, which includes right to freely choose their own leaders. Also it entails 
freedom from external intervention such as colonial rule (Cassese, 1995: 109). Furthermore, 
Cassese explains that self-determination is a human right issue that is firmly entrenched in the 
corpus of international law: as an anti-colonialist standard; as a ban on foreign military 
oppression and occupation; and as a requirement that all racial groups be accorded full and 
legitimate access to government (Cassese, 1995: 110).  
The United Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1960 passed resolution 1514 
tagged: Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The 
resolution emphasizes decolonization and self-determination of indigenous peoples (G.A Res 
1514 (xv), 1960). It bemoaned colonialism as antithetical to human rights and an impediment 
to world peace. The resolution proclaimed that all indigenous peoples should be accorded the 
right to self-determination whilst independence should not be prolonged on the basis of 
inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational framework. Power should 
unconditionally be transferred to the indigenous peoples of non-self-governing and/or non-
independent territories (G.A Res 1514 (xv), 1960).    
The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Ian Smith in 1965 was argued 
following the declarations made by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1514. 
The white minority government argued that the UDI was an expression of their quest for self-
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determination against a colonialist power (Murphy, 2011: 51). This argument was 
strengthened by the evidence that two other constituent parts of Rhodesia were granted 
independence after the Federation. Therefore, declaration of independence conforms with 
General Assembly declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and 
peoples. Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front maintained that their action is legitimate, citing 
that they have the support of the black population. Howbeit, critics argue that African Chiefs 
who supported the declaration were all working in government establishments. Therefore, 
their allegiance to the UDI is compromised, because it did not represent the opinion of the 
African majority who on their part perceived the declaration as a scheme by white elites to 
protect their power and continue to subjugate the black majority (Kapungu, 1974). To critics, 
the UDI was antithesis of the requirement for self-determination. According to James 
Crawford, “the minority government’s declaration of independence was and remained 
internationally a nullity, as a violation of the principle of self-determination” (Crawford, 
2006: 129).  He added that instead of self-determination being an argument against sanctions 
imposed on the regime, it became the justification for the basis of for imposing economic 
sanctions. To Crawford, the Security Council sanctions against the UDI were an effort to 
deter the white minority and allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own 
future consistent with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514. 
3.1.7. Initial difficulties faced by sanctions  
The UN sanctions against Rhodesia faced two main difficulties. The first difficulty 
came from sabotage and breach of the sanctions by countries such as Portugal, South Africa, 
the United Kingdom, the United States and Zambia. The second difficulty was that Southern 
Rhodesia’s economy was able to modify itself to avoid the worst effects of the sanctions 
(Murphy, 2011). Judging by the fact that the sanctions lasted more than a decade, it indicates 
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that at minimum they did not paralyse the economy of Southern Rhodesia and perhaps they 
could have been more effective. 
3.1.7.1. Sanctions breaches by Portugal and South Africa 
Right from the very time sanctions were proposed against Rhodesia, the duo of 
Portugal and South Africa expressed apathy for the measure. Consequently, the two countries 
consistently breached the sanctions when they were imposed. The decision of Portugal and 
South Africa were propelled by series of reasons such as trade and economic ties, proximity 
and common ideology at that time. (Note that Mozambique was under Portuguese rule as at 
that time).  According to McKinnell (1969: 559), the relationship between Southern Rhodesia 
and her allies, South Africa and Portugal, was very cordial that Africa at the time was almost 
divided into two parallel lines; the black dominated north and the white colonialist south. It is 
believed that South Africa and Portugal breached the sanctions on grounds of expressing 
empathy for their ally. Some observers however, argue that the main reason why both 
countries breached the sanctions were because of fear that if sanctions succeed in Rhodesia 
they themselves may be subject of similar sanctions (Murphy, 2011).  
The actions of Portugal and South Africa were criticised by the Security Council for 
failure to implement the sanctions while Council Resolution 320 expresses concern at their 
refusal to observe and/or implement the sanctions. Without doubt, the attitude of both 
countries towards the sanctions was perceived within the Security Council as a factor that 
contributed to the length of time it took for sanctions to take effect. One of the clearest 
examples of breach of sanctions by Portugal and South Africa was that when the supply of 
petroleum to Southern Rhodesia was cut off, it started to make use of alternative sources 
routed through Mozambique and South Africa (Jardim, 1978: 87). The petroleum breach was 
remarkable. Observers argue that the economy of Rhodesia could have been completely 
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paralysed if petroleum supply were completely boycotted particularly when we consider the 
impact it will have on manufacturing and transportation. 
In addition, the regime in Southern Rhodesia established clandestine government 
corporations to coordinate trade in minerals, tobacco, petroleum and other products in South 
Africa and other parts of the world (Paul, 1979: 109). Through this approach, Rhodesia was 
able to amass profit that helped to sustain its economy. As profits were been made through 
these illegal channels, over time, they widened and became more efficient. For example, it 
was easy for international metal traders to negotiate secret contracts with Rhodesia and 
purchase illegitimate certificates of origin from South African firms engaged in the trade. In 
1967 Japan reported that Rhodesia imports fell by 90 percent, but imports from South Africa, 
presumably of Rhodesian origin, increased by the same amount (Paul, 1979: 109-110). 
Mozambique however, gained independence in 1975 from Portugal. Consequently, 
the Mozambique-Rhodesia border was closed in 1976. Additionally, in August 1976 South 
Africa pledged allegiance to the sanctions which compelled Rhodesia to accept the Kissinger 
formula for transition to majority rule (Wills, 1985: 436). As Anglin (1987: 39) notes, it was 
after Mozambique closed its Rhodesian border and South Africa pledged allegiance, that the 
sanctions hold a tighter grip on Southern Rhodesia’s economy.  
3.1.7.2. Sanctions breaches by the United States and the United Kingdom 
Among the sabotage faced by the UN sanctions against Rhodesia, the most surprising 
of it all came from the United States and the United Kingdom. First and foremost, the United 
Kingdom was the first country to impose sanctions against Rhodesia after the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence calling it illegal. Also Britain went further to convince its allies 
to impose similar sanctions on Rhodesia; therefore, it was unimaginable that Britain will 
breach the sanctions on its own or through proxy. Secondly, both the United States and the 
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United Kingdom are permanent members of the Security Council that passed resolution 232 
on December 16, 1966 imposing comprehensive economic sanctions against Rhodesia. 
Reality however, shows that the United Kingdom breached the sanctions (Bailey, 1979). 
According to Murphy (2011), the United Kingdom prosecuted many individuals and 
organizations for breaching the sanctions; however, Britain did not persuade it companies to 
close down their subsidiaries in Rhodesia. Some commentators believed that Britain 
maintained its subsidiaries in Rhodesia due to fear that closing them will impact negatively 
on its economy.  
Although Portugal and South Africa breached the oil boycott by allowing 
transportation of oil into Rhodesia through their borders, the United Kingdom through its 
subsidiary companies was responsible for the oil itself. Given that Southern Rhodesia had no 
oil reserves and required oil for day to day activities, sanctions had to be breached 
continuously in order to ensure that Southern Rhodesia had sufficient oil (Bailey, 1979). 
Thus, the five major oil companies in Rhodesia played a significant role in making sure that 
there was constant supply of oil and maintained their share of the market (Jardim, 1978). 
Among the five major oil companies in Rhodesia were Shell and BP. Ironically, 40 percent of 
these company shares were owned by British shareholders who benefited from the oil breach. 
In 1973 however, there were indications that British-owned companies and/or subsidiaries 
were supplying about 56 percent of the oil transported by rail through Mozambique to 
Southern Rhodesia (Bailey, 1979). Evidently, most of the breaches by the United Kingdom 
were committed largely by organisations rather than by the State itself. It has been argued 
that the UK was aware of potential breaches particularly of oil embargo, by British 
companies yet, the State failed to investigate these oil companies and possibly prosecute them 
(Drezner, 1999). 
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The United States on the other hand implemented certain policies and legislations that 
encouraged breach of the sanctions. For example, the Military Procurement Act of 1971 was 
amended by the US parliament to what became known as the “Rhodesian Chrome Statute” 
(Virginia Law Review, 1972). Rhodesian Chrome Statute allowed for the importation of 
material deemed “strategically” and “critically” important. Although the amendment was 
carefully orchestrated and avoided any mentioning of either Rhodesia or chrome, it remained 
clear that it was enacted to give way to the importation of Southern Rhodesian chrome into 
the United States (Murphy, 2011: 65). In addition, the amendment granted Ian Smith and 
other members of his regime entry into the United States even when they were placed under 
travel ban (UNSC Resolution 437, 1978). Obviously, the actions of the United States and the 
United Kingdom gave legitimacy to the breaches of the sanctions by both States and by other 
States. 
3.1.7.3. Sanctions breaches by Zambia  
Zambia, which was formerly known as Northern Rhodesia, had very close economic 
ties with Southern Rhodesia. It relied heavily on Southern Rhodesia in trade and certainly 
found it difficult to survive without the cooperation of Southern Rhodesia. Before sanctions 
were imposed on Southern Rhodesia, Zambia provided a market for more than 25 percent of 
exports from Southern Rhodesia (Murphy, 2011: 65). In addition, it relied on Southern 
Rhodesian railways to transport an estimated 65 percent of its imports while 95 percent of its 
exports activities were carried out from the same channel (Anglin, 1987: 29). Furthermore, 
Southern Rhodesia was the main source of electricity to Zambia while at the same time it 
served as its major supplier of oil and coal. Therefore, adhering to the sanctions and cutting 
economic ties with Southern Rhodesia seemed suicidal for Zambia; however, the country 
remained committed to the sanctions. 
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In reaction to Zambia attitude and in an attempt to force it to back off from the 
sanctions, Ian Smith government closed down its northern borders in 1973. Consequently, 
Zambia lost its profitable trade with Rhodesia and lacked Rhodesian coal to power the pumps 
to mine Zambian copper (Paul, 1979: 109-114). The blockade almost forced Zambia into 
economic depression. Under a very tough economic situation which some observers referred 
as “threat of starvation,” Zambia breached the sanctions and its borders were reopened in 
1978 (Murphy, 2011: 66). Conclusively, Zambia breached the sanctions because it needed 
economic ties with Southern Rhodesia to survive, in the absence of support from the 
international community. 
3.1.8. Adaptation of the economy  
Just like every other economic sanctions episode, the initial stage of the sanctions 
against Rhodesia affected the economy. Records show that Rhodesian exports declined by 3 
percent after UN imposed comprehensive economic sanctions, while its imports rose to 11 
percent. However, some report shows that sanctions had only partial effect on Rhodesia’s 
economic growth. According to Paul (1979), gross domestic product per capita went up by 5 
percent from 1965 to 1970 and even higher in the following five years, an indication that 
Rhodesians enjoyed greater prosperity in the period. As Rhodesians aspired for new wealth 
and financial prosperity, they reinvested their wealth at home rather than abroad due to 
sanctions. Consequently, savings and capital formation increased up to 150 percent from 
1965 to 1975 (Paul, 1979).  Rhodesia therefore, was able to diversify its production from 
agriculture to mining and manufacturing of consumer products. Thus, the import restrictions 
resulting from sanctions triggered a minor industrial revolution. Joel R, Paul reported that 
about 400 new industries were opened in Rhodesia in 1968 alone and helped to reduce the 
country’s dependence on foreign imports. Although in 1967, Rhodesia’s economy 
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experienced huge deficits in its current account caused by the sharply increasing costs of 
foreign freight services; however, this deficit were balanced with surpluses in the capital 
account (Paul, 1979: 112-113). Thus, Rhodesia’s quick recovery from deficit to surplus 
indicates a rigorous economy with remarkable resilience to adjust to a fast-changing 
economic situation. 
Another factor that helped Rhodesian economy to adjust to sanctions was its decision 
to cease all forms of debt repayment. Being under British rule, Southern Rhodesia owed 
Britain a considerable amount in debt. In addition, it owed the World Bank and other 
creditors and by not repaying those debts it saved a lot of money that helped to reinvigorate 
the economy (Murphy, 2011: 71). As McKinnell (1969: 564) notes, “the interruption of 
external payments from Britain was more than offset by the repudiation of all liability to 
service external debt.” Taking into account Anthony Hawkins statistical analysis, Southern 
Rhodesia saved £8.8 million in 1966 by refusing to repay its debt (Hawkins, 1967: 58), and 
thus facilitated what (Bond, 2003: 252) referred as “dramatic economic restructuring.” It is 
important to note that, although Rhodesia decided not to repay its debt to the United 
Kingdom within the period of sanctions, it does not mean that the debts were written off.  
Rather, the funds that would have been used for debt repayment in that period were 
channelled to other economic uses that helped diversify the economy and thus help the 
country to keep up with the effects of sanctions. 
Another issue was the miscalculation of white elite reactions and their capability to 
adapt to the sanctions. A major calculation of proponents of sanctions against Southern 
Rhodesia was that the white population which was accustomed to a life of affluence and ease 
will be unwilling to suffer economic hardship. That is to say that if sanctions were imposed 
on Rhodesia, the white elites will immediately surrender and adhere to request of the 
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sanctioning party. However, records show that human beings whether white or black will 
always resist economic and political isolation to preserve their national character when faced 
with economic difficulties particularly from foreign interference. The experience of the 
Germans and the British during the Second World War, and the European settlers in 
Rhodesia from 1966 when economic sanctions were imposed on them demonstrates that even 
affluent Western societies can be very adaptive to economic challenges. To support this 
argument, I reproduce part of Johan Galtung’s account on the reactions of the affluent white 
elites during the Rhodesia sanctions episode. 
Question: How do you manage with so little petrol? 
Answer: Oh, that is easy enough. You know, if a family has two cars and receives 
some petrol for both, to put one car in the garage is not very much of a sacrifice. 
Besides, some of us who live in the countryside and have offices in Salisbury join our 
rations and form a car pool and go in together. It is strange to see how much better 
friends one becomes with one’s neighbours in such situations - we really did not 
know them before. And if even this should not work, this may be the great impetus 
that forces the city to develop adequate collective transportation, and if even that does 
not work, doctors are almost unanimous that walking is good for you (Galtung 1967: 
394) 
Question: But what about all kinds of luxury goods, or household appliances? 
Answer: [...] as to luxury goods - we have been without them during two world wars 
when we helped Britain, the same Britain that attacks us today, and we can do without 
them again. Besides, one family has some and another family will borrow from it. 
That was also the pattern during the war (Galtung 1967: 394). 
Going by the above illustration presented by Galtung, it became obvious that the UN 
sanctions against Rhodesia brought synergy and solidarity among the white population. Put 
simply, the white population of Southern Rhodesia was prepared to sacrifice as a reaction to 
what it perceived as unfair sanctions being imposed on them. The determination of the white 
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Rhodesian population justifies Galtung’s assertion of “rally around the flag effect” (Galtung, 
1967: 393) 
Just as UN sanctions did not collapse Rhodesia’s economy; it also failed to break the 
political will of the regime from the stand point of resisting external oppositions and 
pressures. Instead sanctions were perceived as unfair foreign interference which provoked 
white Rhodesian nationalism. Although Smith’s regime has at last agreed to concede to 
majority rule, this apparent concession is arguably unrelated to the impact of sanctions on the 
regime and/or economy. As Joel R. Paul notes, the initial impact of sanctions has long worn 
off without the economy of Rhodesia collapsing. However, the intensifying violence and rage 
from the black community presented a new burden and challenge to the economy (Paul, 
1979: 109). The violence disrupted economic activities because every male below the age of 
57 was eligible to be drafted for military service. This situation presented a huge challenge to 
the economy which was faced with increasingly lack of skilled manpower. In addition, the 
growing number of casualties from the violence frightened many white settlers causing about 
20,000 out of a total European population of 280,000 to migrate out of Rhodesia (Paul, 1979: 
110). Whilst the effect of economic sanctions has receded, the increased level of violence 
posed a real threat to governance in terms of maintaining law and order and also managing an 
economy with a desperate shortage of skilled workers. All in all, one can argue that sanctions 
only played a partial role in resolving the conflict. 
3.2. Towards democracy and independence 
After almost 15 years of civil war coupled with economic sanctions, on March 3, 
1978, Ian Smith administration signed the Internal Settlement agreement in Salisbury with 
Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau (Collier, 2013: 336). The 
agreement called for majority rule and democratic elections, while at the same time it 
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provided platform and framework for the conduct of elections in the following year being 
1979. The election was supervised by the Conservative Party of Britain through a five-man 
delegate led by Lord Boyd. The United African National Council (UANC) won the election, 
giving the opportunity for Bishop Muzorewa to assume office on June 1, 1978, as the first 
black Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (Copson, 2006). On December 10, 1979, while 
preparing for recognition and transition to an officially recognized independent State, the 
“Zimbabwe-Rhodesia” reverted to de facto colonial status (Chikuhwa, 2004). After the 
reversion to a de facto British colony, on December 12, the same year, a British Governor, 
Lord Christopher Soames arrived in Salisbury and reasserted British authority over the 
colony. The action of Britain quickly propelled violence across the country until December 
21, 1979, when the Lancaster agreement was signed (Chikuhwa, 2004) calling for a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict in the colony. The agreement addressed issues such as new 
elections, a transition period under British rule and a new constitution that implements a 
majority rule while protecting minority rights. Sequel to signing the Lancaster House 
Agreement, same day, the UN Security Council unanimously voted and asked member States 
to remove sanctions on Rhodesia. In March 1980, the British government conducted an 
election in Rhodesia. Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party won the election and formed 
Zimbabwe’s first government (Primorac and Chan, 2007: 73). 
It was after the election that Zimbabwe was formally granted independence on April 
18, 1980. On that day, the United States opened its embassy in Harare and became the first 
State to establish a foreign mission in Zimbabwe. Following independence, Zimbabwe’s 
parliament convened for the first time on May 13, 1980, and the country became a member of 
the United Nations on August 25, 1980. At this time, the country embarked on reconstruction 
and development programs, including increased wage and land redistribution (US 
Department of State, 2010). 
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3.2.1. The Matabeleland crisis that lasted within 1982 to 1987 
On assuming office as the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe on April 18, 1980, Robert 
Mugabe was faced with the responsibility of rebuilding a volatile nation and reconciling a 
country that had been under repressive racist rule for over 90 years. Outside the oppressive 
rule of the white European settlers, the country had experienced an increasing violent military 
activity, which facilitated the emancipation process of the black majority, but at the same 
time sow seed of discord within it (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, 
1997). After independence, the country continued to experience constant outbreaks of 
violence and the guerrillas or ex-combatants were often accused of perpetrating the violence, 
which erupted from time to time in different locations across Zimbabwe particularly in the 
Matabeleland. Although such violence was experienced before independence, they continued 
unabated throughout the 1980’s. The guerrillas comprises of ZANLA, ex-ZANU combatants 
and ZIPRA, ex-ZAPU combatants who were kept in camps referred as “assembly points” 
(APs), for the purpose of disarmament and official integration into the Zimbabwe military 
force (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, 1997). The ex-combatants 
continued to perpetrate violence against civilians and quite often against each other. Some 
observers argue that the violence was caused by the mentality of securing post war 
supremacy among the two factions. 
As opinion varies, Terence M. Mashingaidze (2005), shares a different opinion and 
view about the main cause of the crisis. In his opinion, the major cause of the Matabeleland 
crisis was political intolerance of the ruling ZANU led by Robert Mugabe. Mashingaidze 
added that Africa’s post-colonial nation building process was marred by political bigotry on 
the side of the ruling elites. Thus, the Matabeleland crisis that lasted within 1982 to 1987 was 
an outcome of the homogenous conceptualisation and practice of nation-building in Africa 
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(Mashingaidze, 2005: 78). The war, which was believed to be a spill-over from the nationalist 
politics of the 1960’s and 1970’s, caused the death of about 20,000 people (Alexander, 
McGregor and Ranger 2000). Alexander et.al, note that the escalation of violence between 
the two guerrilla armies’ (ZANLA and ZIPRA) after the liberation war was propelled by a 
history of animosity and distrust between the two armies and their political leaders dating 
back to the 1970’s (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000: 112). 
ZIPRA forces were dominated by Ndebele speakers from Matabeleland, while 
ZANLA was predominantly Shona-speaking. The formation of these two political armies 
along tribal lines had serious effects on individual political loyalties. Voting and political 
participation was largely based on ethnic and regional divisions, creating the possibility of 
conflict along these lines. Following ZANU’s victory in the February 1980 elections, the 
party feared that ZAPU may use its combatants, which were deemed to be more sophisticated 
than ZANU fighters to obtain victory by other means. While ZANU was speculating on a 
potential coup by ZAPU, there were several assassination attempts on the Prime Minister, 
Robert Mugabe himself. He and others narrowly escaped an assassination attempt planned to 
coincide with Independence Day in 1980 (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000: 112-113). 
In December 1981 he was a target of attack by South African agents who blew up the new 
ZANU headquarters with the intention of killing Mugabe, and later that year, there was yet 
another abortive attempt on his life, involving ex-ZIPRA combatants, when shots were fired 
at his residence in Harare (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000: 113). The outcome of the 
unstable situation was that by mid-1982, Zimbabwe was faced with serious security issues in 
different parts of the country, particularly in the Western half, where civilians were 
frequently killed and property destroyed. The distrust between ZANU and ZAPU led to the 
removal of ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo, from the post of Minister of Home Affairs to 
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Minister without Portfolio (Alexander et al 2000). This action angered ZAPU and ZIPRA 
cadres who responded with violence (Mashingaidze, 2005: 83). 
The violence resulted into a full brown war between members and supporters of 
ZANU and ZAPU. In response and/or preparation for the worst from ZAPU combatants, the 
government secretly initiated training of the notorious Fifth Brigade by 106 North Korean 
military instructors (Mashingaidze, 2005: 84). Then in February 1982, the government 
alleged that it had discovered arsenal of weapons on properties that belong to Nitram, a 
Company owned by ZAPU. In addition, the government claimed to have discovered another 
coach of arms in and around ZIPRA APs. Based on these findings and/or allegations as the 
case may be, the government confiscated the properties and sacked Nkomo and other ZAPU 
Ministers (Mashingaidze, 2005: 85). Consequently, the political environment of Zimbabwe 
became tensed and as a result, many ZAPU combatants who were already drafted into the 
Zimbabwe army left due to fear of persecution and took up arms. According to Alexander et 
al (2000): 
The desertion in 1982 of thousands of armed former Zipras from the Zimbabwe 
National Army (ZNA) and their persecution at home led to a vast increase of 
dissident violence in Matabeleland. These dissidents were not the same as 
those of 1980. Their position was due to the deterioration of relations within 
the ZNA and targeting of former Zipras outside it, a situation that was to 
worsen dramatically with the deployment of the notorious Fifth Brigade to 
Matabeleland North in 1983 (Mashingaidze, 2005: 84 - 85). 
Mashingaidze notes that the tension in Zimbabwe grew so high after February 1982 
that there was no room for political reconciliation between ZANU and ZAPU (Mashingaidze, 
2005: 83-86). Prime Minister Robert Mugabe concluded that the arms discovered in ZAPU 
owned property was clear evidence that ZAPU had always planned a coup. It was alleged that 
it had held back forces and cached weapons to fight in a final struggle to overthrow a ZANU 
government if it came to power (Alexander et al 2000: 181). Apart from the internal problem 
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between ZAPU and ZANU, the situation was exacerbated by South Africa’s involvement. It 
was believed that South Africa played a role in fermenting the crisis. It is accused of 
recruiting and sponsoring insurgent groups in Zimbabwe and its army is linked to the 
sabotage of Inkomo Barracks in August 1981. Also there is a belief that it sponsored and/or 
facilitated an attack on Zimbabwe Air-force base located in Thornhill in July 1982 
(Mashingaidze, 2005: 84). Another evidence of South Africa’s involvement in the conflict 
was the killing of three soldiers of the South African Defence Forces (SADF) in a clash 
inside Zimbabwe in August 1982. That is to say, South Africa was not only sponsoring 
militia groups in Zimbabwe; their soldiers/troops were actually carrying out attacks inside 
Zimbabwe. According to available reports, towards the end of 1982, South Africa launched 
“Operation Drama” (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, 1997; 
Chiwome and Mguni, 2012: 40), with the task of recruiting, and arming a Zimbabwean 
insurgent group called Super ZAPU. 
The action and/or involvement of South Africa made the ZANU government grew 
increasingly paranoid whilst it became more convinced that the crisis could only be solved by 
the use of military force. The government responded by deploying the Fifth Brigade to 
Matabeleland North in January 1983. Unlike the regular army, the Fifth Brigade was 
accountable only to the Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, and not to the normal military chain 
of command. The government went on to claim that the Fifth Brigade was to be used for 
internal defence purposes (Mashingaidze, 2005: 85). However, the Brigade’s activity from 
1983, when it was deployed in Matabeleland North until its withdrawal from Matabeleland 
South in late1984, was marred with violence. It was accused of violence against leaders of 
opposition parties, civilians’ at large, former ZIPRA combatants and anyone suspected of 
supporting ZAPU. Many people were tortured, raped, murdered, and maimed while those that 
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survived still bear the mental and physical scars of the Fifth Brigade’s repression 
(Mashingaidze, 2005: 85). 
Although opinion varies, some observers argue that the war was fought along ethnic 
lines. However, it is worth noting that though the Fifth Brigade was deployed in 
Matabeleland, they also attacked areas that were predominantly Shona speaking population. 
ZAPU supporters in Shona speaking areas such as Hurungwe, Gokwe and Mberengwa were 
perceived as dissidents and consequently attacked (Mashingaidze, 2005: 86). Absolutely, the 
Fifth Brigade and other State security units targeted mostly Ndebele people because of their 
support and commitment to ZAPU. However, according to Mashingaidze (2005: 86) the war 
was largely fought along political line and/or affiliation rather than ethnicity. The 
Matabeleland crisis continued until December 22, 1987 when the Unity Accord was signed. 
3.2.2. The Unity Accord 
The repressive policies of the Rhodesian racist colonial regime necessitated the 
formation of ZAPU. The party became the main nationalist party that challenged the racist 
policies of the ruling white minority. It was formed in 1961 with Joshua Nkomo as its first 
president (Msipa, 2013). In 1963, a splinter group comprising of Robert Mugabe and others 
broke away from ZAPU and formed ZANU. The breakaway was perceived as an act of 
rebellion by ZAPU leadership and it led to distrust among the two parties. Although there 
was love lost between ZAPU and ZANU, both parties however, remained committed to 
fighting a common enemy, Ian Smith and his Rhodesia Front (Msipa, 2013). The war waged 
by these two parties against the colonial regime facilitated Zimbabwe’s independence in 
1980. Ironically, attaining independence did not end the conflict as ex-combatants of the two 
parties continued to fight each other until December 22, 1987, when the Unity Accord was 
signed. 
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The Unity Accord therefore, is an agreement signed by Robert Mugabe and Jushua 
Nkomo on behalf of ZANU-PF and PF ZAPU on December 22, 1987 in Harare (Msipa, 
2013). The Accord stated that both parties have irrevocably committed themselves to unite 
under one political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). 
In any case, PF ZAPU was exterminated by the Unity Accord, whilst ZANU-PF became the 
only political party in Zimbabwe. Speaking after signing the agreement, Robert Mugabe had 
this to say:  
Today is a great day. It is great because we have seen the coming together in 
body, mind and spirit of our two parties. What we are witnessing is a 
tremendous blow to the forces of negation, the forces of division, the forces of 
destruction [...] let them be murdered and laid to rest for eternity (The Glasgow 
Herald, 1987). 
On his part, Joshua Nkomo commented that the Accord was “the beginning of unity, for unity 
is not just the signing of documents, unity is what follows” (The Glasgow Herald, 1987). The 
accord therefore ushered in a new era of political development.   
According to Terence M. Mashingaidze, the keyword in post-conflict reconstruction 
is reconciliation (Mashingaidze, 2005: 86) and the best way to bring peace and reconciliation 
in post conflict societies is through truth telling and a shared willingness to reconcile. 
Reconciliation therefore, should involve all the major actors in a conflict. The government, 
social and civil society organisations such as churches, mosques and in fact the entire 
population have to come to terms with the past in order to provide space for peace and 
reconciliation. In my opinion, the 1987 Unity Accord may have ended the war but it failed to 
bring peace and reconciliation. The Accord was elitist and embodied a top-down approach in 
which Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo signed the Accord and then enforced it on the 
people. Such approach offers only temporary peace and may result in a bigger conflict in the 
future. 
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3.2.3. Shortfall of the 1987 Unity Accord 
 The foundation of reconciliation either in post conflict situation or in other 
circumstances is recognition of suffering and pain undergone by victims (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 
2003). Recognition of suffering differentiates reconciliation from what could ordinarily be 
perceived as political negotiation and compromises. It is usually accompanied by measures of 
compensation and redress which benefit the victims. Thus, recognition is undoubtedly a 
major factor that guarantees peace, dignity and justice in post conflict societies. The 
effectiveness of the 1987 United Accord is not in any way in question here as it did bring an 
end to hostilities in the Zimbabwean society. However, my concern is that it did not bring the 
much needed peace, unity and justice. As Mashingaidze (2005: 87) notes, victims of the 
Matabeleland crisis and other violent conflicts in Zimbabwe have not been identified and 
compensated. Neither have the perpetrators of the violence been brought to justice nor have 
they apologised for their actions and sought the forgiveness of their victims. As a result, the 
Unity Accord has been associated with many loopholes. In line with Mashingaidze (2005: 86-
87) I the Accord had a poor post conflict peace building framework, because it failed to 
incorporate the following core elements needed to establish durable peace. 
 It did not offer platform for political freedom and democratic rebuilding of the society. 
That is to say, it failed to provide a framework that will eradicate fear among citizens, 
and enhance accountability, transparency, legitimacy, human security, and social 
peace among Zimbabweans. 
 One of the major imperatives of post conflict reintegration of victims into the 
communities is psychological rebuilding and/or rehabilitation. A report by the 
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) supported this view point when it 
noted that “part of the process of psychological healing for any victim of abuse is 
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being given the opportunity to recount that suffering to a supportive, non-judgmental 
audience” (CCJP Report, 1997: 16). The Unity Accord was credited for successfully 
curbing the conflict; however, it did not encompass this all important element needed 
to avert future crisis or revenge. The Accord is supposed to include a recount of 
victims experiences that the national leadership need to hear and take account of, if 
they wish to achieve positive peace. Apart from victims, the process should have 
compelled perpetrators of the violence to acknowledge their wrongdoing. In addition, 
an atmosphere of truth telling was necessary, which would have enabled perpetrators 
and victims to purge themselves of their memories of events. Some sort of national 
exorcism would have been crucial. As the CCPJ notes: “One of the most painful 
aspects of the 1980’s conflict for its victims is their perception that their plight is 
unacknowledged. Officially, the State continues to deny any serious culpability for 
events during that period, and refuses to allow open dialogue on the issue. In effect, 
there is a significant chunk of Zimbabwean history, which is largely unknown, except 
to those who experienced it first-hand. All Zimbabweans, both present and future, 
should be allowed access to history” (CCJP Report, 1997: 15). 
 A key factor of post conflict reconciliation is compensation of victims. According to 
international law, victims have a right to material compensation. Zimbabwe’s Unity 
Accord and its post-conflict development paradigm did not embrace this approach 
(Mashingaidze, 2005: 89). Although some parts of Zimbabwe experienced 
infrastructural development after the Unity Accord was signed, the Matabeleland and 
some parts of the Midlands Provinces did not benefit. The Accord should have 
pursued and/or included massive infrastructural development and rehabilitation of 
Zimbabwe in general but particularly the people and the areas that were mostly 
affected by the crisis. Unfortunately, the people of Matabeleland that suffered brunch 
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of the crisis did not benefit from either infrastructural development nor receive 
personal compensation and the people feel alienated from national development 
processes. The feeling of neglect has continued to fuel apathy in the people of 
Matabeleland against ZANU-PF (Mashingaidze, 2005: 89-90). This could be deduced 
from a statement credited to one Dumiso Dabengwa, a contestant of the 2000 
parliamentary election under ZANU-PF when he commented thus: “the people have 
rejected us not only as candidates, but also as ruling party ZANU-PF now. The reason 
is that since the signing of the Unity Accord in December 1987, the people of 
Bulawayo feel they have not gained anything. The people have been saying; what is 
the need of supporting ZANU-PF and its candidates?” (Mashingaidze, 2005: 89). 
Obviously, a key message passed by the people of Bulawayo is that they are 
discontented with the ruling party.  
 The Zimbabwean Unity Accord glossed over recognition of victims, truth telling, 
reconciliation and compensation, which are integral components of achieving durable peace 
in post conflict societies.  
3.2.4. Crisis and challenges of the 1990’s 
Zimbabwe witnessed economic difficulties and political crisis in the 1990’s 
(Dansereau and Zamponi, 2004: 28). In the period, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
proposed the disastrous Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) to the Zimbabwean 
government. Just like many other developing countries that fall victim of this unfortunate 
economic scheme, the Zimbabwean government was convinced that introducing SAP would 
help the country reduce its balance of payment deficit and growing inflation rate. Thus, SAP 
was intended to bring macro-economic stability to the country (Bond, 1998). Ironically, 
introduction of SAP instead led to economic stagnation while unemployment rate increased 
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rapidly. Consequently, the economic and social situations became appalling while the 
government struggled to revive the economy. Joblessness and hopelessness that followed 
created tension throughout Zimbabwe and helped to sustain apathy against the regime. This 
was evident in low political participation in terms of voting throughout the 1990’s. 
Consequently, there was a boom and wide spread of civil society groups in the absence of a 
strong opposition party (Laakso 2003: 126). 
Increase in the activities of civil society groups led to the formation of an opposition 
party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999 with Morgan 
Tsvangirai as its leader (Maroleng, 2004: 19), bringing an end to Zimbabwe de facto one 
party State. The newly formed party provided a platform for increased political participation 
and competition that eroded the Zimbabwean political landscape for the most part of the 
1990’s (Mair 2002: 62). Being a party that abhors opposition, the ruling ZANU-PF did not 
perceived MDC’s entrance into Zimbabwean politics in a good light and soon a political tug 
of war ensued between the two political parties. The President, Robert Mugabe was resolute 
to his own ideology, which is anchored on African nationalism (Grebe, 2010: 11), 
authoritarian belief and the specific command structure that mainly delegitimizes both 
individual and political opposition (Mair 2002). As Chikuhwa (2004) notes, Mugabe’s 
ideological behavioural patterns, which are mainly focused on retaining political power at all 
cost, dominate the actions of the regime throughout the current crisis. Thus, intimidation and 
blackmail became a necessary tool to exterminate opposition. 
3.2.5. Developments since 2000 
After the MDC came on board in 1999, the political landscape of Zimbabwe quickly 
took a dramatic change. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, the party secured 57 out of 120 
seats in parliament and thus brought an end to ZANU-PF one party parliament (Grebe, 2010: 
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7). The party also made a significant impact in the 2002 presidential election while it won a 
notable number of seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections despite widespread intimidation 
from the regime. The success recorded by MDC, however, complicated the political situation 
(Schwersensky and Traub-Merz, 2005). With MDC making political progress, the 
constitutional reform and/or amendment proposed by the regime met stiff resistance. The 
Mugabe regime had proposed a “home-grown” constitution that will replace the 20 years old 
Lancaster House Constitution (Vollan, 2013). The opposition, however, alleged that the draft 
constitution failed to incorporate the will of the people; instead it allocated more power to the 
office of the president (Grebe, 2010: 19). In addition, the draft constitution had more to do 
with land reform and provided the government with immunity to acquire land for 
resettlement without hindrance or payment of any form of compensation. Other contending 
issues in the draft constitution included the introduction of compulsory military service, 
condemnation and outright prohibition of same-sex marriages and a call for Britain to pay 
compensation to farmers (Dzinesa, 2013: 4).  
The draft was put to a national referendum on February 2000. ZANU-PF campaigned 
vigorously for an endorsing “Yes” vote while the MDC orchestrated a “No” campaign. The 
MDC in its “No” campaign argue that the draft constitution neglected the provincial 
committee reports that had been submitted, and particularly people’s views on the need to 
limit the powers of the executive and rather ensure a balance of power between the 
legislative, judicial and executive arms of government (Dorman, 2003: 853). According to 
Chenjerai Chisaka, “the majority of those consulted clearly wanted a governmental system 
that was accountable to them through elected representatives in parliament […] but this was 
denied them by the Commission” (Chisaka, 2000: 19). The outcome of the referendum was a 
wholly 54.31 percent “No” vote, signifying a majority rejection of the draft constitution 
(Hatchard 2001: 213; Chikuhwa, 2013). Mugabe’s failure to successfully implement his 
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changes to the constitution gave the regime the impression that they were losing grip of both 
parliament and the Zimbabwean population. The regime’s stability was threatened, and 
Mugabe decided to pay significant pensions to war veterans so as to secure their loyalty 
(Chikuhwa, 2013: 7). Since the draft constitution that would have enabled the government to 
finally redistribute the white-owned farmland was rejected in a national referendum, the 
regime opted to achieve its aim through other means. Consequently, there were mass invasion 
of white-owned farmlands by ex-combatants, war veterans and ZANU-PF youth groups 
(Grebe, 2010: 12-13).  
Another factor that heightened the tension in the country to a crisis level was the 2008 
presidential election. The atmosphere was characterized by severe economic meltdown, 
hyperinflation and high level of political intolerance and violence, as well as by a mass 
exodus of Zimbabweans, who sort for greener pastures abroad. The outcome of the election 
was devastating on ZANU-PF; the result was very close that it called for a run-off election 
(Badza, 2009). Before the run-off was conducted, MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangirai 
withdrew his candidacy from the election, accusing ZANU-PF and the regime of 
manipulating the process. Mugabe however declared victory in the election. 
The outcome of the election added a twist to the long political backlash in Zimbabwe. 
In fact opinions were divided between West and South. Some Western countries such as the 
EU member States and the United States alleged that the election process was marred by 
violence and irregularities and it did not meet criteria for a democratic election. Whilst 
African observers on ground during the election adjudged the election process to be free and 
fair, the US and the EU with no observer present condemned the elections from afar as 
fraudulent (Elich, 2007). The rejection of the outcome of the election has prompted an array 
of opinion, as to why the EU and the US took such stance. On one hand, the regime in 
 235 
 
Zimbabwe and scholars such as Gregory Elich (2007) claim that the duo of the EU and the 
US are only witch hunting Mugabe for his ill-fated land reform policies. On the other hand, 
the EU and the US insist that they rejected the outcome of the election because Robert 
Mugabe manipulated the election process. Be it as it may, the truth remain that the US was 
dissatisfied with the political situation in Zimbabwe even before the election. For instance, 
prior to the presidential run-off election, the State Department issued a statement where it 
expressed deep concern on how the regime in Zimbabwe was hoarding several ballot boxes in 
the weeks after the main election (Ploch, 2008: 11; under foot note). The statement continued 
that the department does not believe that the conditions on ground would allow for a free and 
fair runoff.  
By issuing the above statement, the US may have justified their rejection of the 
outcome of the election. The process was not free and fair. Apart from the statement issued 
by the State department, the then US Assistant Secretary of State, Jendayi Frazer before the 
election accused Mugabe of trying to steal the election and urged him to do the honourable 
thing and step down (Ploch, 2008: 16). However, Bernard Kouchner, the Foreign Minister of 
France, on July 1, 2008, during a press interview, said that the European Union would 
“accept no government in Zimbabwe other than a government led by Mr Tsvangirai” 
(Reuters, 2008). With such apologetic statement, one can argue that the EU and the US may 
have rejected the election result, not necessarily because of irregularities in the election 
process; rather they were not comfortable with the incumbent remaining in power. In essence, 
rejecting the outcome of the election may be perceived merely as a protest against Mugabes’s 
long stay in office. According to Gregory Elich, Western condemnation of the election result 
was prompted by the uncomfortable realization that a different outcome could not be 
achieved in the election (Elich, 2007). 
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Following barrage of condemnation from Western countries and MDC’s disagreement 
with the outcome of the election, the regime was forced to sort political dialogue and 
compromises. There were series of meetings, negotiations and dialogue between Robert 
Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai in the months that followed. In February 2009, under the 
mediation of Arthur Mutambara, the two party leaders were able to reach an agreement and 
established a unity government under the Global Political Agreement (Grebe, 2010). Whether 
the unity government is a success or a failure remains an issue that needs to be explored 
further. 
3.2.6. Foreign intervention 
The pattern of reaction from the EU and the US were completely different when crisis 
erupted in Zimbabwe in the year 2000. The EU tried to gain political influence over the 
situation through the Cotonou Agreement (Grebe, 2010). The Cotonou Agreement is a treaty 
between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). 
It was adopted in June 2000 in Cotonou, Republic of Benin, by fifteen member countries of 
the EU as at then and by 78 ACP countries, (European Commission, 2008) with the exception 
of Cuba. It replaced the Lome Convention, which had been the basis for EU-ACP 
development cooperation since 1975. The Agreement aimed at giving a stronger political 
foundation to EU-ACP development cooperation. As a result, political dialogue was 
incorporated as an integral part of the agreement. In addition, it addresses other issues which 
had previously been perceived to be outside the scope of development cooperation, such as 
peace and security, arms trade and migration. 
Based on the provisions of Article 96 of the Lome Agreement, the EU tried to mediate 
the crisis to avoid a total breakdown of rules and order. The EU requested Mugabe and his 
government to end all politically motivated violence and grant unlimited access to neutral 
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election observers, protect the right to freedom of the press, establish an independent 
judiciary and end all manner of land invasions and reallocation. However, the attempt made 
by the EU was characterised by a “political and diplomatic tug-of-war” (Weiland, 2003: 127; 
Grebe, 2010: 9) between the EU and the Zimbabwean government. The regime accused the 
EU of behaving like a superior partner and as such will not yield to their dictates. 
Consequently, the EU election-observer chief, Pierre Schori was denied entry into Zimbabwe 
during the 2002 parliamentary elections. This incident led to the initial implementation of 
targeted sanctions by the EU against Mugabe and twenty other top members of his regime 
(Stubig, 2007).  
The US however, responded differently to the situation. Rather than exploring 
diplomacy through in-depth negotiation with the Zimbabwean regime, they acted mainly 
through the 2001 enacted Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA). 
Detailed analysis of ZIDERA would be provided in a later part of this chapter. 
3.3. Misconceptions and ambiguities: Overview of the US and the EU sanctions 
 Perhaps the most reasonable question to ask is why did the United States and the 
European Union impose sanctions on Zimbabwe? The reasons for sanctions against 
Zimbabwe have been marred with controversy from both the perspective of the sanctioning 
party and the sanctioned (Chingono, 2010: 67). Prior to the imposition of sanctions and even 
presently, the regime in Zimbabwe has been identified with internal repression of its citizens. 
The government of President Robert Mugabe is characterized with brutality and being 
hypersensitive to opposition. The regime abhors human rights values and the rule of law; 
also, press freedom is never considered in the regime’s agenda. In addition, the regime has 
been in power for too long, starting from independence in 1980, thereby making it one of the 
longest serving regimes in the world. In 2001, the United States imposed targeted sanctions 
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on the regime through the enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery 
Act (Chingono, 2010: 66). Also in 2002, the EU imposed sanctions on the regime, which it 
refers to as restrictive measures (ibid). The reasons advanced by the US and the EU for 
imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe were to establish democratic principles; to institutionalize 
real democracy and political emancipation of the people of Zimbabwe; and to improve 
human rights and restore the rule of law. However, the regime and the political ruling class in 
Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF) allege that the sanctions against the country are a new form of 
colonialism (Masaka, 2012). The regime claims that the sanctions have nothing to do with 
democracy and argue instead that they were imposed because of the land reform policy of the 
government. The US and the EU believes that sanctions against the government of Zimbabwe 
will pressure the regime to change its behaviour and restore democracy in the country 
according to Western modern standards of democracy. On the contrary, the government of 
Zimbabwe perceives the use of sanctions as an illegal tool meant to destabilize the internal 
political affairs of the country, particularly the land reform exercise (Chingono, 2010: 66). 
Furthermore, the regime claims that sanctions against them contradict the UN Charter and 
principle of non-interference in the internal political matters of a sovereign State (Chingono, 
2010: 66). The differences in interpreting the causal factors that led to sanctions against 
Zimbabwe have prompted inherent questions regarding the exact nature of these sanctions. 
Despite identifying an array of factors, the fundamental question remains: What underlying 
factors have shaped the two parties’ understanding of the actual reasons for the sanctions? 
Exploring these underlying factors helps us not only to understand the nature of the sanctions 
against Zimbabwe from the points of view of the involved parties, but it also acts as a key 
driver to understanding the prospects for resolving the conflict and most importantly, the 
appropriate strategy for re-engagement. Furthermore, the legality of the sanctions against 
Zimbabwe has generated a huge debate even among the sanctioning party and the sanctioned 
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party with the later out-rightly calling it illegal and an aberration of international law 
(Chingono, 2010: 72). 
 In my opinion, the focus on legality and illegality of sanctions against Zimbabwe is 
distracting and misleading, as it does not get at the heart of the matter. Instead, I approach 
this sanctions dilemma differently and shift the argument away from a juridical cul-de-sac, 
which leaves very little room for conflict transformation, to the international “logic” and 
conceptualization of sanctions. Perhaps the right questions to ask is: are sanctions a wise 
conflict management tool and do they and have they achieved their target objectives? The 
objective of the US and the EU for imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe is to influence a 
positive change in the behaviour of the regime, in a manner that will be beneficial to the 
citizens. For example, the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) of 
2001 was enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress “to support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect peaceful, 
democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable economic growth, and restore the 
rule of law” (Masaka, 2012: 58). Such statements contained in the ZIDERA are 
commendable and provide hope for Zimbabweans. The EU on their part issued a statement in 
2004 explaining its position on the sanctions against Zimbabwe when stated thus: 
The objective of these restricted measures is to encourage the persons targeted 
to reject policies that lead to the suppression of human rights, of the freedom 
of expression and of good governance (Council Common Position 
2004/161/CFSP: 2). 
In any case, the primary goal of EU sanctions and/or restrictive measures is to change the 
politics and the behaviour of the targeted persons and not a regime change as argued by the 
Mugabe government. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair in 
June 2004, made a glaring revelation of Britain’s intention in Zimbabwe when he had this to 
say:  
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We work closely with the MDC on the measures that we should take in respect 
of Zimbabwe, although I am afraid that these measures and sanctions, although 
we have them in place, are of limited effect on the Mugabe regime. We must 
be realistic about that. It is still important that we give every chance to, and 
make every effort to try to help, those in South Africa- the southern part of 
Africa- to put pressure for change on the Mugabe regime, because there is no 
salvation for the people of Zimbabwe until that regime is changed (UK 
Parliament, 14 June 2004, Column 523). 
 Apart from Mr Blair, I reproduce a statement accredited to the then Foreign Minister 
of France, Bernard Kouchner, who said that the European Union would “accept no 
government in Zimbabwe, other than a government led by Mr Tsvangirai” (Reuters, 2008). In 
view of the above statements made by these two leaders, sanctions against Zimbabwe may 
have a hidden agenda: to remove Mugabe and his ZANU-PF from office, instead of to 
modify his behaviour towards the people of Zimbabwe. The US and the EU strategy in 
Zimbabwe raise two crucial questions. First, can sanctions stop a regime from oppressing its 
citizens? Second, can sanctions in any way provide remedy to a population facing repression 
from its government? The present economic and humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe 
evidently shows that sanctions are not a solution. Trevor Ncube (2005) argues in with the 
above statement when he notes that, Western sanctions against Zimbabwe are not meeting the 
objectives for which they are imposed. Ncube continued by saying that sanctions have failed 
to address the political conflicts in Zimbabwe or improve the well-being of the population. In 
addition, he concluded that Western sanctions against Zimbabwe are vague and problematic 
to understand because they were imposed out of emotional rather than practical reasons 
(Ncube, 2005).  
 A more complicated issue about Western sanctions against Zimbabwe is that instead 
of focusing on personal finances and businesses of the targeted individuals, they target the 
regime’s access to finances without recourse to the consequences of such action on the entire 
population the sanctions intend to help. Consequently, many Zimbabweans particularly 
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government officials believe that the US and the EU sanctions were imposed specifically to 
destabilize the government (Chingono, 2010: 3-5). Gideon Gono of the Governor Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe argues in the same line when he notes:  
Before the Land Reforms in Zimbabwe, the world was literally silent about 
the imbalances that existed in the ownership and distribution of national 
wealth. The prevailing situation was instead, passively preserved, and in the 
process, breeding what could have degenerated into a chaotic state of affairs 
in the country’s socio-geo-political landscape (Gono, 2007: 1).  
In a situation such as this, where the parties could not agree on the underlying reasons for 
imposing sanctions, it is problematic for anyone to accept any of the reasons advanced by 
either party. Perhaps an important question that could guide us in addressing this issue is why 
did the US and the EU impose sanctions on Zimbabwe for not adopting a Western model of 
democracy, while countries such as China, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and others with 
questionable human rights and democratic record remain allies of the United States and the 
EU? This type of logic raises doubt on the actual intentions of the sanctions imposed against 
Zimbabwe.  
 In my opinion, the US and the EU should not base their quest to establish democracy 
globally on scapegoating. For example there are many countries in Africa and around the 
world with long serving governments like Zimbabwe. Many of these leaders (HM Sheikh 
Hamadibn Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Ali Bongo Ondimba of 
Gabon, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of 
Equatorial Guinea, Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo and many others) are 
allergic to democracy and hypersensitive to opposition (real or imagined), yet they enjoy 
friendly relationships with the US and the EU. Therefore, I query the United States and the 
European Union motive for singling out the regime in Zimbabwe for sanctions.  
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 Furthermore, I acknowledge that the reasons presented by the US and the EU for 
imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe are reasonable and will be of benefit to Zimbabweans if 
they are achieved. However, employing economic sanctions to achieve these objectives is 
unacceptable. Also the difficulty of parties involved in the sanctions to agree on the type of 
sanctions in place in Zimbabwe is worrisome. After more-than a decade, sanctions have 
failed to deter Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party, who continue to dominate the 
political landscape of Zimbabwe. Instead, sanctions are hitting most strongly on ordinary 
Zimbabweans and civil society groups. These and related considerations demonstrate, in my 
view, that the sanctions are not wise and hence are counterproductive. 
 All in all sanctions have added to the burden of the civilian population in Zimbabwe. 
The well-being of the population has deteriorated since sanctions were imposed (Chigono, 
2010: 1-6). Apart from that, sanctions create other problems that may be difficult to root out 
even after they are lifted. For example, pressures from sanctions on the targeted individuals 
may lead to unintended consequences such as smuggling of commodities by those targeted 
and their allies. The impact of smuggling on the wider society may be such that sustains the 
wealth and fortunes of sanctioned individuals and entities at the expense of ordinary citizens 
(Masaka, 2012: 66). Thus, a scenario of uneven wealth distribution between the ruling elite 
who are targeted by sanctions and their sympathizers on the one hand, and the ordinary 
citizens on the other, becomes more visible (Masaka, 2012: 66). Also Peter Andreas notes, 
sanctions may “create an economic opportunity structure that privileges those best 
positioned in the underground economy, enhancing the value of their smuggling skills and 
connections and such criminal endeavours […] may even be celebrated as patriotic” 
(Andreas, 2005: 336). Andreas stated further that, sanctions may lead to the legitimization 
and acceptance of corrupt and immoral economic policies and practices, as long as they 
proffer avenues to bust the sanctions while at the same time provide economic benefit to the 
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targeted individuals and the country in general (Andreas, 2005: 336). For this reason, I 
submit that Western sanctions against Zimbabwe are only adding to the difficulty faced by 
ordinary Zimbabweans whom they are meant to protect. 
3.3.1. Determination of US sanctions on Zimbabwe: Economic or Targeted sanctions? 
 As defined in chapter one, smart or targeted sanctions impose coercive measures on 
specific individuals and entities. It places restrictions on selected products or activities while 
minimizing unintended economic and social consequences on innocents and bystanders 
(Cortright and Lopez, 2002: 2). Smart sanctions are intended to target specific political elites 
espousing policies and committing actions deemed reprehensible by the international 
community. Secondly, they are supposed to protect innocent social groups such as children, 
women, the elderly and the sick from so-called collateral damage (Tostensen and Bull, 2002: 
373). This brand of sanctions are expected to achieve their goals through actions such as 
travel bans, freezing of financial and capital assets, suspension of diplomatic relations and 
other kinds of embargoes on the leadership or specific individuals of a targeted State, region 
or organization.     
 Smart sanctions were introduced by the United Nations as an answer and solution to 
growing concerns over the negative humanitarian impact of comprehensive sanctions. In fact, 
they were considered to be a refinement of the conventional comprehensive sanctions 
(Cortright and Lopez, 2002: 3-5). Unlike comprehensive economic sanctions, smart/targeted 
sanctions are meant to strike only the “bad guys,” while minimizing the impact or negative 
consequences on third parties, such as civilians and neighbouring countries (Cortright and 
Lopez, 2002). In the case of Zimbabwe, the United States has insisted that its sanctions 
against the country are smart/ targeted. However, the Zimbabwe government argues that the 
US sanctions are comprehensive and economic in nature since they have adverse economic 
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costs both on the economy and on the civilian population. The government of Zimbabwe 
insists that the enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act 
(ZIDERA) by the United States in 2001 brought considerable economic difficulties to the 
country (Chingono, 2010: 3). According to Section 4(c) of ZIDERA titled, Multilateral 
Financial Restrictions, until the President of the United States makes the certification 
described in subsection 4(d), the Secretary of the Treasury Executive to each of the 
international financial institutions must oppose or vote against: 
 An extension by the respective institutions of any loan, credit or guarantee to the 
Government of Zimbabwe or 
 Any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by the Government of Zimbabwe 
to the United States or any international financial institution (Chingono, 2010: 70). 
 A simple explanation of the consequences of ZIDERA is that the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) cannot 
provide loans or credit guarantees to the government of Zimbabwe, without direct approval 
from the president of the United States. According to Heather Chingono, since the enactment 
of ZIDERA, financial applications made by Zimbabwe to these international financial 
institutions have been blocked and frustrated by the United States (Chingono, 2010: 68). This 
accusation has been denied by the United States. In a roundtable discussion with journalists 
on February 24, 2010 in Harare, a United States diplomat, James Garry, dismissed the 
allegation, stressing, “there is a wide spread misunderstanding that the US has some kind of 
veto at the IMF. It is not true” (Guma, 2010). He further states that most decisions of the IMF 
are made from a majority vote and the voting strength of a member is determined by a 
country’s financial interest in the Fund (Zimbabwe News, 2010; Guma, 2010). However, this 
argument could not debunk the fact that the United States has more voting rights than any 
other member country of the IMF. Also Ozias Tungwarara, the director of Africa Governance 
 245 
 
Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP), states that there is no evidence to show that 
the veto provided for in ZIDERA has ever been exercised with respect to an application 
brought by Zimbabwe. However, he concedes that sanctions have curtailed Zimbabwe’s 
ability to access international capital, and highlights that there is no conclusive evidence to 
suggest that they are the sole cause of the economic crisis in the country (Tungwarara, 2011: 
113). No matter the disagreements on how the US sanctions affects Zimbabwe, the truth is 
that the country is unable to access loan or any form of financial support from any of the 
multilateral financial institutions since the enactment of ZIDERA in 2001. The implication of 
this being that Zimbabwe is experiencing a balance of payment deficit. It is against the short 
and long-term impact of ZIDERA that I argue that the enactment of ZIDERA subtly marks 
the beginning of economic sanctions on Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the cancellation of loans 
and grants by Multilateral Financial Institutions has more negative consequences on the 
civilian population than those targeted individuals who maintain vast material resources and 
foreign reserves. 
 Furthermore, after the enactment of ZIDERA, on March 7, 2003, President George W. 
Bush issued Executive Order 13288 imposing sanctions against specific individuals and 
entities in Zimbabwe. Additionally, on November 23, 2005, the President issued a new 
Executive Order superseding Executive Order 13288 (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2005). In 
the new Executive Order, President Bush expanded the list of Zimbabwean officials targeted 
by sanctions. The list includes immediate family members of the individual already 
designated in the previous sanctions list, as well as those persons providing assistance to any 
of sanctions target (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2005). The content of the new Executive 
Order reads as follows:   
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“[It] Prohibits U.S. persons, wherever located, or anyone in the United States from engaging 
in any transactions with any person, entity or organization found to  
 Be undermining democratic institutions and processes in Zimbabwe. 
 Have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological 
support to these entities. 
 Be or have been an immediate family member of a sanctions target or  
 Be owned, controlled or acting on behalf of a sanctions target.  
 Persons, entities and organizations referenced in Annex “A” of the Executive Order 
are all incorporated into the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list of Specially 
Designated Nationals (SDNs). Furthermore, it prohibits transactions with persons or entities 
on the list. The prohibition includes exports (direct and indirect), imports (direct and 
indirect), trade brokering, financing and facilitation, as well as most financial transactions. 
Attempts to evade or avoid these sanctions are punishable. Also, these prohibitions extend to 
any person, organization or entity found to be owned, controlled or acting on behalf of any 
Zimbabwe entity whose name is on the SDN list (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2005). The 
Executive Order of 2005 went on to outline penalties for violators by stating thus: 
Criminal fines for violating the Executive Order or regulations to be issued 
pursuant to the Executive Order may range up to the greater of $500,000 or 
twice the pecuniary gain per violation for an organization, or up to the greater 
of $250,000 or twice the pecuniary gain per violation for an individual. 
Individuals may also be imprisoned for up to 10 years for a criminal violation. 
Knowingly making false statements or falsifying or concealing material facts 
when dealing with OFAC in connection with matters under its jurisdiction is a 
criminal offense. In addition civil penalties of up to $11,000 per violation may 
be imposed administratively (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2005). 
 The above content of the US president Executive Order of 2003 and 2005 provides 
support for the US argument that the sanctions are targeted on specific individuals and 
entities. Having explained the operational strategy of ZIDERA earlier, it is obvious that the 
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Executive Order of 2003 and 2005 are an additional effort to impair the life conditions of 
Zimbabweans. In as much as the Executive Order(s) appear(s) to be smart in nature, they 
cannot over-rule the disastrous consequences of ZIDERA, which contributes immensely to 
Zimbabwe’s present economic woes. In such a scenario of apparent contradictions between 
the US and the government of Zimbabwe, one way out of this paradoxical situation is to refer 
to the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001. ZIDERA (2001: 115, 
STAT. 963) states that it intends to influence change of behaviour in the government of 
Zimbabwe by instructing the IMF and International Development Association, among other 
international financial institutions, to suspend their support for Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the 
Act confirmed that in September 1999, the IMF suspended its support for Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). In October 1999, the International Development 
Association (IDA) also “suspended all structural adjustment loans, credits, and guarantees to 
the government of Zimbabwe […]. In May 2000, the IDA suspended all other new lending to 
the government of Zimbabwe and in September 2000, the IDA suspended disbursement of 
funds for on-going projects under previously-approved loans, credits, and guarantees to the 
government of Zimbabwe” (ZIDERA, 2001: 115, STAT. 963). In light of these 
pronouncements in the Act, I doubt whether the so-called targeted sanctions were really 
targeted at specific individuals, institutions, and business organizations that promoted an 
undemocratic system of governance and violations of human rights. Rather, it confirms that 
the US sanctions on Zimbabwe do have an economic element that inevitably contributes to 
the country’s economic collapse. 
3.3.2. The EU sanctions on Zimbabwe: Restrictive Measures or Economic sanctions? 
 On February 8, 2002, the EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe, which the EU 
officially referred to as “restrictive measures” (Chingono, 2010: 67). The reason for using the 
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term restrictive measures instead of sanctions by the EU remains unexplained. However, the 
reasons put forward by the EU for imposing the so-called restrictive measure are to ensure 
political and democratic stability in Zimbabwe and to enforce human rights and the rule of 
law (Tungwarara, 2011: 112). The EU imposed its restrictive measures on Zimbabwe three 
months prior to the general elections. The EU justified the use of sanctions at this time based 
on the fact that the forthcoming elections in Zimbabwe would not be free and fair, 
particularly when considering the prevailing political situation (Eriksson, 2007). In essence, 
the EU gave its verdict, even before the conduct of the election. Furthermore, the EU 
sanctions list contains 203 individual and 40 entities (Eriksson, 2007: 21). The individuals on 
the list are mostly government officials and the sanctions policy states: 
Funds, financial assets or economic resources of the person listed for their 
engagement in activities that seriously undermine democracy, respect for 
human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe will be frozen. Also no funds, 
financial assets or economic resources will be made directly or indirectly to 
the persons listed in the sanctions list (Eriksson, 2007: 21; Chingono, 2010: 
72). 
 The EU argues that it enforces sanctions in order to improve the human rights record, 
foster the rule of law and to promote the conduct of free and fair elections in Zimbabwe. 
However, one major controversy surrounding the EU sanctions is the nature of the sanctions. 
Another problem is the euphemism used by the EU to address the sanctions. The EU refers to 
their sanctions on Zimbabwe as restrictive measures, while the regime in Zimbabwe calls 
them illegal economic sanctions. Thus, a dispute of a semantic nature has ensued between the 
EU and the government of Zimbabwe. Perhaps, I would argue that calling these sanctions 
“restrictive measures” is a well-conceived attempt by the EU to lessen the severity of these 
measures and at the same time make them appear acceptable to the public who would 
ordinarily query such measures. Additionally, such manipulation of euphemisms presents 
sanctions as a soft approach in international diplomacy. According to Weiss (1999: 500), one 
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of the reasons for manipulating sanctions euphemisms is that it offers the opportunity for a 
community of States to intrude in issues that were once off limits. Sanctions provide the 
opportunity for a State to intrude into the internal matters of another State. As Masaka (2012: 
58) notes, sanctions are another indicator that State sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct. In my 
opinion, the EU is free to use any semantic connotation when referring to its sanctions against 
Zimbabwe. Whether they are referred to as restrictive measures or targeted sanctions is 
inconsequential because the terms restrictive measures and “sanctions can be used 
interchangeably. What is important is to reflect on the practical implications of the policies 
on Zimbabwe and most importantly their impact on the well-being of the civilian population. 
The restrictive measures include freezing of assets and bank accounts owned by senior 
government officials and other entities enlisted on the sanctions list. 
 Ironically, despite sanctioning Zimbabwean beef and tobacco exports into the EU, 
which is Zimbabwe’s largest export market, the EU continues to represent their action as 
nothing near sanctions in the traditional sense. The EU argues that their restrictive measures 
are solely directed at targeted individuals propagating obnoxious policies on the Zimbabwean 
masses. They support their argument by stating that, unlike other institutions such as the IMF 
and the World Bank, they still provide development funds directly to the Zimbabwean people 
to counter any casualties (Masaka, 2012: 58). This to me suggests that the EU perceives its 
action simply as a shift in the structures distributing developmental aid or assistance. The EU 
resorted to use non-governmental organizations to provide developmental aid, instead of 
providing aid directly to the government. As Heather Chingono notes, the motive behind this 
action is to apply all possible measures to restrict and minimize the government’s access to 
funds. Also, it aims to reduce corruption and mismanagement of funds (Chingono, 2010: 67). 
On the contrary, the Zimbabwean government argues that the use of the term restrictive 
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measures is a publicity stunt utilized to hide the devastating and catastrophic nature of 
economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe (Chingono, 2010: 67-68).  
 I would argue that by banning Zimbabwe’s cocoa into the EU, the so called targeted 
sanctions or restrictive measure deviated from targeting a few individuals to ordinary 
civilians. EU ban on Zimbabwe cocoa deteriorated the country’s export performance, thereby 
exacerbating the plight of the already struggling ordinary Zimbabwean citizens. Furthermore, 
it automatically decreases Zimbabwe’s foreign earnings and invariably leads to a decline in 
the national income. It is important to note that most cocoa and livestock farmers in 
Zimbabwe are not government officials and their names are not enlisted in the EU sanctions 
list. However, they are indirectly targeted by sanctions as a result of EU bans on their 
products and means of livelihood. Sadly, the EU restrictive measures could not spare 
innocent Zimbabweans, not only because they have contributed in damaging the economy 
through suspension of project finances and cancellation of credit lines to Zimbabwe, but also 
because they have negatively affected the operations and activities of some key government 
institutions and business organizations that are crucial for the economic well-being of the 
country (Chingono 2010: 66-70). Therefore, the EU restrictive measures or targeted sanctions 
have ceased to be targeted, in that they have crossed the line and unfortunately drag the 
whole Zimbabwean populace into the targeted sanctions jigsaw (Masaka, 2012: 67). Such 
unfortunate realities undermine the utility of targeted sanctions. When targeted sanctions end 
up affecting the well-being of the civilian or unintended population, they cease to be targeted 
sanctions (Masaka, 2012: 67-68). It is against these points raised that I submit that the EU 
restrictive measures are in fact a comprehensive pack of economic sanctions.  
 However, on July 24, 2012 after a meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers in 
Brussels, the EU announced that they had lifted development aid restrictions imposed on 
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Zimbabwe a decade ago (Sibanda, 2012; Independent online News, 2012). Additionally, the 
EU pledged that it will send aid directly to Zimbabwe government starting from 2014, so as 
to improve living conditions of the Zimbabwean people (Matenga, 2012). Although the EU 
expressed magnanimity by pledging to support the population, yet there are discrepancies in 
understanding the terms used to refer its sanctions against Zimbabwe, bearing in mind the 
ultimate nature of the sanctions. The point here is that the lack of proper definition of its 
actions and measures against Zimbabwe has rendered the prospects for re-engagement 
(dialogue and resolution) unpromising. It is disheartening that the EU and the US 
governments consider their restrictive measures and targeted sanctions as the only means to 
enforce democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe. The government of Zimbabwe perceives 
itself as being penalized for a decent cause of fare redistribution of their land amongst the 
once marginalized black population (Derman, 2006; Chingono, 2010: 66-70). This is not to 
deny the brutality of the regime in Zimbabwe or to suggest that the land reform agenda was 
done to bridge economic disparity between the Zimbabwean white farmers and their black 
counterparts, when it is well known that its purpose was to avenge what the regime regards as 
post-independence colonization of their lands. Even at that, Britain’s response to the land 
reform policies, which includes imposing sanctions against Zimbabwe and rallying its allies 
to impose similar sanctions shows that Britain and its allies (the US and EU) are not 
necessarily concerned about the well-being of the Zimbabwean population, rather it cares 
about its own interest. Therefore, one can argue that the use of sanctions against Zimbabwe is 
a new form of legalized and continued colonization of the country. The Mugabe regime 
claims that sanctions imposed on them by Britain are purely out of witch-hunt resulting from 
the regime’s land reform policy (Fowale 2010: 7). In making this claim, the government of 
Zimbabwe refers to a statement made by Howard French, who served as an ambassador of 
the United States to Zimbabwe between 2004 and 2007. In his comment, French states, 
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“Everyone felt that they had invested something to the success of Zimbabwe, so when it all 
started unraveling, everyone felt personally disappointed” (Fowale 2010: 9).  
 This statement is believed to be a great betrayal of the hidden agenda of Britain and 
the United States because it sheds light on the truth behind their sanctions on Zimbabwe. 
Based on the statement above, the government of Zimbabwe insists that Britain and its allies 
want to continue colonizing their country through unfair land allocation to white farmers at 
the expense of the black Zimbabwean population. In line with the regimes argument, Fowale 
notes, “there is nothing that President Mugabe has done which is so strange in the continent; 
plunder, torture, corruption, ethnic politics, mismanagement, election rigging and state 
brutality thrives in the continent with the support of the same great powers of the West who 
cry foul over Zimbabwe” (Fowale, 2010: 9). In summary, the EU sanctions against Zimbabwe 
possess elements of economic sanctions. The ban on the importation of Zimbabwean cocoa 
into the EU is an example of how the so-called restrictive measures affect the ordinary 
citizens whom they were supposed to remedy.  
3.4. General Impact of economic sanctions on Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans 
 The economic situation of Zimbabwe has deteriorated to such an extent that one is 
forced to ask what has caused the shift in Zimbabwe’s once stable economy to a spectacular 
collapse.  The US, the EU, scholars and political analysts have provided different reasons for 
the present economic nightmare in Zimbabwe. Among the issues cited are Mugabe’s land 
policies, endemic corruption, Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) war, absence of the rule of law, and most importantly, ill-conceived economic policies 
(Hove, 2012: 74). Other reasons provided are President Mugabe’s political intolerance, 
electoral fraud and gross human rights abuses by the regime in Zimbabwe. Undoubtedly, 
each one of these often-cited factors contributes or provides an explanation to Zimbabwe’s 
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current economic woes. However, an important issue is missing, which I would argue has a 
significant contribution to Zimbabwe’s present economic dilemma. Western countries, 
political/economic analysts and the media almost collectively ignore the implication of 
economic sanctions when assessing the country’s economic collapse. In fact, economic 
sanctions imposed by the US, the EU, Canada and Australia against Zimbabwe are often a 
missing factor when addressing the causes of Zimbabwe’s present economic situation. I 
consider it imprecise as well as misleading to exclude the impact of sanctions when analysing 
Zimbabwe’s present economic demise. 
 As I stated earlier, the US and the EU often argue that their sanctions against 
Zimbabwe are not economic in nature; rather, they submit that they are smart sanctions, 
targeted specifically on ZANU-PF loyalists. This argument obscures the reality that 
Zimbabwe’s economic woes are largely a result of a concerted and systematic campaign to 
effect regime change through an economic implosion. As Chenga (2009: 6) notes, the general 
perception of members of ZANU-PF is that sanctions were designed to induce suffering on 
Zimbabweans so that they would turn against their government, particularly through the 
ballot box, thereby bringing about a change of government. Arguments upholding that 
Mugabe is evil, brutal and a dictator who needs to be removed from office are not in question 
here. However, I do put into question and problematize removing him from office by 
precipitating the collapse of Zimbabwe’s economy through economic sanctions. As noted 
earlier, through the enactment of ZIDERA, Zimbabwe’s access to finance and credit facilities 
within the multilateral financial institutions were effectively incinerated (Chingono, 2010: 
66).  
 The suggestion that Zimbabwe’s economy is what it is because of mismanagement is 
partly true, but at the same time misleading. Scholars such as Tungwarara (2011: 112) and 
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Western politicians often retort that Zimbabwe’s ability to borrow from the IMF and the 
World Bank was restricted due to the country’s inability to pay-up previous loans from these 
institutions. This argument is however disingenuous as it ignores the other more vicious 
consequences of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act on the economy of 
Zimbabwe. It is not disputed here that Zimbabwe should pay its debts, including money that 
it owes the IMF. However, taking into consideration the circumstances of Zimbabwe’s 
financial crisis, it is immoral for the IMF to insist on the payment of its debt or face expulsion 
from the institution for non-payment. Furthermore, Zimbabwe is in an economic limbo with 
critical foreign currency shortages, high unemployment levels and crippling inflation rates. 
Sanctions on Zimbabwe have not incited the people to force the regime out of power. Instead, 
they have become a propaganda tool for the regime to draw sympathy within and outside 
Zimbabwe. Thus it reinvigorates “rally around the flag” effect (Galtung, 1967: 393). Galtung 
uses the term “rally around the flag” in effect to argue that leaders in target nations could use 
the economic pain caused by sanctions to rally their population in opposition to those that 
impose sanctions on them. In order to convey my findings, I utilize graphical illustrations. 
The use of graphs and tables is an analytical method that allows me to provide explicit and 
critical analysis of the impact of sanctions on different sectors and areas of Zimbabwe’s 
economy.  
3.4.1. Effects of sanctions on Zimbabwe’s economy and rights of civilians 
 Thus far, I have argued that economic sanctions have adverse effects on the civilian 
population of a target State or territory. However, the degree of effect depends on the survival 
capability of the individual, which in most cases has to do with their social class. Although 
sanctions imposing countries or organizations claim not to target the entire population, reality 
shows that sanctions often cross their limit. line with the above proposition, former US 
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Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asserts that, “When the United Nations or the United 
States imposes sanctions against a regime; it does not intend to create unnecessary hardships 
for the innocent people, especially children and infants. Good intentions, however, do not 
automatically translate into good results” (Albright, 2000: 155). 
 In spite of the fact that the use of economic sanctions has been challenged by scholars 
such as Mary Kaldor, David Cortright and many others, there is as yet no empirical strategy 
to measure accurately the magnitude of its humanitarian consequences. The Unilateral 
Declarations of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948), the Charter of the United Nations 
(United Nations, 1945) and other international covenants guarantee and attempt to protect the 
basic rights of every individual, such as the right to life and good quality of life, right to 
quality healthcare, right to education and other basic needs. However, international human 
rights laws have not significantly challenged economic sanctions as a means of violating 
human rights. Although agreements in the Charter of the United Nations and the Unilateral 
Declarations of Human Rights specify limits to the use and permissible impact of economic 
sanctions, these limits are hampered by a lack of data on the manner and degree to which 
sanctions affect the core human rights and a result this thesis intends to explore this gap in 
information in this chapter. 
 As Richard Garfield notes, against the provision of humanitarian exemption for basic 
needs such as food and medicine, all economic sanctions episodes are characterized by 
capital shortages and a subsequent limitation in the importation of consumption and 
investment goods (Garfield, 1999). It is thus entirely not possible to isolate the sum of the 
effects of economic sanctions on health and nutrition from its effects on the economy as a 
whole. This is because transportation, energy, and inflation affect access to food, health 
services and other essential goods. In the specific case of Zimbabwe presented below, I 
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examine the effects of economic sanctions on the human rights of Zimbabweans, also their 
impact on different sectors of Zimbabwe’s economy and by extension, their impact on the 
well-being of the civilian population.  
3.4.1.1. Right to healthcare 
 Economic collapse over the past decade has precipitated a growing exodus of 
professionals from Zimbabwe to other countries, particularly South Africa, Europe and the 
Americas in search of better economic opportunities (Feltoe, 2009: 6). Although the impact 
of migration is felt by other sectors of the Zimbabwean economy, the health sector is the 
most affected (Gutsa and Choguya, 2012: 442). Most professionals and semi‐skilled workers 
in the health sector have migrated in search of better employment opportunities. In 2002, the 
United Kingdom alone issued 2,346 work permits to nurses from Zimbabwe. Thus, 
Zimbabwe is the fourth largest supplier of overseas nurses to the United Kingdom, after the 
Philippines, India and South Africa (Chikanda, 2005: 1). A research conducted by the 
Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) on health professionals leaving Zimbabwe in 
2002 reveals that 54 percent of the respondent cited economic factors as a major reason for 
leaving Zimbabwe (Feltoe, 2009: 6-8). As of December 2008, the overall vacancy rate in 
Zimbabwe’s public health sector was 32 percent, while general medical practitioners, medical 
equipment engineers, environmental health officers and healthcare programmers stands at 60 
percent, 48 percent, 79 percent and 79 percent respectively (International Organization for 
Migration, 2009: 8). A report published in December 2008 by the Ministry of Health and 
Child Welfare shows that Zimbabwe has 1.7 health workers per 1000 people. This is far 
below the World Health Organization (WHO) Africa regional average of 2.6 per 1000 
people. The shortage of staff gives a gloomy picture of Zimbabwe’s doctor patient ratio of 
0.16 doctors per 1000 people compared to 0.22 doctors per 1000 patients in Africa on 
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average (Gutsa and Choguya, 2012: 445). As of January 2009, the University of Zimbabwe, 
College of Health Sciences had an average vacancy rate of 50 percent, while the National 
University of Science and Technology’s medical school had an average vacancy rate of 51 
percent (International Organization for Migration, 2009: 8). As a result, the range of courses 
offered at the two institutions has reduced, suggesting that the quality of education received 
by Zimbabwean medical professionals has been compromised. In March 2009, the 
Government of Zimbabwe published a document entitled, “The Short Term Emergency 
Recovery Programme” (STERP), with the theme “Getting Zimbabwe Moving Again.” The 
document acknowledged the many problems bedevilling the health sector. They include a 
sharp decrease in funding for the health sector, leading to loss of experienced health 
professionals and deterioration of infrastructures, shortages of drugs and a drastic decline in 
the quality of public health services (Government of Zimbabwe (2009: 24). STERP notes that 
high vacancy rates in the health sector leads to overburdening of remaining staff in the sector 
and thus it compromises the quality of service rendered to patients. Consequently, there is a 
rising challenge in dealing with diseases such as malaria, cholera, tuberculosis and 
particularly HIV/AIDS which has the highest mortality rate in Zimbabwe (Government of 
Zimbabwe, 2009: 24).  
 In a situation such as the one in Zimbabwe, there are some pertinent questions to ask: 
first, how did Zimbabwe’s healthcare sector deteriorate to its present condition. Second, what 
factor(s) prompted the present collapse of the health sector? After independence, providing 
adequate healthcare services to the population was among the major policy goals of the 
Zimbabwean government. Consequently, the government developed a road map or 
framework to achieve what it termed “health for all by year 2000” (Duri; Stray-Pedersen and 
Muller, 2013: 16). It started with the construction of more than 240 new health centers and 
renovation of about 500 already existing centers. The government approach and strategy 
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became very successful that about 85 percent of the population lived within 10 kilometers of 
a health care facility (Duri; Stray-Pedersen and Muller, 2013: 16-17). As a result, life 
expectancy, maternal and infant mortalities improved significantly. Unfortunately, these 
achievements were short-lived due to economic challenges arising mostly from sanctions. 
Maternal mortality rate went up from 283 in 1994 to 960 deaths per 100000 live births in 
2010 (Musizvingoza, 2014: 4). Infant mortality rate increased from 50 per 1000 live births 
recorded in 1990 to 57 per 1000 in 2010, while mortality rate among adults shoot up from 
286 per 1,000 in 1990 to 751 per 1000 in 2006 (Duri; Stray-Pedersen and Muller, 2013: 17). 
Obviously, this dramatic decline in health statistics was as a result of diminished access to 
healthcare services, brain-drain resulting from migration of medical professionals, closures of 
government funded hospitals and outrageous medical costs associated with foreign currency 
shortages. More worrisome is the substantial decline of the average life expectancy at birth 
from 60 years in 1990 to about 40 years in 2006 (Musizvingoza, 2014: 3-4). Malnutrition 
resulting from food insecurities and HIV prevalence are the major factors that precipitated the 
decline of life expectancy. Sadly, the impact of economic sanctions has made it impossible to 
checkmate these anomalies. With about 15 percent of the population living with HIV (World-
bulletin, 2015), Zimbabwe is being ravaged by one of the most deadly epidemics in the 
world. Therefore, the country deserves support and assistance from donor agencies at-least 
for the sake of saving humanity.   
 Unfortunately, Zimbabwe has been unable to access funds needed for prevention and 
treatment of HIV from the Global Fund. On November 28, 2004, the Kaiser Networks’ Daily 
Reports and AFP News Agency reported that Zimbabwe’s grant application for funding its 
HIV/AIDS programmes were denied for political reasons. In the backdrop of the 
aforementioned, Zimbabweans have found it increasingly more difficult to access affordable 
healthcare services; particularly antiretroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS patients. This situation 
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was confirmed during my interview. According to a HIV patient who identified himself 
simply as Garikai:  
[…] initially I was getting antiretroviral drugs in the government hospital in 
Gokwe, but it is no longer possible. I was told there are no drugs available. I 
was referred to a private pharmacy here in Harare where I can buy the drugs. 
Imagine I paid $34 for the drugs apart from my transportation fare. Since I 
have no job, it is certain that I will stop my medication in the near future 
unless the drugs are made available again in my district hospital […] 
(interview with Garikai in Harare, on 14
th
 July, 2014).  
 In addition, sanctions had led to the suspension and in some cases an outright 
cancellation of partnership and/or support programs from international donor agencies to the 
Zimbabwean healthcare sector. The action taken by these donor agencies which is prompted 
by sanctions has put the health of the population in dire condition. For example, in April 
1997, the Swedish Government founded a health initiative through “The Health Sector 
Support Programme” and funded to the tune of SEK 50 million, equivalent of US$6.4 million 
(Gono, 2012: 5). The objective of the programme was to improve water and sanitation, to 
improve education and living condition of disabled people in Zimbabwe society and also to 
prevent the spread of HIV and other related diseases. As a result of the EU sanctions on 
Zimbabwe, in 2002 the Swedish government suspended the fund (Gono, 2012: 14). Ordinary 
citizens, who did not in any way contribute to the reasons for the sanctions, suffered the 
consequences of the suspension. Also, the Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA) suspended its Health Sector Support Programme valued at DKK 235 million 
(US$ 29.7 million). The programme was established in May 2000 to supports healthcare 
services in rural areas through the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare (MOHCW). The 
programme aimed to integrate Zimbabwe Essential Drugs Action Program (ZEDAP) to 
national laboratories and also to establish a Health Information System and Health Services 
Fund Transport Management. The Danish Government suspended this programme without 
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providing any other programme to replace it (Gono, 2012: 14). I am not suggesting that it is 
the responsibility of any State to provide support or aid to another, however history have 
shown that States depend on each other’s support and partnership for development and 
growth. Obviously, it is the responsibility of every State to provide basic healthcare services 
to its population and Zimbabwe is not an exemption. My point here is that sanctions have 
denied the population of the health benefits they initially enjoyed from healthcare 
programmes sponsored by donor agencies and unfortunately at a time when the government 
is unable to provide a replacement or alternative. Conclusively, sanctions have “tied the 
hands” of the government in providing quality healthcare to the population and as a result 
their right to quality healthcare has been breached. Apart from rights violation, Hove (2012: 
80) notes that, sanctions became Zimbabwe’s major barrier to meeting the 2010 Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) which aimed at combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
ensuring improvement in maternal health and decline in child mortality rate. 
3.4.1.2. Right to education 
Education is a fundamental right; it is a road to the accomplishment of an 
individual’s ambition as well as a medium for socialization of societal norms 
and values from one generation to the next. Furthermore, education is the 
nerve centre for community and economic development of the country. 
Schools remain the fundamental systems for the provision of access to 
education therefore any meddling in their running disrupts the discharge of 
their responsibilities (Hove, 2012: 80).  
 Owing to the imposition of sanctions, the Zimbabwean government could barely fund 
its public schools registered under the Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture. 
Consequently educational environment, teaching and learning facilities and mostly teachers’ 
conditions of service deteriorated alarmingly (Hove, 2012: 80). Many of the teachers’ 
abandoned the public schools for private ones, while others migrated to other countries 
mostly to neighboring Botswana and South Africa looking for better opportunities. As of 
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January 2009, only 6 percent of public schools in the rural areas were open (Hove, 2012: 80). 
Considering that primary education is compulsory and free according to UNESCO 
recommendation, however, the closure of most of the public primary schools in rural parts of 
Zimbabwe have denied a segment of the population the opportunity to acquire education. In 
my opinion, the situation mentioned above imposes restriction on the personal mobility of the 
affected pupil and also violate their rights to education. The gap created by the government’s 
inability to sustain a broad education system in the formal institutions has been filled by 
individual businessmen who provide alternative private schools. The upsurge of unequipped 
private schools across Zimbabwe has become a big challenge to quality education. These 
“unofficial learning establishments” as the Zimbabwean government chose to call them are 
mostly organised in private homes, churches and town halls (Hove, 2012: 80). Despite their 
disapproval by the government, the fact is that private schools are trending in Zimbabwe 
simply because they are filling a gap created by inordinate policies of the government and the 
impact of sanctions. Going by Mediel Hove’s account, there used to 524 registered 
independent training colleges in Zimbabwe but thousands had sprouted over the last few 
years (Hove, 2012: 80-81). The obvious concern about Zimbabwe’s growing unofficial 
learning establishments is that the quality of education they offer is questionable. 
 Another factor affecting education is massive migration caused by the unprecedented 
levels of unemployment and instability in the educational sector (Hove, 2012: 83). Mass 
exodus of teachers from public schools, caused by poor numeration and unpaid salary arrears 
has endangered the opportunity of kids from poor homes and family background to gain 
education, since they cannot afford to join private schools or to go abroad for education. 
From what I saw on ground in Zimbabwe, I will add that, sanctions contributed to the present 
plight of Zimbabweans, where education is gradually becoming something that only the rich 
can afford. Apart from that, Zimbabwean societies are unwittingly divided into affluent rich 
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population that can afford education and enjoy better opportunities in the future and poor 
uneducated population whose chances and opportunities of being successful is limited and 
dicey.  
 Furthermore, the high rate of inflation has added to the problems and challenges faced 
by the population in getting education. In January 2009, the government suspended the 
Zimbabwean Dollar due to it became worthless and replaced it with US Dollar and South 
African Rand (Noko, 2011: 349). Unfortunately, Zimbabweans living in the rural villages did 
not have access to these foreign currencies. As a result, people who live in the rural areas 
engaged in trade by barter as a means of exchange. One of the respondents during my 
interview confirmed that in some villages, “students had to pay their school enrolment and 
fees in kind using valuables other than cash such as sugar beans, cows, goats, fowl, wheat, 
maize and other household items” (interview with Kudakwashe, Tofara in Gwai- 
Matabeleland on 24
th
 July, 2014). Such a situation is unimaginable in the 21st century, 
particularly when the people are engaging in this practice as a result of a situation to which 
they never subscribed. 
  Furthermore, sanctions have also affected support programmes provided by foreign 
donors to Zimbabwe’s educational sector. For example, the Swedish government in 1996 
established the Education Sector Support Programme, which was funded to the tune of SEK 
95 million (US$13.9 million) by the Swedish government (Hove, 2012: 80). The programme 
supplied textbooks and other educational materials to Zimbabwe schools. Also, it constructed 
school buildings and promoted gender equality in educational systems in Zimbabwe. After 
the EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe, the Swedish government withdrew funding for this 
project (Gono, 2007: 105-106). The suspension of this project by the Swedish government 
has created more hardship for families who will now provide school materials for their 
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children even under terrible economic situations prevailing in their country. Also, the US and 
the EU sanctions against Zimbabwe have a negative impact on the accessibility of technology 
in the universities and other institutions of higher learning within Zimbabwe. As Gideon 
Gono, Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe notes, “The sanctions imposed on 
Zimbabwe by the West, has thus spilled over to the country’s institutions of higher learning, 
by affecting their ability to procure modern technology, critical for learning purposes” 
(Gono, 2007: 104). Thus, the situation in Zimbabwe as of the time of writing this thesis 
shows that the population’s rights to education have been violated whilst education has 
become a preserve of the rich. Given this scenario, my submission will be that though 
Western sanctions do affect the targeted group, it is the civilian population that is hit hardest 
as their basic rights are terribly violated. 
3.4.1.3. Right to life and quality of life 
 On August 27, 2012 the World Food Programme (WFP) released its report on 
Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment (ZimVAC). ZimVAC is an annual study conducted by 
the Government of Zimbabwe in collaboration with UN agencies and non-governmental 
organizations in order to estimate national food insecurity levels. The report states that in 
2013, over 1.6 million Zimbabweans will need food assistance (OCHA, 2012: 1). In response 
to the food insecurity in Zimbabwe, the UN agency launched a food aid operation in 
conjunction with the government and other stakeholders to provide a combination of food 
distribution and the provision of other relief materials. The WFP budget estimates that it 
would cost approximately $119 million to tackle food shortages in Zimbabwe between 
January and March 2014 alone (OCHA, 2012: 1). This is problematic and ironic considering 
that Zimbabwe used to be the food basket of Africa. The inability of Zimbabwe to access 
foreign finances from multilateral financial institutions, coupled with suspension of 
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agricultural projects financed by EU member States contributed immensely to Zimbabwe’s 
shift from a high agricultural production country to a situation of food insecurity and 
dependency (Gono, 2007: 95). According to Gideon Gono, the government of Zimbabwe 
inability to access necessary finances from the IMF, the World Bank and African 
Development Bank to finance its agricultural sector is due to the US sanctions imposed 
through the enactment of ZIDERA (Gono, 2007: 95). Also, drought experienced in some 
parts of Zimbabwe within the last decade added to the problem. Another important factor that 
added to this problem is the land reform policy of the Zimbabwean government. The land 
reform policy enabled the government to re-allocate farmlands to black farmers that lack the 
financial capacity to utilize the farmlands allocated to them. Unfortunately, the government 
was unable to provide loans to these farmers due to shortage of funds availability to the 
government. The inability of the government to get foreign financing or new lines of credit 
exacerbated the situations. Thus, Zimbabwe switched from Africa’s food basket to one of the 
world’s food aid recipients. It is unfair that today many Zimbabweans survive by begging or 
waiting for food distributions from donor agencies.  
  Following the controversial land reform programme of the regime, Zimbabwe’s 
agricultural sector suffered a huge set back owing to the fact that most foreign partnership 
and international support programmes that assisted the agricultural sector were suspended. 
Thus, the government became solely responsible for providing support and finance to the 
sector and farmers in general. Consequently, the government implemented changes in its 
agricultural policies. For example, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) became 
responsible for providing finance for sourcing inputs and mechanisation equipment while 
policy on grains shifted to State controlled markets (Gono, 2007). The government argued 
that State controlled markets will ensure and/or guarantee food self-sufficiency while keeping 
prices low for consumers. Other interventionist policies of the government include the 
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reconstitution of Grain Marketing Act, which made private grain trade illegal and thus led to 
the suspension of the Zimbabwe Agricultural Commodity Exchange (Kapoor; Mugwara and 
Chidavaenzi, 1997: 26). This paradigm shift from market liberalisation policy to market 
control dispensation played a role in reversing the gains made in the agricultural sector 
(Anseeuw; Kapuya and Saruchera, 2012: 25). Apart from grains, similar controls were 
extended to other agricultural products such as beef and tobacco.   
Nonetheless, despite corruption, mismanagement and bad policies of the government, 
the suspension of aid by donor agencies had a significant impact on the agricultural sector 
and invariably the quality of life of the ordinary citizens that benefited from these projects 
(Gono, 2007: 110). The agricultural sector prior to sanctions had received support from donor 
agencies. Although foreign support or aid cannot substitute the role of government in 
building its economy, however, they contributed to the growth experienced in agricultural 
production in Zimbabwe prior to sanctions. An example is the Agricultural Sector 
Programme financed by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). The 
project was established in the 1990’s and funded by Danish government to the tune of DKK 
98.6 million an equivalent of US$ 15.4 million (Gono, 2007: 103). Its objectives were to 
improve forestry extension services, development of a market information system in 
Zimbabwe, improvement of household income through direct farming support, establishment 
of an agricultural policy and provisions of irrigation to smallholder or peasant farmers (Gono, 
2007: 103-104). The agricultural sector programme of DANIDA became a success by 
providing funding and agricultural materials such as pesticide and fertilizer to rural farmers. 
Most significant is the financial and material support the project provided for rural women. 
The soft loan programme of DANIDA provided the opportunity for women to engage in 
livestock and food crop production (Gono, 2007: 103). This boosted food production in the 
rural areas to the extent that most rural populations were sufficient with the crops and 
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livestock’s they produce and even exported part of their harvest to external markets and 
consumers. Furthermore, the agricultural sector programme of DANIDA made it possible for 
women to have access to farm lands, which were initially allocated to the men alone. In 
essence, DANIDA agricultural sector programmes in Zimbabwe provided an opportunity for 
social and economic integration of women in Zimbabwe. Thus these donor programmes 
improved the quality of lives of the rural women by offering them empowerment packages 
and incentives. Additionally, it combated food insecurity and reduced rural poverty (Gono, 
2007: 104). Consequently, Zimbabwe moved from an internal consumption economy to a 
market economy. Unfortunately, this programme was suspended due to sanctions, resulting in 
a lost opportunity to enhance food security. 
In my opinion, the struggle for survival, growing poverty and hardship resulting from 
the collapse or near collapse of Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector cannot be blamed on 
sanctions alone. Instead, a combination of bad government policies and decisions, corruption 
and mismanagement, lack of agricultural loan and support from MFI’s and the suspension of 
aid by Western donors contributed in one way or another to the present state of the sector. 
Therefore, I would argue that sanctions played a major role in the present food insecurities 
that threaten the quality of life of Zimbabweans. The impact and/or outcomes of sanctions as 
detailed above have complicated the living conditions of the population that it was meant to 
alleviate. Although persistent droughts in parts of Zimbabwe played a role in food shortages 
in the country, however, lack of foreign finances and support particularly of the MFI’s made 
it impossible for the government to initiate mitigation measures. Thus, sanctions glaringly 
threaten the right to quality of life of Zimbabweans 
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3.4.1.3.1. Inflation 
 The economy of Zimbabwe has experienced high rates of inflation since 2006. The 
cancellation of loans and other forms of finances by the IMF, the World Bank and the 
African Development Bank resulted in the inability of the government to satisfy demands for 
finances. Consequently, the government was pressured by a rapid growing domestic demand 
for finances. In an effort to curtail this pressure and to solve domestic financial needs, the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe printed Zimbabwean dollars excessively, thus leading to high 
currency circulation within the economy. Consequently, the country was ravaged by inflation, 
the situation gradually deteriorated, until in 2008 when the country hyper inflated (Hanke, 
2008). Inflation rates in Zimbabwe recorded 50 percent per month in 2007 (ibid). By the end 
of 2008, the Zimbabwean dollar had become worthless (Hyman, 2011). Despite all this, the 
extent of inflation was still unclear, due to the absence of official data concerning money 
supply and inflation rates. The situation left analysts overwhelmed, as there was no official 
data to analyse the extent of the inflation. In an attempt to solve this myth, Steve Hanke of the 
Cato Institute developed the “Hanke Hyperinflation Index for Zimbabwe” (HHIZ) in 2008. 
Hanke used metrics derived from market-based price data for the period of January 2007 to 
November 2008 to explain the inflation rate in Zimbabwe. In Hanke’s analysis, Zimbabwe’s 
daily inflation rate stands at 98.0  percent while the prices of goods doubled every 24.7 hours 
in late 2008 (Hanke, 2008). He concluded that Zimbabwe’s annual inflation rate was 89.7 
Sextillion percent. Thus, Zimbabwe became the first country to hyper inflate in the 21st 
century (Hanke and Kwok, 2009: 353). As noted earlier, due to the high level of inflation, the 
government of Zimbabwe suspended the use of the Zimbabwean dollar and declared the US 
dollar and the South African Rand as the official legal tender. The impact of inflation and the 
consequent suspension of the Zimbabwean dollar have created a striking problem for many 
people that live in the rural areas. The nonchalant attitude of the government in making 
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available the US dollar and South African Rand to people living in the rural areas have made 
exchange of goods and services extremely difficult, whilst trade by barter became available 
alternative.  
 In a situation such as this, where the civilian populations are experiencing untold 
hardships due to a lack of means of exchange, it is difficult to exonerate the vicious impact 
and/or contribution of the US and the EU sanctions from such regretful challenges faced by 
the population, mostly by the poor and the vulnerable. It is accurate to argue that Zimbabwe’s 
economy is being ravaged by inflation due to ill-conceived policies by the government and 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. However, I would point out that it is important for us to 
acknowledge that the government decision to print money was an effort to solve a problem 
created by sanctions. Therefore, sanctions against Zimbabwe partly contributed to the 
inflation ravaging the economy. Unfortunately, inflation has no capacity to distinguish 
between the individuals sanctioned and the ordinary Zimbabwean, instead it has complicated 
the living standard and condition of the entire population. Today Zimbabweans are hit by 
drought, HIV/AIDS and economic meltdown while hunger and poverty are a daily reality for 
majority of the population. 
3.4.2. Multilateral financial institutions funding and their impact on well-being 
  Due to the US and the EU sanctions on Zimbabwe, multilateral financial institutions 
have isolated the country. Since 2002, it has been impossible for the country to access funds 
or financial leverage from these multilateral financial institutions (Chingono, 2010). In 
compliance with the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA), 
multilateral institutions cancelled their balance of payment (BOP) support for Zimbabwe 
(Gono, 2008: 95). In addition, the MFI’s suspended all technical assistance to Zimbabwe. 
Furthermore, the IMF disfranchised the country and also declared it ineligible to access 
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financial resources from the fund (Chingono, 2010: 67). Table 2 below illustrates cash flow 
from multilateral institutions to Zimbabwe from 1980 through 2010. The table demonstrates 
that since 2001, multilateral financial institutions (the IMF, World Bank and African 
Development Bank) have not disbursed any finances to the government of Zimbabwe. A 
situation such as this is problematic because the government will not be able to finance its 
domestic projects or even provide basic needs for its citizens. My main argument here is, by 
not providing finances to Zimbabwe, it is difficult to accept that the US sanctions are 
targeted, particularly when ZIDERA states that all multilateral financial institutions (MFI’s) 
should sever all forms of financial assistance and support to the government of Zimbabwe. 
Additionally, a scenario such as this one can be manipulated and used by the government to 
vindicate itself from bad economic policies. This is possible when we consider the fact that a 
government of an economically poor country like Zimbabwe can hardly perform or provide 
for its citizens without foreign finances and support. In order to provide a clearer explanation, 
I analyse the consequences of lack of finances, loans and guarantee from each of these MFI’s 
to Zimbabwe. 
Table 2: Cash flow from multilateral institutions into Zimbabwe  
YEAR IMF WORLD BANK AFDB 
1980 0 0 0 
1981 0 104,917,535.8 0 
1982 0 45,478,573.51 25,342,914.53 
1983 0 133,760,761.05 57,22,913.63 
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1984 2, 058,441.00 36,467,113.09 0 
1985 0 9,668,219.07 67,768,983.37 
1986 0 10,000,000.0 0 
1987 0 0 0 
1988 0 130,121,817.97 28,612,977.32 
1989 0 0 19,286,995.95 
1990 0 127,243,010.98 145,027,034.56 
1991 0 62,386,243.86 15,218,604.29 
1992 216,150,000.00 299,592,641.86 180,428,222.49 
1993 65,656,168.00 226.810,152.15 3,966,823.47 
1994 76,642,125.00 0 11,090,644.2 
1995 75,492,900.00 0 11,686,232.22 
1996 0 323,99,074.25 0 
1997 0 4,037,287.79 1,940,910,99 
1998 53,802,392.00 5,796,928.56 39,074.27 
1999 32,233,993.40 88,856,697.27 0 
2000 0 0 0 
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2001 0 30,526,725.67 0 
2002 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 
2009 0 0 0 
2010 0 0 0 
TOTAL 522,036,019.4 1,348,062,782.39 524,789,416.76 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and Ministry of Finance and Gono 2007: 86 
3.4.2.1. African Development Bank (AfDB) 
  The African Development Bank was established in 1964 with a mandate to promote 
economic and social development in Africa. The bank provides loans and grants to African 
governments and private companies investing in the regional member countries (RMCs) in 
Africa (Fahim, 2010: 146). The bank has four principal functions. First, it provides 
investment loans and equity to regional member countries to enhance their economic and 
social growth. Second, it supports member countries with technical assistance required for 
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project development and execution. Third, it provides and promotes investment of public and 
private capital for development purposes. Fourth, it coordinates development policies and 
plans of RMCs (Bala, 2012: 119-123). Furthermore, the AfDB is required to give special 
attention to national and multinational projects and programs that promote regional 
integration (ibid).  
 Based on its responsibility, the AfDB commenced operations in Zimbabwe in 1982, 
shortly after the country’s independence from Britain. Since then, it has approved and carried 
out a total of 24 development projects in Zimbabwe (see Figure 4). On May 2001, the bank 
issued a statement that it was suspending all lending operations to Zimbabwe. The reason 
cited was Zimbabwe’s debt to the bank. However, the AfDB specified that they will suspend 
normal lending operations, but will give support to Zimbabwe through capacity building 
activities (Gono, 2007). This decision of the AfDB to suspend lending operations to 
Zimbabwe has created a considerable amount of debate and disagreement among scholars 
and analysts. The government of Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF and some other political analysts 
argue that the suspension of lending operations to Zimbabwe by the AfDB is unconnected to 
debt. They support this argument by highlighting the fact that other countries that owe arrears 
to the bank are not sanctioned as is Zimbabwe. Despite the disagreement of the reason why 
AfDB suspended its lending operation to Zimbabwe, I would argue that the suspension of 
lending operations to Zimbabwe by the AfDB has had its own toll on the country's economic 
and development collapse. According to Robertson (2003: 17), before sanctions against 
Zimbabwe the country experienced an increase in loan inflows from an average of US$134.3 
million in the 1980’s to US$480.3 million in the 1990’s, thereby providing opportunity for 
economic growth. As a result of the US and the EU sanctions on Zimbabwe, loan inflows to 
the country declined to an average of US$49.3 million between 2000 and 2010. 
Consequently, Zimbabwe’s industries find it extremely difficult to access funds from the 
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international financial market or even to access lines of credit from companies abroad. The 
effect of this on Zimbabwean businesses is that they have to pay cash before they can import 
goods or raw materials. In addition, it forces private companies in Zimbabwe to secure 
offshore funds at prohibitively high interest rates due to a perceived risk premium 
(Robertson, 2003: 17-18). The resultant effect is that many Zimbabwean companies have to 
liquidate and this resulted in high unemployment level. Unarguably, unemployment creates 
poverty, while poverty affects the well-being of the people. In addition, the AfDB loan 
cancellation to Zimbabwe has had an impact on the country’s agricultural sector. As detailed 
in the previous section of this chapter, Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector and production suffers 
serious setbacks due to lack of funds required for improved or large scale productions. The 
diagram (figure 5) below shows that Zimbabwe received huge financial support from the 
African Development Bank in the 1980’s and 1990’s. In this period the country experienced 
considerable boosts in its agricultural productivity (Gono, 2007: 90). The AfDB made funds 
available that were used to develop the agricultural sector and provide loans to farmers. As a 
result of the US sanctions, AfDB has not disbursed any funds to Zimbabwe since 2000, thus 
putting the country’s agricultural sector and the people’s well-being in stagnant danger. 
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Figure 5: Average Annual AfDB Disbursements 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
3.4.2.2. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
 Due to Zimbabwe’s debt payment overdue, the IMF suspended technical assistance to 
Zimbabwe on grounds of non-cooperation on June 14, 2001 (Gono, 2007: 87). Subsequently, 
on September 25, 2001, the country was declared ineligible to borrow funds from the IMF. 
Despite these difficulties resulting directly from IMF actions, the IMF suspended 
Zimbabwe’s voting rights on June 6, 2003 (IMF, 2003). At the same time, it threatened to 
suspend outright the country from the fund, thus exacerbating the country’s economic 
situation. In response to the threat and other difficulties resulting from the IMF actions, 
Zimbabwe managed to clear most of its debt with the IMF, valued at US$193 million in 
February 2006 (The Zimbabwean Pundit, 2006; Gono, 2007: 87). Unfortunately, after 
repayment of the debt, which was the main reason cited for the IMF sanctions against the 
country, the IMF maintained its sanctions against Zimbabwe (Gono, 2007: 88).  
 
 
 275 
 
 Additionally, in 2009, the G20 group of countries decided that the IMF should create 
and allocate US$290 billion amongst the IMF’s 186 member countries. Zimbabwe’s share 
was US$520 million. Out of this amount, US$420 million was deposited into Zimbabwe’s 
account at the IMF. The IMF holds a further US$100 million in trust until Zimbabwe’s 
arrears to other international organizations are cleared (BBC, 2009; Ghana Pundit, 2009). Of 
the US$420 million, the Zimbabwean government withdrew US$150 million while the rest of 
the fund remains with the IMF. In an effort to have access to their balance, the government of 
Zimbabwe through the Finance Minister Tendai Biti informed the IMF on August 2011, to 
deduct the remaining US$270 million it owes the fund and make available the balance of 
US$100 million to the government (Sandu, 2011). Sadly, the IMF deducted the US$270 
million owed by Zimbabwe, but refused to release the balance of US$100 to the government 
of Zimbabwe.  
 The reason cited by the IMF for refusing to release the balance were the arrears owed 
to the World Bank and the African Development Bank by Zimbabwe. In my opinion this is 
“realpolitik” at work. Obviously, the IMF, the World Bank and the African Development 
bank are different financial institutions with different administrative strategies, policies and 
modes of operation. In addition, they do not share a common pulse. By citing arrears owed by 
Zimbabwe to other MFI’s for not releasing their balance, the IMF is exercising its powers 
unfairly on Zimbabwe. This action by the IMF raises a couple of questions for me. First, is 
the IMF insinuating that other MFI’s such as the World Bank and AfDB are incapable of 
drawing their own debts? Second, has the IMF turned to a debt recovery agency for other 
MFI’s? The decision of the IMF on Zimbabwe is very regretful, particularly when we 
consider that the main objective for establishing the IMF is to provide financial support to 
countries going through financial and economic difficulties. The action of the IMF has made 
it impossible for Zimbabwe to attain a positive balance of payment and as a result, the 
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government has abandoned most of its development and welfare programmes due to 
incapacity to finance them (Gono, 2007). Most importantly, it is now extremely difficult for 
Zimbabwe to access finances necessary for domestic capacity building. Below (figure 6) is a 
graphical illustration of the IMF fund disbursement to Zimbabwe between 1984 and 2010. 
The diagram reveals that Zimbabwe received a huge amount of financial support from the 
IMF in the 1990’s. In this period, Zimbabwe experienced economic growth and 
infrastructural development. However, since 2000 the IMF has stopped disbursing funds to 
the country, thereby hampering economic development. Obviously, it is the ordinary 
Zimbabwean citizens that bear the difficulties arising from the decision and action of the 
IMF. 
Figure 6: Average Annual IMF Disbursements (US$M) 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and Gono, 2007: 87. 
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3.4.2.3. World Bank 
 Zimbabwe’s past economic progress has been possible due to massive economic 
support from the World Bank (Gono, 2007: 88). The World Bank has provided in total 19 
loan batches to Zimbabwe. They include 5 International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) loan and another 14 International Development Association (IDA) 
loans, totaling about 1.55 billion (Gono, 2007: 88). However, after the enactment of ZIDERA 
by the US Congress in 2001, the bank suspended financial support to Zimbabwe. As noted 
earlier, ZIDERA requires the approval and permission of the President of the United States 
before the World Bank can grant any financial assistance to Zimbabwe. Consequently, the 
World Bank lending programme on Zimbabwe has become inactive and all IBRD loans and 
IDA credits are placed under non-accrual status (Gono, 2012: 14). Although the World Bank 
is not providing loans to Zimbabwe, it does provide technical assistance, focusing on food 
securities and microeconomic policies. By cancelling all loans and other financial assistance 
to Zimbabwe, it becomes evident that the World Bank joined the sanctions against 
Zimbabwe. The World Bank suspended its grants and infrastructural development flows to 
both the government of Zimbabwe and the private sector (Gono, 2012: 8). The decision of the 
IMF and the World Bank to refuse to disburse funds to the government of Zimbabwe deters 
the government from engaging in any significant development projects that will benefit its 
citizens. The impact on the macro-economic level is lethal to the entire population. 
 One of the consequences of the action of the World Bank is that Zimbabwe’s Balance 
of Payment (BOP) presently suffers a capital flight (Gono, 2012: 7-11). This means that the 
economy is running at a deficit and cannot provide any capital or development project to its 
citizens. Apart from this challenge, the action of the Word Bank has broad implications for 
the country’s ability to find fund sources elsewhere as it affects the decisions of other 
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bilateral creditors (Gono, 2012: 8). Donors such as the Paris Club followed suit by either 
scaling down or suspending disbursements on existing loans for both the Government and 
private businesses. Consequently, Zimbabwe lost almost all foreign financial leverage, thus 
making the country prone to an economic meltdown. The implication of this is that the 
government of Zimbabwe now finds it difficult to address its domestic responsibilities 
including payments of wages and salaries of workers. In my opinion, this may partly explain 
why many Zimbabwean professionals migrate out of the country for fear of not receiving 
their salaries. When we reflect on the purpose of establishing Multilateral Financial 
Institutions (MFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 
1945, it is evident that these institutions have deviated from their founding mandate. The 
MFI’s were essentially established to ensure international financial stability, through the 
provision of bridging finances to countries experiencing temporary Balance of Payments 
(BOP) difficulties. If we put into cognizance their actions on Zimbabwe, it becomes obvious 
that they have strayed from their core business and mandate. Below (figure 7) is a graphical 
illustration of the World Bank fund disbursement to Zimbabwe from 1984 to 2010. The 
diagram reveals that Zimbabwe received a significant amount of fund disbursement from the 
World Bank in the 1990’s. This period Zimbabwe experienced an economic boom. However, 
since the year 2000, the World Bank has not disbursed any funds to Zimbabwe. This type of 
situation raises doubts as to the real targets of the US and the EU sanctions.  
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Figure 7: Average Annual World Bank Disbursements (US$M) 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and Gono, 2007: 89. 
3.4.5. A Paradigm shift, Zimbabwe’s “looks East Policy” 
 As a result of sanctions, almost all financial corridors were locked against Zimbabwe. 
There was no access to international finance, most partnership between the Zimbabwean 
government and Western countries and cooperation particularly; the US and the EU were 
severed while all forms of aid to the country were effectively cancelled (Gono, 2010). As a 
counterstrategy to the action of the US and the EU, Zimbabwe adopts the “Look East Policy” 
(Stiftung, 2004: 2). The policy is an alternative way of attracting funding and investment to 
Zimbabwe by focusing on Eastern countries such as China, India, Malaysia, Russia and 
others (i Stiftung, 2004: 2-3). During Zimbabwe’s 25th independence anniversary, President 
Robert Mugabe made a significant comment that marked a shift in Zimbabwe’s economic 
paradigm in the following statement: 
To this day we bear the lasting scars of that dark encounter with colonialism, 
often described in the West as civilizing. […] and today we have turned east 
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where the sun rises, and given our backs to the West, where the sun sets 
(Meldrum, 2005; Malone, 2008). 
 Since this announcement, Zimbabwe has been making concerted efforts to build trade 
and economic partnerships with Eastern countries. In turn, these countries have not been 
imposing sanctions on other States, making them attractive alternatives to Western countries 
(Mbanje and Mahuku, 2011: 1). Eastern countries, such as China, offer a tremendous amount 
of assistance to Zimbabwe in an effort to help the latter recover from its economic collapse. 
The assistance given by China, unlike Western countries, is provided without direct 
interference in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs; in addition, aid is provided without conditions 
(Blanchard and Rajagopalan, 2014). By this gesture of unconditional aid, China seems to 
have positioned itself as a suitable alternative to Western “tied” aid (Mbanje and Mahuku, 
2011: 2).  Mbanje and Mahuku note that, against liberal-humanitarian principles of foreign 
aid, Western countries such as the US and the EU always pursue national interests when 
providing aid, which often impairs development in the receiving country (Mbanje and 
Mahuku, 2011: 5-6). It is important to state here that I am not in any way implying that 
China’s aid and/or assistance to Zimbabwe and other African countries is without vested 
interest. Obviously, China’s business interest is rooted in profit maximization and this feature 
is paramount in its relationship, partnership and other forms of financial assistance all over 
Africa (Junbo, 2007: 1). However, China’s interest is limited to business and profit 
maximization. The country avoids interfering in domestic politics and keep away from 
dictating or imposing a political framework on African nations (Aidoo and Hess, 2015: 108). 
My position here is that whether aid is from the East or West, it will not be able to solve the 
economic problems facing Zimbabwe. 
 The reason for sanctions against Zimbabwe is to promote democracy and the rule of 
law. In any case, Western democracy tends to mean a political system that practices good 
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governance and upholds human rights and the rule of law, but does not challenge the rule of 
capitalist corporations (Mbanje and Mahuku, 2011: 9). In as much as I support democracy, 
subjecting a country to such a brutal economic situation as Zimbabwe in order to promote 
democracy and human rights is contradictory and unacceptable. Looking at the horrific 
consequences of US and EU sanctions on the population of Zimbabwe, I argue that the 
conditions and strategic interests appeal more to US and EU interests than to the aspirations 
and needs of the Zimbabwean people. As noted earlier, in 2002 alone, United Kingdom 
issued 2,346 work permits to Zimbabwean nurses (Chikanda, 2005: 1) who are now working 
and servicing the British health care system while the health care system of Zimbabwe is in 
comatose. Also, Pasura (2008) note that, the population of Zimbabwean in Britain increased 
from 47,158 in 2001, to an estimated 200,000 in 2008. Apart from the United Kingdom, the 
adoption of the US dollar as the official currency by the government of Zimbabwe is a plus to 
the US exchange market. Dollarisation in Zimbabwe has made the country to lose its ability 
to directly influence its economy, including its right to administer monetary policy and any 
form of exchange rate regime (Noko, 2011: 349-351). According to Margaret Doxey, 
governments for obvious reasons prefer to assert ethical grounds for their foreign policy 
behaviour. They will say that they are imposing sanctions to defend legitimate, worthy and 
general interests, rather than advancing particular interests of their own (Doxey, 1996). I wish 
to emphasise that am not in any way insinuating that the US and the EU imposed sanctions 
on Zimbabwe, with the intensions to boost their own economy from the outcome of the 
sanctions. However, available facts show that both the US and the EU have benefited in one 
way or another from the sanctions. 
 Zimbabwe refers to its strategic partnership with China as a “win-win” principle 
rather than “winner takes all” principle of the West, which has made Africa a continent that 
continues to depend on foreign assistance (Mbanje and Mahuku, 2011: 9). However the ‘win-
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win’ principle is also questionable as seen in the high degree of asymmetry in trade between 
China and Zimbabwe (Mbanje and Mahuku, 2011: 9). Also China’s policy of non-
interference and unconditional stance has been questioned. Western critics argue that they are 
counterproductive because they sabotage democracy and the rule of law. In addition, China’s 
decision not to interfere in the domestic activities of other States even when the regime is 
autocratic is tantamount to complicity.  
 I support the argument projected by critics. By providing funds to a dictator, he/she 
will have access to recourses to finance his/her political machineries and also to remain in 
power. However, when we examine the terrible economic situation in Zimbabwe, it becomes 
obvious that the Zimbabwean population needs help despite whether their leader is a dictator 
or not. In view of the above criticisms about China’s strategy in Zimbabwe and Africa in 
general, Adama Gaye challenges the argument of critics, stating that, “they are inconsistent 
and not found on truth” (Gaye, 2008: 12). Gaye argues that the US and the EU foreign 
policies are marked by gaps between “claims and realities.” They preach democracy and at 
the same time they support dictators or keep a blind eye to them in other African countries 
such as Uganda, Cameroon, Angola and Gabon (Gaye, 2008; emphasis mine). Nevertheless, 
from the perspective of realists, whether East or West, States tend to pursue their own selfish 
interests. China is by no means an exception within this ideological conception of State 
relations.  
All in all, China’s trade and aid policy seems to be simple and attractive to African countries 
and Zimbabwe to be precise. Michael Frith in his 2006 article, Beijing in major bid to woo 
Africa, states: 
Many African countries are now fed up with the intrusiveness of the European 
Union fussing about corruption, good governance and the rule of law. 
Zimbabwe embraced the ‘Look East’ policy because Chinese aid and that of 
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other Eastern countries comes with no strings attached to it (Sunday Times, 
2006: 9). 
 According to Flower (1987), when an economic measure is taken against a country, 
the natural reaction is for the government to look elsewhere for alternative assistance. 
Therefore, Zimbabwe’s look east policy is a natural reactions aimed at curtailing the worst 
impact of sanctions. Although Europe remains Zimbabwe’s major trade and aid partner, 
because of its colonial history, aid from the EU to Zimbabwe has gone down, whereas aid 
from China has increased (Mbanje and Mahuku, 2011: 9). Thus, the “look East policy” can 
be analysed on the following assumption. It is a policy implemented from a grand strategy 
that aims to rehabilitate and overhaul the entire sector of Zimbabwe (economic, cultural, 
social and political needs). As Atuanene-Gima (2008) frames it, the “look East policy” aims 
at reviving and sustaining the economy of Zimbabwe, which was collapsing under the so-
called Western “targeted” sanctions. To the government of Zimbabwe, it is important that 
their economy does not collapse completely, thereby adopting the “look East policy.” By 
looking east, Zimbabwe manages to avoid complete isolation within the international system 
(Mbanje and Mahuku, 2011: 9). China is now Zimbabwe’s largest export market for tobacco. 
The total trade between China and Zimbabwe was about $500 million in 2007 (Shinn, 2008: 
1). Although this figure is low when compared with China’s trade with other African 
countries that export oil and other minerals, it is a considerable change for Zimbabwe, 
considering the present economic situation in the country. Additionally, Sinosteel, a Chinese 
company bought a stake in the holding company for Zimbabwe’s largest ferrochrome 
producer in 2007 (Shinn, 2008: 1). Apart from that, China is now investing in gold and 
platinum mining in Zimbabwe, which will hopefully boost trade between the two countries, 
thus bringing economic growth to Zimbabwe. China also opened a Confucius Institute at the 
University of Zimbabwe in 2007. The look east policy of Zimbabwe has not been able to 
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solve all the problems facing the country, but gradually it is making a positive impact on the 
economic situation of the country. 
 Finally, I submit that the “look East policy” of Zimbabwe could pressure Western 
countries, particularly the EU, to realize that it is losing out to Eastern investors and that a 
continued standoff between it and Zimbabwe will not pay off in the end. The reality is that 
China’s economic interests are fuelling Africa’s economic leverage (Alden, 2005). This 
should be a major concern for the EU simply because China is encroaching and gradually 
dominating what has traditionally been an area of interest and influence for the European 
powers. With China making inroads into Africa, Zimbabwe and other African countries 
realize that it is not in their best interests to depend solely on the West as development or 
economic partners. I am not arguing that Zimbabwe’s partnership with Eastern countries is 
the best for the country. In fact, the partnership raises serious issues, particularly with China. 
The question is whether or not China’s aid assistance to Zimbabwe will translate into 
economic development and stabilization. According to Mbanje and Mahuku (2011: 10) China 
will not provide the panacea for Zimbabwe’s development challenges; rather, it is the 
responsibility of government and other local institutions to ensure that regulatory frameworks 
are established to monitor good governance. I conclude that the government of Zimbabwe 
must push its development agenda by taking advantage of its partnership with China and 
other Eastern countries. It must ensure that the relationship translates into viable development 
practices, which are not as exploitative as previously experienced. 
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Conclusions 
 The controversies surrounding sanctions discourse in Zimbabwe has assumed a 
number of paradoxical dimensions. On the one hand, the regime in Zimbabwe sees them as a 
Western machination against the regime, which is aimed at weakening the government. On 
the other hand, the US and the EU perceive them as an important measure needed to curtail 
the excesses of the regime. Ironically, the sanctions have provided some sort of political 
leverage to the regime in Zimbabwe, who apparently uses them as a propaganda tool to rally 
political support by presenting itself as a victim of Western oppression. The government of 
Zimbabwe maintains that it is being oppressed by the US and the EU because of their land 
reform policies, which enables it to re-allocate lands that were forcefully taken from the 
indigenous black people of Zimbabwe by white settlers. Meanwhile, the US and the EU try to 
avoid linking their sanctions to Zimbabwe’s land reform or re-allocation policy and instead 
cite lack of democratic process, human rights abuses and absence of the rule of law as 
primary reasons for imposing targeted sanctions on President Mugabe and some of his 
ZANU-PF members. This lack of common understanding between the senders and targets on 
what caused the sanctions has provided a loophole for the government of Zimbabwe, who use 
it as an “escape route” from taking responsibility, partly for the collapse of Zimbabwe’s 
economy. Considering the situation at hand, I would add that sanctions lack the capacity to 
resolve the conflict in Zimbabwe and instead create more suffering for the general 
population. Sanctions against Zimbabwe have violated the rights of the same people that they 
are purportedly intended to save from a repressive regime. Therefore, they are 
counterproductive. Although sanctions have been imposed with good intentions, for example, 
to strengthen democracy, to promote human rights and to establish the rule of law, they have 
not been able to significantly achieve any of these objectives. Instead, they contributed to the 
present economic and social decay in Zimbabwe. Thus, the sanctions have failed the senders 
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who believed it would change the behaviour of the regime and also the Zimbabwean 
population who may have hoped that sanctions would pressure their government to stop 
repression against them. 
 Evidently, sanctions contributed to a high rate of inflation and a high level of 
unemployment in the formal sectors of Zimbabwe. In order to survive the difficult economic 
situation, families have to devise strategies to survive. This includes the sale of family assets, 
reduction of household expenses on food and the decision of families to cancel the school 
enrolment of their children. In some cases, children drop out of school to join street begging 
and prostitution. Such actions lead to increases in social crimes (child abuse, illegal 
smuggling and child abandonment). I do not pretend to argue that such situations do not exist 
in other countries. However, my main point is that the level of social vices has increased due 
economic implosion caused by sanctions. The truth is that the Zimbabwean crisis remains 
unsolved despite sanctions and Mugabe still seems to lack interest in making real progress 
towards a democratic and economic renewal of Zimbabwe. That notwithstanding, numerous 
States and other actors have expressed concern over the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe 
and called upon the EU and the US to lift their sanctions in order to help solve the political 
and economic crisis. In 2010, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) urged 
both the US and the EU to lift their sanctions against Zimbabwe in other to help the unity 
government. Instead of withdrawing the measures, the EU and the US maintained their 
sanctions and even extended them on the claim that Zimbabwe’s human rights situation and 
democratic performance have not improved (Grebe 2010: 23-24). The decision of the US and 
the EU to maintain its sanctions against Zimbabwe is worrisome, even when available 
empirical data expresses serious doubts about the effectiveness of the so called targeted 
sanctions. The general effectiveness of the sanctions remains doubtful. Political violence, 
intimidation of opposition and the general population remain unabated despite sanctions. 
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Also, the democratic process and human rights situation has not been improved by the 
measures. Instead, Zimbabwe remains tense as both economic breakdown and political crisis 
continues to escalate. Thus, the primary objectives of the sanctions have not been satisfied 
whilst their effectiveness is absolutely questionable. Having given an overview of individual 
and social situations in Zimbabwe, I have provided support for the conclusion that sanctions 
against Zimbabwe infringe upon the rights and well-being of ordinary citizens who in no way 
contributed to the actions that led to sanctions. 
 Finally, I would point out that this chapter is not intended to disparage the US and the 
EU sanctions on Zimbabwe in such a way that no benefits came out of the sanctions. On the 
contrary, though with reservations, I would say that the sanctions led to the destabilization of 
Robert Mugabe’s political structure, whilst it provided the MDC with a propaganda tool and 
opportunity to sell itself to the people of Zimbabwe, who are clamouring for change. 
However, despite political gains and compromises achieved through sanctions, which may 
include forming a unity government, this thesis is concerned with the humanitarian 
consequences of the measures on the civilian population, which supersede whatever political 
gain that may come from them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 288 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 289 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE CHALLENGES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST 
IRAN AND A REVIEW OF SELECTED CASES OF NUCLEAR DETERANCE 
THROUGH SANCTIONS 
4.1. Introduction 
Since the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), entered into force in 1970 (Sokolski, 2010, 26), 
economic sanctions have been occasionally used against countries aspiring to acquire nuclear 
weapons. However, the use of economic sanctions as a mechanism to stop and/or deter a 
country from acquiring a nuclear weapon has had varying degrees of impact depending on the 
extent of the sanctions and the underlying economic and political conditions in the target 
country.  
The reason for employing economic sanctions as a measure to deter countries from 
developing nuclear weapon may be summarised as follows: to weaken and/or cripple the 
target country economic capability and thus, increase the cost of developing such weapons. 
Since developing nuclear weapons requires huge amount of finance, economic sanctions can 
potentially yield positive results by substantially and/or effectively curtail the amount of 
funds available to the target regime, thereby making it difficult for the regime to continue 
with its nuclear program and/or policy (U.S. State Department, 2010).  
Just like Zimbabwe, Iran has a history of sanctions. In fact the country could be 
adjudged as the most sanctioned country in the world having been targeted with more than 
thirty-two different rounds of sanctions by the US, the EU and the UN between 1979 and 
2012 (Kattan, 2013: 1). According to the Centre for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation 
report of 2013, the US has slammed not less than twenty-four rounds of economic sanctions 
on Iran between 1979 and 2012 (Kattan, 2013: 1). Most of the sanctions were imposed 
through Presidential Executive Order. Also, the EU has imposed four rounds of economic 
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sanctions against Iran between 2010 and 2012, while the UN on her part has imposed four 
rounds of economic sanctions on Iran between 2006 and 2010. Although the US has been 
maintaining economic sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program since the past two decades, 
these sanctions however, gained a boost in the last decade, after the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors concluded in 2005 that Iran’s nuclear 
programme had not complied with its safeguards agreement (Tariq and Kelley, 2015: 1). 
Consequently, the United Nations Security Council imposed several rounds of economic 
sanctions on Iran with the aim of forcing the regime to comply with IAEA standard on 
uranium enrichment.  
The idea of Iran acquiring nuclear weapon is very delicate. The US and the EU 
speculate that if Iran becomes a nuclear power, the country might become even more 
aggressive towards its neighbours and destabilize the balance of power in the Middle East. 
This might in turn lead to a nuclear proliferation race in the region. In order to stop Iran from 
becoming a “nuclear monster,” economic sanctions seem to be the only available antidote 
that can stop the country from developing a nuclear weapon that may eventually be used 
against Israel and other countries in the Middle East. According to the US Department of 
State, the unprecedented sanctions against Iran, is a response to Iran’s “continued illicit 
nuclear activities” (Philpott, 2015: 146). The sanctions aim to “censure Iran and prevent its 
further progress in prohibited nuclear activities, as well as to persuade Tehran to address the 
international community’s concerns about its nuclear program” (Philpott, 2015: 147). Thus, 
the sanctions aim to bring about change in behaviour with respect to forcing the Iranian 
government to comply with international standards and set rules.    
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On November 2012, shortly after President Barrack Obama was re-elected as the 
President of the United States, during a press conference, the president boosted of the severity 
of the sanctions against Iran through the following statement:  
We have imposed the toughest sanctions in history. It is having an impact on 
Iran’s economy. There should be a way in which they can enjoy peaceful 
nuclear power while still meeting their international obligations and providing 
clear assurances to the international community that they’re not pursuing a 
nuclear weapon (International Crisis Group, 2013: 1). 
In response, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while denying US claim 
that his country is aspiring to produce a nuclear bomb, maintained that sanctions will not 
deter its “peaceful” nuclear program when he stated thus: 
You impose in your own words crippling sanctions to paralyse the nation. 
Does this show good or ill intention [...]. They naively think that the nation 
has been exhausted by the sanctions and will therefore yearn for negotiations 
with the United States (The New York Times, 2013) 
Obviously, the UN, the US and the EU and the regime in Tehran were at a crossroads 
with respect to using sanctions to force Iran to reconsider its nuclear programme. 
Nevertheless, Iran’s economy without question is badly affected, particularly due to dramatic 
drop in oil exports and a near collapse in the value of its currency. In a situation such as this, 
the reasonable question to ask is: how much economic damage has sanctions caused to the 
economy of Iran and the well-being of its civilian population? 
In the light of the above questions, this chapter of the thesis examines the extent to 
which economic sanctions against Iran influences the country’s nuclear policy. Furthermore, 
it analyses the impact of sanctions on Iran’s economy and the well-being of the civilian 
population. Although some other scholars may have analysed the impact of economic 
sanctions imposed against Iran’s nuclear program, only a few have examined the sanctions 
from the perspective of rights violation and well-being of the civilian population. Therefore, 
 292 
 
this chapter intends to fill this information gap by analysing US, EU and UN economic 
sanctions against Iran, in relations to their impact on the core human rights and well-being of 
the entire population. 
4.1.1. Historical overview of Iran 
The history of Iran is very vast and dated back to about 5000 years ago. It is very 
difficult to put up a chronological analysis of the history of the country. Therefore, this thesis 
will only provide a brief historical overview of Iran. The Iranians are an Indo-European 
people. Sometime, probably in the early second millennium B.C.E, a people calling 
themselves Aryans migrated from north of the Black Sea southwest towards Iran and 
Afghanistan. The bulk of the population were nomads. One group, the Indo-Aryans, went 
southeast into north-western India, where they apparently conquered the native population. 
Another group, the Iranians, moved southwest into Iran, eventually settling a region including 
much of Afghanistan, Iran, and the area east of the Caspian (Walbridge, 2002). 
In the seventh century B.C.E, one of the Iranian allies of the Medes, Cyrus II the 
Great of Persis in south-western Iran, overthrew his master and went on to conquer a vast 
empire, which eventually stretched from Libya to the gates of India and from the Bosphorus 
to the Indian Ocean and formed what is known in history as Persian or Achaemenid Empire. 
The empire was so properly administered that its efficient administrative pattern were used 
throughout the Middle East for centuries. Apart from running a well structured and highly 
articulate pattern of administration, the king of the Persian Empire extended his influence 
outside his territory. He restored the temple in Jerusalem and conveyed Iranian culture and 
religious ideas to the Mediterranean world (Walbridge, 2002). 
In 334 B.C.E, the Persian Empire became victim of Alexander the Great’s invasion 
and the empire was defeated and conquered. However, Alexander himself died before he 
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could establish his dynasty, thus the empire was divided among his generals. This division 
made Iran to fall under the leadership of the descendants of Seleucus, who also ruled Iraq and 
Syria. But then, in the second century C.E, Iranians residing near the south-eastern corner of 
the Caspian formed a dynasty and the new dynasty went on to defeat the Seleucids. The 
dynasty was known to the West as the Parthians, while they refer to themselves as the 
Arsacids (Walbridge, 2002). Just like the Seleucus, in the third century C.E. the Parthians 
were overthrown by a local dynasty of Fars, who then formed the Sasanian Empire. The 
Sasanian Empire ran a well-coordinated and centralized administration. At their high point in 
the early seventh century, they were able to occupy much of the Byzantine Empire and 
besieged Constantinople itself. The achievements of the Sasanian Empire accorded the 
Sasanian kings high level of acceptance by their subjects, and thus the king remained a well 
known figure in many aspects of Iranian culture: literature, statecraft, art, and folklore 
(Walbridge, 2002). 
One factor that continually played a significant role in the history of Iran is religion. 
In the years when Prophet Muhammad was preaching his new religion and establishing a 
Muslim State in Medina and north-western Arabia, the Sasanian Empire was facing civil 
unrest. So when the Arabs invaded Sasanian Empire, there was little resistance and the 
empire could not repel the invaders (Walbridge, 2002). The provincial nobility failed to unite 
to support the central government against the invaders. Thus, the Arabs were soon able to 
occupy both Iraq and Iran. Yazdegerd III, the fugitive Sasanian emperor, was killed in Marv, 
in the far north-eastern corner of his empire. Subsequently, Iran was ruled first from Medina 
and later from Damascus (Walbridge, 2002).  
In this period, Persians played a significant role in the Islamic State. The Arab 
invaders and/or occupiers depended highly on Persians to administer the old Sasanian 
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provinces; as a result, Persian became the official language of administration in the eastern 
part of the Islamic world throughout the seventh century. By the end of the century, 
considerable population of Persians had converted to Islam. However, a Shi`ite revolution in 
eastern Iran led to the overthrow of the Umayyad caliphs of Damascus and the Abbasids 
became the new caliphs. The Abbasids continued to run a decentralised pattern of 
government, but the government became weak and by the end of the ninth century, the 
Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad could no longer exercise full control over their jurisdictions. The 
weakness of the Abbasid caliphs to exercise control over its territory led to the formation of 
the Safavid dynasty that ruled between 1502 and 1736 (Walbridge, 2002). The Safavid 
dynasty headed by Shah Ismail, restored internal order and established the Shi`ite sect of 
Islam as the State religion. The Safavid dynasty became very powerful and was able to push 
the Portuguese out of their colonies on the Persian Gulf. In addition, the leader Shah Ismail 
established trade relations with Great Britain and some other Western countries (The 
Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 2012). In 1722 however, Afghans invaded and defeated 
the Safavid dynasty, marking the beginning of Afghans rule from 1722 until 1736 when they 
were expelled by Nadir Shah who then formed the Afshar dynasty. The Afshar dynasty was 
succeeded by the Zand dynasty that ruled from 1750 to 1794 (The Columbia Electronic 
Encyclopedia, 2012). The founder of the dynasty, Karim Khan, established his capital at 
Shiraz and managed to restore peace and renewed prosperity in his territory. However, the 
country was again engulfed with unrest that lasted until a new leader known as Aga 
Muhammad Khan took over the mantle of leadership and formed the Qajar Dynasty. 
According to Rashidvash (2012: 182-187), the Qajar Dynasty ruled from 1794 to 
1925. The period saw Iran gradually losing territory to neighbouring countries and 
continuously pressured by European nations, particularly Russia. Within this period, Persian 
claims over the entire Caucasian area were utterly challenged by Russia leading to a 
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protracted conflict. In the end, Iran was forced to give up the Caucasian lands by signing the 
Treaty of Gulistan in 1813 and the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828 (Rashidvash, 2012: 182). 
In addition, it lost Herat, the rich city on the Hari Rud, which had been part of the ancient 
Persian Empire to Afghans. Attempts made by Iran to reclaim the land from Afghans ended 
with Britain intervening on-behalf of Afghanistan, resulting in the recognition of Afghanistan 
independence by Iran in 1857 (Rashidvash, 2012: 182-183).   
The discovery of oil in the early 1900’s however, escalated Western and/or foreign 
interest in Iran. In this period, the interest of Britain and Russia over Iran heightened and 
resulted to a struggle over who will control the affairs of Iran between these foreign 
countries. Apart from external pressure, 20th century Iran was characterised by a 
continuously growing constitutional movements resulting in the establishment of a 
constitutional parliament in 1906. At the same time, the British-Russian rivalry continued 
until August 31, 1907 when Russia and Britain signed the Anglo-Russian agreement in St. 
Petersburg (Dowling, 2015: 37). By signing the agreement, the governments of Great Britain 
and Russia agreed to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and to maintain peace 
and encourage economic development throughout the country. However, during the First 
World War, Iran was occupied by both Britain and Russia whilst after the war Iran was 
admitted into the League of Nations as an original member. 
In 1919, Iran signed a trade agreement with Great Britain in which the later formally 
reaffirmed Iran’s independence but actually attempted to establish a complete protectorate 
over it (Mirza, 2012: 537). Then in 1921, a military officer named Reza Khan, masterminded 
a coup and established a military dictatorship. Subsequently, in 1925 Reza Khan was elected 
hereditary shah and he established the Pahlevi dynasty. The new leader abolished the Anglo-
Persian agreement of 1919, which, if ratified, would have granted the British a paramount 
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position of control over the financial and military affairs of Iran. Also the leader introduced 
other reforms and encouraged industrial and educational development. But on August 1941, 
shortly after the German invasion of the USSR, British and Soviet forces again occupied Iran. 
Then on September 16, 1941 the shah abdicated his office in favour of his son Muhammad 
Reza Shah Pahlevi (Mirza, 2012: 538), and towards the end of that year, American troops 
entered into Iran.  
In 1943, the Tehran Declaration was signed by the United States, Great Britain, and 
the USSR (Ro’i, 1974: 3). The agreement guaranteed the independence and territorial 
integrity of Iran. However, the USSR was dissatisfied by the refusal of the Iranian 
government to grant it oil concessions. Consequently, the USSR orchestrated a revolt in the 
northern part of Iran leading to the creation of the People’s Republic of Azerbaijan and the 
Kurdish People’s Republic in December 1945 (Hahnemann, 2014). At the expiration of 
wartime treaty in January 1946, that allowed foreign troops to remain in Iran, the government 
of Iran protested at the United Nations, demanding that all foreign troops should vacate its 
territory. Consequently, the Soviets withdrew their troops in May of the same year but after 
receiving a promise of oil concessions from Iran (Bill, 1988: 35). Upon withdrawing their 
troops in mid-1946, the Soviet established governments in the north were deposed by the 
Iranian army and subsequently, parliament rejected the oil concessions earlier given to USSR. 
In 1951 however, Iran had what is considered its first democratic election that 
produced Mohammad Mosaddegh as the Prime Minister (Hahnemann, 2014). The 
government of Mosaddegh succeeded in nationalising the oil industry and established the 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The move by Iran to nationalise its oil industry did 
not go down well with Britain which had a major interest in Iran’s oil. Consequently, the 
British imposed oil blockade against Iran which led to the virtual collapse of the oil industry 
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and caused serious internal economic troubles to the regime. Of important note is that the 
Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was against the idea of nationalising the oil industry and 
openly criticised Mosaddegh’s policies (Gasiorowski and Byrne, 2004). In 1952, Mosaddegh 
was ousted but he quickly regained power while the Shah fled Iran. In 1953, the Shah 
returned to Iran and with clandestine support of Western governments and domestic 
monarchist elements Mussadegh was ousted from office in August that year (Gasiorowski 
and Byrne, 2004).  
Following the CIA masterminded coup, General Fazlollah Zahedi was appointed the 
Prime Minister of Iran. The resulted coup caused the renewal of Britain imperialism 
predominance over Iran (Mansoureh and Kamaruzaman, 2011: 205). In 1954, shortly after 
taking over power, General Zahedi recalled Western (British, American, French, and Dutch) 
oil companies to operate Iranian oil facilities. However, the General restored peace and order 
within Iran. In 1957, he abolished martial law and build close relationship with Western 
countries. He joined the Baghdad Pact popularly known as Central Treaty Organization and 
received huge amount of military and economic aid from the West, particularly from the 
United States. Between the 1960’s and 1970’s, the regime undertook a broad program 
designed to improve economic and social conditions. Top in the regime’s agenda were land 
reforms (Mansoureh and Kamaruzaman, 2011: 206). Also, certain democratic reforms were 
carried out by the regime. For example, the Iran Novin party was formed, though critics 
allege that the party was a government backed political party and therefore it did not 
represent democracy. In addition, women were offered unprecedented right to vote in 
national elections. During the parliamentary election held in 1963, the Iran Novin party won 
majority of the seats in parliament (Vianna, 1979: 345), while women were allowed to 
participate in the election process.   
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Also in the period, 1960’s and early 1970’s, Iran’s relations with Iraq degenerated due 
to conflict over the Shatt al Arab waterway even though the regime and the Shah established 
strong economic ties with communist countries particularly with the USSR (Jones, 2009: 10).  
The strained relationship between Iran and Iraq continued until April 1969 when Iran 
disregarded the 1937 accord with Iraq and demanded that the treaty be renegotiated (Bhanot 
and Lacayo, 2006: 8). For clarity, the 1937 accord gave Iraq virtual control of the water ways 
bordering its territory with Iran. In March 1973, Iran’s foreign policy took a dramatic change. 
The Shah revoked the 1954 agreement that saw Western oil companies run and manage Iran’s 
oil facilities and re-established NIOC’s full control over all aspects of Iran’s oil industry. 
Western oil companies were offered advisory role in return for long-term oil supply contracts 
while NIOC assumed total control and management of Iran oil. However, during the Arab-
Israeli war in the later part of 1973, Iran refused to use oil as a weapon of war, hence it did 
not participate in the oil embargo against the United States, Europe, Japan, and Israel (The 
Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 2012: 5-6). 
4.1.2. The Islamic revolution 
Tehran, Iran’s capital was engulfed by a popular uprising and revolt on January 19, 
1979. Although the country experienced rapid growth of industrialization and modernization 
programs in this period, however, ostentatious private wealth among few elites became 
greatly resented by the bulk of the population, mainly in the overcrowded urban areas and 
among the rural poor. Also the population was against the Shah’s use of secret police known 
as Savak, to checkmate dissidents and rule the country (Ghosh, 2012: 1). Owing to the Shah’s 
high handedness and virtually intolerable attitude, an opposition emerged among his subjects. 
The opposition was led by Ayatollah Khomeini, who lived in exile in Iraq and later in France, 
where he continued to instigate apathy against the Shah through his loyalist. Although the 
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protest started in 1978 as a religious based protest, the Shah responded by declaring martial 
law in all major cities. Instead of quelling the demonstrations, it soon became apparent that 
the enactment of martial law intensified the uprising and caused demonstrations against the 
Shah’s leadership. As governmental controls faltered, the Shah fled Iran on January 16, 1979, 
while Khomeini returned back from exile and led religious revolutionaries that finally 
overthrow the Shah’s government on February 11, 1979 (Vasseghi, 2010: 1).  
After defeating the Shah and sending him on exile, a new constitution was drafted to 
replace the 1906 constitution. On April 1, 1979 a national referendum was conducted and 
Iranians were offered the choice to choose whether to adopt an Islamic Republic or not. 
During the referendum, Iranians were offered one choice, Islamic Republic: Yes or No? 
(Paidar, 1995: 226). An overwhelming 99 percent voted in favour of the new constitution. 
Consequently, Ayatollah Khomeini declared an Islamic Republic with a new constitution 
reflecting his ideals of Islamic government (Alem, 2011). The new government represented a 
major shift toward conservatism. First, it nationalized industries and banks and revived 
Islamic traditions. Second, it made effort to eradicate Western presence and influence over 
the population by banning Western music and life style, while women were forced to return 
to traditional veiled dress (Alem, 2011). However, the regime’s new constitution permitted a 
presidential system though Khomeini remained at the executive helm as the Supreme Leader. 
Thus, there was a change of designation from what was formerly known as the Shah to the 
Supreme Leader. Towards the end of 1979, young supporters of Khomeini, angered by 
United States long and overwhelming support for the exiled Shah stormed the US embassy in 
Tehran, taking 66 people hostage (McDermott, 2001). The hostage taking created a lot of 
tension within Iran and in November of 1979, the then Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan 
resigned his position. Consequently, an election was held in 1980 and Abolhassan Beni Sadr 
was elected the president. 
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On September 22, 1980 Iraq invaded Iran over the disputed Shatt al Arab waterway 
and the war lasted for eight long years. The war crippled both nations economically, and led 
to an estimated five hundred thousand to one million casualties (Kurzman, 2013; Bhanot and 
Lacayo, 2006: 8). Then on January 20, 1981, the American hostages were released, after long 
negotiations, though there were speculations that the US paid ransom as well as supplied 
military equipment to Iran (Guerrero, 2016: 193). In June of that year, President Beni Sadr 
was removed from power by Ayatollah Khomeini and replaced by former Prime Minister 
Mohammad Ali Rajai. Unfortunately, President Mohammad Ali Rajai and his Prime Minister 
died in a bomb incident that happened on August 30, 1981 (Kihss, 1981).  
Following the death of President Mohammad Ali Rajai, an election was conducted on 
October 1981 and Hojatoleslam Seyed Ali Khamenei was elected as the president. On June 
1989 the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini passed on. Consequently, Khamenei vacated 
the position of President and assumed the role of the supreme spiritual leader, while 
Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected the president (The Columbia 
Electronic Encyclopedia, 2012: 9). When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Iran was 
among the countries that enforced international sanctions against Iraq despite opposing the 
US led coalition forces against Iraq during the Persian Gulf War. However, the United States 
suspended all trade with Iran in 1995, accusing Iran of supporting terrorist groups and 
attempting to develop nuclear weapons (The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 2012: 8-10).  
4.1.3. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty 
On August 6, 1945 during World War II, the United States deployed the world first 
atomic bomb over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The bomb resulted in the 
death of approximately 170,000 people in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Lindee, 1994; 
Khan, 2012). Then in the 1960’s, presidents, prime ministers, and arms-control analysts 
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predicted that about 25 to 30 countries would possess nuclear weapons by the end of 20th 
century (Kaplan, 2005). The world soon became petrified by an impending devastation from 
nuclear weapons. Therefore, an alternative ideology was imperative for the sake of mankind. 
Consequently, in 1968, the United Nations drafted the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) and States were obliged to sign and be part of the treaty in order to promote peaceful 
nuclear use. At the time of writing this thesis, the NPT has been ratified by 189 countries. 
About 3 or 4 countries have acquired nuclear weapon since the treaty came into force outside 
the original five nuclear powers. 
Although we cannot claim that the NPT is the only reason or factor restraining 
countries from pursuing nuclear technology; however, it is an undeniable fact that it played a 
role and thus it reinforces other deterring factors. As noted earlier, at the time of signing the 
treaty on March 5, 1970, there were five nuclear weapon States: China, France, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR (Alonso, 2012: 424). However, since the time of 
signing the NPT, India, Israel, and Pakistan have developed nuclear weapons while North 
Korea developed a nuclear explosive capability (Joyner, 2011; Gardner, 1994). Among these 
four countries that later developed nuclear weapon and/or capability, India, Israel, and 
Pakistan were not signatory to the treaty, while North Korea ratified the treaty but later 
withdrew from the agreement. 
The NPT in my opinion has three main clauses that could be summarised in the 
following: First, States seeking to be part of the treaty would agree to promote and also make 
efforts towards non-proliferation. That is to say, nuclear weapon States would agree not to 
transfer nuclear weapon devices or technology to non-nuclear weapon States. Besides, 
nuclear weapon States have to consent not to assist, influence, encourage, coerce or induce a 
non-nuclear weapon States to acquire nuclear weapons. 
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The second main clause deals with disarmament. The treaty states that consenting 
nations would have to, “in good faith,” make efforts in disarming and liquidating existing 
nuclear weapons and make efforts toward an eventual withdrawal from the nuclear arms race. 
This means that countries currently having nuclear weapons or nuclear capability will be 
required to destroy or get rid of their weapons.  
The third main clause in the agreement is that it permitted the use of nuclear 
technology solely for peaceful purposes. The implication of this clause is that nuclear 
technology can be transferred or traded between nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear 
weapon States as long as it is indicated that the technology will be used in a peaceful manner. 
In addition, a country that is aspiring to acquire nuclear technology and eventually 
developing a nuclear program must be able to prove that the technology will be limited to 
peaceful purposes only. 
Arguably, the world is a better place because of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Nonetheless, the treaty has some flaws. Referencing the third clause identified above, the 
treaty permits nation States to pursue nuclear program as long as they are doing so for 
peaceful purposes. Article V of the treaty, went on to state that: the technology will be 
provided, “on a non-discriminatory basis” at a price “as low as possible” and exclude any 
charge for research and development. The inherent danger in this assertion is that the 
technology for producing nuclear energy is the same as the technology for producing nuclear 
weapons. Enquiry from my physicist friends reveals that to produce a bomb from a 
supposedly peaceful nuclear program takes only enriching the uranium or reprocessing the 
fuel rods into plutonium. It is believed that the drafters of the treaty knew this impending 
danger; instead they ignored it and counted on two impediments. First, the drafters’ relied on 
using a “watchdog” as a mechanism to checkmate any derailment. The treaty specifies that 
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the recipients of nuclear technology must allow international inspectors to monitor their 
nuclear facilities in order to make sure that they complied with IAEA standards. Second, at 
the time the NPT was drafted, it was perceived to be very difficult for a recipient country to 
deviate (Kaplan, 2005). However, reality has proved contrarily to the assumptions of the 
drafters of the NPT. The spread of science and the continuously growing ingenuity of black 
marketers have made it possible that a country can clandestinely learn how to enrich uranium. 
In addition, the difficulty to access information or carry out intensive intelligence monitoring, 
especially in closed societies, pose serious challenges because such a country can 
clandestinely build nuclear facilities, whilst at the same time elude inspectors. 
Another challenge facing the treaty is in the lack of interest by the original five 
nuclear weapon States to adhere to the recommendation of the treaty by relinquishing their 
nuclear weapons. The apparent expression of interest by these countries to keep and/or 
safeguard their nuclear weapons has sparked the interest of other countries that aspire to 
acquire their own nuclear capability. For example, India that has never signed or observed the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty argues that: “it is unfair for already nuclear nations to 
impose limiting sanctions on nuclear weapon development while they observe no signs of 
disarmament and liquidation of nuclear stockpiles from the nuclear States” (Khan, 2012). 
Therefore one can argue that the lack of political will among the original nuclear weapon 
States to relinquish their nuclear weapons is a factor that may propel other countries to pursue 
a nuclear program with the hope of balancing power.  
In the year 2000, during the NPT Review Conference, all member States agreed on 
nuclear weapons disarmament. Consequently, 13 practical steps were outlined for the 
systematic and progressive disarmament of the world’s nuclear weapons (Kerr; Nikitin; 
Woolf and Medalia, 2010: 5). However, at the 2005 Review Conference, States parties could 
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not agree on a final document. After five weeks of deliberation, the conference ended without 
State parties signing any document that will serve as a working plan. Analyst dubbed the 
conference a failure. Then again in 2010, States parties adopted a 64 point action plan in 
order to move forward (Kerr et al., 2010: 5-6). Unfortunately, till date there has not been any 
significant and/or concrete step taken towards disarming the nuclear States of their weapons. 
4.1.4. The US sanctions against Iran.  
The objectives of US sanctions against Iran have evolved over time. In the 1980’s and 
1990’s, the US imposed sanctions on Iran with the aim or intention to compel Iran to cease 
support for acts of terrorism and most importantly to limit Iran’s strategic power in the 
Middle East (Kenneth, 2016: 1). However, since the mid 2000’s, US sanctions have focused 
intently on compelling Iran to abandon its nuclear program or even to limit the scope of its 
nuclear program to a level that may be considered “peaceful” to the international community. 
Given the fact that the US has imposed series of sanctions on Iran, it will be useful to review 
these sanctions by breaking them up into smaller time spans. Therefore, I divided the US 
sanctions against Iran into six categories or groups, starting from 1979 until the time of 
writing this thesis. By doing so, I relied on my own research and also a list provided by the 
Centre for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation on US sanctions against Iran. Then, relying 
on data from the United Nations, I presented a chronology of UN sanctions against Iran. 
Finally, I provide a brief overview of EU imposed sanctions against Iran.  
4.1.4.1. Sanctions imposed between 1979 and 1991 
Sanctions have become a regular feature of US policy towards Iran for more than 
three decades (Kenneth, 2015: 1). Washington imposed the first sanctions against Iran in 
1979. Nine months after the Islamic revolution, precisely on November 4, 1979, angry young 
Islamic revolutionaries attacked the US Embassy in Tehran, taking more than 60 Americans 
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hostage. The hostages remained in captivity from November 4, 1979 until January 20, 1981, 
when they were released. In this period, the US employed several approaches to secure the 
release of the hostages, including launching a military rescue operation, “Operation Eagle 
Claw”, which failed, and unfortunately caused the deaths of eight servicemen (Radvanyi, 
2000: 1). Owing to the failure of military operation, the US opted to use economic pressure 
and imposed economic sanctions against Iran. 
First, the sanctions started with a ban on Iranian oil imports, followed by freezing of 
all assets of the government of Iran in the United States and under the control of US banks, 
businesses and individuals outside the United States. Consequently, Iran was deprived of the 
use of more than $12 billion in bank deposits, gold and other property (Caswell, 1981: 247). 
In addition, the US banned most export and other transactions with Iran and requested the UN 
Security Council to impose similar sanctions against Iran. The US proposal seeking UN 
sanctions against Iran was blocked by a Soviet veto on January 13, 1980; however, some 
Western nations gradually reduced their trade and commerce with Iran as a way of expressing 
their dissatisfaction with Tehran (Caswell, 1981: 247).  The sanctions remained in place until 
January 20, 1981 when Algiers Declaration/Accord was reached between the US and Iran. 
Consequent upon reaching an accord, Iran released the hostages while the US was expected 
to unfreeze Iran’s assets. Although, one cannot state precisely why Iran decided after 14 
months to agree to the Algiers Declarations and release the American hostages, one thing for 
sure was that Iran’s economy was gradually withering due to a combination of economic 
sanctions and war with Iraq. 
After the hostage crisis sanctions, the US imposed another round of economic 
sanctions on Iran in 1984. Following the 1983 bombing of US Marine peacekeepers in 
Lebanon, which caused the deaths of 161 Americans, (Friedman, 1983) the US, imposed 
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stringent economic sanctions on Iran. President Ronald Reagan’s administration accused 
Tehran of sponsoring terrorism by providing support for the group that carried out the attack 
which later became Hezbollah. Consequently, Iran was designated a “state sponsor of 
terrorism” by the US State Department on January 23, 1984 (Katzman, 2015: 3). Reagan’s 
administration invoked section 505 of the International Security and Development Act, 
banning trade relations between the US and Iran. In addition to that, Washington banned all 
forms of arms and ammunition sales, export of dual-use technologies, and foreign assistance 
to Iran. Furthermore, the US effectively opposed and blocked Iran’s loan applications to the 
World Bank. Then following a resolution passed by congress and signed into law on October 
29, 1987, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12613, and imposed total embargo on the 
importation of Iran’s oil into the US. In addition, there was a ban on the export of goods that 
could be used for military purposes from the US to Iran (Katzman, 2015: 3-4).  
Since then onwards, Washington has perceived Iran as a potential threat to the US and 
its allies. Even recently, the US State Department still considers Iran the world’s “most active 
State sponsor of terrorism”, while relationship between Washington and Tehran has remained 
tensed. According to Bruno (2011), US officials continue to allege that, “Iran provides 
funding, weapons, training, and sanctuary to numerous terrorist groups, most notably in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon […] posing a security concern to the international 
community.” Thus, the US perception of Iran is in twofold: a State sponsor of terrorism and a 
potential nuclear terrorist. As a result, serious actions need to be taken in other to curtail the 
excesses of Iran. 
4.1.4.2. Sanctions imposed between 1992 and 1995  
On April 8, 1992, the US Congress believing that Iran was aspiring to produce a 
nuclear weapon adopted the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-proliferation Act (IIANA). The bill, which 
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was sponsored by Senator John McCain, seeks to extend the restrictions of the Iraq Sanctions 
Act of 1990 to Iran. Thus, the bill seeks to “prevent the transfer of certain goods or 
technology to Iraq or Iran and for other purposes” (U.S. Congress Report, 1992). 
Additionally, the act imposed sanctions on foreign entities that provide nuclear technology to 
Iran or any form of assistance that will facilitate Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon.  
In 1994, the United States accused Iran of sourcing uranium from Kazakhstan. 
Washington claimed that it has discovered and successfully block a uranium deal between 
Iran and Kazakhstan. Consequently, the United States started to take more and more drastic 
measures to halt Iran’s nuclear program. Numerous additional economic sanctions were 
imposed on Iran’s key energy sector with the aim of weakening its economy and capability to 
continue with the nuclear program. In 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12957 
and declared Iran an “extraordinary national security threat” and called for national 
emergency to deal with it (Kattan, 2013). Since then onwards, the President of the United 
States is permitted at all times to regulate trade with countries considered an “extraordinary 
threat.” Thereupon, the president issued Executive Order 12959 in May 6, 1995 placing a 
comprehensive ban on US trade with, and investment in Iran, whilst excluding food and 
medical products. Additionally, the US Senate in the same year passed the Iran Foreign Oil 
Sanctions Act that set limit at $40 million which a foreign company can invest in the Iranian 
oil and gas industries, above which will be penalised (Kattan, 2013). 
4.1.4.3. Sanctions imposed between 1996 and 2000  
On June 18, 1996 the US House of Representatives, following the footstep of the 
Senate passed their own version of Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act by extending the sanctions 
imposed on Libya’s oil industry to Iran. The act was named Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
(ILSA). It imposed sanctions on persons “exporting certain goods or technology that would 
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enhance Iran’s ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum 
resources, and for other purposes” (Katzman, 2006). In addition, ILSA prohibited entities 
from investing an amount more than $20 million in Iranian energy. In essence, the act is 
intended to strangulate Iran’s energy sector by sanctioning and/or deterring entities who wish 
to invest hugely in the industry. ILSA is remarkable because according to congress, the 
sanctions will remain in force until a time when Iran is certified to have given up its 
aspiration to acquire nuclear weapon and a point when it is no longer considered a significant 
threat to the US or its allies (Kattan, 2013). 
Furthermore, on August 19, 1997 President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 
13059, preventing US companies from deliberately exporting goods to a third country that 
will eventually re-export them to Iran. While in the middle of the same year, the two houses 
of congress passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act (Congressional Record: 1998: 
13312). The act, opposed export licenses to ship weapons to Iran and cancel US aid to any 
country reasonably believed to be assisting Iran produce a nuclear weapon. Then on March 
14, 2000 the President signed Iran “Non-proliferation Act into law.” The act empowers the 
President, to impose sanctions on countries and organizations helping Iran to develop 
weapons of mass destruction (Congressional Record: 1998: 13312- 13313). 
However, despite all the sanctions imposed by the US, Iran’s nuclear program is on-
going and has become an issue of international concern and debate. Some observers however, 
believe that the US sanctions on Iran is part of Washington’s doctrine of establishing “full 
spectrum dominance” around the world. According to Eric Sommer, the US is antagonising 
Iran because of love lost between the two countries. The US doctrine is to “allow only 
countries firmly allied to its government to acquire nuclear weapons or to even develop the 
capacity to do so. Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons. Yet there is no call 
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for sanctions or investigations of them. The reason is simple: They are a US ally” (Sommer, 
2010). Whatever be the case, countries should endeavour to adhere to treaties they signed, 
while justice should be served equally. 
4.1.4.4. Sanctions imposed between 2001 and 2005 
On September 23, 2001 President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13224, 
sanctioning entities that support terrorism (Katzman, 2016: 4). The order prohibited 
American entities from having any financial transactions with organizations and persons 
believed to be supporting terrorism. Primarily, the order was targeting entities that provide 
support for al-Qaeda; however, it began by targeting Iranian firms and other entities. Also in 
the same 2001, the US Congress voted in favour of renewing the ILSA for another five years, 
while in 2002, the US successfully blocked Iran from joining the World Trade Organization 
(Clawson and Rubin, 2005: 153). Then on June 28, 2005 the president imposed yet another 
sanctions through Executive Order 13382. The order empowered the president to seize the 
assets of entities that support WMD proliferators and to ban those entities’ financial 
transactions with American entities. Consequently, in June 2006, the US Treasury 
Department seized assets belonging to four Chinese companies that were accused of assisting 
Iran’s ballistic-missile programs. Apart from seizing there assets, US citizens and entities 
were banned from doing business with these companies. Two months later, two other 
companies with Russian origin were sanctioned for supplying Iran with materials and/or 
constituents that could be used in making unconventional weapons. On September 2006, 
President Bush, through the Treasury Department, banned “U-turn transactions,” or indirect 
transactions with Iranian Bank Saderat. Washington accused the bank of facilitating terrorism 
by transferring millions of dollars to terrorist groups including Hezbollah and Hamas 
(Katzman, 2016: 28). The imposed ban on financial transactions with Bank Saderat by US, 
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effectively limited financial transactions between Iranian businesses and the rest of the world 
(Ghaderi, 2015). 
4.1.4.5. Sanctions imposed between 2006 and 2010  
On September 28, 2006 congress adopted the “Iran Freedom and Support Act.” The 
act appropriated the sum of $10 million to the President of the United States who will in-turn 
use the fund to support pro-democracy and human rights organizations in Iran (Katzman, 
2011: 3). Critics however, allege that the act was a move by Washington to provide financial 
support to groups that oppose the Iranian government and thus, the bill was seen as indirect 
US-led propaganda coup against Tehran (Kattan, 2013). In my view, it is not proper for 
Washington to impose sanctions on Tehran, denying it access to international finance while at 
the same time provide financial support to local opposition groups, tagging them “pro-
democracy.” Washington has continued to initiate new and even harsher sanctions against 
Iran. At the beginning of 2007, the US Treasury Department targeted another Iranian bank 
called Bank Sepah and banned all US banks from handling transactions with or on-behalf of 
the bank (Newcomb, 2008: 471). 
On September 11, 2008 the Treasury Department banned US banks from handling 
financial transactions with the Iranian Maritime Carrier, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Shipping Lines (IRISL) and 18 other affiliated entities (Mohammed and Somerville, 2008). 
Then on July 1, 2010 President Obama signed “the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act” (CISADA) into law. The act expanded already existing 
sanctions on Iran’s energy sector by banning the sale of gasoline and gasoline production 
equipments to Iran (Wilcox, 2010: 645). In addition, CISADA expanded the sanctions 
contained in the 1996 Iran Sanctions Act by targeting banks that transact with the Iranian 
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Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and also blacklist individuals’ accused of human rights 
violation during the 2009 presidential elections in Iran. 
4.1.4.6. Sanctions imposed between 2011 and 2015 
In May 2011, the US president issued Executive Order 13572. The order expanded 
the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004, 
which targeted the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for their alleged involvement in 
human rights abuses in Syria (Liebman; Thomsen and Bartlett, 2012: 70). Then on June 23, 
2011 the US Treasury Department, referring to presidential Executive Order 13382 of July 1, 
2005 imposed sanctions on Tidewater for their alleged ownership by the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Katzman, 2015: 44). The US Treasury Department 
accused IRGC and the Iranian government of using Tidewater seaports to transport arms, 
ammunitions and related materials, in violation of United Nations Security Council 
resolutions. As a result, all assets belonging to Tidewater within US jurisdiction were 
effectively frozen. Additionally, US persons were prohibited from engaging in transactions 
and activities with or involving Tidewater. 
Apart from Tidewater, Iran Air, the national carrier airline of Iran was also designated 
by the US Treasury Department for “providing material and logistical support and services 
to the IRGC and Iran’s Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics” (U.S. Department 
of Treasury, 2007). Then on Oct 12, 2011 another Iranian commercial airline known as 
Mahan Air, was sanctioned for providing financial, material, logistical and technological 
support to the IRGC (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2016). On November 21, 2011 President 
Obama issued Executive Order 13590, and targeted Iran’s energy sector. The order prohibited 
a US person from providing goods, services, technology or support for Iran’s energy and 
petrochemical sector (Katzman, 2011: 4). Executive Order 13590 expanded on existing 
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energy-related sanctions to authorize sanctions against persons that knowingly provide goods, 
services, technology, or support above certain limited monetary thresholds (US$ 5 million per 
annum) to Iran that could directly and significantly contribute to either the maintenance or 
enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources located in Iran or to the 
maintenance or expansion of Iran’s domestic production of petrochemical products 
(Katzman, 2011: 4). Thus, paralysing Iran energy sector seem to be the ultimate priority for 
Washington. 
On November 21, 2011 the Department of Treasury invoked section 311 of the US 
Patriot Act and designated Iran as a “money laundering concern” (Mohammed and Lawder, 
2011). Consequently, Iranian banks were only granted minimal access to the US financial 
market and/or sector. Then on the last day of 2011, specifically on the December 31, 2011, 
President Obama signed the yearly National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) for the year 
2012 (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2011). Section 1045 of the act imposed new sanctions on 
Iran. The section specified sanctions on foreign banks that still maintain financial transactions 
with Iran’s Central Bank. Among the sanctions, is that foreign banks doing business with the 
Central Bank of Iran will be banned from opening accounts in the US, while concessions 
were given to importers of Iranian oil, encouraging them to reduce their purchases in order to 
get exemption from the sanctions established under the NDAA. However, in my opinion the 
clause pertaining to exemption from sanctions is tricky. This is because there is no 
specification as to how much reduction will be enough to merit exemption from the 
sanctions. 
On February 5, 2012 President Obama issued Executive Order 13599, “blocking 
property of the government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions” (U.S Federal Register, 
2012). Section one of the Executive Order read the following: 
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that the president of the United States hereby order “all property and interests 
in property of the government of Iran, including the Central Bank of Iran, that 
are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that 
are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States 
person, including any foreign branch, are blocked and may not be transferred, 
paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in (U.S Federal Register, 2013: 
560.211).  
In any case, Executive Order 13599 is an expansion of the 2012 National Defence 
Authorization Act to include a blockage of all property of Iranian government and those 
owned by the Central Bank of Iran.  
Then on April 26, 2012 the US president issued Executive Order 13606, targeting the 
Iranian government for alleged human rights violations and abuses through information 
technology (Federal Register Archives, 2012). Consequently, all information technology 
companies were mandated to make sure that their products were not used by the regime in 
Tehran to carry out human rights abuses through network disruptions, monitoring, and other 
uses. Furthermore, the order blacklisted some government officials and bar them from entry 
into the United States for their alleged involvement in human rights violation using 
information technology platforms. On July 30, President Obama issued Executive Order 
13622, targeting foreign entities and/or financial institutions that maintained trade 
relationship with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and Naftiran Intertrade Company 
by purchasing oil, petroleum, or petrochemical products from them (Federal Register 
Archives, 2012).  
Thereafter, on August 10, 2012, President Obama signed into law, “the Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act” (ITRSHRA). The act significantly expanded the list 
of sanctions against foreign financial institutions cooperating with Iran’s energy sectors, as 
well as on entities involved with human rights abuses in Iran (Federal Register Archives, 
2012). In addition, the act amended portions of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) of 1996, the 
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Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010, and 
section 1245 of the 2012 National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) to increase the 
pressure on Iran to withdraw from nuclear proliferation and relinquish its nuclear ambition. 
Among the amendments provided in the act is that foreign subsidiaries of US companies were 
banned from having any transaction with Iran (Federal Register Archives, 2012). It also 
established a requirement whereby companies issuing securities have to verify with the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission whether they or their affiliates knowingly engaged in 
activities that may warrant sanctions. In essence, the act significantly strengthened previous 
sanctions against Iran, and particularly those imposed on the oil and gas sector. 
On October 9, 2012 the US president issued Executive Order 13628 (Federal Register 
Archives, 2012). The order significantly enhanced sanctions against Iran as well as provided 
a stronger enforcement mechanism for other laws prohibiting activity with or involving Iran. 
Most significantly, the order re-emphasized the sanctions contained in the Iranian 
Transactions Regulations (ITR) that prohibited US parent companies’ owned or controlled 
non US subsidiaries from having any dealings with Iran and the Iranian government (Federal 
Register Archives, 2012). Consequently, on October 22, 2012, the Department of Treasury 
through Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) renamed the Iran Transactions Regulations 
(ITR) to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR). However, the sanctions 
contained in the ITR were entirely re-imposed under ITSR. In addition, Executive Order 
13628 allowed the US president through OFAC to freeze assets owned by entities determined 
to be involved with censorship within Iran (Federal Register Archives, 2012). 
On January 2, 2013 President Obama signed into law the National Defence 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for the year 2013. The act significantly expanded existing US 
economic sanctions against Iran and targeted non US third parties that continued to do 
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business with Iran (Cordesman; Gold and Coughlin-Schulte, 2024: 4). In addition, it 
sanctioned entities that provide goods and services to Iran’s energy, shipbuilding, shipping, 
and port sectors, as well as those that supply semi-finished metals and related products to 
Iran. 
4.1.5. Sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program by International Organizations 
Apart from the US that has maintained sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program since 
the 1990’s; the UN has also imposed four rounds of economic sanctions against Iran on the 
same issue, to deter Iran from developing a nuclear bomb. The sanctions were imposed 
between 2006 and 2010 (Nakanishi, 2015: 26). Similarly, the EU on its part has imposed 
other sets of economic sanctions on Iran between 2010 and 2012 aimed at achieving same 
result as those imposed by the US and the UN (Nakanishi, 2015: 26-27). Despite all the 
sanctions imposed against Iran’s nuclear program, there are a number of reasons why the 
country is aspiring to join the “nuclear club.” First, Iranian leaders seem to believe that 
having a nuclear weapon will result in Iran’s dominance in the Middle East (Hufbauer; 
Schott; Elliott and Oegg, 2007: 233) and thus it would increase the country’s bargaining 
power in the region. Second, Iran feels uncomfortable with the fact that Israel may have 
acquired nuclear weapon. In that case, acquiring nuclear weapons will offer it protection from 
an attack from Israel and also restore balance of power in the region. Third, there is an 
ideological perception among Iranian leaders that having such advanced weapons would 
show off Iran’s military and scientific dexterity to the rest of the world (Hufbauer; Schott; 
Elliott and Oegg, 2007: 233).  
4.1.5.1. Sanctions imposed by the UN 
 In February 2003, The National Council of Resistance on Iran revealed that it has 
built nuclear facilities near Natanz and Arak, claiming it was using the technology for 
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peaceful purposes (Wright, 2010: 79). Consequently, the UN nuclear monitoring body, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was mandated to inspect the facility and make 
recommendation based on the NPT agreement. Thereupon, the IAEA Board of Governors on 
September 12, 2003 adopted a resolution mandating Iran to cease all uranium enrichment, 
reprocessing of fuel rods and related activities (Davenport, 2015). The IAEA resolution 
requires Iran to declare all materials relevant to its uranium enrichment program on or before 
October 31, 2003 and also permit IAEA inspectors to investigate and/or scrutinize the 
facilities (U.S Congress report, 2003: 28900). However, the US alleged that Iran has hatched 
a clandestine plan to develop nuclear weapons and sought to refer the case to the Security 
Council. Then in 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors produced a vague report that is marred 
by varied interpretations, although the most wildly held view is that Iran’s nuclear program 
did not comply with NPT standards. For clarity, the IAEA inspector’s report states that “it 
could not confirm that Iran was not pursuing undeclared nuclear activities” (Toumaj, 2015: 
1). In essence, the report did not prove that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapon neither did it 
disprove it. Then on July 31, 2006 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 calling on 
Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment programs by August 31, 2006 (S/RES/1696/2006). 
 Responding to Council’s Resolution 1696, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
said that Iran will not yield to “the language of force and threats” (Jafarzadeh, 2007: 234). He 
insisted that Iran’s nuclear program was for peaceful purposes when he stated following: 
Basically, there is no talk of nuclear weapons. There is no discussion of 
nuclear weapons, we are not a threat to anybody even the Zionist regime, 
which is a definite enemy for the people of the region. They may impose some 
restrictions on us under pressure. But will they be able to prevent the thoughts 
of a nation? […] will they be able to prevent the progress and technology to a 
nation? They have to accept the reality of a powerful, peace-loving and 
developed Iran. This is in the interest of all governments and all nations 
whether they like it or not (Conroy, 2006). 
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 Following Tehran’s neglect of a UN deadline to halt its uranium enrichment, the 
Security Council adopted resolution 1737 on December 23, 2006 and imposed economic 
sanctions against Iran. The sanctions contained in Resolution 1737 were in twofold. First, it 
prohibited the supply of sensitive nuclear materials and technology to Iran. Second, it froze 
the assets of individuals and entities that were involved in Iran’s uranium enrichment 
activities. Acting upon Resolution 1737, the IAEA gave Iran a 60 day grace period to suspend 
its uranium enrichment in exchange for suspension of the UN sanctions (S/RES/1737/2006). 
However, Tehran turned down the offer. Following Tehran’s defiance of Resolution 1737 and 
the IAEA’s proposal, the Security Council passed Resolution 1747 on March 24, 2007 and 
imposed additional sanctions against Iran (Davenport, 2015). Resolution 1747 prohibited UN 
member States from trading with Iran equipment or materials that could aid or facilitate its 
nuclear or ballistic missile development. In addition, it strengthened the sanctions contained 
in Resolution 1737, particularly the asset freeze. Consequently, the assets of 28 people and 
entities accused of providing support to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs were 
seized, of which more than half of those affected were linked to the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (Davenport, 2015). Reacting to Council’s decision to adopt Resolution 1747, the 
Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told Council members that no-matter the 
severity of sanctions, they cannot deter Iran’s nuclear development when he made the 
following statement: 
The world must know-and it does-that even the harshest political and 
economic sanctions or other threats are far too weak to coerce the Iranian 
nation to retreat from their legal and legitimate demands. He added that 
suspension is neither an option nor a solution (Olson, 2007). 
Tehran however, rejected the sanctions citing its right to enrich uranium without external 
interference and within the ambit of the international law. 
 318 
 
 As a response to Tehran’s failure to suspend uranium enrichment and heavy-water-
related projects as contained in previous Security Council Resolutions on Iran’s nuclear 
program, on March 3, 2008 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1803 and imposed 
additional sanctions against select Iranian officials (Security Council Press Release, 2008). 
Resolution 1803 requires member States to refuse entry into their territories of individuals 
involved in Iran’s nuclear development. It also expanded sanctions on the sale of WMD 
equipment to Iran and urge member States to be “vigilant over the activities of financial 
institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, particularly with Bank Melli 
and Bank Saderat” (Kaussler, 2014: 61). Furthermore, it called for thorough inspection of 
Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines cargo suspected of proliferation 
activities, while Iran was instructed to stop any research and development activities associated 
with centrifuges and uranium enrichment. Just like others, Iran once again rejected the 
sanctions, claiming that its nuclear program was solely for peaceful purposes as permitted by 
the NPT. 
 Following the failures of Security Council Resolution 1696 and Resolution 1737 of 
2006; also Resolution 1747 of 2007 and Resolution 1803 of 2008 to deter Iran from further 
uranium enrichment, the Security Council on June 9, 2010 adopted Resolution 1929 imposing 
another set of sanctions against Iran. Unlike previous sanctions, Resolution 1929, took a step 
further by establishing a panel of experts that will monitor the implementation of the 
sanctions (Davenport, 2015). The resolution banned Iran from investing in nuclear and missile 
technology abroad, while member States were prohibited from selling heavy weaponry such 
as missiles, tanks, military aircraft, and warships to Iran. Also the resolution sanctioned 
entities affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, whilst it toughened rules on financial 
transactions with Iranian banks by prohibiting Member States from permitting Iranian banks 
to establish branches in their territories and urged them to refrain from entering into 
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relationships with them. In addition, the resolution expanded the list of individuals and 
companies with asset freeze and travel ban (Davenport, 2015). Reacting to Resolution 1929, 
Mohammad Khazaee, the ambassador of Iran to the United Nations said that the new 
sanctions will not force Iran to change its policy when said: 
No amount of pressure and mischief will be able to break our nation’s 
determination to pursue and defend its legal and inalienable […] Iran never 
will bow to the hostile actions and pressures by these few powers and will 
continue to defend its rights (BBC News, 2010).  
In line with Khazaee’s position, President Mahmud Ahmadinejad was quoted as saying, “I 
gave one of the [world powers] a message that the resolutions you issue are like a used 
handkerchief which should be thrown in the dustbin” (BBC News, 2010). In essence, Tehran 
ones again undermined the sanctions. 
 Apart from the aforementioned resolutions, the Security Council has adopted two 
other resolutions in respect to Iran’s nuclear program; however these resolutions did not 
impose any further sanctions. Resolution 1984 was adopted by the Security Council on June 
9, 2011. It elongated the tenure of the expert panel monitoring sanctions against Iran until 
June 9, 2012, while resolution 2049 was adopted on June 7, 2012, which again extended the 
mandate of the expert panel until July 9, 2013 when they will present their final report to 
Council (United Nations Press Release, 2010).  
 In conclusion, the UN employed sanctions as a measure and/or mechanism to halt Iran 
from enriching uranium, however, Tehran’s defiance to the sanctions have cast doubt on the 
efficacy of using economic sanctions to remould the behaviour of the leaders or change 
Tehran’s policy. Instead, there are speculations, by Western countries and particularly by 
Israel that Tehran is on the verge of producing a nuclear bomb despite an arrear of sanctions 
imposed against the country. In my opinion, the assumption of Western countries and Israel 
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about Iran’s nuclear program is tricky owing to the fact that available empirical evidence 
shows that Iran’s nuclear program still lacks the capacity to produce bomb and there is no 
evidence to the contrary (Kittrie, 2015). An example is the June 2014 report of the UN Panel 
of Experts on implementing sanctions against Iran. In the report, the Panel of Experts 
acknowledged that Iran “continues to seek key items abroad, preferably from established, 
high-quality suppliers” (Kittrie, 2015). The above submission by the Panel of Experts clearly 
shows that Iran nuclear program is far from being able to produce weapons of mass 
destruction. Nevertheless, Iran’s nuclear programme must be stopped, but that entails devising 
alternative approach other than economic sanctions.  
4.1.5.2. Sanctions imposed by the EU 
 Since inception, the EU has tactically avoided adopting the word economic sanctions. 
Although some of its sanctions could be adjudge to have economic elements, however, the 
union has carefully avoided using the phraseology “economic sanctions” in it sanctions 
policies. For example, EU sanctions against Zimbabwe despite having all the elements of 
economic sanctions were dubbed targeted “restrictive measures.” Some observers argue that 
the EU considers the term economic sanctions a dangerous phrase, which may harm its own 
interest both economically and diplomatically even without producing a desired outcome 
(Tabrizi and Santini, 2012: 2). However, in July 2010, EU shifted its stance and introduced 
the term “economic sanctions” in its sanctions policy and strategy. Consequently, Iran became 
the first victim of EU’s economic sanctions when the union imposed sanctions on former’s 
energy and financial sector, banning the import of crude oil and blacklisted most of Iranian 
banks (Tabrizi and Santini, 2012: 2). Although the EU has previously imposed sanctions 
against other countries for offences ranging from States sponsoring of terrorism (Syria and 
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Libya in the 1990’s) and gross violation of human rights, Iran once again was the first country 
the EU sanctioned on issue relating to nuclear proliferation (Tabrizi and Santini, 2012: 1). 
 According to the EU, the objective of implementing punitive measures against Iran is 
to persuade Tehran to comply with its international obligations and to hinder its development 
of sensitive technologies that will facilitate its nuclear and missile programs (Tabrizi and 
Santini, 2012: 2). In 2010, EU prohibited its member States from exporting and/or supplying 
Iran with dual-use items and technology, as well as other equipment that could potentially 
facilitate Iran’s nuclear program, or aid the regime in oppressing its population. In 2011, the 
EU imposed another sect of sanctions on a number of Iranian officials for their alleged 
involvement in human rights violation. Those listed were banned from entry into the EU 
territory while their assets within the EU were seized. Then in March 2012, the EU adopted a 
decision and banned provision of financial communication services to exchange data with the 
Central Bank of Iran and some other banks in the country (EU Council Decision 
2012/152/CFSP). Acting on EU Council decision, the world’s biggest electronic payment 
system, Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) cut-off its 
services to Iranian banks (Norman, 2012). The decision of SWIFT to expel Iran from its 
services, posed instant difficulties to entities buying Iranian oil in terms of payment. Thus 
Iran’s oil export was badly affected whilst foreign revenue dropped to a significant low. Also 
in the later part of 2012, the EU adopted additional sanctions against Iran. This time the 
Union imposed a total ban on the importation of Iranian natural gas into the EU (Buonanno; 
Cuglesan and Henderson, 2015: 53), as well as a ban on the export of certain sensitive 
materials such as metal, shipbuilding technology and oil storage facilities to Iran. 
In essence, the EU sanctions against Iran compliments the US unilateral and the UN 
comprehensive economic sanctions against Iran, which aims at sabotaging Tehran’s nuclear 
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program by denying the economy access to foreign finances and support. However, the 
sanctions were breached by EU citizens and entities. Of particular note is that the EU 
sanctions that banned the export to Iran of dual-use items and technology that could facilitate 
the country’s nuclear program. According to Kern (2014), more than a dozen EU countries 
breached the sanctions and exported dual-use items to Iran, though some of the trades were 
carried out lawfully and in compliance with export control regulations. Outside that, there are 
other cases of high level illegal export of dual-use equipment from the EU to Iran. For 
example, in January 2013, Spanish police arrested two suspects in the Basque Country and 
seized a truck loaded with huge number of nickel and chromium alloy valves that were 
intended for export to Iran (Kern, 2014). Then on April 1, 2014 Spain’s Civil Guard arrested 
four people, an Iranian and three Spaniards for attempting to export to Iran industrial 
equipment and technical blueprints that could be used in producing unconventional weapons. 
Figure 8: Dual-use equipment seized by Spanish police on April 1, 2014 
 
Source: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4256/iran-europe-nuclear-dual-use | International 
Policy Council, Gatestone Institute. 
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Apart from Spain, in May 2013 two Switzerland based commodity companies 
Glencore Xstrata and Trafigura were accused of alumina for aluminium swap deals with 
Iranian companies. According to Reuters’ news, Glencore alone had supplied thousand tons of 
alumina to an Iranian company that is associated with the country’s nuclear program (Reuters, 
2013). Also in February 2014, German police in Bonn arrested a man suspected of exporting 
to Iran items that could be used to produce missile weapons (Kern, 2014). In view of the 
above examples, the EU sanctions against Iran particularly its ban on export of certain goods 
and technology to Iran are perceived not to be effective owing to the activities of smugglers. 
Even though, the aforementioned cases are believed to represent only the tip of the iceberg of 
the illegal trade in dual-use items, between Europe and Iran. Analysts believe that smugglers 
of these illegal materials to Iran succeed more often than they are caught. 
4.2. A review of other cases of nuclear proliferation 
In different occasions, economic sanctions have been imposed with the aim to 
checkmate nuclear proliferation. Cases abound where sanctions and threat of sanctions have 
been used particularly by the United States to forestall nuclear ambitions. Although it is 
difficult to analyse the impact and/or degree of contribution made by sanctions in each case, 
in terms of persuading a government to abandon its nuclear policy, however scholars such as 
Hufbauer; Schott; Elliott and Oegg, (2007), argue that sanctions have been successfully used 
to curb nuclear proliferation, though not in all cases where they were employed. In their book 
Economic sanctions reconsidered, Hufbauer et al. classified sanctions episodes against 
nuclear proliferation into three categories: successful, partially-successful and unsuccessful 
(Hufbauer; Schott; Elliott and Oegg, (2007: 3). I would rather say that one has to be cautious 
when classifying sanctions episode as a “successful” or “unsuccessful.” This is because the 
outcome of every episode can be judged differently, using a different barometer, benchmark, 
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method or mechanism of assessment. In any case, an outcome of every sanctions episode can 
be questioned. The use of sanctions to engage and/or preempt a country from developing 
weapon of mass destruction is sensitive and may be dicey in some cases. This is because 
governments with nuclear ambition always keep details and information about the program 
secret. Even when there is available information about a specific case, it is still difficult to 
ascertain the contribution of sanctions to the outcome of the particular case. In some cases 
sanctions can only hamper the progress of a nuclear program at the short run, a situation 
where a country may suspend its nuclear ambition only to recommence in a later date. This 
type of situation makes it difficult to determine the success of sanctions in terms of their 
actual contribution to the outcome of each episode.  
4.2.1. Taiwan 
Taiwan is not officially recognized as a sovereign State by most countries and even 
the United Nations. In that case, it cannot be a party to the NPT or International Export 
Control Regimes. The Island is being claimed by both People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
the Republic of China (ROC), although it is ruled under de facto government in Taipei. In 
1956, under the regime of Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan pursued nuclear ambition and 
constructed its first nuclear reactor at the National Tsinghua University (Trenear-Harvey, 
2011: 203). Subsequently, in the 1960’s, it launched a training program for atomic energy 
specialists and procurement of nuclear facilities to aid its nuclear ambition (Albright and Gay, 
1998: 54-60). Some scholars suggest that Taiwan’s nuclear ambition was propelled by nuclear 
explosion carried out by the PRC in 1964, which left Taiwanese petrified. The then leader 
Chiang Kai-shek feared that Taiwan could be exterminated in a single attack and that defense 
or retaliation from allies such as the US might come too late. Thus it became imperative for 
Taiwan to seek self help by developing a defensive and/or retaliatory measure that will be 
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readily available in the case of any eventuality. According to Chiang Kai-shek, “only war 
would leave us with a living path, not fighting this war would lead us to death. Rather than 
dying by Chinese Communist’s atomic bombs, we should fight and die on the battlefield” 
(Chang, 2011: 9).  
To facilitate it nuclear program, Taiwan started to construct a heavy water production 
plant and a plutonium separation plant and secretly developed a reprocessing facility and 
acquired a research reactor. The US National Intelligence estimated that if permitted, by 1972 
Taiwan will develop the capacity to test a nuclear device and at the most between 1976 and 
1979 (Chang, 2011: 9-10). Following this revelation, the IAEA was tasked to inspect 
Taiwan’s nuclear facilities to determine the country’s level of nuclear activities. During the 
IAEA inspection that lasted between 1976 and 1977, the agency documented discrepancies in 
Taiwan’s nuclear activities, whilst it was discovered that research reactors used for the project 
where supplied from Canada. Other materials used for the nuclear project were from 
Germany, and France including US-supplied heavy water, uranium from South Africa and 
technological advice from Israel and Norway (Albright and Gay, 1998: 54-60). The indication 
of the intelligence report that Taiwan has the potentials to achieve nuclear capability within a 
short time frame became an issue of concern to the United States and consequently, 
Washington exerted pressure on Taiwan to abandon its nuclear program or else it will cancel 
both economic aid and military support to the country. Also there was threat of sanctions if 
Taipei fails to comply with US request to forswear its nuclear proliferation program (Albright 
and Gay, 1998: 54-60). In this period, Taiwan relied heavily on US aid and military support 
and as a result, Taipei compromised and gave up its nuclear aspiration in 1976 to avert 
imminent reaction from Washington. In essence, Taiwan gave up its nuclear program not 
because of imposed sanctions, but due to Washington’s threat to do so and to withdrawal 
other ties and support. Hufbauer; Schott; Elliott and Oegg (2007) categorized Taiwan among 
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successful cases where sanctions and/or threat of sanctions as the case may be, were used to 
stop an impending nuclear proliferation.  
4.2.2. Libya  
Libya is another country that has been sanctioned in many occasions. The country has 
been a target of economic sanctions by the US and the United Nations on issues ranging from 
human rights abuses, State sponsor of terrorism to nuclear weapon proliferation. Although 
most of the sanctions imposed against Libya have to do with terrorism, however, Washington 
has always accused Tripoli of nuclear weapon proliferation. For example, a US intelligence 
report revealed that between 1978 and 1981 Libya purchased more than 2,000 tons of lightly 
processed uranium from Niger and through the help of the soviets, it launched a 10 megawatt 
nuclear research reactor at Tajoura (Arms Control Association, 2014). Following the report, 
Libya was compelled to ratify its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), thus permitting the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities. Then in 1982, 
Libya ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) (Kahana and Suwaed, 
2009: 191), which prohibits member States from developing, producing, and stockpiling 
offensive biological materials or equipments. Despite Libya showing cooperation with 
international agencies by ratifying treaties on non-proliferation, the country was increasingly 
involved in terrorism activities. On January 7, 1986 the US President Ronald Reagan imposed 
sanctions on Libya for its involvement in December 1985 attacks at airports in Rome and 
Vienna. The sanctions include a comprehensive ban on exports to Libya, as well as 
commercial contracts and travel to the country, while all Libyan assets within the US were 
frozen (Cooke, 1990: 196). Then following the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 and 
French airliner UTA Flight 772 in 1989, Libya was accused of having a hand in the bombing 
and consequently the Security Council adopted Resolution 748 and imposed sanctions on 
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Libya. The sanctions include arms embargo and air travel restrictions (Arms Control 
Association, 2014). On November 11, 1993 the Security Council adopted Resolution 883 and 
imposed another set of sanctions on Libya, banning export of oil equipments to Libya and 
froze some assets belonging to the regime (Bassiouni and Wise, 1995: 25).  
A report published by the IAEA in July 1995, states that Tripoli is making a “strategic 
decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities, including gas centrifuge uranium enrichment” 
(Gawdat, 2008: 110; Rubin, 2014). Consequently, the US president on August 5, 1996 signed 
into law the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). The act empowers the president to sanction any 
foreign entity that invests more than $40 million a year in Libya’s oil industry. Furthermore, 
reports from the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction alleged that in the year 2000, centrifuge technology was 
shipped from Pakistan to Libya (Arms Control Association, 2014). While a CIA report in 
2003 accused Libya of sourcing for nuclear weapons materials and technology in Western 
Europe.  
Then on August 3, 2002 President George W. Bush signed the “ILSA Extension Act 
of 2001,” and postponed the tenure of ILSA for another five years while the $40 million 
yearly investment limit for foreign entities was reduced to $20million above which sanctions 
will be imposed. On September 12, 2003 the Security Council voted to lift sanctions against 
Libya and the vote ended in a 13 to 0 vote in favour of lifting the sanctions. Although the US 
and France did not take part in the vote, however, Council officially lifted the sanctions (Arms 
Control Association, 2014). On December 19, 2003 Libya denounced its nuclear program and 
promised to eliminate its chemical and nuclear weapons programs. Furthermore, the country 
reaffirmed its commitments to the NPT and BTWC agreements, as well as a promise to limit 
the range and payloads of its missiles to conform to the guidelines set by the Missile 
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Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Although UN sanctions have already been lifted before 
Libya denounced its nuclear program, scholars argue that sanctions played a significant role 
in Tripoli’s decision to relinquish its nuclear ambition. Scholars argue that although UN 
sanctions were lifted, the US still maintained its unilateral sanctions against Libya. In fact 
Hufbauer; Schott; Elliott and Oegg (2007: 12-13) argue that Tripoli acceded its nuclear 
program because of its desire to “gain access to American oil field technology and know-how” 
which obviously will not be possible unless sanctions were lifted. In other words, sanctions 
compelled Libya to abandon its nuclear program in order to gain oil field technology from the 
United States. Sanctions were adjudged to be successful in this very case albeit with 
reservations.  
4.2.3. India  
After gaining independence from Britain, Indian became a vocal voice against nuclear 
proliferation. A year after gaining independence, precisely in 1948 India’s spiritual leader 
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi denounced nuclear proliferation when he stated thusly: “I 
regard the employment of the atom bomb for the wholesale destruction of men, women and 
children as the most diabolical use of science” (Veeravalli, 2014: 95). As a follow up, India 
presented a proposal to the United Nations General Assembly, expressing the need for an 
effective international control mechanism to checkmate atomic energy and technology 
(Arundhati, 1997: 240). Then in 1965, it proposed a nondiscriminatory nonproliferation treaty 
while in 1978, it proposed an international convention that will implement an outright ban on 
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (Charnysh, 2009: 1). In 1982, it proposed a 
“nuclear freeze,” and emphasized a total prohibition on the manufacturing of materials needed 
to produce nuclear weapon (Charnysh, 2009: 1). At the UN General Assembly Special 
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Session on Disarmament in 1988, it ones more presented a framework and/or guideline 
suggesting total elimination of nuclear weapons.  
Initially, India had been an anti-nuclear weapon crusader and its nuclear technology 
was solely for peaceful purposes, mainly to produce inexpensive electricity. India’s nuclear 
program started in 1955 when it built its first reactor (Aspara Research Reactor) with the help 
of Britain. The subsequent year, it acquired a heavy-water moderated research reactor from 
Canada while the US supplied it with heavy water for the project. In addition, the US 
facilitated the building and fueling of its other reactors located in Tarapur (Charnysh, 2009: 
1).  India’s nuclear ambition remained solely for peaceful purposes in the 1950’s, until in the 
mid 1960’s when it veered from peaceful nuclear program to the production of nuclear bomb. 
Analysts blame this change in India’s nuclear attitude on the escalating regional instability 
between India and its neighbors particularly with Pakistan and China. The protracted dispute 
between India and Pakistan dating back to 1947 when British India was incorporated into the 
Muslim State of Pakistan was believed to be a contributory factor. In addition, India’s defeat 
in the 1962 border conflict with China sent a chilling message to Indian leaders who 
considered India’s military strategy and might to be weak. Then in 1964, China tested a 
nuclear weapon and in April 1970, it again launched a long range rocket into orbit (Charnysh, 
2009: 2). Leaders of India interpreted China’s actions as an indirect message to India, 
signifying its readiness to launch nuclear attack on distant targets.  
In response to China’s nuclear test, India deemed it of utmost importance to acquire its 
own nuclear weapon as a guarantee for safety and maintenance of its sovereignty. In a few 
years, precisely in 1974, India carried out it first “peaceful” nuclear explosion, which drew 
mix concern from the international community (Charnysh, 2009: 2). Then in 1983, it launched 
an Integrated Guided Missile Program (IGMP) and shortly after, in 1989, it tested both short 
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and medium range missiles. Following a successful missile test, the then director of the CIA 
William H. Webster, testified before the US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and 
informed the committee that: “there are indicators that tell us India is interested in 
thermonuclear weapons capability” (Charnysh, 2009: 2). Consequently, the US and fourteen 
other Western countries including Japan, Australia, Canada, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden 
imposed sanctions against India for unlawful nuclear activities (Morrow and Carriere, 1999: 
5). The sanctions include total cancellation of aid and the suspension of non-humanitarian 
lending to India. Japan cancelled development aid to India valued at $30 million as well as 
loans worth $1.2 billion. Germany on her part, suspended bilateral aid negotiation with India 
and cancelled development aid worth $168 million. Also Denmark cancelled its aid to India 
worth $28 million while Sweden cancelled $119 million worth of aid. Furthermore, Canada 
and Australia suspended their aid valued at $9.8 million and $2.6 million respectively 
(Morrow and Carriere, 1999: 5). In addition, the World Bank and G-8 countries joined the 
sanctions by revoking non-humanitarian lending agreement with India. However, India 
defiled these numerous sanctions and went ahead to produce a nuclear weapon. In 2012, the 
Federation of American Scientists reported that India possesses between 80 and 100 nuclear 
warheads (Raj, 2015).  
Of important note is that India is not and has never been a party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Obviously, sanctions could not deter Indian from nuclear proliferation. 
Hufbauer; Schott; Elliott and Oegg (2007) concluded that sanctions were unsuccessful in the 
case of India and this has raised more questions as to the actual contribution of sanctions in 
other cases they were claimed to be successful. 
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4.2.4. Pakistan 
 Pakistan launched its nuclear program around 1952 and in 1955, the country 
participated in the US Atoms for Peace program (Weiss, 2003: 34). Initially, it was believed 
that Pakistan was seeking civilian nuclear capabilities and a nuclear cooperation agreement 
was signed between Washington and Islamabad, under which the later was offered $350,000 
in aid to facilitate its supposedly peaceful nuclear program (Charnysh, 2009: 1). However, as 
the relationship between Pakistan and India worsened, coupled with India’s successful nuclear 
test in 1974, albeit being tagged “peaceful nuclear explosion,” Pakistan reconsidered its 
nuclear ambition and was determined to take the next step and acquire its own nuclear arsenal 
(Charnysh, 2009). Although there were different reasons cited for the change in Pakistan’s 
nuclear objective, the most general view was that Pakistani Leader’s believed that acquiring 
nuclear weapon will counterbalance Pakistan’s conventional inferiority posture against India 
and earn it the prestige associated with being a member of the nuclear club. Prime Minister 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was quoted as saying that, India’s nuclear activities were aimed at 
intimidating Pakistan and a vehicle used by India to establish regional hegemony. He 
maintained that his subjects will “eat grass” to keep up with India (Epstein, 1977: 19). 
Thereupon, Pakistan launched a clandestine nuclear weapons program and in September 
1974, the CIA estimated that in 10 years, Pakistan would be able to acquire nuclear weapon. 
Following available intelligent reports on Pakistan’s ambiguous nuclear activities, the UN in 
1979 suspended its military and economic aid to Pakistan (Charnysh, 2009: 2).  
Apart from the UN, the US congress passed the Pressler Amendment, cancelling all 
US foreign aid to Pakistan until a time when it had denounced its nuclear weapon program. 
Following a confirmation by the US in 1990 that Pakistan was actually progressing in 
developing a nuclear bomb, Washington slammed Pakistan with sanctions and all economic 
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and military aid from Washington to Islamabad were effectively cancelled. Despite sanctions, 
in May 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced that Pakistan has conducted 
successfully nuclear tests. He boasted that whether Pakistan was recognized as a nuclear 
weapons power or not the truth is that it has successfully acquired nuclear power (Charnysh, 
2009: 2). It is estimated that Pakistan has about 60 nuclear warheads (Norris and Kristensen, 
2007: 71) as the country continues to produce fissile material, which can be used to expand its 
weapons arsenal. Clearly, sanctions failed to stop Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapon; 
another case challenging the notion that sanctions as a single policy tool has the capacity to 
deter nuclear proliferation. 
Conclusively, I would say that the degree of successes and failures in using sanctions 
as a mechanism to forestall nuclear proliferation is relative. In fact of all the cases discussed, 
sanctions cannot be regarded as the single factor that determined the outcome of each 
particular episode. I would argue that in the cases which sanctions were claimed to have 
impeded nuclear proliferation, acquiring nuclear weapon was not the primary goal or end 
game for those countries. Although Taiwan at some point changed its nuclear program 
ambition from civilian purpose to military purpose; however, nothing suggests that acquiring 
nuclear bomb was its ultimate goal. As the thesis also reveal, Libyan leader Muammar 
Gaddafi, was more interested in gaining access to key oil technology than pursuing a nuclear 
program. Therefore, imposing economic sanctions as an arbiter to achieve a nuclear free 
world, without recourse to their impact on the rights and well-being of the civilian population 
is worrisome; hence it will be the subject of out next discussion.  
4.3. The Impact of economic sanctions on Iran and Iranians 
As I mentioned earlier, there are many justifications and/or reasons for imposing 
economic sanctions against Iran. However, since the UN is a party to the economic sanctions 
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against the country, it is important to examine the contradiction in the organization’s (UN) 
position as a human rights safeguard and its role and/or contribution in rights violation. 
Against the principles of human rights, the UN policies and reactions against Iran suggest 
utilitarianism (Mehrabi, 2014: 55), “a situation where people express a strong sense of 
collective purpose, while their ultimate goal overriding all other, is to maximize the overall 
utility of all of them” (Lukes, 2003: 154). An impending problem with this view and/or notion 
is that it legitimizes the suffering and hardship imposed on civilians and otherwise innocent 
people, as long as their suffering and hardship will bring satisfaction and joy to the majority. 
Whilst sanctions against Iran may be justified on grounds of safeguarding the world against 
the threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the international community is witnessing a 
backlash resulting from the scandalous level of humanitarian consequences and rights 
violations resulting from such policies. The doctrine and/or principles of the UDHR suggest 
that human rights are those rights which are inherent to the human being (OHCHR, 2008: 3) 
and as such these rights must be enjoyed without restriction. However, the decision of the UN 
to maintain economic sanctions against the civilian otherwise innocent population of Iran 
seems hypocritical to the position of the UN on human rights protection. The position of the 
UN confirms the thesis Lukes (2003) when he notes that the notion and/or principle of 
defending human rights is almost generally accepted, whilst rights are also often violated and 
virtually everywhere, though much more in some places than in others.  
Economic sanctions imposed by the UN, the US and the EU against Iran’s nuclear 
program have in fact shifted from targeting nuclear technology to having disastrous effects on 
the civilian population and causing a huge humanitarian crisis. An array of economic 
sanctions imposed on the petroleum industry, cargo shipment and shipping insurance, 
followed by sanctions against the country’s banking system have damaged the economic 
bedrock of Iran and thus it has substantial negative impact on the well-being of civilians and 
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mostly the vulnerable groups within the Iranian societies. Although certain good were 
exempted from sanctions on humanitarian grounds, the glaring truth is that sanctions have 
acutely decreased Iranian people’s access to commodities and major services, virtually in 
every sector (International Institute for Peace, Justice and Human Rights (IIPJHR), 2013: 1). 
Considering their impact on the civilian population, one may ask: to what extent have 
sanctions been able to coerce the regime in Tehran to denounce and/or abandon its nuclear 
weapon program? A related question is: how long will Tehran be able to hold on to its nuclear 
policy, against the impact of sanctions and the inevitable humanitarian casualties resulting 
from them? Proponents of sanctions argue that lifting sanctions will give Iran “jail-exit or 
hostage-free” opportunity that will eventually enable the country to re-commence its nuclear 
program at a later time. Thus, instead of lifting the sanctions, harsher economic measures are 
being rolled out against the country.  
In my opinion, the proliferation of sanctions is largely propelled by an almost total 
lack of awareness of the cost this policy tool imposes on the civilian victims. Just like 
Zimbabwe, the impact of sanctions is so ruthless that they violate basic human rights of the 
Iranian citizens, and threatens their lives and quality of life. I will base my analysis on the 
information and answers elicited from my respondents and also data from the US 
departments, Iranian State authorities and other international organizations. Therefore, my 
analysis will be in threefold; first, I will present how sanctions have affected Iran’s economy 
in general, particularly its GDP and revenue accruable to the government. Second, I will 
analyze the impact of sanctions on certain core human rights of the Iranians, such as 
healthcare, education and quality standard of living. Third, I will present other economic 
elements or variables such as inflation; reviewing how such inauspicious economic factors is 
prompted by sanctions and their wider impact on the capability of the Iranian population to 
enjoy their rights.  
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In as much as I am not supporting Iran’s nuclear weapon program or other actions of 
Tehran that are deemed to be a threat to world peace and particularly capable of making the 
Middle East unsafe, my argument is that sanctions have not proved to be a reasonable solution 
to the nuclear impasse. Of course by signing the NPT agreement, Iran by law should not nurse 
the ambition of producing a nuclear weapon while if we consider the provisions of the UNDR 
and the 2005 world summit outcome, the UN and other parties involved should not have 
considered sanctions as a viable option to deter Iran’s ambiguous nuclear activities. 
Unarguably, the regime in Tehran has expressed defiance to calls by the UN to stop uranium 
enrichment and as such taking a tougher measure seems appropriate to the international 
community. The danger here, which has always been the case in other economic sanctions 
episodes, is that the main people that conceive and implement the policy and/or policies that 
result in sanctions are often not the ones that bear the brunt of the outcomes. Therefore, I 
consider it to be paradoxical for the US, EU and the UN, to engage in measures knowingly 
that violate the rights of the Iranian population in the name of providing global security. As it 
is, sanctions against Iran do not seem to serve as deterrence to nuclear proliferation; rather it 
is more of a parchment on the population. Giving that punishment maybe acceptable in certain 
situations, for example, when a person take part in an act of terrorism, genocide and gross 
human rights violation, however, it is only proper that people be punished for their personal 
action and not for the actions committed by others as it is witnessed in Iran and other 
countries where regime related economic sanctions are imposed on the population. 
4.3.1. A snapshot of the economy and economic figures 
Oil remains the major source of revenue to the economy and government of Iran. 
According to Farzanegan (2009: 489) oil accounts for 90 percent of export earnings and it 
provides 60 percent of government revenues. However, sanctions have decreased Iran’s oil 
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export by eliminating markets in which oil can be sold. Research has proved that the 
contraction of the oil sector can impact on the economy of an oil producing State in many 
ways. Firstly, a contraction in the oil sector lowers wealth and therefore lowers aggregate 
demand (Zhang, 2014: 18). Consequently, prices of non-tradable goods will fall, leading to 
depreciation of the real exchange rate. Secondly, a contraction in the oil sector affects labour 
and other factors of production. In the case of labour, it leads to job loss and increase 
unemployment. In the case of Iran, the situation is such that revenue from oil exports goes 
directly into the government pulse. In return the government utilizes part of the funds to 
provide subsidies for basic consumer goods and imports of critical inputs to production 
(Zhang, 2014). Thus a decrease in oil export implies a decrease in government revenue which 
invariably will affect government’s capability to support it developmental programs. This will 
prompt a decline in demand on the consumer side as well as decline in output on the 
production side (Behdad, 1988: 3). Based on micro economic assumptions, shifts in the 
aggregate demand supply will definitely affect prices of general goods. However, whether 
prices will increase or decrease depends on how the government responds to the situation. In 
essence, a country such as Iran that is dependent on oil is vulnerable to economic volatility in 
the event of fluctuation in oil production, oil export or decline in market price of oil.  
Sanctions targeting Iran have evolved over time, significantly involving a wider range 
of countries and directed at broader sectors of the Iranian economy. As noted earlier, 
sanctions episodes against Iran started on a unilateral basis by the United States, followed by 
the United Nations and then the EU. These sanctions aimed at reducing Iran’s major source of 
export revenue; its crude oil exports and severing Iran’s ties with the international financial 
system (Leslie; Marashi and Parsi, 2014: 5). Since much of Iran’s revenue earning comes 
from export of oil, imposing sanctions on the oil sector is perceived by proponents of 
sanctions as a means to an end, with respect to the country’s nuclear program. Although the 
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US has singularly imposed series of sanctions against Iran, however, combined sanctions by 
Washington, the UN and the EU against the country in 2010 marked the beginning of Iran’s 
economic waddle. When compared with other oil producing countries, it is evident that Iran’s 
economy is underperforming; oil production, oil export revenues, and economic growth 
estimates have fallen. For example, in 2010, Iran’s oil revenue declined by 18 percent 
whereas oil revenue of other oil producing countries increased by 50 percent in the same 
period (United States Government Accountability Office, 2013).  
The year 2012 however, was marred with significant decrease in oil production and 
export revenue accruable to Tehran. On March 1, 2012 the Dubai-based Noor Islamic Bank, 
which was accused of being the single most important channel for oil money transfers and 
repatriation severed business ties with Iran (Cowell, 2012) and weeks later, SWIFT suspended 
financial dealings with major Iranian financial institutions (Tabrizi, 2014: 2), resulting in an 
unexpected cash “hostage” abroad to Tehran. Then an EU sanctions in 2012 banning shipping 
and providing insurance cover for Iranian oil added to the country’s financial troubles. The 
impact of sanctions on Iran’s oil production and export could be seen from figure 9 below.  
Figure 9: Iran oil production and condensate from 2011 to 2014 
 
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com | U.S. Energy Information Administration 
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 Moving forward, it is important to present basic figures about Iran’s economy as a 
guide to understanding the impact of sanctions. Undoubtedly, Iran is among the richest 
countries in the world in terms of natural resources. The country is home to 10 percent of the 
world proven oil reserves (OPEC, 2013; View figure 10) and also 17 percent of the world 
natural gas reserves.  
Figure 10: OPEC share of world crude oil reserves, 2013 
 
Source: http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm | OPEC 
In 2011, Iran produces about 4 million barrels of oil daily (both crude and natural gas) while 
its domestic oil consumption was estimated at 1.8 million barrels a day. It’s GDP in terms of 
purchasing power parity was estimated at $990 billion or $474 billion according to official 
exchange rate (Kam and Even, 2013: 70-75). Then in 2012, its crude oil production dropped 
to about 1million to 1.5 million barrels a day (excluding natural gas). In general Iran’s export 
in 2011 was estimated at $110 billion and its trading partners were mostly Far East countries 
such as China, Turkey, India, South Korea and Japan. Furthermore, in the same year 2011, its 
foreign currency balanced at $80 billion, more than its import value for the same year while 
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the country’s external debt was estimated at $18 billion; far below its GDP. Government 
budget for 2011 was valued at $100 billion while budget deficit was estimated at 2.4 percent 
of the GDP (Kam and Even, 2013: 70-77). In essence, Iran ended the 2011 fiscal year on a 
positive note.  
In contrast to 2011, from 2012 onwards Iran’s economy experienced significant 
decline. It’s GDP, oil revenues, general export and import activities were hampered by 
sanctions. First, the EU oil embargo on Iran and subsequent isolation of Iranian banks 
hampered Iranian oil sales. Crude oil sales that stood on average of 2.5 million barrels a day 
in 2011 declined to less than 1 million barrels in mid 2012 and then it moved up to about 1.3 
million barrels in the last quarter of 2012. Estimates show that from 2012 to 2014 Iran lost 
about $2.5 billion each month as a result of decline in oil sales resulting from sanctions (Kam 
and Even, 2013: 70-75). With recent fall in global market price of oil, it is estimated that 
Iranian economy will experience more difficulties. Sanctions forced many international 
companies mainly of the United States and European origin to desert Iran while at the same 
time; they reduced their investment in the country (Kam and Even, 2013). The implication of 
this is that government revenues will continue to shrink whilst at the long run; the country 
may lack the expertise needed for the exploration of existing oil fields. Thus sanctions against 
Iran has affected its capability to access foreign finance and exchanges needed to provide 
essential goods, commodities and services to the Iranian public and ultimately, they have 
negative implication on the well-being of the population. 
4.3.2. Impact of sanctions on the human rights of Iranians  
Economic sanctions imposed against Iran’s nuclear energy has affected and in some 
cases violated the human rights of Iranians. Human rights ranging from healthcare, education 
and quality standard of living have been compromised by the brutal outcome of sanctions. 
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Although human rights are said to be universal, indivisible and inalienable (Dennis and 
Stewart, 2004: 462), however, sanctions as a tool of international diplomacy has defiled these 
characteristics of human rights and thus relegate them to a mere assumption. Given that the 
intended and continuous outcome of economic sanctions is to impose severe economic pain 
on the targeted population suggest that human rights are “relative” and not “universal” as 
claimed by the UDHR. Having said this, I review some human rights of the Iranians that have 
been violated by sanctions and their unpalatable outcomes.  
4.3.2.1. Right to health care  
Following an array of sanctions, the health sector of Iran is facing serious difficulties 
in providing adequate medical care to the population. Although medicines are exempted from 
sanctions, however, due to restriction on foreign finances, money transactions and proper 
insurance, the health sector and the pharmaceutical industries are finding it difficult to import 
medicines and medical materials (Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 2014: 2). This is 
because they are required to pay cash off-front before they can import medicines and by so 
doing, they secure offshore funds and/or loans at a very high interest rate. In August 2013, the 
US government issued a statement, saying that for humanitarian reasons, medical supplies are 
exempted from international sanctions. Subsequently, it expanded the list of medical supplies 
that can be exported to Iran without special licenses, so that they can be readily available to 
those that need them (Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 2014: 35; The Economist, 
2013). However, many companies and financial institutions remained reluctant to trade with 
Iran or fill orders from the country due to fear of penalties (The Economist, 2013) and lack of 
proper insurance. Again the suspension of Iranian major banks from SWIFT owing to EU 
sanctions has made it difficult to process supplier payments. As a result, it became very 
difficult to import goods, including medicines.   
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Owing to the difficulties in importing medicines and medical materials, Iran made a 
concerted effort at developing its local pharmaceutical industries. As reported by Almashat 
and Shirazi (2014) on Aljazeera, Iran’s health ministry officials claim that between 90 and 97 
percent of the medicines and medicinal products being used in the health sector are 
manufactured locally. In addition, about 50 percent of the raw materials needed as inputs are 
equally manufactured locally. However, the truth is that locally manufactured medicines are 
limited to less sophisticated diseases and ailments. Siamak Namazi (2013) in his article 
Blocking Medicine to Iran published in The New York Times confirmed this fact when he 
writes that Iran still needs to import and/or source for the most advanced and the most 
effective medicines for treatment of complicated ailments such as cancer and cardiovascular 
diseases overseas.  
According to the World Health Organization, Iran has the highest cancer prevalence in 
the Middle East. Latest statistical and epidemiologic surveys in Iran reveal that cancer and 
cardiovascular diseases are among the three ailments with the highest mortality rate in the 
country. Therefore, considering the prevalence of cancer and the importance of cancer 
treatment within the Iranian society, it will be justified to use the ailment for my analysis. Out 
of about 85 thousand cancer cases detected in the country annually, about 30 thousands of 
them result in death (International Institute for Peace, Justice and Human Rights, 2013: 2). 
The prevalence of cancer in Iran is worrisome, in the year 2000 about 17765 cases were 
diagnosed and in 2005, the number rose to 55855 cases, and then in 2011 it had reached up to 
85000 cases. Speculations have it that the number will increase with high margins in 2015 and 
Professor Nasser Parsa, a member of American Cancer Society confirmed this when he said 
that Iran will experience “cancer tsunami” in 2015 (International Institute for Peace, Justice 
and Human Rights, 2013: 2). As of 2011, Iran had about 61 cancer treatment centers and the 
government used to subsidize treatment of patients. However, government efforts face two 
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main challenges. First is the fast growth rate of the disease. Second is that the government is 
cash trapped owing to sanctions and thus lack the finance needed to support treatment of 
patients or initiate advance research and development program for cancer treatment. The 
dilemma here is that, given that even under full government funding or support and good 
medical conditions, about 40,000 Iranians die every year from cancer (Sahimi and Sadeghi-
Boroujerdi, 2012). Then with less financial support from the government, it is obvious that 
many more patients will pass on, except those who can afford their treatment.  
During the 2012 annual cancer conference, an assistant director of the Medical 
Council of Iran in the person of Alireza Zali stated that sanctions has negatively affected 
cancer treatment across Iran because governmental aid are no longer effective due to inflation 
and high treatment costs. Consequently, treatment centers are paralyzed. In his words, “many 
patients may not respond to the available treatment and will soon die as the disease progress” 
(IIPJHR, 2013: 2). For example, to get radiotherapy treatment, patients have to wait in 
treatment queues for months and sometimes they are deprived of treatment due to limited 
available treatment devices. In this situation, there are physicians and medical personnel’s, but 
lack of access to equipments is the major factor of cancer mortalities.   
With sanctions imposed on Iran banking system, it became impossible for Tehran and 
local businesses to purchase medical equipments abroad because of restrictions on money 
transfers and movement of money to and from Iran. As a result, medicines without Iranian 
equivalents were no longer available in the market (IIPJHR, 2013: 4). Thus precipitating a 
situation in which patients are not only faced with the problem of financing their own 
treatment, but also faced with the difficulty of accessing needed medicines. In 2013, the 
IIPJHR reported that Mahmud Ostad Mohammad, a famous actor and writer died due to lack 
of availability of needed medicines in the market and not because he could not afford his 
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medication (IIPJHR, 2013: 4-5). Thus, current situation in Iran health sector and 
pharmaceutical market confirms that sanctions have adverse impact on both the ordinary 
citizens and the national health sector. It has resulted in the reduction of availability of 
lifesaving medicines in the local market and has increased the pain and suffering of Iranian 
patients and thus violates their right to health and quality healthcare. Unnecessary price hike 
and shortage of medicines in the market have drastically compromised treatment of patients. 
Therefore, the suggestion or claim by the sanctioning parties that their sanctions are not 
targeting medicines and medical equipments are problematic at best and misleading at worst.  
Although one may argue that Iran should source for medicines and medications from 
other countries outside the US and the EU, such as Asian and South American countries or 
even from Africa, the problem is that there is a limited number of certified and/or qualified 
manufacturers of medicines and equipments for the treatment of sophisticated generics such 
as cancer, hemophilia, cardiovascular diseases and immunodeficiency disorders. Considering 
the issues reviewed above, I submit that sanctions against Iran particularly on banking and 
insurance of goods can be fairly referred to as a direct human attack on the population. This is 
because they have apparently contributed to the violation of the population’s rights to good 
and affordable health care. 
4.3.2.2. Right to education 
Just like healthcare, sanctions have a negative impact on education and the entire 
educational sector of Iran. Although education at every level is important, however I will 
focus my analysis mainly on how sanctions have affected higher education of Iranians. The 
main reason for choosing higher education being that some of the respondents are higher 
education students, drop outs or employees while another reason is that it is easier to access 
information about higher education than for example primary or other lower levels of 
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education. Higher education in Iran is made up of private and public universities, while 
funding of the public universities come from governmental allocations, funding of the private 
section is provided by private investment and high education fees (Mehrabi, 2014: 52). In this 
case, universities and/or higher education sectors are integrally dependent on the country’s 
economic situation. In 2012-2013 academic sessions, Iran slashed its education funding by 3 
percent (Mehrabi, 2014: 52) and ever since then it has continued budget cut on education 
owing to economic difficulties arising mainly from sanctions, though there are other factors 
such as mismanagement. The consequences of budget cut on education has manifested in a 
way of crowded classrooms and low quality teaching materials mostly in the science and 
technology faculties. Also the impact is felt by students through cancellation of huge number 
of government scholarships. The devaluation of Iranian Rial in the exchange market added to 
the problem as it became difficult for universities to procure items, technology and services 
whose medium of exchange is the dollar. A good example is that many Iranian universities 
find it difficult to subscribe to scientific journals and databases such as Scopus and Science 
Direct due to restrictions on money (Mehrabi, 2014: 52). The inability to access international 
scientific journals has impacted negatively on both teaching and learning in Iranian 
universities, since teachers and students are confined to domestic debates and narratives.  
Also sanctions imposed on money transaction have its own toll on education and 
quality of education offered by Iranian universities. As Mehrabi (2014: 52) notes, although 
Iranian universities are underequipped, sanctions has worsened the situation by imposing 
restrictions on the import of technological tools and equipments. In addition, Iranian students 
and scholars are almost isolated from participating in international educational activities such 
as conferences and scientific exhibitions. Although Iranian scholars are not bared from 
signing up for international conferences and other educational activities, there is a tremendous 
difficulty in obtaining Visas to attend conferences, particularly in Western countries and this 
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factor has been linked to sanctions. Apart from those studying within Iran, sanctions have also 
affected Iranian students abroad. The near collapse of the Rial coupled with restrictions on 
money transfer to and from Iran has made it difficult for foreign students to finance their 
education. Inflation has added cost to education abroad, while restriction on money transfer 
has made it difficult to remit necessary finances for studies abroad. My interviews reveal that 
some families could not support their children education abroad due to the collapse of the 
Rial. In line with this preposition, Torbati (2012) notes that many Iranian students studying 
abroad had to abandon their studies and return back to Iran since they were unable to pay their 
tuition fees in their country of study. In all, sanctions have compromised the right to education 
of many Iranians and by extension threaten their capability to enjoy their other rights, which 
are imminent on them getting education. The reduction of scholarships due to budget cuts on 
education has affected many Iranians youths. Although one can argue that other countries for 
example in Europe have also reduced their budget on education as part of austerity measures, 
the point is that Iran’s case unlike some European States is precipitated by capital flight and 
financial shortages resulting from sanctions. As one of the respondents during my interview 
notes: “sanctions were supposed to target nuclear reactors and not my education and 
scholarship, I lost my scholarship and now am out of school, yet the nuclear reactors are still 
standing” (Skype interview with Rakhsha Muhammad Baraz on 2nd November, 2014).  
Given that education plays a crucial role in the development of every society and 
individual’s mobility, it is worthwhile to note that violating the right to education hampers 
the development of both the individual person and the society at large. Also acknowledging 
that the right to education as contained in the UDHR and other international conventions 
include provision of conducive and/or enabling environment for learning, provision of sound 
and quality education through research and development, it is evidently clear, whilst it is 
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justifiable to say that sanctions among other factors impedes the right to education of the 
Iranian populace.  
4.3.2.3. Right to life and the quality of life  
The right to life means that the human life is sacred and its protection is paramount, 
while the right to quality of life implies that the individual person should be able to enjoy 
good standard of living (Wicks, 2012: 199). However, sanctions have affected certain core 
economic variables of the Iranian economy and as such they have significantly contributed to 
human rights violation of Iranian citizens. Although the outcome of sanctions generally 
threatens the right to life of many Iranians, I will focus my analysis on their impact on the 
quality of life. This is because the right to quality of life can easily be compromised by lots of 
factors and economic variables. Therefore, I will analyse how economic vices such as 
inflation propelled by economic sanctions affects the right to quality of life of Iranians.  
4.3.2.3.1. Inflation 
Unarguably, inflation and/or hyperinflation in the case of Iran are among the economic 
variable that can have severe impact on individual right to good life and quality standard of 
living. Although inflation is not a human right per se, however, its impact on the human 
capability to enjoy rights cannot be over emphasized. Economists have struggled over time to 
define the term, thus providing varied definitions and determinants of the subject. Vane and 
Thompson (1979) defined inflation as the increase and/or rise in general price level, while 
Bronfenbrenner and Holzman (1963) defined it as a continual fall in value of money over a 
time period (Pahlavani and Rahimi, 2009: 63). Despite an array of definitions, attempts to 
determine the actual cause of inflation have led to two main schools of thought; the monetary 
approach and the Neo-Keynesian approach. The first school of thought is led by Milton 
Friedman, Friedman and Schwartz (1970), argue that “inflation is always and everywhere a 
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monetary phenomenon” (Mishkin, 1984: 1). That is to say, high supply of money within the 
economy will automatically lead to inflation. While the second school of thought represented 
by Blinder (2002) argues that the main causes of inflation are aggregate demand in the 
economy rather than the money supply. According to Keynesians, if GDP increases beyond 
its natural level, inflation will accelerate as suppliers increase their prices (Pahlavani and 
Rahimi, 2009: 64). This argument suggests two basic types of inflation: demand-pull inflation 
and cost-push inflation, wherein demand-pull inflation will occur from shortages created by 
increases in aggregate demand while Cost-push inflation will occur due to shortages created 
by decreases in aggregate supply.  
Aljebrin (2006) carried out a study on three oil-based economies, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Bahrain to determine the major causes of inflation in these economies. He 
concluded that oil market and its revenue is a major factor responsible for inflation in oil 
based economies, wherein oil production growth, oil price growth rate, non-oil GDP growth 
rate and liquidity are the main factors of inflation. Going by this assumption, the economy of 
Iran having experienced low oil GDP, low oil production and oil revenue and minimal growth 
in non-oil GDP since 2012 should be immune to inflation. However, reality proves the 
contrary, an indication that other factors are responsible. Bowdler and Nunziata (2004) argue 
that a major trigger of inflation is international trade index. Their empirical results show that 
greater trade openness decreases the probability of inflation and vice versa. The conclusion 
made by Bowdler and Nunziata rings true when we contextualize the situation in Iran. The 
disconnection of Iran from international financial systems, coupled with restrictions on 
international trade particularly with Western countries and blocking of its membership of the 
World Trade Organization by the United States (Sahay and Sharma, 2008) resulting in gross 
decline in foreign direct investment could be adjudged as major factors precipitating inflation 
within Iran. Although sanctions play a key role, however, we cannot infer that it is a single 
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factor that caused the high inflation rate ravaging Iran’s economy. Instead, imbalances in the 
economy were partly policy driven, resulting from the controls on the allocation of credit and 
foreign exchange and also distortions in the pricing system. These factors induced 
inefficiently in the management and allocation of resources and thus rendered the economy 
less competitive, and weakened its capacity to respond to external shocks (Tafti, 2012: 197).  
According to Steve H. Hanke of the Cato Institute, Iran experienced hyperinflation in 
2012. It became the third country in the 21st century to experience hyperinflation after 
Zimbabwe and North Korea and the first in the Middle East. While monthly inflation rate 
before the 2010 combined sanctions by the US, the UN and the EU, stood at 0.698 percent, 
the rate skyrocketed to 69.6 percent after sanctions were imposed. In addition, Hanke states 
that Iran is experiencing an implied annual inflation rate of 196 percent compared to 8.25 
percent annual inflation rate prior to 2010 sanctions (Hanke, 2012). However, figures 
provided by the Iranian government shows that inflation rate in the country is slightly below 
30 percent. Iran being a closed society, where access to official data and statistics is difficult 
makes it hard to verify and/or validate official data against market data and information. 
Nevertheless, sanctions on the banking sector, shipping and insurance of goods to Iran among 
other economic measures caused the Rial to depreciate up to 71.4 percent in the exchange 
market in September 2012, thereby making it the least valued currency in the world in 
nominal terms (View figure 11 below).  
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Figure 11: Iranian Rial - Dollar exchange rate 
 
Source: Cato Institute | http://www.cato.org  
In essence, sanctions played a strategic role in Iran’s economic downturn. It imposed 
economic hardship and unnecessary suffering on the wider population. In mid 2012, price of 
goods were doubling on average of 39.8 days, while prices of food items such as meat and 
flour were doubling even faster (Hanke, 2012). Unfortunately, despite the high rate of 
inflation, wages and salaries remained the same causing huge poverty and low standard of 
living to the population.  
Relying on my research interviews, I would say that sanctions have induced poverty 
and other economic hardships on the population of Iran and therefore it will be justified to 
state that economic sanctions is among the major factors precipitating violation of the 
people’s right to quality standard of living. Apart from the right to quality standard of living, 
hyperinflation in Iran affects other rights such as the rights to education and healthcare. My 
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interviews reveal that while salaries remained the same, the cost of education and health care 
particularly medicine increased, thereby adding burden and cost to individuals and families. 
In some cases, families resort to withdraw their wards from school due to they are unable to 
afford the increasing cost of education. During my interview some Iranian parents 
complained that they adopted a strategy of choosing among their kids who will attend high 
institution while others will have to stay back pending when their finances will improve. My 
conclusion on all the issues raised in this section of the thesis is that sanctions induced 
inflation, is a factor that has impeded on the capacity of many Iranians to enjoy different 
aspects of their fundamental human rights. Therefore sanctions are culpable of rights 
violation of the Iranian people. 
4.3.2.4. Right to work and free choice of employment  
Sanctions present huge challenges to Iran’s labour market, causing high 
unemployment rate in the country. Although opinion varies, however, there is a general 
agreement among scholars and analysts that unemployment is a factor threatening Iran and its 
population. According to the Statistical Centre of Iran, unemployment rate was estimated at 
10.3 percent in 2013 while unofficial sources, however, estimate the overall unemployment 
rate to be as high as 20 percent (World Bank, 2015). Former US Labour Secretary Robert 
Reich, during a round table debate on ABC News on September 22, 2013 stated that 
“economic sanctions do seem to work” he continued by saying: 
Right now Iran is suffering 30 percent inflation, 20 percent unemployment 
[...]. I mean this nation is hurting and our economic sanctions, because 
we’ve been patient with them, because we have actually rounded up 
almost every other nation to support us, have had a huge impact (Bowers, 
2013).  
Certainly sanctions among other factors such as corruption and mismanagement have played 
a significant role in escalating unemployment rate in Iran, which unfortunately is affecting 
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the civilian population more, particularly the youths and women. The Iranian deputy in 
women and family’s affairs Shaheen Dokht Molaverdi on April 27, 2013 told the State news 
agency (Mehr) that:  
The unemployment rate of 15-24 year old women in Iran is 46 percent. 
According to the 2012 census, 12.1 percent of Iranian women are 
responsible for earning a living for their families while 82 percent of them 
are unemployed that can have many consequences and cause social 
damages (Iran News Update, 2014) 
Then on October 25, 2013 Adel Azar, head of the Statistic Centre of Iran told the Mehr that: 
“The unemployment rate for the youth is twice that of the general unemployment rate, this 
number means that we are in the crisis zone regarding the unemployment rate.” While 
President Rouhani was reported as saying that the root of poverty and unemployment in Iran 
are the “international sanctions” (Iran News Update, 2014). Undoubtedly, sanctions are 
biting hard on Iranians and Iran’s economy. To refresh our memory, US presidential 
Executive Order 12959, placed a comprehensive ban on US trade with, and investment in 
Iran, the Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act banned foreign companies from investing more than 
$40 million in Iranian oil and gas industries, while the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 
prohibited entities from investing an amount more than $20 million in Iranian energy. Apart 
from the US, the EU sanctions against Iran include a ban on export of goods; shipping and 
insurance. The sanctions affected local businesses in Iran severely, prompting a situation 
where foreign direct investment is restricted to the minimum, causing companies and 
organizations to downsize their labour force in relation to businesses and finances available 
to them. In mid 2012, Kian Tyre, the biggest tyre manufacturer in Iran laid-off 800 
employees, citing inability to import raw materials from the EU. Also Iran’s pharmaceutical 
industry, a medicine manufacturing plant, after retrenching 220 employees in the same 2012, 
blamed its action on the inability to purchase necessary raw materials from Germany, Austria 
and Italy, prompting the need to downsize its workforce (Tait, 2012). 
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During my interview, one of the respondents named Reza, Mohammed Abdul, a 
former customer service analyst in a private oil servicing company claimed that he lost his 
job in 2013. According to him, the company he worked for owed him and other workers five 
months salary arrears before finally retrenching him and 229 others in November 2013. In his 
dismissal letter, the company thanked him and his other colleagues for their services while 
stating that they could no longer retain their services due to lack of investment and finance 
from their foreign counterparts. In his words, “now I have no job and I have no hope for the 
future, unless Allah intervenes on my behalf” (Skype interview with Mohammed Reza on 3rd 
October, 2014). Basically, sanctions are a major factor triggering mass retrenchment and high 
unemployment rate within Iranian societies. This to me suggests an intentional violation of 
the Iranian people’s right to work and their right to quality standard of living. High 
unemployment rate has resulted in long queues for social handouts in Iranian cities. I am not 
in a way insinuating that Iranians were fully employed prior to sanctions. However, an array 
of economic sanctions and their regretful outcomes significantly contributed to the high 
unemployment level, whilst the rights and well-being of the civilian population have being 
relegated to the periphery. Certainly, Iran has never been a champion when it comes to 
maintaining international labour standards; however, with huge unemployment rate, labour 
conditions have deteriorated while employers of labour in most cases exercise full right 
and/or control over their jobs including employment terms and conditions thus perpetrating 
another form of labour rights violation. All in all, even though we cannot solely blame 
sanctions for Iran’s unemployment catastrophe, still there is substantial evidence they have 
had a huge impact and thus, they violate the right to quality standard of living of many 
Iranians.  
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4.4. Minimizing sanctions impact: sourcing alternative economic relations 
 Due to restrictions on trade and financial transactions, Iran made frantic efforts to 
dilute the impact of sanctions on the economy and their impact on the entire Iranian 
population. Prior to the UN and EU sanctions, Germany had been Iran’s largest trading 
partner. In the 1990’s, Germany accounted for 14.4 percent of Iran’s imports, however, trade 
relationship gradually declined to 11.4 percent in 2007 and 8.9 percent in 2008 (Habibi, 
2010: 6 -7). The significant decline in trade between Iran, Germany and other EU member 
States is largely as a result of the UN and EU trade and banking sanctions against Iran 
starting from 2006. After EU sanctions on Iran’s banking sector and insurance of goods to the 
country, Tehran resorted to look for other sources of needed inputs for its domestic firms. 
Ever since then, Iran has made concerted effort at building new economic ties with the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Tehran’s strategy of luring new trade partners is to 
offer them trade and investment incentives that will discourage them from joining in the 
sanctions (Habibi, 2010: 7). According to Nader Habibi, this strategy of using trade 
incentives to discourage countries from becoming a party to sanctions against Iran relatively 
proved successful in the 1990’s when Tehran deliberately expanded its trade and investment 
ties with Germany, France, Italy, and the UK to increase the costs to them of joining the US 
sponsored sanctions against it. Additionally, Habibi contends that Tehran’s trade incentive 
strategy was the main reason why many European countries initially subscribed to resolve the 
nuclear impasse through diplomatic means (Habibi, 2010: 7). In recent years, Tehran had 
applied same trade incentive diplomacy and offered even greater incentives to the GCC and 
China for the same purpose of discouraging them from joining the sanctions (Habibi, 2010: 
8).  
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 Since 2006 when the EU joined the sanctions crusade against Iran, Tehran’s 
partnership interest shifted from Western countries to the GCC countries. The GCC 
comprises of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE are all oil producing 
countries and therefore, just like Iran, oil is their main export product. As oil exporting 
nations, they have similar economic needs with Iran and their main trading partners are 
developed countries of the West whose main import is oil. Consequently, the proportion of 
bilateral trade between Iran and the GCC represented only a fraction of each side’s aggregate 
trade. Historically, Iran’s major export to its Arab neighbours has been mostly handicrafts 
and agricultural products. However, within the last decade, trade between the GCC countries 
and Iran have increased and most importantly the GCC have shown interest in importing 
natural gas from Iran (Habibi, 2010: 4).  
 Prior to the year 2000, the volume of trade (imports and exports) between Iran and the 
GCC countries remain minimal and the value was under one billion dollars in most years. 
Subsequently, the volume of trade increased dramatically. The GCC export to Iran increased 
from $1.3 billion in the year 2000 to $13.4 billion in 2008 while Iran’s export to the GCC 
also grew from $630 million to $2.62 billion in same period. Thus the GCC enjoyed trade 
surplus with Iran to the value of about $10.7 billion in 2008 (Habibi, 2010: 4). Iran’s trade 
with the GCC however, has not been proportional; instead it is dominated by the UAE 
followed by Saudi Arabia. For example, in the year 2008 the UAE export to Iran was 
estimated at $13.2 billion while aggregate exports from the remaining GCC members were 
estimated at only $1.58 billion (Habibi, 2010: 5). The port city of Dubai has been the biggest 
advantage to the UAE over other GCC countries. Dubai serves as a re-export channel for the 
entire Middle East and particularly for Iran. Data’s from the UAE Ministry of Foreign Trade 
shows that in 2009 alone, the value of re-exports to Iran stood at $7 billion (Haider and 
Croucher, 2010). Apart from the UAE, Saudi Arabia has increased its bilateral trade with 
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Iran. Prior to the year 2000 Saudi imports from Iran remained below $100 million annually. 
But then it grew up to $900 million in 2008. However, unlike the UAE which has enjoyed 
surplus trade with Iran, trade between Saudi Arabia and Iran is seen to be relatively balanced. 
Nevertheless, the share of trade between both countries remains relatively low when 
compared with their overall foreign trade.  
 The US sanctions against Iran started with restrictions on US corporations and their 
international subsidiaries from exporting certain products to Iran (Habibi, 2010: 7). As a 
counter measure, Iran started to import the sanctioned items through black market or 
indirectly intermediaries from the UAE. The black market re-importation through Dubai was 
facilitated by UAE’s liberal trade policies and free trade zones of Dubai. Through Dubai re-
export agreement, Iran was able to purchase and import many of the banned products and 
items. Apart from importation of sanctioned goods, the ease to travel to the UAE offered 
Iranian investors the opportunity to move their businesses to the UAE and mostly to Dubai. 
According to Habibi (2010: 7) as of 2008, as many as 9,500 Iranian businesses have 
established their branch or subsidiary in Dubai. I would say that the adverse impact of 
sanctions on Iran’s direct trade with its traditional trade partners (European countries) is a 
factor responsible for the reorientation of Iran’s trade toward the GCC and particularly with 
the UAE in recent years. It was easy for Iranian firms to set up clandestine affiliate in the 
UAE, enabling them to access European market and avoid regulatory delays and bottlenecks 
involved in dealings directly with European firms from Iran. By using clandestine affiliates, 
Iran was able to import goods from other countries via Dubai, whilst it provided an 
opportunity for Iranian firms and producers to export their products and services to foreign 
partners who would have been reluctant to deal with them due to sanctions (Habibi, 2010: 7). 
However, Iran’s strategy of relying on indirect trade through Dubai as a counter measure or 
response to Western sanctions has become an issue of concern to the sanctioning States. 
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 In 2008, the United States began to coerce financial institutions based in the UAE to 
minimize their trade finance services to Iranian businesses, by threatening that violators 
would be expelled from or bared access to the US market. In addition, the US expanded its 
sanctions, targeting foreign entities cooperating with Iranian government and businesses 
(Habibi, 2010: 7). These steps taken by the US had different impact on Iran and definitely it 
affected Iran’s ability to establish alternative trade partners in major trade and business areas. 
For example, Saudi Arabia used to be one of Iran’s major trade partners but it later joined the 
sanctions. Although other GCC countries did not express support for US sanctions, however 
they pledged to UN imposed sanctions. Furthermore, in 2010, the US requested Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE to increase oil sales to China, a measure that was aimed at encouraging Beijing 
to stop trade relationship with Iran and join the latest round of UN sanctions, which was 
approved in June of 2010 (Habibi, 2010: 8). Although there have been no formal acceptance 
of the US proposal by the GCC, anecdote sense points to the fact that the GCC seem to 
comply with the US request. For example, Iran accounted for 11 percent of China’s crude oil 
imports in 2009, but the volume of imports decreased in 2010 to somewhere between 4 to 5 
percent, while in the same period, China’s crude oil import from Saudi Arabia and Brazil 
increased (Habibi, 2010: 8). In 2013, China’s daily oil import from Iran declined further to an 
average of 394,600 to 416,400 barrels per day, a decline of about 3 to 3.5 percent (Reuters, 
2013). Overall, it appears that Iran’s various initiatives and strategies of attracting and 
maintaining trade partners were not successful after the UN sanctions. Although these 
strategies may have been successful in the past, they failed to deter the impact of UN 
comprehensive sanctions. In the absence of getting new trade partners or retain old ones, 
sanctions took a tighter grip on Iran’s economy and unfortunately, the considerable victims 
are the civilian population. 
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4.4.1. Exploring diplomacy through negotiation: EU-3 
Iranian nuclear diplomacy started in 2003 with EU-3, comprising of Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom (Mazzucelli, 2007: 3). It has remained unclear why the EU chose to 
adopt an ad hoc initiative to address Iran’s nuclear impasse. Scholars such as (Habibi, 2010: 
7) suggest that the vast trade relationship between Iran and Europe was the reason why 
Europeans decided to seek a diplomatic solution to the problem, while scholars like 
Mazzucelli (2007: 3) posit that the EU had to engage Iran because the US as at the time was 
dealing with global war on terrorism. Whatever the case maybe, the negotiation between Iran 
and EU-3 seemed positive in the beginning with the signing of the Paris Agreement on 14 
November 2014 (Kutchesfahani, 2006: 18). In the agreement, Iran agreed to halt its uranium-
enrichment activities within the period it was having talks with the EU. However, after 1 year 
and 6 months specifically in August 2005, Iran reneged on its agreement and accused the EU 
of sabotage, by not implementing their part of the agreement (Kutchesfahani, 2006: 18). 
From then onwards, the EU-3 dialogue with Iran was marred by deadlocks with Iran accusing 
the EU of not recognising its right to enrich uranium within the ambit of law and as permitted 
by the NPT. Iran had maintained that it has right to enrich uranium under the NPT agreement 
and within the ambit of the international law, therefore any negotiation or proposal pertaining 
to its nuclear program must incorporate right to enrich uranium. The stalemate in the 
negotiation between Iran and EU-3 continued until 2006 when three other members of the 
Security Council China, Russia and the United Sates joined the negotiation. 
4.4.2. New approach: EU-3+3 or P5+1 
In June 2006, China, Russia and the United Sates joined the EU-3 to continue 
negotiation with Iran about the latter’s nuclear program. The group which is often referred to 
as P5+1 drafted a framework agreement and proposed incentives to Iran in exchange for Iran 
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to give up its uranium enrichment activities (Davenport, 2016). Iran rejected the proposal 
presented by P5+1, citing its right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. The Security 
Council responded to Tehran’s rejection of the proposal by unanimously adopting resolution 
1737 and imposed sanctions against Iran. Consequently, relationship between Iran and P5+1 
deteriorated and led to more sanctions imposed against Iran. Tehran rejected all Security 
Council sanctions against it and maintained that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful 
intentions. Gradually, the negotiation grounded to a halt under President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s leadership. The change in Iran’s leadership from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to 
Hassan Rouhani in 2013 presented another opportunity for dialogue between Iran and P5+1. 
The takeover of leadership by Hassan Rouhani facilitated and/or renewed intensive 
negotiation between Iran and P5+1. Consequently, negotiations resumed in Geneva and on 
November 20, 2013 the parties successfully signed a tentative Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) 
(Kile, 2014: 360). The JPOA outlined specific steps to be taken by each side during the first 
phase agreement, and also a broad framework and/or guideline to achieve a comprehensive 
solution. Under the terms of the framework agreement, Iran granted permission to the IAEA 
to inspect the Arak nuclear plants (Arms Control Association, 2014). Following series of 
meetings held between Iran and P5+1 in May 2014, a comprehensive agreement was drafted 
by the parties. Unlike previous attempts, Iran was committed to the negotiation and due to the 
level of corporation expressed by the Iranian negotiator, the IAEA board meeting Director 
General Yukiya Amano, announced in June 2014, that Iran is “complying with the terms of 
the interim agreement and the agency’s investigation into the unresolved concerns about 
Iran’s nuclear program” (Arms Control Association, 2014). 
On April 2, 2015 the parties announced that they have agreed on a general framework 
that outlined the broad parameters of a nuclear deal. In reaction, President Obama announced 
that a historic nuclear deal with Iran is on the way and on 14
th
 of July 2015; a nuclear deal 
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was struck between Iran and P5+1 (Gordon and Sanger, 2015). While announcing the deal, 
EU foreign policy Chief Federica Mogherini, stated that the agreement will open up a new 
chapter in international relations and it shows that “diplomacy, coordination, corporation can 
overcome decades of conflicts” (Aljazeera, 2015). Responding to the nuclear deal, President 
Obama said that diplomacy have achieved what decades of animosity could not achieved. He 
added that the deal shows that diplomacy can bring real and meaningful change (Gordon and 
Sanger, 2015). Spectators believe that the deal will mark a shift in the nitty-gritty of 
international relations and the mechanism employed in transforming global challenges and 
conflicts.  
Both Mogherini and Obama’s statement highlights the fundamental argument of this 
thesis, which is that violent measures such as economic sanctions are not a plausible conflict 
transformation tool. Instead, the application of the moral imagination of peace through 
dialogue, peaceful and honest engagement seem to be credible, feasible and a preferred 
alternative. Noteworthy, is that what sanctions could not achieve in decades, diplomacy 
achieved in months. For more than two decades, economic sanctions could not deter Iran 
from pursuing an ambiguous nuclear program, which we hopefully believe that diplomacy 
has achieved through the Vienna agreement between Iran and P5+1.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND REFLEXIONS 
 In the introduction of this study, I proposed to explore how regime related sanctions 
affect the human rights and well-being of the entire civilian population of a targeted State. In 
doing so, I advanced the following research questions: Are sanctions capable of resolving 
international conflicts and restore peace and security? What are the impacts of regime related 
sanctions on the civilian population? In a situation where economic sanctions are employed 
to resolve a conflict, are they capable of avoiding mass suffering and other negative 
consequences associated with war? Does the use of economic sanctions conform to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights?  
The study reveals that economic sanctions are far from being a soft form of 
diplomacy, but rather function as a new form to wage war. Sanctions against Iran and 
Zimbabwe are in fact problematic. They have violated the basic rights of the people, against 
the recommendation and provisions of the international humanitarian law and other human 
rights treaties. Obviously, sanctions are effective in protecting the interests of the sanctioning 
parties, while at the same time they serve as a profound repudiation of our humanitarian 
interests. In 1993, a world conference held in Vienna pronounced that civil, political, social, 
economic and cultural human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent rights. By 
that pronouncement, all human being despite race, religion and sex are entitled to rights that 
must be protected at all times. Thus, when I reflect on the impact of economic sanctions on 
the rights and well-being of Iranians and Zimbabweans, the following questions arise for me: 
is it essential to modify our moral stance, ethical standards and human rights values in order 
to advance democracy or maintain international security? More specifically, is it acceptable 
to relinquish the human rights of the majority (civilian population) in order to force a 
minority ruling group to comply with the demands of the sanctioning party or parties? Does 
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the UN consider the fact that its position as a moral leader in the world is undermined if its 
own ethics as a human right defender are mutable? How do the UN and other regional 
organisations, the US and other States feel about violating international law and the Geneva 
Convention by imposing economic sanctions?  
The mechanism through which economic sanctions goals are achieved is to impose 
collective guilt and punishment on the entire population of a targeted State (Köchler, 1994). 
Such guilt orchestrated against the entire population in a way that opens the avenue for the 
violation of their basic and/or fundamental rights, such as right to healthcare, right to 
education, right to employment and good working conditions and right to quality standard of 
living. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 
1966 under Article 11 and 12 recognised healthcare, as part of human rights. Apart from the 
ICESCR, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) recognized the right to health for 
all children and provided guidelines for its realization. Similarly, CEDAW established the 
obligation to adopt adequate measures to guarantee women access to health and medical care, 
with no discrimination on the basis of race, religion, economic or social condition and 
political belief (Grodin, 2013: 157). According to OHCHR, every individual person should 
have the right to a system of health protection that provides equality of opportunity for people 
to enjoy the “highest attainable standard of health” (Grodin, 2013: 157). Therefore, right to 
health implies that every human being has the right to the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health, which includes the prevention, treatment and control of diseases, 
access to all medical services, sanitation, adequate food, decent housing, healthy working 
conditions, and a clean environment (Grodin, 2013: 157-158). In any case, the individual right 
to healthcare connotes that hospitals and clinics, medicines, medications and medical services 
must be available, accessible and of good quality for everyone, on an equitable basis, where 
and when needed. However, sanctions imposed against Iran and Zimbabwe has severely 
 363 
 
affected the health care sectors of these countries. Consequently, the quality of services 
rendered to the public and specifically to patients has greatly depreciated. For example, 
sanctions caused shortage of available medicines for the treatment of HIV, hypertonia and 
similar generics, as well as shortages of healthcare workers, resulting in suffering, pains and 
untimely deaths of patients. Thus, sanctions imposed against both countries substantially 
contributed to violation of the population’s rights to quality and available medical services. 
Similarly, education is recognized among the core human rights. Section (1) of the 
UDHR, under article 26 states that: “everyone has the right to education. Education shall be 
free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be 
compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and 
higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit” (Beiter, 2006: 90). 
Apart from that, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) proclaimed education as a fundamental human right that is essential for the 
exercise of all other human rights because it “promotes individual freedom and empowerment 
and yields important development benefits” (McPherson and Welch, 2012: 801). The 
underlying notion of this proclamation is that education occupies a central role when it comes 
to individual human rights; therefore, the violation of the right to education will significantly 
affect the enjoyment of other rights, such as right to employment and good working condition. 
However, this study reveals that sanctions against Iran and Zimbabwe have impaired the 
population from enjoying this “all important” human rights. And thus, it threatens the 
population’s capability to enjoy their other rights and also put their social mobility in stagnant 
danger.  
Furthermore, Article 25 of the UDHR recognizes the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of the human person, including food, clothing, housing 
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and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his/her control (Lawson, 1996: 656). On the account of this right, under 
no circumstance should the human person be subjected intentionally to a situation that will 
negatively affect his/her standard of living. However, as noted earlier economic sanctions are 
imposed with the aim to impair the living conditions of the population of a targeted State. 
Therefore, the measure intentionally, indiscriminately and negatively affected the standard of 
living of the civilian population of Iran and Zimbabwe and thus, it added to the violation of 
their human right to quality standard of living. In Iran and Zimbabwe, sanctions triggered 
inflation and aided high levels of unemployment and capital flight, which in turn caused 
poverty and low quality of life to the population. In my opinion, imposing economic sanctions 
against a population, despite its foreseeable negative consequences on civilians is a clear 
infringement on their fundamental human rights and an aberration of the international 
humanitarian law. Unfortunately, sanctions have not been successful in resolving the issues 
that led to their implementation, such as restoring “real democracy” in Zimbabwe, or stop Iran 
from enriching uranium. Instead, they added to the problems and challenges faced by the 
civilian population. Thus, the Achilles heel of economic sanctions is not only evident in its 
inability to compel the so-called deviants of international norms to retreat their steps and 
actions, but also its inability to protect the inalienable rights, so to say, of the population of a 
sanctioned State or region. 
 In the case of Zimbabwe, the thesis concludes that the sanctions have shifted from 
targeting select individuals within the ruling elites in Zimbabwe to targeting the entire 
population. In addition, they have failed so far to achieve the goals for which they have been 
in place for over a decade. Besides, it is hard for anyone to plausibly claim that they will 
likely succeed in achieving various changes in Zimbabwe State policies, including the 
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removal of Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF government. Unfortunately, the so called 
targeted sanctions are hitting harder on the civilian population it was meant to protect, than 
the select individuals it claimed to target. For example, President Robert Mugabe has been in 
Singapore for medical check-ups more than fifteen times between 2010 and 2015, while 
ordinary Zimbabweans cannot afford good medical services at home, either due to lack of 
money, lack of medical staff in the hospitals or both. Furthermore, the violations of the rights 
of Zimbabweans go beyond the collapse of the health, education systems and high level of 
unemployment and inflation covered in this thesis. Sanctions have a damaging effect on all 
sectors of the Zimbabwean economy and thus contributed to the high levels of corruption in 
the country (Hove, 2012: 82). The black market opportunities that is inherent in economic 
sanctions enhanced corruption and racketeering, while at same time, it widens economic 
inequalities among the population. The impact of corruption is glaringly evident in low 
service delivery to the population, while the ruling elites maintain affluent lifestyle. 
 For clarity sake, I am not suggesting that targeted sanctions are useless. Instead if they 
are effectively implemented, it appears reasonable and makes intuitive sense. The 
consequences of such measures will focus only on resented behaviours of targeted individuals 
and entities and may pressure them to change their behaviour. As such, it may serve as a 
valuable component of a broader strategy to promote political and economic reforms in a 
targeted State. However, sanctions against Zimbabwe are not targeted as claimed by the US 
and the EU. Instead they are a pack of economic sanctions. As noted earlier, one important 
issue the US and the EU should consider is whether their sanctions have in anyway provided 
an avenue to remove President Robert Mugabe and his cohorts from power after a decade. 
Definitely, Mugabe must go considering all his atrocities; however, this will remain wishful 
thinking as long as US and EU prevailing philosophy continues to support the destruction of 
the country’s economy as well as violation of the peoples right.  
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 Frankly speaking, it has become crucial to harmonise relations between Zimbabwe 
and the West at least for the benefit of the present and future generations. The US, the EU 
and other Western countries should find a way to reengage the government of Zimbabwe 
through dialogue. In addition, access to foreign finance should be made available and credit 
lines open to Zimbabwe in order to improve the economic situation of the civilian population. 
In my opinion, an economically stable people are more likely to vote out a brutal 
government. Thus, reviving the economy of Zimbabwe may provide an opportunity for a 
political revolt by the people through the ballot box. Also, the issue of land re-allocation is a 
central subject to the diplomatic impasse between the West and Zimbabwe, though it is not 
cited among the official reasons for the sanctions. Mugabe’s land re-allocation exercise 
should be revisited and resolved by all stakeholders in a transparent manner, beyond political 
lines and taking into consideration the poignant memories attached to it. Party politics should 
be made nuanced and service delivery should be the priority of the government. 
 It is also pertinent to note that although sanctions played a huge role in Zimbabwe’s 
economic collapse, some other factors contributed to the country’s economic meltdown. First 
is the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the IMF and the World 
Bank. Second is its involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict and third 
are ill conceived government policies, coupled with corruption and mismanagement. 
Conclusively, I wish to state that although sanctions against Zimbabwe have not achieved its 
goal after more than a decade, they are valuable to the US and the EU as a means of 
communicating their dissatisfaction with President Mugabe’s regime. Finally, the 
government of Zimbabwe has a moral and constitutional obligation to uphold human rights 
and democratic principles for the benefit of its citizens. The government should be 
accountable to the electorate without external coercion and influence.  
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In the case of Iran, almost two decades of economic sanctions could not deter the 
country from pursuing a nuclear program. Instead sanctions have shattered the economy 
caused high levels of poverty and huge amount of economic inequality among the population. 
The inability of the Iranian government to access foreign finances, coupled with the difficulty 
encountered by Iranian companies to access foreign markets affected both the per capita 
income of Iranians and their general standard of living (Ghaderi, 2015: 2 and 50). Thus, the 
sanctions resulted in induced mass suffering on the civilian population, in contrast with the 
provisions of the UDHR. The outcome of the sanctions affected and/or violated the 
inalienable rights of the civilians, such as right to healthcare, education, employment and 
quality of life and as such the sanctions are indefensible.   
However, sanctions against Iran make a lot of sense when one view them from the 
conventional or periphery perspective, which is without given consideration to the actual 
victims of their outcome. Unarguably, any attempt to get the world free from a potential 
nuclear danger should be welcomed at least in the interest of humanity. Nevertheless, the 
question is: who is really suffering from the sanctions? Obviously, Iran’s former president, 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the current president Hassan Rouhani, the Supreme Leader Ali 
Khamenei and other top government officials are not feeling the hit from the sanctions 
compared to the ordinary civilians, who unfortunately made no contribution and may not 
have been consulted before the nuclear policy was adopted by their leaders. Thus, in my 
opinion it is irrational as well as unjust to induce economic hardship on ordinary civilians for 
a crime they did not commit by themselves. Emphatically speaking, Iran must not develop a 
nuclear weapon having pledged to the NPT. It will be a violation of the NPT should Iran at 
any point whether now or in the future produce weapon of mass destruction. Also, it will be a 
clear sign of insubordination by Tehran. However, sanctions are not a plausible conflict 
transformation tool and in this particular case of Iran, they have made no difference other 
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than to hurt the civilian population and the vulnerable members of the Iranian society. Even 
to the extent that sanctions are successful in curbing Iran’s nuclear ambition, the world and 
particularly peace scholars, facilitators and human rights advocates should be weary of such 
success. My reason being that success should not be predicated on civilian pain, suffering and 
deaths. Sanctions exacerbated Iran’s economic problems resulting in widespread economic 
inefficiencies (Kaussler, 2009: 2). Unfortunately, the main culprits are the poor civilian 
population.  
Nevertheless, the nuclear deal reached by Iran and P5+1 on July 14, 2015 (Gordon 
and Sanger, 2015), albeit with reservation offers a glimmer of hope and the possibility of 
reengagement towards achieving sustainable and durable peace. Among other issues 
contained in the nuclear deal, is that the parties will be meeting every two years to review and 
assess progress of the deal and to adopt appropriate decisions (JCPOA Preamble and General 
Rules, 2015: xvi). In as much as I subscribe to a periodic review and/or assessment of the 
agreement, I would suggest that the review should include a feasibility analysis of the 
humanitarian impact of the sanctions. My reason being that a clear understanding of the 
heinous impact of the sanctions on the Iranian citizens by the regime in Tehran and an 
acknowledgement by Western countries and the UN of the impact of their action on the rights 
and well-being of ordinary and otherwise innocent civilians will play a huge role in 
determining the best way to handle or resolve other future conflicts. Although a deal has been 
reached, however, as it is the agreement is lacking in valid facts and/or empirical evidence 
about the real victims and the magnitude of the humanitarian consequences of the sanctions, 
making it to appear as if the sanctions were coercing Iran as an entity instead of the Iranian 
people.  
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 This study has painstakingly shown that economic sanctions against Iran, Zimbabwe 
and indeed any other country is a clandestine declaration of war on the population of a 
sovereign State, by putting the economy under siege, with negative downstream effects on 
the entire population. Overall, the incessant use of sanctions as a “one-fit-all” antidote for all 
forms of conflict confronting our contemporary world is rooted in the Western mentality of 
writing the rules of the game, whilst expecting strict adherence and/or compliance from the 
rest of the world. The current situation proves that such an approach is no longer sustainable. 
Instead of achieving compliance to demands, sanctions are in fact instigating provocations 
and add to the tension in world affairs. Proponents of economic sanctions project the 
argument that the measure fills a gap in certain situations where diplomacy fails. Going by 
this assumption, economic sanctions are somehow perceived and justified as a means to a 
good end, against contrary empirical evidence of right violation and backlashes. As expressed 
by Thomas Theorem, “if men define their situations as real, they are real in the 
consequences” (Merton, 1995: 380). What this simply means is that one must never allow a 
perceived falsehood to become one’s reality. Again, individuals who accept a defined 
position act as though the situation is justified and as a result they embede themselves in that 
narrowly defined perspective.  
My contention is that proponents of sanctions and particularly politicians are loath to 
reconcile political speculation and reality. Politicians speculate that the brutal impact of 
economic sanctions on the civilian population will propel them to revolt against a targeted 
regime, thus the reality (gross human rights violation) is overshadowed by a fallacious 
political hypothesis. This flawed, misguided and erroneous assumption in my opinion, 
defines the unabated and ceaseless imposition of economic sanctions as a panacea for world 
peace and security. The solution to disagreements and conflicts is diplomacy through 
continuous dialogue and negotiation. The major challenge of diplomacy in our contemporary 
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world has to do with the vested interest of the negotiating parties. Therefore, diplomacy in 
our case should mean an inclusive, committed and continuous dialogue, devoid of rapacity. 
Negotiators must understand the need to be fair and transparent, while a reasonable amount 
of time should be allowed for negotiation to be successful. 
 This thesis has proved beyond reasonable doubt that economic sanctions against 
Zimbabwe and Iran immensely contributed to the violation of the basic rights of the 
population. Thus it serves to awaken global citizens to stand for civilian victims of economic 
sanctions, whose basic rights such as education, healthcare, employment and good quality of 
life are breached or endangered. Finally, I wish to state that although this thesis have 
provided substantial amount of evidence to prove that economic sanctions are anti-human 
rights and well-being, as a peace scholar my investigation of sanctions is from a humanitarian 
perspective and therefore my analysis may differ from the views of an economist, politician 
or diplomat. 
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Appendix 2: Map of Iran 
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Appendix 3: Research Interview 
 
 
DOCTORAL RESEARCH INTERVIEW 
 
 
Date: _________________ 
 
 
PART 1: PERSONAL INFORMATION  
 
 
Your name  
(Optional) 
 
 
 
Gender 
 
 
Age  
 
 
In which sector of the economy do you work?  
 
 
What is your highest level of education?  
 
 
 
Male 
Female 
Elementary School 
High School 
First Degree 
Postgraduate Degree 
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PART 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
(1) How will you describe the present sanctions against your government or country?  
(2) Do you think that sanctions imposed against your country have economic implications?  
(3) In what ways are you affected by sanctions against your country? 
(4) Do you think that sanctions do have effect on the well-being of other people in your 
family, neighbourhood or community?  
(5) Do you think that sanctions against your country have violated your human rights or 
affected your well-being?  
(6) Do you think that sanctions are capable of resolving the conflict between your 
government and Western countries? 
(7) Do agree that sanctions can force your leaders to change their behaviours and policies? 
(8) What will you recommend as a solution or an alternative to sanctions against you 
country? 
(9) What will be your advice to your government and the countries that imposed sanctions 
against your country? 
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INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT PREAMBLE 
 
A total number of fifty respondents were interviewed during the research. Thirty of 
the respondents are from Zimbabwe, while twenty are from Iran. Among the respondents 
were forty two men and eight women.  
The interviews were conducted using two mediums; face to face interview and Skype. 
Thirty two of the respondents were interviewed face to face while eighteen of them were 
interviewed through Skype. Furthermore, the interviews were represented in a chronological 
order of date and time, beginning with Zimbabwe interviewees and then followed by Iranian 
interviewees. 
Finally, it is important to inform that the interviews have been meticulously edited in 
order to improve legibility, while it reasonably maintains the views of the respondents in their 
own words. The interviews are available in the appended compact disc. 
 
 
 
 
